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**Ninth-century Arabic Christian Apology and Polemics: a
Terminological Study of ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ's *KitÁb al-
MasÁ'il wa-'l-a'wiba***

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**Kilencedik századi arab keresztény apológia és polémia:
Yammár al-Ba'orð *Kitáb al-Mas'íl wa-'l-a'wiba* c.
művének terminológiai vizsgálata**

Doktori (PhD) értekezés

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Introduction

The aim of the present dissertation is the examination of an important author of Arabic Christian literature, ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, from a terminological perspective. ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ (d. 840) is an understudied yet interesting Christian author; he was among those early Arab Christian authors who wrote the most sophisticated theological works of their era. The little information we possess about him has been collected by M. Hayek.¹ We do not know anything certain of his life, except that he was a native of BaÒra, an important Nestorian centre of the age. He was a Nestorian theologian who had vast religious and philosophical education. Only a vague reference forms the basis of our hypothesis that he might have been a bishop or a monk. Two of his works survived: *The Book of the Proof* (*KitÁb al-BurhÁn*) and *The Book of Questions and Answers* (*KitÁb al-MasÁ'il wa-'l-aÊwiba*). These are considered to be among the most sophisticated texts in early Arab Christian theology. The former concentrates on controversial issues that Christians living under Muslim rule had to deal with, such as the authenticity of the Bible, the question of the Trinity, Incarnation, sacraments, etc. It is written in dialogue form, as a reference work for Christians who might eventually be interrogated by Muslim opponents.² The latter piece introduces reasoning on the existence and unity of God, and then discusses the Trinity and the Incarnation.

Other contemporary authors include the Jacobite ÍabÐb ibn Êidma AbÙ RÁ'iÔa al-TakrÐtÐ (d. probably soon after 830) and the Melkite Theodore AbÙ Qurra (d. c. 820-25). Theodore AbÙ Qurra was a Melkite scholar and polemicist. Born probably in Edessa, later on he is likely to have been a monk in the monastery of Mar Sabas in the Judean desert, and finally he was bishop of ÍarrÁn. He is the first known Christian author who wrote theological works in Arabic. He was not only known in his own community, but by Christians of other denominations and Muslims, as well. He must have held a high status in the society of his day, and he is thought to have disputed even in the court of the caliph.³ Some of his *opuscula*

¹ HAYEK, M., *ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, La première somme de théologie chrétienne en langue arabe, ou deux apologies du christianisme*, In: *Islamochristiana* 2 (1976) pp. 70-132. And HAYEK, M., *Introduction générale* In: Ed. HAYEK, M., *Apologie et controverses*, Beyrouth, Dar el-Machreq, 1986. pp. 13-84.

² C.f. BEAUMONT, M., *Christology in Dialogue with Muslims: a Critical Analysis of Christian Presentations of Christ for Muslims from the Ninth and Twentieth Centuries*, Oxford, Regnum Books, 2005. p. 68. And GRIFFITH, S., *ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ's KitÁb al-BurhÁn: Christian KalÁm in the First Abbasid Century*. In: *Le Muséon* 96 (1983), pp. 145-181.

³ GRIFFITH, S. H., *Faith and Reason in Christian KalÁm: Theodore AbÙ Qurrah on Discerning the True Religion*. In: Eds. SAMIR, Kh. - NIELSEN, J., *Christian Arabic Apologetics during the Abbasid Period, 750-1258*. pp. 6-8.

survived in Greek,⁴ but his main works are in Arabic and include the *Treatise on the Existence of the Creator and the True Religion*⁵ and the *Treatise on the Veneration of Icons*.⁶ As for the third author, not much is known of ʾĪbāḍ ibn ʿĪdma Abū RāʾiʿŌa al-Takrītī's life, except for his being the Jacobite bishop of Takrīt or Nisibis in the beginning of the ninth century, and that his native language was Syriac.⁷ His surviving works are edited by G. Graf,⁸ and include pieces written against Muslim and Melkite opponents.

By this period, namely the first half of the ninth century, Hellenism had entered Arabic culture, with the translation, dissemination and development of sciences, including that of *kalām*. D. Gutas demonstrates that the translation of non-literary and non-historical secular Greek books that were available in the Eastern Byzantine Empire and the Near East into Arabic had already started, but it was a long process, lasting for more than two centuries (8-10th c.s).⁹ The effect of Hellenistic theology and philosophy can particularly be seen in the Arabic language which underwent a terminological revolution in the theological, philological, linguistic and literary fields. For this reason, the study of terminology is of great interest. As a first step, this dissertation aims at demonstrating how the effect of Hellenistic ideas and Patristic influence can be discerned in a ninth-century Arab Christian author's work; and then, as a second step whether and how these ideas recur in contemporary or later works of Muslim authors.

By the third/ninth century the translation of philosophical works from Greek to Arabic had started,¹⁰ but exact understanding and accurate use of concepts and terms is thought to have been in its inchoative stage. It is due to the fact that when the Arabs began translating Greek texts, they lacked a complexity of pre-existing technical vocabulary in Arabic to express philosophical concepts. Early translators and *falāsifa* had to develop a vocabulary, since they needed terms in specific meanings not previously set up in their ordinary language.

⁴ ABØ QURRA, Theodore, *Opuscula ascetica*, In: MIGNE, J. P., *Patrologia Graeca*, Vol. 97., Paris, 1865. cc. 1461-1598.

⁵ ABØ QURRA, Theodore, *Maymar fġ wuʿūd al-ĒĀliq wa-'l-dġn al-qawġm*, Ed. DICK, I., ʿĪniyya, al-Maktaba al-Būlusiyya, 1982.

⁶ ABØ QURRA, Theodore, *Maymar fġ ikrām al-ġqŪnĀt*, Ed. DICK, I., ʿĪniyya, al-Maktaba al-Būlusiyya, 1986.

⁷ GRIFFITH, S. H., *ʾĪbāḍ ibn ʿĪdma Abū RāʾiʿŌa, a Christian Mutakallim of the First Abbasid Century*, In: *Oriens Christianus*, 64 (1980), pp. 164-165.

⁸ ABØ RĀʾIŌA, ʾĪbāḍ Ibn ʿĪdma, *Die Schriften des Jacobiten ʾĪbāḍ ibn ʿĪdma Abū RāʾiʿŌa*, Ed. GRAF, Georg, *Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium*, vol. 130.; *Scriptores Arabici*, tom. 14., Louvain, Peeters, 1951.

⁹ GUTAS, D., *Greek Thought, Arabic Culture.*, New York, Routledge, 2005. p. 1. (Later on: GUTAS, D., *Greek Thought, Arabic Culture*).

¹⁰As indicated by GUTAS, D., *Greek Thought, Arabic Culture*, p. 1. But Kiki Kennedy-Day establishes the beginning of the translation movement in the third/tenth century. See: KENNEDY – DAY, K., *Books of Definition in Islamic Philosophy. The Limits of Words*, London – New York, Routledge, 2004. p. 19. (Later on: KENNEDY – DAY, K., *Books of Definition in Islamic Philosophy*).

They did it in a variety of ways: by transliterating Greek words (e.g. AbÙ RÁ'iÔa's *barsÙb*, which stands for $\pi\rho\acute{\sigma}\omega\pi\omicron\nu$); by adopting foreign words (e.g. ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ's *uqnÙm*, which stands for the Syriac ܘܩܢܘܡ), and by dedicating ordinary language words to a technical philosophical use or concept (c.f. *Ýaql*, present in all above-mentioned authors' works).¹¹

The standard scholarly view on the early development of *kalÁm* had it that Muslim theologians owe their terminology to the translation movement of philosophical works in the ÝAbbÁsid era. In this respect, scholarly consensus relies on the interplay of terminologies between *kalÁm* and philosophy. The two fields were still in their formative stages, as well as their scientific methodologies. Philosophy and *kalÁm* themselves were not clearly separated, either; since philosophy dealt with the question of God's existence and cognition in the early period, that is, it concentrated on questions that would make up the subject matter of *kalÁm* later on. Though ÝAbd al-AmÐr al-AÝsam argues that ÉÁbir Ibn ÍayyÁn (d. c. 815) is considered to have made a distinction between the two sciences already in the first half of the third (i.e. the eighth) century,¹² defining philosophy as the science dealing with the essences of caused existents (*al-Ýilm bi-ÍaqÁ'iq al-maw'ÙdáÁt al-maÝlÙla*), thus separating it from *metaphysika* (*al-Ýilm al-ilÁhÐ*), ÝAbd al-AmÐr al-AÝsam admits that this distinction becomes widely spread only later, especially after al-KindÐ (d. c. 873).¹³

In addition, scholars who adhere to this view highlight the tensions between theology and philosophy in the early works. As Kennedy-Day claims it, this tension is evident while both sciences aimed at delineating their terminology.¹⁴ It is generally accepted that al-KindÐ incarnates a transition *momentum* where philosophy and *kalÁm* were still closely related, although apparently philosophy was on its way to a complete de-theologizing. In this approach, philosophy is considered as a separated, self-sufficient field free from theological terms and impact from the tenth century, beginning with the works of al-FÁrÁbÐ (d. 950/51).

This view has recently been challenged by Miklós Maróth. In his *The Correspondence between Aristotle and Alexander the Great* (an anonymous novel of letters translated from Greek to Arabic), he examines the earliest case of transmitting Greek wisdom. M. Maróth demonstrates that Arabic prose literature started by this translation in Damascus, in the first third of the eighth century; he also proves that Arabic prose literature developed under a strong Greek influence. Thus he modifies the scholarly consensus, according to which Arabic

¹¹ KENNEDY – DAY, Kiki, *Books of Definition in Islamic Philosophy*, p. 19.

¹² al-AÝSAM, ÝAbd al-AmÐr, *al-MuÒÓalaÁ al-falsafÐ Ýinda al-ÝArab*, Cairo, al-Hay'a al-MiÒoriyya al-Ýamma li-'l-KitÁb, 1989, p. 21. (Later on: al-AÝSAM, ÝAbd al-AmÐr, *al-MuÒÓalaÁ al-falsafÐ Ýinda al-ÝArab*).

¹³ al-AÝSAM, ÝAbd al-AmÐr, *al-MuÒÓalaÁ al-falsafÐ Ýinda al-ÝArab*, p. 21.

¹⁴ KENNEDY – DAY, Kiki, *Books of Definition in Islamic Philosophy*, p. 19.

prose literature started around the middle of the eighth century, in Baghdad, under Persian influence. An important aspect in M. Maróth's examination uses a terminological method, demonstrating that many technical Arabic terms had already been present by this time: he introduces some specifically philosophical terms that had already appeared.¹⁵ Scholarly consensus concentrates on the 9th or 10th centuries as the period of the formation of Arabic philosophical and theological terminology, but on the basis of these results, we need to be aware that it had already started earlier.

In this dissertation I consider ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ an author who plays an important role in this early Greek influence on Arabic prose. A terminological examination of his *KitÁb al-MasÁ'il wa-'l-aÊwiba* can help us get to know the formation of terminologies of *kalÁm* and *falsafa* even more. The main issue would be whether Christian authors played any role in the delineation of the vocabularies of philosophy and *kalÁm* by influencing Muslim authors while interacting with them. Scholarly consese asserts it that Arab Christian theologians played a prominent role in the process of the Hellenization of the Islamic theology, which ultimately led to the systematic and logical development of *kalÁm*. Apart from carrying out most of the translations of Greek works into Arabic, they provided Muslim theologians with chief themes of theological inquiry such as predestination and the attributes problems.¹⁶ It is expected then, that Arab Christian theologians had their impact on the formation of Arabic language and especially on the philosophical-theological terminology, as well.

Christian terminology can be examined from many points of view; according to a given field, either philosophical or theological terms can be concentrated on. Christian polemical and apologetic writings mainly belong to the field of theology, since they deal with theological issues, but due to their nature, they are less descriptive than argumentative, and argumentation needs clear, accurate concepts and terms, so philosophical terms may also appear in these texts. ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ's *KitÁb al-MasÁ'il wa-'l-aÊwiba* is an apology (as such, it is polemical in nature), so its terminology may offer interesting examples of interaction between philosophy and *kalÁm*. Through the study of its terms I also aim at answering the question: to what extent did Arab Christian authors affect Arabic prose? To what extent did Arab Christian theology in general, ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ in particular, interact

¹⁵ As Miklós Maróth indicates it in: MARÓTH, M., *The Correspondence between Aristotle and Alexander the Great. An Anonymous Greek Novel in Arabic Translation*, Piliscsaba, Avicenna Institute of Middle Eastern Studies, 2006. In particular, see the following terms: *al-mÁhiyya*: pp. 77., 91.; *iÁdÁ*×: pp. 77-78., 91.; *ayniyya*: p. 78.; *kayfiyya*: p. 78.; *mÁ'iyya* p. 78.; *ÒÙra*: p.78.; *Êawhar*: p. 91.; *mÁdda*: p. 91.

¹⁶ WOLFSON, H. A., *The Philosophy of the Kalam*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, Harvard University Press, 1976., pp. 58-63, 80-82. As for dialectics, see COOK, M. A., *The Origins of KalÁm*, In: Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, 43 (1980) 1, pp. 32-43.

with Muslim theology and philosophy in the field of terminology? This investigation will be carried out on the basis of comparative methodology: representative terms ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ used are classified and compared to corresponding Hellenistic and Patristic terms, and then to their contemporary use by Muslim and other Christian authors. Interaction should be examined in the framework of polemics, where both Christians and Muslims used the Arabic language, interacted, and discussed specific problems. Terms will be classified according to their nature – that is, whether they are theological or philosophical ones. There are terms of foreign origin; ones which are in current usage and stereotyped formulae; adaptations from Qur'Ánic and Islamic expressions; and combinations of Biblical and Islamic expressions.¹⁷

As far as philosophical and theological terms are concerned: when comparing the way ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ used them to how Muslim philosophers and theologians did, in order to find them in their clearest form, I examine their usage in books of definitions (*kutub al-ÍudÙd*). I take the latter as references of comparison, since my approach deals with technical terms in both Islamic theology and philosophy. What interests me primarily is to compare ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ's terminology to what became standard terminologies of *kalÁm* and *falsafa*. For this reason I rely on the following books of definitions: AbÙ YÙsuf b. IsÍÁq al-KindÐ's (d. c. 873) *RisÁla fÐ ÍudÙd al-ašyÁ' wa-rusÙmihÁ*, the first Arabic book of philosophical definitions,¹⁸ by an author contemporary to ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ. Where necessary, my research will go on to check whether the terms can be found in the following works (progressing in chronological order): AbÙ ÝAbdallÁh MuÍammad ibn AÍmad ibn YÙsuf al-KÁtib al-ËwÁrizmÐ's (d. 997) *MafÁtÐÍ al-ÝulÙm*; AbÙ Bakr MuÍammad b. al-Íasan Ibn FÙrak al-AnÒÁrÐ al-IÒbahÁnÐ's (d. 1015) *KitÁb al-ÍudÙd*; Ibn SÐnÁ's (d. 1037) *KitÁb al-ÍudÙd*; Sayf al-DÐn al-ÀmidÐ's (d. 1233), *al-MubÐn*; and finally, ÝAÍÐ ibn MuÍammad al-Éur°ÁnÐ's (d. 1414) *al-TaÝrÐfÁt*. My research will try to define whether the given term is earlier used by ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ than the Muslim authors: that would mean that Christian authors might have been active in inventing and outlining terms. If terms are to be found in contemporary works, too, we may think of a common heritage, or the use of everyday words in a new sense, mutually accepted by both parties. Given that ÝAmmÁr al-

¹⁷ In setting up the classification, I benefited from the work of FARAG, F. Rofail, *The Usage of the Early Islamic Terminology as a Constituent Element of the Literary Form of a Tenth-Century Christian Arab Writer: Severus Ibn al-MuqaffaÝ*. *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 99.1 (1979), p. 51. (Later on: FARAG, F. R., *The Usage of the Early Islamic Terminology as a Constituent Element of the Literary Form of a Tenth-Century Christian Arab Writer: Severus Ibn al-MuqaffaÝ*).

¹⁸ al-AÝSAM, ÝAbd al-AmÐr, *al-MuÒÒalaÁ al-falsafÐ Ýinda al-ÝArab*, pp. 34., 36.

BaÒrÐ was contemporary to the translation movement,¹⁹ if no earlier appearance can be traced in a term's case, we can think of ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ's own invention. Such a term may have come from a tradition of the rhetorical schools in which Christians were educated.

We should not, ignore the Syriac, Greek and Coptic Christian terms introduced into Arabic either, which represent another phase of the revolution which the language underwent. These terms were mostly theological; they came into usage after the translation of the Old and New Testaments into Arabic. Before Islam, Syriac, Greek, Coptic and Ethiopic were the languages used by the Christians. With the spread of Islam, the Arabic language took firm root, whereas the other languages suffered a setback and were gradually replaced by Arabic; many only survived in the Christian rites.²⁰ As an example, let us refer to the Melkite church, which, as Gutas indicates it, faced the decline of the Greek language in the population in Syro-Palestine and eventually was compelled to switch to Arabic even for liturgical purposes after the ÝAbbÁsid revolution.²¹ We can accept this claim, though probably instead of an inner decline of the Greek language we may think of a native Arabic-speaking majority as the motivation for assimilation. As we are looking at the question from the viewpoint of polemical and apologetic literature, an intention to use a common language (i.e. Arabic) with the majority and the opponent as a motivation may also be accepted. Farag argues that though Arabic became the vernacular among Christians, it was inadequate for the expression of all their theological terminology. This accounts for the numerous Biblical terms which they maintained in Arabic after translating the Gospels into that language.²²

The encroachment of Arabic Islam into the religions in the Near East was felt on many fronts, and in unexpected ways of which non-Muslims had no experience from Umayyad times. Hence the palpable need to explain themselves and to maintain, enlarge, and at times even re-establish their rights and positions. As a result, the first ÝAbbÁsid century saw an unprecedented rise in Arabic Christian apologetic writings directed against Islam.²³

¹⁹ If we take what GUTAS claims into consideration, we have to make it clear that the translation movement had already started by the time ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ lived and worked.

²⁰ FARAG, F. R., *The Usage of the Early Islamic Terminology as a Constituent Element of the Literary Form of a Tenth-Century Christian Arab Writer: Severus Ibn al-MuqaffaÝ*, p. 50.

²¹ GUTAS, D., *Greek Thought, Arabic Culture*, p. 66; and GRIFFITH, S.H., *Eutychius of Alexandria on the Emperor Theophilus and Iconoclasm in Byzantium: A Tenth Century Moment in Christian Apologetics in Arabic*, Byzantium, 1982. vol 52, pp. 154-90, p. 161.

²² FARAG, F. Rofail, *The Usage of the Early Islamic Terminology as a Constituent Element of the Literary Form of a Tenth-Century Christian Arab Writer: Severus Ibn al-MuqaffaÝ*, p. 50. E.g.: Many of the Christian terms were introduced into Arabic in the so-called literature of ÊÁhiliyya, such as *In°Ðl – TawrÁt – dayr – qissDs*.

²³ GUTAS, D., *Greek Thought, Arabic Culture*, pp. 66-67.

Christians were no strangers to polemical literature. Disputation was the main form of communication in the seventh century, particularly in the conflict among Chalcedonians, Monophysites, and Nestorians which was intensified after the Fifth Ecumenical Council of 553. Public debates on matters of religion became regular events. These debates were recorded, as a result of which the dialogue form of disputation became one of the most widely used genres of Christian (Greek and Syriac) literature in the seventh century. When the Christian – Muslim dialogues began in the ÝAbbÁsid period, they owed a lot to the long tradition of using the dialogue form for Christian apologetic and polemic purposes. As a matter of fact, the very first Arabic Christian polemic against Islam that we possess dates from the middle of the eighth century and is in dialogue form.²⁴ As it is attested by Griffith, Islamic *Ýilm al-kalÁm* grew out of the participation of Muslims in the styles of scholarly discussion Christian intellectuals employed in the Greco-Syrian milieu of the Christian centres of learning in the oriental patriarchates. Griffith emphasizes that Christian *kalÁm* already existed in the formative period of Arabic thought in the Islamic world. They used the Arabic language according to the Islamic frame of reference: so Christian teachings needed to be investigated and interpreted in a new framework. Griffith also draws attention to the bipolar character of the terminology and argumentation of these writings: according to this view, Christian authors were not only translating Greek and Syriac statements of faith into Arabic, but also employed terms that suggest an Islamic or Qur'Ánic view of the matter.²⁵

As for the importance of this topic, let us refer to the anonymous novel of letters examined by Maróth Miklós, on the basis of which it can be demonstrated that Arabic prose literature started in the first third of the eighth century in the frame of the tradition of Greek rhetorical schools. Christian authors – including ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ – were the representatives of the same tradition. After the Islamic conquests, Greek rhetorical schools became the educational centers of Christians, who could learn classical Greek knowledge there for centuries. It means then that rhetorical schools, i.e. schools of Christian communities were the transmitters of classical Hellenistic culture for the world of Islam. Christian authors who are going to be mentioned – in particular, the author whose work is the core of this dissertation, ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ – were educated in such schools. In general, on the basis of the works of the Christian authors living in the ninth century, one can demonstrate the main

²⁴ GUTAS, D., *Greek Thought, Arabic Culture.*, pp. 66-67. See also: CAMERON, A. *New Themes and Styles in Greek Literature*, in Ed. Averil Cameron and Lawrence I. Conrad, *The Byzantine and Early Islamic Near East I, Problems in the Literary Source Material*, Princeton, 1992. pp. 97-100.

²⁵ GRIFFITH, S. H., *Faith and Reason in Christian KalÁm: Theodore AbÙ Qurrah on Discerning the True Religion*. In: Eds. SAMIR, Kh. - NIELSEN, J., *Christian Arabic Apologetics during the Abbasid Period, 750-1258*. pp. 1-6.

topics, themes and imagery shared by them. What is remarkable is that these topics and images, as well as analogical demonstrations can be found in later Muslim writings, and especially in scientific prose. In order to complete this examination, this dissertation aims at the examination of terminology, so that it can be seen how Greek concepts could make their way into Muslim authors' writings through the mediation of Christian authors.

I will carry out my terminological analysis in five chapters. In every chapter, I will start with the introduction of corresponding Greek terms with particular concern for their appearance in Patristic schools. This is due to what was said above: Christian authors were educated in the traditions of Greek rhetorical schools, so Greek ideas, terms, and at the same time, Christian traditions (including the ideas of Patristic literature) must have been known to them. Then, I am going to examine how these terms are used by ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, and check whether he is a continuer of Patristic ideas. As a third step, I am going to examine the same term as it is defined by Muslim books of definition, and check whether ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ's usage in particular (or Christian ideas in general) precedes the appearance of the term or the idea on the Muslim counterparts' behalf. I aim at demonstrating that Arab Christian literature has a mediating role between Greek and Islamic cultures.

In the first chapter, I will start my terminological analysis with the term *Ýaql* (intellect). I decided to start with this one for several reasons. First, its place corresponds to the one it occupies in *kalÁm* manuals. Muslim theologians start their books with a chapter on knowledge where they examine the intellect as a provider of acquired knowledge. Further, it is an important term for ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, who uses it extensively and refers to it as the method of demonstration. Another reason for placing this chapter at the head of the study is that it covers, in a general manner, several subsequent terms.

I will keep the same *kalÁm* order in the following chapters. In every chapter, a group of terms which deal with the same theological question is going to be examined. Thus, in the second chapter, I will examine the terminology of body and incarnation (*ta'annus* – humanisation vs. *taÉassud* – incarnation; and *badan* vs. *Êirm* vs. *Êasad* vs. *ism* vs. *haykal* – body, bodily form). In the third one, I will examine the terminology of eternity (i.e. *azalÐ*, *azaliyya* – pre-eternal vs. *sarmad* – perpetuity vs. *qidam*, *qadÐm* – eternal vs. *baqÁ'*, *bÁqin* – permanent). In the fourth chapter, I will inspect the terminology of Creation (i.e. *ibda'* and *ibtida'* – beginning, commencement vs. *ibda'Ý* – direct creation vs. *ibtida'Ý* – instauration vs. *iltirÁÝ* – creation ex nihilo vs. *lalq* – creation vs. *ilda'×* – creation ex nihilo vs. *ÒinÁYa*, making vs. *takwÐn* – generation vs. *inšÁ'* – bringing into being). In the fifth chapter, the terminology of Fatherhood-Sonship (*Ubuwwa* – fatherhood vs. *Bunuwwa* – sonship) will be

considered. The last chapter concentrates on terms that refer to divine Trinity and Unity (i.e. *ta×lÐ×* - trinity, „making three” vs. *waĪĀniyya*, *tawĪĪd*, *ittiĪĀd* – unity, “making one,” union) in addition to the question of duality.

Chapter I.

The Terminology of intellect

In this chapter, I will inspect how ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ uses a term of crucial importance, i.e. the term *Ýaqł* (intellect), taking into consideration the way his Christian contemporaries used it. I will explore the potential sources of *Ýaqł*, then its uses and implications in the *KitÁb al-MasÁ'il wa-'l-aĒwiba*. I will also inquire into ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ's possible impact on the use of *Ýaqł* among Muslim theologians and philosophers, on the basis of Muslim books of definitions (*kutub al-ĪudÙd*).

The term *Ýaqł*²⁶ is a translation of the Greek terms *διάνοια*, *ἡ φρόνησις*, and *ὁ νοῦς*.²⁷ These terms may be found in Greek Patristic literature, as well, as Lampe indicates it, with the exception of the first one, i.e. *διάνοια*. The second term, i.e. *ἡ φρόνησις* may be found in various meanings; according to Lampe's classification, they are the following: intellect, understanding; wisdom, prudence in moral philosophy and Christian teaching; opinion, faith.²⁸ (It is obvious that the source of the use of intellect as practical reason is Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*. For Aristotle used the division as follows: “Let us begin again, then, and discuss these states of soul. Let us assume that there are five ways in which the soul arrives at truth by affirmation or denial, namely, skill, scientific knowledge, practical wisdom, wisdom, and intellect; for supposition and belief can be mistaken.”²⁹ Art is the translation of *τέχνη*, science stands for *ἐπιστήμη*, practical wisdom is *φρόνησις*, theoretical wisdom stands for *σοφία*, and intelligence is *νοῦς*.) As for *ὁ νοῦς*, its connotations are numerous. It can be found as a description of mind and its functions with reference to man's distinctive nature; in relation to other faculties; particularly in relation to sense perception. It is referred to as mind's various processes in general or owing to its power of discernment. Lampe then classifies its appearances with reference to spiritual life: e.g. God as object of the mind,

²⁶ In HAYEK's translation: ‘intelligence.’ C.f. Ed. HAYEK, *Apologie et controverses*, p. 85.

²⁷ AFNAN, M. S., *A Philosophical Lexicon in Persian and Arabic*, Beirut, Dar El-Mashreq, 1968. pp. 178-179. (Later on: AFNAN, *A Philosophical Lexicon in Persian and Arabic*.)

²⁸ LAMPE, G. W., *A Patristic Greek Lexicon*, Clarendon, Oxford, 1961. (Later on: LAMPE, *A Patristic Greek Lexicon*.) pp. 1490-91.

²⁹ ARISTOTLE, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 6.3.1., Tr. and ed. CRISP, R., Cambridge University Press, 2004, 105.

mind's capacity for knowing God; mind and body, e.g. mind enslaved by senses, or mind controlling senses. Mind and sin also appear, further classified into connotations referring to mind's responsibility for sin, mind obscured by sin, and mind between good and evil. Lampe's last major category is "mind's way to perfection," but I would only mention divine assistance as a common point with Arab Christian theologians among its subdivisions. (The term \acute{o} $\nu\acute{o}\delta\zeta$ also plays an important part in philosophy: as it can be seen in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, it refers to one of the intellectual parts of the soul, as mind/intelligence/intellect.³⁰)

Now that we have gained a general understanding of this concept according to Church Fathers, let us see how ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ's Arab Christian contemporaries (Theodore AbÛ Qurra and AbÛ RÁ'iÔa) used it, then we can examine ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ's examples, and finally, we will proceed to the investigation of Muslim terminologies.

As for Theodore AbÛ Qurra, he aims at demonstrating in his tract *Maymar fÐ wuÊÛd al-ËÁliq wa-'l-dÐn al-qawÐm* (*On Existence of the Creator and the True Religion*)³¹ that the only true religion (*al-dÐn al-qawÐm*) is that of the Christians. He proves it on the objective basis of the intellect. Taking the role of a neutral observer, he enumerates and examines the main religious groups and denominations of his epoch, puts scriptures aside, and turns to the cognitive and analyzing abilities of human reason. Human nature and human intellect are the bases of human recognition, so the "narrator" in this tract turns to them in his pursuit of objective truth and introduces the intellect and its role by an allegory.

The narrator is a "natural man" who has never previously belonged to any denominations. Now he meets religious groups and wants to find the right one among them. At this point, he introduces an allegorical story about an unknown king, his son, who gets ill, and a doctor, as follows. The king has a son, and for the sake of his protection and health, he summons a doctor by his side. The son ignores the doctor, and falls ill. By the way of a messenger, the king sends him medicine and a book that describes him (i.e. the king) as well as it prescribes the use of the medicine, what the son should do in order to get and stay healthy and what he should not do, and what the result of committing forbidden things would be. The enemies of the king, who cannot harm him in any way, try to benefit from the illness of his son, and they send poison instead of remedy and forged books with false descriptions of the king, the free and forbidden things and the results of these actions. The books differ, but each messenger claims to be the true one. At this point, the doctor tells the son to dismiss them all, since he is going to make the case of each of them clear saying: "I am the doctor and

³⁰ ARISTOTLE, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 6.3.1., Tr. and ed. CRISP, R., Cambridge University Press, 2004, 105.

³¹ ABØ QURRA, Theodore, *Maymar fÐ wuÊÛd al-ËÁliq wa-'l-dÐn al-qawÐm*.

I know these things because this is my profession”³² He also tells the son the way he is going to examine the question: being a doctor he knows what makes man ill or healthy, and he is sure to recognize the real attributes of the king from the resemblance of the son.³³ Remedies have to be examined, the things prescribed or forbidden in the different books should be studied, and the king’s attributes (*ÒifÁt*) ought to be looked at. The real attributes of the king can be established by the resemblance of the son by way of comparison, *qiyÁs*. Having completed his task, the doctor sees that with one exception, all the books exhort the son to do things that would do him wrong, and they discourage him from doing things that would benefit him. The remedy belonging to that only book is the only truly healing one. As for the description (*waÓf*) of the king: the doctor compares the different descriptions to the features of the son,³⁴ and he finds similarity between them in only one book – the one that described the illness correctly and with which the right remedy came. So the way of cognition includes two steps: the first one is intellectual reasoning, in the course of which one may arrive at specific results; but intellect has limits, the things that are beyond them can be clarified by revelation. The second step is the comparison of the intellectual results with the revealed books; agreement shows which one to choose. Things going beyond the limits of intellectual cognition can be known from the revealed books.

All the characters and events of this allegory are meant to promote a theological view: the hidden king is God, while the son is Adam and his offspring (i. e. mankind). The doctor is the intellect that was given to Adam in order to recognize what is right and act in accordance with it, and in order to recognize what is wrong and avoid committing it. The son’s ignoring the doctor and getting ill stands for Adam’s or humankind’s leaving the intellect out of consideration and going astray. The king’s sending remedy and a book stands for God’s sending messengers and scriptures that contain his description and determine the good and forbidden deeds with their results that is reward or punishment. Enemies that want to do the king wrong by harming his son are the evil ones or demons.

According to the message of this allegory, man should not depend on revelation only, but he should put books aside, rely on the intellect and ask it how to recognize the unperceivable and incomprehensible God on the sole basis of his resemblance with our human nature. We have to ask the intellect how to make out what is right and wrong, evil or good

³² Ibid., p. 214.

³³ ABØ QURRA, Theodore, *Maymar fD wuÊÙd al-ËÁliq wa-’l-dDn al-qawDm*, p. 215.
وأنا على ما ذكرت لك طبيب، وأعرف أيضاً عاهات الأمراض التي تسقم والحالات التي تصح. وأعرف صفات ابيك من شبيهك لأنك ابنه

³⁴ Ibid., pp. 215-16.

فقداس الصفات كلها إلى صفات الغلام

(*qabĐĪ - °amĐl*),³⁵ and what to think about eternal reward and punishment. In Theodore AbŪ Qurra's view, the intellect is a "doctor", God's "agent" that originally belongs to and comes from him.³⁶ The task of the intellect is to protect man from illness, this is why God made him man's guide.³⁷ But if man ignores the intellect and falls ill, it is the intellect that can help him find the way to health and prosperity again, and this is what can lead him back to God. So according to Theodore AbŪ Qurra's opinion, the intellect is God's gift for mankind: the faculty of thought. In Griffith's interpretation, Theodore AbŪ Qurra introduces a rational strategy here,³⁸ which comes from a Neo-Platonic intellectual framework of human cognition of God with a methodology earlier Byzantines had called *kataphasis/apophasis*. This approach relates all perceivable natural perfection to God, and negates all imperfection from Him.³⁹ He further asserts that Theodore AbŪ Qurra applies an epistemology which depends on the results of his spiritual predecessors, e.g. Nemesius of Emesa (d. c. 390), Dionysius the Pseudo-Aeropagite (fl. c. 500) and John of Damascus (d. c. 749). In Griffith's view all of them were representatives of a Neo-Platonism which might as well be called Christianity, i.e. a philosophical system based on the teaching of Christianity. While theology explains Christian teaching, Christianity takes it as a basis for a rational account of the universe.⁴⁰

Let us mention the significance of the medical allegory in the Islamo-Christian interaction. First of all, the idea of religion as healing, *šifÁ'* is highlighted in the Qur'Án and *sunna*.⁴¹ The image of Jesus himself in the Qur'Án and in the Islamic literature is that of a great spiritual physician. Second, it is well known that Muslim ŃŪfĐs used extensively the allegory of the ŃŪfĐ master as a physician of the heart. This allegory was also consolidated with the highly appreciated position of the physicians in the Muslim popular religion. It can be said that AbŪ Qurra was aware of the effect of such an allegory while he attempts at rebutting his Muslim adversaries. Nothing could be more persuasive than a familiar terminology and imagery to them. Naturally, in order to understand the significance of this allegory on spirituality and medicine one has to go back to Greek roots, i.e. the Greek rhetorical tradition, which had its effects on Christian theology before it entered Islamic

³⁵ This pair of terms corresponds to the Greek *κακόν - αἰσχρον*, or the Latin *turpe – pulchrum*.

³⁶ ABŪ QURRA, Theodore, *Maymar fĐ wuĒŪd al-ĒÁliq wa- 'l-dĐn al-qawĐm*, p. 212.

فبعث ابنه ...، وهو حدث، ومعه طبيباً كان له

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 212

ليحفظه من العاهات العارضة، وصير له أيضاً وزيراً

³⁸ GRIFFITH, S. H., *Faith and Reason in Christian KalÁm: Theodore AbŪ Qurrah on Discerning the True Religion*, p. 8.

³⁹ *Ibid.* p. 26.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.* pp. 27-28.

⁴¹ With regard to the Qur'Án, see 16,69. As for the *sunna*, there is an entire literature on the subject to be found in *al-Óibb al-nabawĐ* books.

culture. Further, this allegory has been widely used in the Neo-Platonic thought,⁴² one may find medical analogies in Aristotle's works,⁴³ as well. AbÛ Qurra testifies to the reliance of Arab Christians on Greek philosophy. Though in a different context, ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ also uses medical allegory, or rather parable to express his view on the necessity of the Son's death and resurrection.⁴⁴

With regard to the problem of good and evil according to Theodore AbÛ Qurra, he later on addresses the possibility of its recognition on the basis of the intellect. He says: "just like the way our intellect was able to find out the invisible attributes of God on the basis of our nature, it can, on the same basis, find out about licit (*ÍalÁl*) and illicit (*ÍarÁm*), beautiful and detestable, good and evil, what is beneficial for us, and what makes us strong, as well."⁴⁵ He goes on by listing various offenses, saying, if someone hurts us acting so, by our intellect we know that it brings corruption for us, it is detestable, evil and illicit. He then concludes that evil is to treat another in a way that we would dislike if that were committed against us. He goes on the same way to demonstrate how we recognize that which is good, right and licit.⁴⁶ Thus both right and wrong may be distinguished on the basis of human nature and the intellect. We have already seen on the basis of the allegory that intellect is a divine grace that can differentiate between good and bad, and AbÛ Qurra elaborates on this point in the rest of his treatise. Only in the end does he say that the good man wants the benefit of others, in which he resembles God, and thus links the ethical quality of good to the divine. We need to emphasize that good and bad are not classified this way in Islam: since good and bad are what God created as such.

We have seen that intellect and choice appear together when it is not the cognition of God which is in the centre but an ethical approach. Based on Patristic sources, this idea was further developed by Christian authors such as AbÛ Qurra, and later on this idea reappears in

⁴² Vid. GRUDZEN, Gerald, *Spirituality and Science: Greek, Judeo-Christian and Islamic Perspectives*. Bloomington, AuthorHouse, 2007.

⁴³ E.g. "Διόπερ δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι σκέψιν καὶ διανέμειν τε καὶ ἀνιέναι κατ' ἀξίαν ἕκαστα, καὶ τροφήν καὶ ἐσθῆτα καὶ ἀργίαν καὶ κολάσεις, λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ μιμουμένους τὴν τῶν ἱατρῶν δύναμιν ἐν φαρμάκου λόγῳ, προσθεωροῦντας ὅτι ἡ τροφή οὐ φάρμακον διὰ τὸ συνεχές.") ARISTOTLE, *Economy*, 1.1344b. In: *Aristotle in 23 Volumes*, Vol. 18. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., London. 1935. Or: "Ἔτι οὐδὲ δείκνυσιν οὐθεὶς ὅτι ἀγαθὸν ἢ ὑγίεια, ἂν μὴ σοφιστικῆς ἢ καὶ μὴ ἱατρὸς (οὗτοι γὰρ τοῖς ἀλλοτριῶσι λόγοις σοφίζονται), ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἄλλην ἀρχὴν οὐδεμίαν." ARISTOTLE, *Eudemian Ethics*, 1.1218b. Ed. F. Susemihl. Leipzig: Teubner. 1884.

⁴⁴ al-BANRÍ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ'il wa-'l-aÉwiba*, In: Ed. HAYEK, M., *Apologie et controverses*, Beirut, Dar el-Machreq, 1977. p. 229,8-13.

⁴⁵ ABØ QURRA, Theodore, *al-DDn al-qawDm*, p. 229.

كما استطاعت عقولنا أن تستخرج لنا صفات الله التي لا تبصر، من شبه طبيعتنا، كذلك من طبيعتنا تستخرج لنا علم الحلال والحرام، والجميل والقيح، والخير والشر الذي يصلحنا ويفيدنا، والأمر الذي تقوى على فعله به

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 230.

وكل واحد منا، من نفسه يحب ويعرف الأمر الحسن الصالح الخير الحلال...الأمر الحسن الصالح، الحلال، أن تصنع بصاحبك الأمر الجيد الجميل الذي تحب أن يصنعه بك

Muslim authors' works, too. As an example let me refer to how Tritton defines effects of nature and intellect: "Effects produced by man's nature are mean; those due to intellect come from choice and are honourable; man can incline to either side of his being."⁴⁷ In this, he relies on AbŪ ĪayyĀn al-TawĪdd's *KitĀb al-MuqĀbasĀt*, in which intellect is referred to together with the capacity of choice so that it gains an ethical faculty.⁴⁸ The idea of the Church Fathers is used by Arabic Christian authors who were educated in the rhetorical schools, and it was probably them who influenced Muslim adversaries – as this example may suggest it.

Another Christian theologian, the Jacobite AbŪ RĀ'ĪŌa made an interesting contribution to the Arabic Christian use of *Yaq̄l*, which is worth exploring. According to Griffith, AbŪ RĀ'ĪŌa refuses to prove the verity of Christianity on the mere basis of rationality, because he considered this attempt successful among the learned only.⁴⁹ We find that he rarely mentions intellect explicitly, as far as it can be judged on the basis of the collection of his writings, *Die Schriften des Jacobiten ĪabĒb Ibn Ēidma AbŪ RĀ'ĪŌa*.⁵⁰ However, on the basis of his few examples, his approach is still cognizable. In his major treatise, *RisĀla fĒ i×bĀt dĒn al-naŌrĀniyya wa-i×bĀt al-×ĀlŪ× al-muqaddas*⁵¹ he is in the pursuit of the only true religion, but this work lacks propedeutical introduction or any other theoretical basis. AbŪ RĀ'ĪŌa does not enumerate religious groups, but finds something else to contrast Christianity with: the list of various motivations or intentions that can make people follow a religion. There are six driving forces that are far from God's intention⁵² and there is only one in agreement with His will. The groups that follow the first six false motivations deviate from the true divine religion in AbŪ RĀ'ĪŌa's view, because they do not endeavour

⁴⁷ TRITTON, A. S., *Man, nafs, rŪĪ, Yaq̄l*. In: Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 3 (1971) 34, pp. 491-495.

⁴⁸ al-TAWĪDĪ, AbŪ ĪayyĀn, *al-MuqĀbasĀt*, Cairo, 1929., p. 243.

الذي هو بالطبيعة قد أحاطت به الضرورة، والذي بالعقل قد أطاف به الاختيار

⁴⁹ GRIFFITH, *Faith and Reason in Christian KalĀm: Theodore AbŪ Qurrah on Discerning the True Religion*, p. 37.

⁵⁰ ABŪ RĀ'ĪŌA, *Die Schriften des Jacobiten ĪabĒb Ibn Ēidma AbŪ RĀ'ĪŌa*, Ed. Georg GRAF, Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium vol. 130.; Scriptorum Arabici tom. 14., Louvain, Peeters, 1951.

⁵¹ ĪabĒb Ibn Ēidma AbŪ RĀ'ĪŌa, *RisĀla li-AbĒb RĀ'ĪŌa al-TakrĒtĒ fĒ i×bĀt dĒn al-naŌrĀniyya wa-i×bĀt al-×ĀlŪ× al-muqaddas*. In: *Die Schriften des Jacobiten ĪabĒb Ibn Ēidma AbŪ RĀ'ĪŌa*, Ed. Georg GRAF, Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium vol. 130.; Scriptorum Arabici tom. 14., Louvain, 1951. pp. 129-158. (Later on: *fĒ i×bĀt dĒn al-naŌrĀniyya wa-i×bĀt al-×ĀlŪ× al-muqaddas*)

⁵² *Ibid.*, pp. 131-32. For the sake of brevity, these reasons are only introduced in the footnotes:

- the first: desire for some immediate benefits or later ones
- the second: aspiration for reaching the hereafter
- the third: a coercive fear that forces one to accept a religion
- the fourth: a religion that permits forbidden things
- the fifth: if one likes the ornament of a religion
- the sixth: "clanism", i.e. belonging to a certain group that follows this religion, in order to gain power

to obey God. The author does not elaborate on this point, saying only that these approaches bear corruption (*fasÁd*) and contrariety (*tanÁquÁ*). For him “the seventh type is the right one, the one for which there is proof and upon which faith relies – by the support of the Lord of Majesty – in what is inaccessible for **intellect** to understand and it is impossible for the creation to do so, except for people of the truth, the rightly guided ones.”⁵³

If AbÛ RÁ’iÔa’s approach to the intellect is compared to that of AbÛ Qurra, we may find that the former, right at the beginning, enumerates motivations for choosing a religion and talks about them briefly. He then returns to each and every one of them, and presents a more detailed contrast between them and Christianity. As he has already claimed that these approaches are not godly intentions now he only has to prove that Christianity is not dependant on any of them. He does not need the intellect as a basis for demonstration. While AbÛ Qurra relies on intellect as a premise for his argument, and only as a second step does he turn to scriptures for a comparison, AbÛ RÁ’iÔa underlines that the characteristic of faith is that it goes beyond reason, and cannot be comprehended by the intellect alone. With the aid of God, it is possible to believe what one cannot comprehend with the intellect, hence, for AbÛ RÁ’iÔa, it is not only the intellect which is important, but the divine help (*ta’yDd AllÁh*) as well. If one wants to gain knowledge about God (*taÔØl maÝrifat AllÁh*), it is only possible with divine help and the intellect together. In this, he reflects an important topic in Patristic literature, as we have seen it above (on the authority of Lampe). Both authors consider the intellect the gift of God, and the function of the intellect the cognition of God, right and wrong; and also establishing and defending the religion.

According to Griffith, ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ did not believe in the role of intellect and argumentation as much as Theodore AbÛ Qurra did, since he considered it a characteristic of a polemist personality, and such conduct would exclude reference to miracles. Griffith asserts that ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s apology is based on miracles, since the Nestorian author considers them as the most important proofs for the true religion.⁵⁴ However, looking at the *KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba*, we can see that ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ turns to the intellect in various issues and uses the term *ÝaqI* in different meanings. This does not imply any inconsistency on his part, since the meaning of the intellect varies in both *kalÁm* and philosophy. Variance is the result of the diversity of contexts, vocabularies and influences. ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s understanding of *ÝaqI* can be classified into five categories:

⁵³ ABØ RÁ’iÔA., *RisÁla li-AbÐ RÁ’iÔa al-TakrÐtÐ fÐ i×bÁt dÐn al-naÒrÁniyya wa-i×bÁt al-×ÁIÛ× al-muqaddas*, p. 132.

⁵⁴ GRIFFITH, S., *Faith and Reason in Christian KalÁm: Theodore AbÛ Qurrah on Discerning the True Religion*, p. 37.

1. As for the first meaning: there is a *locus* where the author gives something like a definition of it. When he speaks about *qudra*, *quwwa* and *istiŌÁÝa* (potency and faculty or potentiality), there he mentions their two causes (*ÝillatÁni*). One of the causes is bodily, corporeal (*ĒismÁniyya*, *ĒasadÁniyya*), but it is now left out of consideration. The other is spiritual, and it belongs to the soul. It is defined as follows: “[the other cause] is psychological, spiritual, namely the **intellect**, which is the faculty of the soul that creates these subtle things, which we can see in the making of the bodies, the moulding of forms, the composition of (bodily) structures, and similar making actions that can be carried out by the wisdom of the soul and the reflexion of the **intellect**.”⁵⁵ Thus, intellect is a cause; and it can be understood from the context that it is the universal intellect, *al-Ýaql al-kullĎ*, which is defined here. The passage also defines it as a faculty.
2. Intellect as a faculty can be considered the second connotation and is further elaborated in other examples and contexts. Intellect is a means of distinction and choice: “the property of goodness or immorality can be attributed only to man among all the creatures, since he is created to be able to choose his actions by his **intellect** and distinction; so he can choose for himself whatever he pleases.”⁵⁶ It reflects the Patristic idea according to which intellect appears as a reference to man’s distinctive nature. ÝAmmÁr al-BaŌrĎ’s approach is in accordance with that: since if man is the only creature that can have the property of goodness or immorality due to his intellect, then it is the feature that distinguishes man among all creatures. The author uses intellect in this meaning when he refers to it as a means of understanding or distinction, since it is something that God created in humankind, alongside with understanding; at the same time, it recognizes good and bad: “He left them with [the guidance] of the **intellect** and understanding, which He had created in their nature and [to the guidance of] what He had made for them as a path to good and bad.”⁵⁷ As we could see above, ‘mind between good and evil’ is a theme that had already appeared in Patristic literature. In this, ÝAmmÁr al-BaŌrĎ, as well as his Christian contemporaries, can be considered continuers of that tradition.

⁵⁵ al-BANŌRĬ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aĒwiba*, p. 157,16-19

الأخرى نفسانية روحانية أعني العقل الذي هو قوة النفس المخترع هذه اللطائف التي نرى من صنعة الاجرام وتصوير الأشكال وتأليف البنين ونحو ذلك من الصناعات المقدور عليها بحكمة النفس وروية العقل

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 125,14-15

نسب الناس خاصةً إلى البر والفجور من بين جميع الخلائق، إذ خلقوا مستطيعين لاختيار الأعمال بعقل وتمييز فاختاروا لأنفسهم ما اختاروا

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 117,11-12

فأهملهم لذلك على ما طبعهم عليه من العقل والفهم وما جعل لهم به السبيل إلى فعل الخير والشر

3. The previous example offers another opportunity for interpretation. In the following part of the cited phrase: „intellect and understanding, which He had created in their nature” (i. e. *YalÁ mÁ ÓabaYahum Yalayhi min al-Yaql wa-'l-fahm*), understanding and intellect are referred to as human disposition, as *ÓabaYahum* indicates it.
4. The fourth meaning of intellect is that of an attribute (*Óifa*). It appears with the ability of speech, when the author defines the One, Who is characterized by mercy and compassion: “As for mercy, compassion, justice, gentleness, generosity, grace, and what resembles them; all of them are effects that appear as attributes on the behalf of a deliberate, rational substance, not on the behalf of substances that lack the capacity of speech and **intellect**.”⁵⁸ It can be considered an attribute, too, when mentioned with *iltiyÁr* and *istiÓÁYá*, or when it is a gift of God, together with life, speech, understanding, ability, and free will: “what grace might be better or generosity greater than his generating them in this noble disposition [including] life, **intellect**, speech, understanding, capacity, and free will, after that they had been nothing/they had not existed.”⁵⁹ So intellectuality may be either a divine attribute or that of a created being as well.
5. Intellect plays an important role in ethics, too, and when appearing in this context, it is used as a quality, equal to capacity and free will in importance. From an ethical point of view, *YammÁr al-BaÓrÐ* establishes that the intellect, as well as free will and ability can make one good or bad. He says: “no one deserves the name ‘good’ or ‘bad’ without having all the three following qualities: ability, **intellect**, and free will. And if one follows the path of obedience to his Creator in his **intellect**, by his choice and ability, ...”⁶⁰ it will be considered as goodness from him. We could see it in the case of the second meaning, too, that *YammÁr al-BaÓrÐ* follows Patristic tradition insofar he gives intellect an important role between right and wrong. This idea is further accentuated here.

⁵⁸ al-BAÑRĪ, *YammÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ'il wa-'l-aÉwiba*, p. 158,6-8

وأما الرحمة والرفاة والعدل والحلم والجود والنعمة وما أشبهها، فإنها معلولات تبدو عن الجواهر الناطقة المروية خاصة لا عن شي من الجواهر العديمة العقل والنطق

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 105,7-8

فأية نعمة أفضل وجود أعظم من تكوينه إياهم خاصة على هذه الهيئة الشريفة من الحياة والعقل والنطق والفهم والاستطاعة والاختيار بعد أن لم يكونوا شيئاً.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 125,12-14

لا يستحق اسم الصالح والطالح إلا من كملت فيه الخصال الثلاثة: الاستطاعة والعقل والاختيار جميعاً. ومن يجري طاعة خالقه بعقلٍ واختيارٍ واستطاعة

Here we could see the intellect among qualities, as equal to capacity and free will in importance. The way it appears may make us think of what MuYtazilite ethics say of human acts as being created by humans themselves. And therefore, they are responsible for their acts.

As for ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ's definition of the intellect as a cause, this usage can be considered mainly philosophical. In the rest of the cases, where intellect is used in the meaning of a means, faculty, quality and attribute, both philosophical and theological influences are clearly discernible. Since the meaning of *Ýaq̣l* depends on the context, it may seem at first glance that ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ is using this term inconsistently. In fact, upon further investigation, it appears that this author is quite thorough in his discussion of its various senses.

After examining ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ's use of *Ýaq̣l* as a term, let us consider now its role in his theological reasoning. ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ affirms that understanding divine grace in creation is only possible for a person using his intellect to grasp the signs or the outcome of divine generosity: "As soon as it became firm in our **intellect** that by creating His creatures He did good to others only, and out of generosity and grace, He did good and intended the benefit of his creatures; our **intellect** was convinced that the favours of generosity may only appear on the behalf of someone who has intellect and wisdom."⁶¹ In other instances he depends on both intellect and scriptural evidence, that is: on *Ýaq̣l* and *naql* together. "We do not negate what **intellect** is unable to comprehend without the Scripture, but we admit that intellect has not become aware by its own accord that these meanings are Father, Son, Holy Spirit, without the Scripture."⁶² In this respect ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ appears as a proponent of complementarity between intellect and Scriptures in theological reasoning. Although he gives credit to the intellect, he still thinks that scriptures matter in understanding Christian mysteries and the Trinity. He cannot be considered a philosopher only, since the *alḥáq* of Scriptures – from a rationalistic point of view – always carry the possibility of being either true or false.

Sometimes complementarity between intellect and senses as a way of cognition is defended by ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ. He says:

"In the first investigation, witnessing the forms of creatures forced the **intellect** to affirm that there is a substance that created them in time and brought them into being. In the second investigation, the fact that in the eternity of His pre-eternity He had abstained from creating [his creatures], but later on He carried out their making as a donation, [forced the intellect] to render pre-eternal life necessary for Him. And the third investigation, on the basis of His perfect government, and of what had previously shown of His care, guided [the intellect to

⁶¹ al-BANŖĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ'il wa-'l-aÉwiba*, pp. 151,19-152,1

فلما استقر في عقولنا أنه، إنما يجري بخلقه الخلاق الإحسان إلى غيره، تفضل وتوخي به صلاح بعض خلائقه جيداً وإنعاماً، أيقنت عقولنا بأنه لن تبدو فضائل الجود والنعمة إلا من ذي عقل أو حكمة.

⁶² Ibid., p. 169,7-9

ما عجزت العقول عن دركه من دون الكتاب فلا ننكره، بل قد نفر بأن العقول لم تنتبه من تلقائها على هذه المعاني أباً وإبناً وروح قدس، دون قول الكتاب

accept] that He carries this out in order to be generous to others. It witnesses to the substantiality of His Word and the pre-eternity of His wisdom, necessarily.”⁶³

So the first step of the investigation was based on the physical evidence of bodily forms, and the second and third steps were more “intellectual” or rational. This methodology can also be considered a continuation of Patristic traditions, since *ó voũç* is also found in relation to other faculties or particularly in relation to sense perception in Church Fathers’ texts. Here is another example: “And the traces of their actions (burning, ashes, smoke and steam) are signs for the intellect of the existence of their sources.”⁶⁴ Although ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ displays here common methodological elements with Muslim philosophers, mainly experience and sense perception, he does not elaborate his proof as a philosopher. First, he does not endorse emanation or necessity to explain the creation of things. Second, he mixes proofs from experience or sense perception with others based on signs or analogy (*qiyÁs*). Signs or analogies, which do not produce certain knowledge, are typically used by Muslim theologians, not philosophers. ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ does not use in this case the Aristotelian syllogistic in a strict philosophical, but rather in a rhetorical sense. M. Maróth asserts that in general the assessment of rhetoric proofs was not clear in Greek and Latin rhetoric traditions either. It is sure that they were not admitted as valid and applicable in theoretical sciences, while the results of practical sciences were introduced by rhetorical proofs, since there the aim was conviction instead of exact knowledge. Aristotle permitted invalid and incorrect proofs in rhetoric.⁶⁵ Similarly, in Arabic prose, an analogy on the basis of senses – even if combined with the intellect – is not a *burhÁn falsafÐ*; it is rather *kalÁmÐ*, *°adalÐ*. According to what M. Maróth writes in his *The Correspondence between Aristotle and Alexander the Great*, Christian communities were educated in the (once Greek) rhetorical schools. It is not surprising then that ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ uses such argumentation, i.e. sign-inference. On the other hand, it is not just his argumentation which can be characterized by such a feature, but he even asks for the same kind of demonstration, when addressing the (probably Muslim) opponent: “Make us find the truth of this by a clear *burhÁn*, like the way we made you see the essence of the four elements, their createdness in time and the evolution of creatures out of

⁶³ al-BANŖĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÉwiba*, p. 152,5-9

فإنه كما عن الشواهد من أشكال الخلائق اضطرت العقول في الفحص الأول إلى وجود إثبات جوهر أحدثها وأنشأها، والفحص الثاني من تبرعه بصنعها بعد إمساكه قديماً عن خلقها إلى إيجاب الحياة له أزلياً، كذلك ما دل الفحص الثالث من إحكام سياسته لها وما تقدم من سابق همته بأن وجود على غير بها، يشهد على جوهرية كلمته وأزلية حكمته اضطراباً

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 132,7-8

وكانت آثار أعمالها من الاحتراق والرماد والدخان والبخار دلائل للعقول على وجود عينها...

⁶⁵ MARÓTH, M., *Methods of Conviction in Rhetoric Part I*, In: *Acta Antiqua* 49 (2009), p. 339.

them, by way of witnesses of the **intellect** and senses together.”⁶⁶ His use of the term *burhĀn* is typical of a theologian whose background is philosophical. For if he considers *burhĀn* an apodictic proof, then it would be certain knowledge. In this case, he would not as his adversaries to prove the contrary by way of another apodictic proof. The latter is self-evident and a philosopher would not make such a mistake. Since he is a theologian, ÝAmmĀr al-BaÒrÐ uses some philosophical methods and terms (*burhĀn*, *Ýaqł*, *ĪawĀss*) in a polemic against an opponent. An analogy on the basis of senses – even if combined with the intellect – is not a philosophical proof; it may only be dialectical argumentation.

ÝAmmĀr al-BaÒrÐ’s examples refer to the cognitive faculties of the intellect, its role in perception and understanding, its role in ethics, and its being a gift of God. He may be compared to both previous authors, since all the three authors establish the intellect as being a gift of God, in which intellect is used in a theological way. Theodore AbÛ Qurra and ÝAmmĀr al-BaÒrÐ emphasize the cognitive faculties of the intellect as a means of understanding, recognizing; as something that can set up analogies and get to the knowledge of things. In this respect, the use of the concept can be considered philosophical in approach. Both authors consider the intellect a means for distinguishing between good and evil, so there is an ethical approach, too. ÝAmmĀr al-BaÒrÐ and AbÛ RĀ’iŌa both refer to the limits of the intellect, but while AbÛ RĀ’iŌa sees the help of God as a solution in such cases, ÝAmmĀr al-BaÒrÐ turns to analogy or to scripture. In this, their approach is not philosophical, since it is the characteristic of the theological approach to mention the help of God and Scripture in the course of the cognition of God.

The question that raises here is whether ÝAmmĀr al-BaÒrÐ had any impact on later Muslim authors. In answering this, no direct textual evidence is quoted, instead, (Christian) ideas presented by ÝAmmĀr al-BaÒrÐ will be compared to descriptions of books of definitions, as the representatives of standard Muslim theological and philosophical terminology.

Let us first examine the philosopher, AbÛ YÛsuf b. IsĪĀq al-KindĪ, who defines the term in his *RisĀla fĪ ĪudÛd al-aşyĀ’ wa-rusÛmihĀ*⁶⁷ as follows: intellect is a simple substance that comprehends the true nature of things.”⁶⁸ Since *Ýaqł* is defined as a substance,

⁶⁶ al-BANĪRĪ, ÝAmmĀr, *KitĀb al-MasĀ’il wa-’l-aĒwiba*, p. 99,15-16

⁶⁷ al-KINDĪ, AbÛ YÛsuf b. IsĪĀq, *RisĀla fĪ ĪudÛd al-aşyĀ’ wa-rusÛmihĀ* In.: *RasĀ’il al-KindĪ al-falsafiyya*, Ed. ABŒ RĪDA, MuĪammad ÝAbd al-HĀdĪ, *RasĀ’il al-KindĪ al-falsafiyya*, Frankfurt, MaÝhad TĀrĪĪ al-ÝUIÛm al-ÝArabiyya wa-’l-IslĀmiyya, 1999. pp. 165-180. (Later on: al-KINDĪ, *RisĀla fĪ ĪudÛd al-aşyĀ’ wa-RusÛmihĀ*)

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 165.:

we may say that here we see a philosophical approach that underlines the cognitive faculty of the intellect and defines the term by it. The simple and concise definition indicates that al-Kindī shares – at least with regard to the function of the intellect - Ḳammār al-BaḲrī's concept. Indeed, the latter highlights *Ḳaql* as a faculty of comprehension and perception of and distinction between things. Al-Kindī's definition concentrates on intellect as a substance: it is simple, and it is the means of the perception of the true nature of things. Contemporary Christian apologetic writings deal with the concept and the term in a wider range, from multiple approaches. However, the reference to the intellect as a substance in al-Kindī's definition – to the best of my knowledge – cannot be seen in the Christian apologetic writings. There is a possible parallel, though: Christian theologians often use the analogy of the intellect and the word and spirit as three aspects of one substance, when they defend the unity of the three divine *hypostases*. Each constituent is regarded as a substance on its own, forming one general substance altogether. If the parallel is too far-fetched, we can still think of al-Kindī's philosophical interpretation as one coming from a different tradition: probably the one that developed from the translation movement.

Though not a book of definitions, let us mention al-Fārābī's (d. 950) treatise on *Ḳaql* here.⁶⁹ He introduces six meanings of *Ḳaql*, the first of which is a 'general' interpretation of intellect, as it is understood by the *Ḳumhūr* [*al-Ḳumamā'*], i.e. the majority [of philosophers]. It is what makes man intelligent, *Ḳaql*.⁷⁰ According to this interpretation, it is a distinctive characteristic of humankind; it is discernment or prudence, *taḲaqqul*, a faculty that characterizes the man who acts in order to perform what is good.⁷¹ This kind of interpretation may be paralleled with the writings of Christian authors, which indicates that the tradition the latter authors relied on was known to the philosopher, as well. The second interpretation is that of the *mutakallims*, who use *Ḳaql* to say it makes a thing necessary or impossible.⁷² It is

العقل - جوهر بسيط مدرك للأشياء بحقائقها.

The term is defined by al-Kindī in the second place, right after the First Cause (*al-Ḳilla al-Ḳilā*), which indicates its importance in the philosopher's view. This fact can be further emphasized if we take into consideration that al-Kindī mostly followed the order of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, translated for him by UstāḲ, and this term seems to be inserted among those important for Aristotle, as Kennedy-Day demonstrates it. C.f. KENNEDY – DAY, K., *Books of Definition in Islamic Philosophy*, pp. 21-22.

⁶⁹ al-Fārābī, Abū NaḲr MuḲammad, *Risāla fī al-Ḳaql*. In: al-Fārābī, Abū NaḲr MuḲammad, *Texts and Studies III*, Ed. SEZGIN, F., Frankfurt am Main, Institute for the History of Arabic-Islamic Science at the Johann Wolfgang Goethe University, 1999., pp. 47-94.

⁷⁰ Ibid. p. 49.

الشيء الذي به يقول الجمهور في الإنسان إنه عاقل.

⁷¹ Ibid. pp. 50-53.

⁷² Ibid. p. 49.

العقل الذي يردده المتكلمون على ألسنتهم فيقولون هذا مما يوجبه العقل أو ينفيه العقل

identified with common sense, *bÁdi' al-ra'y*.⁷³ This interpretation may also be paralleled with the writings of Christian authors, since all of them use phrases like “*yÛËibuhu al-ÝaqI*” or “*yanfÐhi al-ÝaqI*.” This correspondence shows that the tradition Christian authors rely on and the one al-FÁrÁbÐ defines on the basis of *mutakallims'* usage may go back to a common (philosophical) tradition that transcends denominational and religious differences. Al-FÁrÁbÐ then goes on with four meanings defined on the basis of Aristotle, the first of which relies on the *Posterior Analytics*.⁷⁴ The second one is based on the *Nicomachean Ethics*;⁷⁵ the third one depends on the *Psychology*;⁷⁶ and the last one is defined according to the *Metaphysica*.⁷⁷ As for the first one, it is a faculty of the soul, *quwwat al-nafs*, by which man can gain certitude from true, universal and obliging premises. It is also termed as natural perception, *fiÔra* and disposition, *ÔabÝ*.⁷⁸ The fourth of the six meanings, is a part of the soul, *Ëuz' al-nafs*, in which, by perseverance and experience some certitude formulates, by which good and evil might be distinguished.⁷⁹ There's partial agreement between this statement and ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ's usage. The latter does not refer to Aristotle as his source, but he considers intellect a part, or more precisely a faculty of the soul and a means of distinction. The fifth subsection of the intellect is described on the basis of Aristotle's *Psychology*, and is considered to be of four types: potential intellect, *ÝaqI bi-'l-quwwa*; actual intellect, *ÝaqI bi-'l-fiÝI*; acquired intellect, *ÝaqI mustafÁd*; and agent intellect, or active intellect, *ÝaqI faÝÝÁI*.⁸⁰ Potential intellect, *ÝaqI bi-'l-quwwa* is a part or a faculty of the soul, which – as M. Fakhry puts it – abstracts the forms of existing entities with which it is ultimately identified.⁸¹ By way of the coming into being of these forms in the soul, the potential intellect becomes actual intellect.⁸² The acquired intellect is what can conceive of, imagine or actualize the rational entities.⁸³ The last one is the agent or the active intellect,

⁷³ Ibid. pp. 53-54.

⁷⁴ al-FÁRÁBĪ, AbÛ NaÒr Muġammad, *RisÁla fÐ al-ÝaqI*, p. 49.

⁷⁵ Ibid. p. 50.

⁷⁶ Ibid. p. 50.

⁷⁷ Ibid. p. 50.

⁷⁸ Ibid. pp. 54-55.

⁷⁹ Ibid. pp. 55-57.

⁸⁰ Ibid. p. 58.

⁸¹ FAKHRY, M., *A History of Islamic Philosophy*, London, Longman - New York, Columbia University Press, 1983., p. 121. C.f. al-FÁRÁBĪ, AbÛ NaÒr Muġammad, *RisÁla fÐ al-ÝaqI*, pp. 58-61.

⁸² al-FÁRÁBĪ, AbÛ NaÒr Muġammad, *RisÁla fÐ al-ÝaqI*, pp. 61-66.

⁸³ Ibid. pp. 66-70.

العقل الذي يذكره الأستاذ أرسطاليس في كتاب البرهان

العقل الذي يذكره في المقالة السادسة من كتاب الأخلاق

العقل الذي يذكره في كتاب النفس

العقل الذي يذكره في كتاب ما بعد الطبيعة

which conceives of the more perfect existents.⁸⁴ These subsections are not paralleled with Christian author's writings. The sixth meaning of the intellect – as defined in accordance with Aristotle's *Metaphysics* – is divine intellect, the source of all movements.⁸⁵ God as a rational being is present in Christian understanding, but this kind of philosophical expression cannot be found in the works of the authors examined here. It can be seen that al-FÁrÁbĪ's interpretation is based on a different tradition from the one ÝAmmÁr al- BaÒrĪ relies on. His heavy reliance on what Aristotle said concerning the issue cannot be paralleled with the Christian authors.

In AbÙ ÝAbdallÁh Muġammad ibn Aġmad ibn YÙsuf al-KÁtib al-ĒwÁrizmĪ's *MafÁtĪĪ al-ÝulÙm*,⁸⁶ there is a reference made to *Ýaql* among the terms of *falsafa*, in its second part, in the framework of the science that treats the divine as its subject matter – that is, it belongs to the field of *metaphysika*, although it appears in *kalÁm* books as well. The term is defined in a classified form, and no definition of the intellect as such may be found in itself. We can first read about the active intellect as follows:

“The agent **intellect** is the divine faculty that is followed by everything in the upper and the lower worlds, namely the stars and planets, objects and animals that are not rational beings, and humankind, since everything searches for their benefit, and for what keeps them alive and subsistent. [They do it] according to the possibility that is given to them. And this faculty that is present in things of the natural world is called nature.”⁸⁷

Next in line is the material intellect, which is defined as follows: “The material **intellect** is the faculty in humankind. Its position in the *anima* is like that of seeing in the eye, whereas the agent **intellect** has the position of the light of the sun for the sight. And when this faculty that is the material **intellect** emanates and becomes an act, it is called acquired **intellect**.”⁸⁸ Later on reference is made to the universal intellect, without further definition. We may see that a century after ÝAmmÁr al- BaÒrĪ's time, according to Muslim writers' definition, *Ýaql* is primarily the agent intellect. However, we can also observe that *Ýaql* has the meaning of a faculty given to humankind (i.e. it does not appear as a substance), as we have noticed it in ÝAmmÁr al- BaÒrĪ's and his Christian contemporaries' texts. I do not assert that Muslim

⁸⁴ Ibid. pp. 70-80.

⁸⁵ al-FÁRÁBĪ, AbÙ NaÒr Muġammad, *RisÁla fĪ al-Ýaql*, pp. 80-82.

⁸⁶ al-ĒWÁRIZMĪ, AbÙ ÝAbdallÁh Muġammad ibn Aġmad ibn YÙsuf al-KÁtib, *MafÁtĪĪ al-ÝulÙm*, Beirut, DÁr al-Fikr al-LubnÁnĪ, 1993. (Later on: al-ĒWÁRIZMĪ, *MafÁtĪĪ al-ÝulÙm*)

⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 163.

العقل الفعال هو القوة الإلهية التي يهتدي بها كل شيء في العالم العلوي والسفلي من الأفلاك والكواكب والجماد والحيوان غير الناطق والإنسان لاجتلاب مصلحته وما به قوامه ويقاؤه على قدر ما تهيأ له على حسب الإمكان. وهذه القوة في الأشياء التي في العالم الطبيعي تسمى الطبيعية.

⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 163.

العقل الهيولاني هو القوة في الإنسان وهي (في) النفس بمنزلة القوة الناظر في العين. والعقل الفعال (لها) بمنزلة ضوء الشمس للبصر. إذا خرجت هذه القوة التي هي العقل الهيولاني إلى الفعل تسمى العقل المستفاد.

philosophical tradition roots in the works of Christian authors, as it is a continuation of Aristotelian philosophy, but it is important to emphasize that similarities in interpretation are discernible.

Al-ĒwÁrizmĎ's contemporary, the theologian Ibn FÙrak gives a brief definition of the term in his *KitÁb al-ĪudÙd*:⁸⁹ "the definition of the intellect: it is the evident knowledge which the rational beings do not share with the animals and the sleeping."⁹⁰ Intellect is seen as a means in cognition, in which Ibn FÙrak's approach is close to that of ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrĎ and Theodore AbÙ Qurra. It can be of interest to note that this approach is closer to the Christian theologians' interpretation than to the Muslim philosophers' one. If intellect is a basis for distinction between human beings and animals, wakeful and sleeping, then it implies that intellect is a distinctive feature. If this is the difference between humans and animals, wakeful and sleeping, it may than even stand for rationality. Even if the tradition they are depending on may be different, in this, we may see a resemblance to ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrĎ's and Theodore AbÙ Qurra's interpretations, who are continuers of the Patristic tradition.

Even in the eleventh century, as it can be seen in Ibn SĎnÁ's Book of Definitions,⁹¹ *ÝaqI* is still used as a faculty in addition to several other meanings. On the one hand, Ibn SĎnÁ claims that the common usage of *ÝaqI* includes the meaning of faculty in addition to knowledge and disposition.⁹² On the other, he mentions eight meanings of *ÝaqI*. An examination of his definitions shows his fidelity to the Aristotelian syllogistic and psychology. It can be assumed that Ibn SĎnÁ was aware that some confusion was taking

⁸⁹ Ibn FØRAK, AbÙ Bakr Muġammad b. al-Īasan, al-AnÒÁrĎ al-IÒbahÁnĎ, *KitÁb al-ĪudÙd fĎ 'l-uÒÙl* In: Abdel-Haleem, Muhammad, *Early Islamic Theological and Juristic Terminology: "KitÁb al-ĪudÙd fĎ 'l-uÒÙl" by Ibn FÙrak.* Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, 54 (1991) (1). pp. 5-41. (Later on: Ibn FØRAK, *KitÁb al-ĪudÙd fĎ 'l-uÒÙl*)

⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 19.

حد العقل: هو البدائيه من العلوم التي لا يشترك في علمها الناطقون البهائم، والمتيقظون (النوم).

⁹¹ Ibn SĪNÁ, *KitÁb al-ĪudÙd (Livre des Définitions)*, Ed. and Trans. GOICHON, A.-M., Cairo, Publications de l'Institut Français d'Archéologie Orientale du Caire, 1963. (Later on: Ibn SĪNÁ, *KitÁb al-ĪudÙd*)

⁹² Ibid. pp. 11-13.

حد العقل العقل اسم مشترك لمعان عدة فيقال عقل لصحة الفطرة الأولى في الناس فيكون حده أنه قوة بها وجود التمييز بين الأمور القبيحة والحسنة: ويقال عقل لما يكسبه الإنسان بالتجارب من الأحكام الكلية فيكون حده أنه معان مجتمعة في الذهن تكون مقدمات يستنبط بها المصالح والأغراض ويقال عقل لمعنى آخر وحده أنه هيئة محمودة للإنسان في حركاته وسكناته وكلامه واختياره فهذه المعاني الثلاثة هي التي يطلق عليها الجمهور اسم العقل.

وأما الذي يدل عليه اسم العقل عند الحكماء فهي ثمانية معان أحدها العقل الذي ذكره الفيلسوف في كتاب البرهان وفرق بينه وبين العلم فقال ما معناه هذا العقل هو التصورات والتصديقات الحاصلة للنفس بالفطرة والعلم ما حصل بالاكتساب ومنها العقول المذكورة في كتاب النفس. فمن ذلك العقل النظري والعقل العملي فالعقل النظري قوة للنفس تقبل ماهيات الأمور الكلية من جهة ما هي كلية والعقل العملي قوة للنفس هي مبدأ التحريك للقوة الشوقية إلى ما يختار من الجزئيات من أجل غاية مظنونة أو معلومة.

ثم يقال [لقوى كثيرة من العقل النظري عقل فمن ذلك] العقل [الهيولاني] وهو قوة للنفس مستعدة لقبول ماهيات الأشياء مجردة عن المواد ومن ذلك العقل بالملكة وهو استكمال هذه القوة حتى تصير قوة قريبة من الفعل بحصول الذي سماه في كتاب البرهان عقلاً ومن ذلك العقل بالفعل وهو استكمال النفس في صورة ما أو صورة معقولة حتى متى شاء عقلها وأحضرها بالفعل ومن ذلك العقل المستفاد وهو ماهية مجردة عن المادة [مرتسمة في النفس على سبيل الحصول من خارج.

ومن ذلك العقول التي يقال لها العقول الفعالة وهي كل ماهية مجردة عن المادة] أصلاً. فحد العقل الفعال إما من جهة ما هو عقل فهو أنه جوهر صوري ذاته ماهية مجردة في ذاتها لا بتجريد غيرها عن المادة وعن علائق المادة هي ماهية كل موجود وإما من جهة ما هو عقل فعال فهو أنه جوهر بالصفة المذكورة من شأنه أن يخرج العقل الهيولاني من القوة إلى الفعل باشرافه عليه.

place in the use of *Yaq̣l*, and wanted, accordingly, to separate the use of the term in a philosophical sense from that of the theologians. As a result, Yammār al-Baʿṛḍ's uses of *Yaq̣l* as a faculty, a means or an attribute are, in light of Ibn Ṣnā's strict philosophical vocabulary, common usage. However, when Yammār al-Baʿṛḍ uses *Yaq̣l* as *quwwat al-nafs*, faculty of the soul, it is evident that Aristotelian psychology was known to him.

Two centuries later, al-ʿAmīḍ's work, entitled *al-Mubḍn*, defines intellect in the following way: "as for 'intellect,' this term refers to eleven things; one of them is substantial, the rest are accidental. ..." ⁹³ In his classification we may see a similar principle to that of Ibn Ṣnā. He also uses a strict philosophical vocabulary and an exact classification, a kind that is unparalleled on the behalf of Yammār al-Baʿṛḍ and his Christian counterparts in the ninth century. This difference can be explained by the fact that in the 9th century the fields of *kalām* and philosophy were on their ways to separate, and this is reflected in the formation of distinct terminologies. These late authors define the term in a detailed philosophical sense, while Yammār al-Baʿṛḍ's usage testifies to its early formation.

The last example I am going to examine is al-ʿUṛḍān's definition in his *Taʿrīfāt*: "Intellect, according to theorists, is a substance free from matter in its essence, but it can be compared to that in its action. It is the *anima* capable of rational thinking that is referred to, when one says "me". Intellect is said to be a spiritual substance that is created by

⁹³ al-ʿAMIDĪ, S., *al-Mubḍn fī šarī maʿānī al-fāʾ al-ʾukamāʾ wa-ʾl-mutakallimīn*, Cairo, Maktabat Wahba, 1993. pp. 106-108. (Later on: al-ʿAMIDĪ, *al-Mubḍn*)

The citation goes on in the following way:

"... As for the substantial intellect: this expresses a *quiddity* free from matter or any relation to matter. As for the accidental ones, they are the following:

Practical and theoretical intellects are what have been referred to at the properties of the human *anima*.

Material intellect is an expression of the theoretical faculty in the case of the lack of a device, by which it would be possible to reach comprehension. It is like the faculty of a child in connection to the knowledge of geometrical forms. This faculty is called the absolute faculty. Another kind is the intellect of talent, and this is an expression of a theoretical faculty in the case of the presence of a means for acquiring comprehension by thought and reflection. It can be compared to the situation of a young man who knows the elements of letters, the ink, the pen, and who, while writing, needs the state of thought and reflection. This intellect is called the faculty of enablement.

There is the intellect *in actu*, too, and this expression refers to the theoretical faculty that covers the occurrence of comprehension that does not need any thought or reflection. It is like the case of one who is perfect in writing.

There is the holy intellect that refers to a theoretical faculty that does not need teaching or being taught for acquiring comprehension, like the case of the Prophet.

There is the learned/derived intellect. It is an expression referring to a theoretical faculty, when it is knowing and comprehending, like man while writing.

Intellect can refer to what man acquires through his experiences, and then it is called experimental intellect.

The term may refer to the soundness of the first disposition.

And it may refer to an attitude of a man, which is beautiful in his acts and states."

God together with the human body...”⁹⁴ As we can see, it first appears as a substance, and later on it is defined in a detailed way as faculty, agent, and means. In the latter meanings, i.e. intellect as faculty, agent, means, we can see a common point in his usage and that of the Christian authors in the ninth century. Similarities may be due to the philosophical origins of these terms that influenced Muslim authors through different sources, including the Christian transmission. Christian authors were the contemporaries of Muslim theologians and philosophers and in that sense they seem to have shared a common terminology that transcended to some extent communal and religious divisions. As for the difference: al-ÉURÉÀÑÐ’s definition is more detailed, but by his time the philosophical terminology had been more refined.

Conclusion

I demonstrated that all Christian authors are continuers of Patristic notions, as far as intellect is concerned, inasmuch they considered intellect a distinctive feature of man and a tool for distinction between right and wrong. The contexts in which intellect appears are also similar: Church Fathers refer to intellect as a means of cognition, the object of which is God, and many of them refer to divine assistance as another means in this process. I showed that it is a recurrent topic in Arabic Christian literature, too, especially in the case of AbÛ RÁ’iÔa. Theodore AbÛ Qurra mostly relied on intellectual argumentation, while AbÛ RÁ’iÔa had a

⁹⁴ al-ÉURÉÀÑĪ, A. i. M., *KitÁb al-TaÝrÐfÁt*, Ed. ÍIFÑĪ, ÝAbd al-MunÝim, Cairo, DÁr al-RašÁd, 1991, pp. 173-174 (Later on: al-ÉURÉÀÑĪ, *KitÁb al-TaÝrÐfÁt*)

His definition is very long, so for the sake of brevity, the rest of it is cited only in the footnotes:

“... The intellect is said to be the light in the heart, which knows truth and the false. And intellect is said to be a substance free of matter that sticks to body through direction and regulation.

Intellect is said to be a faculty of the *anima* capable of speech/rational thinking, and it is evident that the intellectual faculty is exchangeable with the *anima* capable of speech/rational thinking. It is also said that the agent of the realization is the *anima*, and the intellect is its means, like the knife is [the means] of one who cuts. Intellect and *anima* and mind are said to be one, but as a comprehending thing it is called intellect, as a regulative thing it is called *anima*, and as something that is ready for comprehension it is called mind.

Intellect is by what it is possible to understand the true nature of things. Its place is said to be the head and the heart.

The material intellect is merely the readiness to comprehension of understandable things. It is a mere faculty free from action like for children (?). It is related to matter only because the *anima* at this stage resembles the first matter that – in itself – is free from all the forms.

The intellect is – according to the linguists – taken from the cord of the camel. It prevents those who have intellect from the abandonment of the right path. It is true that it is only a substance, that can comprehend the hidden things indirectly, and the perceptible things by way of witnessing.

The intellect in natural disposition is the knowledge of necessary things and the preparedness of the *anima* for acquiring the theoretical things.

The intellect in *actu* means that the theoretical things become stored up in the rational faculty by way of repetition of the acquisition, thus it becomes possible for it to produce it, whenever it wants, without undergoing a new acquisition, even if it does not see it in *actu*.

The derived/learned intellect means that the comprehended theoretical things are present at it in a way that these do not disappear from it.”

theological approach, placing divine assistance in the centre. As for ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, he used *Ýaql* in both philosophical and theological meanings. The term had a wide range of references in the ninth century in Christian authors' writings, and we have seen ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ as the one who used the term in the greatest variety of contexts.

Their contemporary Muslim author gave a definition for the term with a narrower sense, but introduced intellect as a substance, which is an interpretation that cannot be found in their works. Later Muslim authors gave definitions including meanings discernible in Christian authors' works and that of the substance. Great elaboration can first be seen in al-FÁrÁbÐ's treatise, and the first to give a lengthy and detailed definition in a book of definitions is Ibn SÐnÁ. However, he represents a later stage of development in the field of terminology, while Christian authors witness to the early formation. The variety of meanings that appear in Christians' usage is unprecedented on the Muslim side, which may refer to Christian contribution to later Muslim elaboration.

Chapter II

The Terminology of body and incarnation

(Ta'annus – humanisation vs. taĒassud – incarnation; and badan vs. Ēirm vs. Ēasad vs. ʿism vs. haykal – body, bodily form)

In this chapter, I aim at examining the formation of a specifically Christian concept and the terms that refer to it in Arabic. My presupposition is that the connotation of terms that refer to body, bodily form, corpse, “frame”/temple, and accordingly, their possible use and appearance may originate in Greek Patristic and/or philosophical literature. I wish to examine terms for body, bodily form in themselves first, and then I wish to see how the concept is adapted to refer to its relation to the divine (whether the divine/God may be/have a body or not). I will examine whether ‘body, bodily form’ i.e. *badan* vs. *Ēirm* vs. *Ēasad* vs. *ʿism* have any specific connotations in Yammār al-Baʿr’s text, and then contrast them with Muslim usage. I intend to investigate them – where possible – in their “clear” form, where they appear in themselves. As a second step, I will cite examples where more than one term is mentioned, and try to demonstrate if and to what extent they might be considered synonyms. Then, the most important issue in this chapter will be the **incarnation** or **humanisation** of Jesus Christ, i. e. *ta'annus* – ‘humanisation,’ *taĒassud* – ‘incarnation,’ and *ittiĪĀĒ* (governing one of the following terms: *bašarĒ*, *hay'a bašariyya*, etc.) – ‘assuming, taking (the form) of a human.’

At the same time, I am interested in the way these terms may be contrasted to Islamic use, and in how interaction or influence may be observed in this very field. I also aim at examining the question if Christian understanding of the relation of the divine and a bodily form, or more specifically, God’s assuming a human body/form, i.e. His incarnation, may be paralleled to Islamic anthropomorphic ideas, ascribing human attributes to God.⁹⁵ Prior to Arabic Christianity, John of Damascus already wrote in his *De Fide Orthodoxa* on the human need to conceive of God metaphorically in human terms. It can be found in the 11th chapter,

⁹⁵ According to van Ess, the Qur’ān is transcendentalist, but uses anthropological language as a reference to God’s actions and qualities. It caused tension later on, when Islam expanded, and both transcendentalist and anthropomorphist tendencies were sharpened by the religious ideas prevailing in the new environment. C.f. VAN ESS, J., *TashbĒĪ wa-tanzĒĪ*, In: EI, Second edition, vol. X., 2000. Leiden, E. J. Brill, pp. 341-44., p. 342. (Later on: VAN ESS, J., *TashbĒĪ wa-tanzĒĪ*.) Martin claims that likening God to humans was already well-known in the Middle East prior to the rise of Islam in Christianity. The formation of Muslim discourse on anthropomorphism and corporealism in the first three Islamic centuries resembles earlier discussions among Christians, Jews, and pagan Greeks. C.f. MARTIN, R.C., *Anthropomorphism*, In: The Encyclopaedia of the Qur’ān, Brill, Leiden – Boston – Köln, 2001., Vol. I., pp. 103- 107., pp. 103-104. (Later on: MARTIN, R.C., *Anthropomorphism*.)

i.e. Τῶν σωματικῶς ἐπὶ Θεοῦ λεγομένων (*De his quae modo corporeo de Deo dicuntur*). He says that in Holy Scriptures we may read symbolical references to God's body or figure; but we need to know that we are corporeal human beings who could not understand divine things and the actions of an immaterial divinity, or could not comprehend His sayings without images and figural language. That is why whatever is told of God's corporeality, it is figuratively expressed, and it is to be understood in a "higher" meaning. Eyes, vision should be meant as a figural expression for God's potency to inspect and thus know everything. Ears refer to His "listening" to humankind's appeal and His forgiveness, etc.⁹⁶

According to Martin, such Christian and some Neoplatonic influence on Muslim thinking in this field is possible, but the problem in Islam is basically linked to disputes about how to interpret passages in the Qur'án that ascribe human attributes to God.⁹⁷ Van Ess, however, underlines that what influenced most Islamic thinking was Neoplatonic philosophy in the form it had assumed in Christian theology.⁹⁸ By an examination of sources, I try to find evidence for Christian influence. E.g. Binyamin Abrahamov studied a Muslim author, al-Qásim ibn IbrÁhĐm al-RassĐ, whose refutation of *tašbĐh* follows MuÝtazilites, who were influenced by Christian theology and Greek philosophy in this field.⁹⁹

If we turn to terms of bodily connotations, we may know on the authority of T. de Boer,¹⁰⁰ that in the understanding of Neo-Platonizing philosophers and theologians, there was a distinction between heavenly and earthly bodies. The latter were composed of the four relatively simple bodies (elements, in Aristotle ἀπλᾶ σώματα: Arab, *al-basÁ'iÓ*). Heavenly bodies were simple; to describe them the term *irm* (plur. *a'rÁm*) was often used, which otherwise is synonymous with *ism*. *irm*, *badan* and *Éasad* are used as synonyms of *Éism*, the two latter ones are usually applied to the human body, *badan* often only to the torso. While *badan* is also used for the bodies of animals, *asad* is rather reserved for the bodies of higher beings (angels etc.), but *a'sÁd* is used particularly for minerals. It may also be mentioned that *haykal* (plur. *hayÁkil*) means with the Gnostics and mystics the physical word as whole as well as the planets, because the world-soul and the spirits of the stars dwell in them like the soul of man in its body. I am going to examine whether ÝAmmÁr al-BaÓrĐ's terms can be placed in the same framework.

⁹⁶ DAMASCENUS, Johannes, *De Fide Orthodoxa*, In: Migne, PG. XCIV., 1860. cc. 841-44.

⁹⁷ MARTIN, R.C., *Anthropomorphism*, p. 104.

⁹⁸ van ESS, J., *TashbĐl wa-tanzĐl*, p. 342.

⁹⁹ ABRAHAMOV, B., *Anthropomorphism and Interpretation of the Qur'án in the Theology of al-Qásim ibn IbrÁhĐm*, Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1996. pp. 8-9.

¹⁰⁰ de BOER, T., *Djism*, In EI, Second edition, Vol. II., Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1965. pp. 553-555. (Later on: de BOER, T., *Djism*)

1. *ʿirm*¹⁰¹

According to Afnan,¹⁰² *Ēirm* was used in the translations to express Greek philosophical terms such as τό στερεόν and σῶμα; but this does not mean that there is a total agreement in their meanings. If we look at the same terms in Greek Patristic usage, we will find that the first one appears with the following meanings: firm, solid, substantial [firmament, divine nature, which is not liable to change].¹⁰³ For σῶμα, Lampe brings a lot of meanings in Patristic literature, the most typical among them referring to man, earthly body, the body of Christ.¹⁰⁴ However, though scarcely, but meanings such as ‘figure of three dimensions,’ ‘corporate body,’ ‘body, unit,’ ‘reality,’ and ‘bodily aspect or form,’ can also be found.¹⁰⁵

As far as we can judge it from the scarce appearance of the term in the *KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aĒwiba*, *ʿirm* is used in a philosophical sense. ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrĎ uses it in the following meanings: ‘the body of an atom,’ or ‘the subject/substratum, carrying something that cannot subsist in itself.’ As for the first meaning, let us examine the context in which it appears: “You may find many kinds of mortal creatures that are praised for various things. E.g. the Sun is praised for the beauty of its light, the radiance of its glow and its sublime disposition. The fire is likewise praised for the subtlety of the **body** of its atom, the power of its heat and its beneficial effects. Thus, it is called a glowing, lucid, glorious, burning, ripening **body**...”¹⁰⁶ It was said above that the simple heavenly bodies were described by the term *ʿirm* (plur. *aʿrÁm*) in Neo-Platonizing philosophy, and though the atom of the fire is not a heavenly body we may find some similarity here taking the simplicity and subtlety of this unique atom into consideration. The term is sometimes synonymous with *ʿism* in Neo-Platonizing philosophy, and it can be observed in ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrĎ’s usage, as well, as in the following examples:

“These four things comprise everything that can be imagined or perceived. There is nothing that could be perceived by imagination or sensory perception except for these four categories, necessarily. Two of them subsist in themselves: the substance and the individual *hypostasis*.”

¹⁰¹ HAYEK does not provide a translation for this term.

¹⁰² AFNAN, M. S., *A Philosophical Lexicon in Persian and Arabic*, pp. 48-49.

¹⁰³ LAMPE, G. W., *A Patristic Greek Lexicon*, p. 1257.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 1362-66.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 1366.

¹⁰⁶ al-BANĎRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aĒwiba*, p. 155, 12-15

وقد تجدون كثيراً من أنواع الخلائق الموات تمدح بأشياء شتى كالشمس الممدوحة بجمال ضوئها وبهاء نورها وشرف هيئتها، وكانار بلطافة جرم جوهرها وسلطان حرها ومحامد آثارها. فسموه لذلك **جرماً** مضيئاً نيراً بهياً محرقةً منضجاً ...

The other two cannot subsist in themselves, and they can only exist in something else. These two are: the simple faculties and the accidents that befall **bodies** and entities.”¹⁰⁷

Here, body refers to the earthly, sublunar body, which carries accidents. It expresses body in a philosophical sense, as a substrate, parallel to an entity, which appears as the subject which can carry accidents. As for the synonymy of *Ēirm* and *ʿism*, it will show in another similar example, in which body, as the entity, the carrier of accidents (i.e. with the same meaning as we could see in this last example) is expressed by *ʿism*: “as the simple faculties and necessary accidents that cannot subsist in themselves without different **bodies**.”¹⁰⁸

These meanings that appear at ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ are not closely related to the ones we could see in Patristic use, as far as τό στερεόν was concerned. The other meaning, i.e. σῶμα, as a synonym of physical body, *ʿism* is more likely to have influenced his interpretation. Looking at the connotations of σῶμα we can see that these have a similar meaning to those used by ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ.

As for his Christian contemporaries, to the best of my knowledge, they don’t use the same term. With regard to Muslim uses, ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s contemporary, al-KindÐ defines only the term *Ēirm* of the ones listed above. It is described from the viewpoint of extent, saying: “Body is what has three dimensions.”¹⁰⁹ In this sense, *Ēirm* proves to be a synonym of *Ēism*, which is also a part of al-KindÐ’s vocabulary,¹¹⁰ but no definition is given for it. This definition is exactly the same Aristotle gives for body (cf. *De Coelo*, i, I, 268a, 7 f., and *Metaph.*, v, 13, 1020a, 7): a body is what has three dimensions (dimension: διάστασις, διάστημα, Arabic *buÝd, imtidÁd*) and is a continuous, therefore always divisible, quantity (ποσὸν συνεχές, *kamm muttaÒil*).¹¹¹ This meaning can also be found in Patristic literature, though its appearance in al-KindÐ’s definition might have originated in the philosophical tradition. Al-KindÐ mentions *Ēirm* another time, right before its definition, in the definition of *anima, nafs*, where the author considers it to be the completion of a body.¹¹² In the same

¹⁰⁷ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aĒwiba*, p. 162,12-15

فهذه الأربعة أشياء محيطة بكل ما هو موهوم ومحسوس. وليس شيء يدرك بوهم وحس إلا وهو داخل في هذه الأربعة المعاني لا محالة. فإثنان منها يقومان بأنفسهما، وهما الجوهر العام والقنوم الخاص، وإثنان لا يقومان بذاتهما ولا يوجدان إلا في غيرهما وهما القوى البسيطة والأعراض المعترضة في الأجرام والأعيان.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 163,14-15

... كالقوى البسيطة والأعراض المضطربة التي لا تستغني بأنفسها عن الأجسام المختلفة لها...

¹⁰⁹ al-KINDĪ, *RisÁla fÐ ĪudÙd al-ašyÁ’ wa-rusÙmihÁ*, p. 165.

الجرم ما له ثلاثة أبعاد.

¹¹⁰ e.g. when defining *nafs*, ‘*anima*’. MuĪammad ÝAbd al-HÁdÐ AbÙ RÐdÁ, the editor, adds in a footnote, that al-KindÐ mostly uses *Ēirm*, not *Ēism*. According to the editor’s view, *Ēism* became more widely used later. He also draws attention to the former term’s disappearance, and as a proof, he mentions that al-ĒurĒÁnÐ does not define it. C.f. p. 165.

¹¹¹ de BOER, T., *Djism*, p. 554.

¹¹² al-KINDĪ, *RisÁla fÐ ĪudÙd al-ašyÁ’ wa-rusÙmihÁ*, p.165.

description, it is used as a synonym of *Ēasad*: since soul is defined as the completion of the body (*°irm*), and then as the integrity of the body (*°ism*). This synonymity can also be found at ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, but the understanding of *Ēirm* as having dimensions is not present in the Christian author's text.

Ēism is the only term Ibn SĎnÁ defines among the ones under investigation in this chapter, but at the same time, *Ēirm* also appears in his use, as it is the case in the definition of fire,¹¹³ with the meaning of one of the elements, the Aristotelian ἀπλᾶ σώματα, as *°irm basÐÓ*. It means then that he also relies on the Aristotelian tradition. ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ used it in the context of the Sun as a burning, glowing “body,” and Ibn SĎnÁ's usage in the description of fire is really similar to that of ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ's first example. On this basis we may say that the Aristotelian classification was not only known to Ibn SĎnÁ, but already to ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, a Christian in the first half of the ninth century, which cannot be interpreted as a proof for the existence of direct influence, but indicates that a common tradition was shared by Muslims and Christians. To the best of my knowledge, there is no definition of this term in the other authors' texts.

2. *°ism*¹¹⁴

In philosophical language the body (σῶμα) is distinguished from the incorporeal (ἀσώματον), God, spirit, soul, etc. In Neo-Platonic influence on Muslim thought two features were emphasized: the incorporeal is simple and indivisible in nature, while the body is composite and divisible; the incorporeal is in spite of its negative character the original, the causing principle, while the body is a product of the incorporeal.¹¹⁵

On the authority of Afnan, the term *Ēism* is considered to be the translation of the following Greek philosophical concepts: σῶμα and τό στερεόν.¹¹⁶ Given that these two terms are exactly the same that were translated as *Ēirm*, it is not unexpected to find them in similar contexts, as synonyms in Arabic texts, too. In Patristic literature (as seen above) τό στερεόν may refer to a solid, firm body, while σῶμα has a plurality of meanings in Patristic literature, as well. Now suffice us to mention that σῶμα may mean a solid figure of three dimensions as

النفس تامة جرم طبيعي ذي آلة قبل للحياة؛ ويقال: هي استكمال أول لجسم طبيعي ذي حياة بالقوة؛ ويقال: هي جوهر عقل متحرك من ذاته بعدد مؤلف

¹¹³ Ibn SĎnÁ, *KitÁb al-ĤudÙd*, p. 27.

¹¹⁴ HAYEK does not provide a translation for this term.

¹¹⁵ de BOER, T., *Djism*, p. 553.

¹¹⁶ AFNAN, M. S., *A Philosophical Lexicon in Persian and Arabic*, p. 51.

understood by Church Fathers (and it is also used in this sense by Johannes Damascenus, as indicated by Lampe).¹¹⁷

Éism appears more frequently in a variety of contexts, implying a variety of connotations. Early in ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ's book, *ism* means a(n inanimate,) physical body (as such it must be created and thus stands in opposition with the simple, uncreated, and incorporeal). The following quote deals with a body's coming into being out of *hyle*:

“In what way is your statement similar to the first one? What similarity is there between your claim: that *hyle* resulted **bodies** out of no **body**, spirits from no spirit, and life out of the lack of life; and between the clay of the ceramist? It will remain clay forever, if the ceramist leaves the clay of the forms – out of which he forms his pot – in its original state. And if he burns it in fire and causes the humidity in it to cease, by this, he will bring it away from the substantiality of the clay which then becomes ceramics.”¹¹⁸

On this basis, body is material in nature, and it consists of *hyle* and form. This approach is close to the approach of Muslim philosophers, because they, as de Boer attests it, say with Aristotle that the body is composed of matter and form (*hayÙlÁ* or *mÁdda* and *ÒÙra*).¹¹⁹

As for ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, the creation of bodies, *aÈsÁm*, is a sign of omnipotence (i.e. as contrary to the lack of potency) in his interpretation: “this is the attribute of a failing, contemptible [being] that persists in his action by the domination of someone else, and he does not deserve to be described by the power to create **bodies** if he is impotent to enforce his will in what he wants.”¹²⁰ This quotation does not clarify what kind of body is referred to, but as the object of creation, ‘body’ may simply refer to a physical unit. The significance of the example lies in the idea that ‘body’ as a result of a creative action proves divine omnipotence.

Body, *ism* has the attributes of partition, and can only be created in time. Its being a body excludes the possibility of pre-eternity: “As for parts and divisions, they are not attributes of something which is not a **body** and has always existed in His pre-eternity. Instead, it is the attributes of **bodies** that are created in time, and which are composed and combined.”¹²¹ Neo-Platonic ideas are clearly reflected here, as well as they are in Muslim

¹¹⁷ LAMPE, G. W., *A Patristic Greek Lexicon*, p. 1366.

¹¹⁸ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ'il wa-'l-aÈwiba*, pp. 98,20-99,3

ما تشبه لعمرى قضيتكم هذه بالأولى؟ وأي قياس بين زعمكم أنها أنتجت من لا جسم أجساماً ومن لا روح أرواحاً ومن لا حياة حياة، وبين طينة صاحب الفخار التي، أن هو أهمل طينة الأشكال التي منها صور أنيته على حالها، ثبت للدهر طيناً، وإن حرقها بالنار فأزال الرطوبة المعترضة فيها عنها ونقلها بذلك عن جوهرية الطين وصارت فخاراً.

¹¹⁹ de BOER, T., *Djism*, p. 554.

¹²⁰ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ'il wa-'l-aÈwiba*, p. 103,12-13

فهذه صفة خائب مهين يصول بعزة غيره في أموره ولا يستحق أن يوصف بالقدرة على خلق الأجسام مع عجزه عن إنفاذ أمره فيما أراد

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 152,17-18

أما الأجزاء والأبعاد فليس من صفات ما ليس بجسم بل ما لم يزل موجوداً بأزليته. بل ذلك من صفات الأجسام المحدثة المؤلفة المركبة.

thought; in this, the two parties rely on shared sources. The same is true the other way round, if something is not a body, it cannot be partitioned:

“As their Creator is seen never to have ceased existing, it is right for us to establish life and rationality for Him necessarily. I do not know why some refute – though they ascertain a pre-eternal Artificer – that He should have pre-eternal life and pre-eternal wisdom. Do they consider this as something that would introduce parts and divisions in His substance? If so, they should annul their fear, and they should know that what is not a **body**, cannot be partitioned and divided.”¹²²

The example introduces the concept of body through a declaration that division and partition are physical actions or states that can only be traits of physical, combined and composed entities. In this context *ism* is to be understood as an inanimate, physical entity; its being animate or inanimate is irrelevant. However, we need to be aware that this evidence, establishing that physical entities can be divided, while division is meaningless outside the connotation of the body, is accepted by Muslims, too. This mutually accepted basis serves here to defend the Trinity. The establishment of God (the Father), His Son, i.e. the pre-eternal Life, and the Spirit, i.e. the pre-eternal wisdom¹²³ is rebutted by Muslims as introducing division in the Godhead, but Christian polemics, on the basis of mutually accepted Neo-Platonic teaching, according to which the incorporeal is in its nature simple and indivisible, try to demonstrate that this cannot be considered division, otherwise, if insisting upon it, Muslims would be accused of turning the incorporeal into a corporeal entity.

If a body can be divided, it can even intermingle with another,¹²⁴ but a body may never reach the pre-eternal, and the bodi(ly) can never mix with the divine. This preliminary gains special importance in the Nestorian teaching on the two *hypostases* of the Messiah: “the substance of the Pre-eternal transcends the tangibility by **bodies**, [stands above] intermixing, intermingling with them, being limited by them, and receiving accidents and contingency through them.”¹²⁵ On the other hand, it can be paralleled to the teaching of the Muslim

¹²² al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ'il wa-'l-aÊwiba*, p. 153,13-17

لذلك إذ ألفي خالقها لم يزال حياً، حق لنا أن نوجب له الحياة والنطق اضطراراً ولست أدري لم أنكر هؤلاء المنكرون، إثباتاً للصانع الأزلي حياةً أزلية وحكمة جوهرية أيحسبون أن ذلك يوجب في جوهره أجزاءً وأبعاضاً فإن ظنوا ذلك فليبتلوا ظنهم ويعلموا أن ما لم يكن **جسماً** فلا إمكان للتجزئ والتبعيض فيه أصلاً

¹²³ According to M. Hayek, in referring to the Word by the term wisdom and the Spirit by the term life, ÝAmmÁr al-BaÔrÐ shares the Catholicos Timothy's practice. C.f. HAYEK, M., *ÝAmmÁr al-BaÔrÐ, La première somme de théologie chrétienne en langue arabe, ou deux apologies du Christianisme*. In: *Islamochristiana*, (1976) 2, p. 81.

¹²⁴ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ'il wa-'l-aÊwiba*, p. 189,13-15. “If a **body** intermingles with another, the result is more probable to be heavy and to [be ready to] mix than the two [original] bodies out of which it resulted.”

بل إذا مزج **جسم** جسماً كانت النتيجة الكائنة منها أحلو للكثافة والغلط من الجسمين الذين عنهما كانت النتيجة.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 215,1-3

counterpart (Mu'ytazilites and other theologians), who claimed that a God limited by a body could not be omnipresent, consequently God's being a body, or God's inhabiting a body is impossible. Let us examine another example, which highlights the same idea and plays an important role in disputes. God's (or the Word's) dwelling in a physical entity, being surrounded (as just referred to in the previous paragraph) by a body appeared both in disputes among Muslims, and between Christians and Muslims. If the Son is considered to be divine, the same problem arises as far as his inhabitation is concerned. In this example we may find the same teaching: God is not restricted by the body. The problem is resolved by introducing the idea that the divine may appear *through* the body. Interestingly enough, in the last case in this example, body is referred to by *asad* instead of *ism*, which will indicate differences in their connotations:

“There is no modality of the Pre-eternal and His actions, and there is nothing similar to Him or to His deeds. Just as in the case of light: He created it as clear light in the beginning of creation (as He said in the book of Genesis), then, this light dwelt in a small, thick, dense **body**. He linked and combined them; and made this **body** a dwelling place and source for the light. Out of this **body** the light can pour out for the benefit of the earth and its magnitude, without the **body's** limiting or restricting the light, or any place surrounding it. Instead, it is the light that limits, restricts and contains the **body**. The Pre-eternal substance can also do the same, and even more. He is not surrounded or limited by any **body**, nor is He contained in any place. He could assume a human [being] for Himself by way of His incarnation, or a temple in which He can dwell, or a dwelling place out of which he can address people. The **body** he took as a garment for Himself did not contain Him, His dwelling place did not restrict or guide Him, His temple, out of which He addressed people, did not limit Him. Instead, He surrounded and restricted this **body**, and He appeared through it.”¹²⁶

The first sentence shows that YammAr al-BaOrD aims at disputing on a mutually accepted basis. The *bi-lÁ kayf* idea of Muslims is expressed in a similar way: i.e. *lÁ kayfiyyata li-'l-AzalD*; and he also emphasizes that nothing can be similar to God or His actions. However, he introduces the issue through an analogy. The first part of the analogy introduces the light to which the divine is compared to, as being created and existing without a body. This body comes into being later, and instead of containing the light, it is contained by the light. The

جوهرا الأزلي... متعالٍ عن مماسة الأجسام ومخالطتها والامتزاج بها والتركيب معها والتحديد فيها وقبول الأحداث والأعراض من قبلها.
¹²⁶ al-BAÑRĪ, YammAr, *KitAb al-MasÁ'il wa-'l-aÉwiba*, p. 194,8-16
 وإن كان لا كيفية للأزلي وصفاته ولا شبه له ولا بفعاله، فإنه كما في النور الذي خلقه نوراً مبيناً في مبتدى الخلق، كما قال في سفر الخليفة، ثم حلولة في الرابع جسماً صغيراً غليظاً كثيفاً فربطه وألفه وجعله له محلاً ومعدناً ينشئ منه إلى شرف الأرض وعزتها من غير أن يحده الجسم أو يحصره أو يحويه، بل هو المحيط الحاصر له الحاوي عليه؛ كذلك وأفضل من ذلك أمكن الجوهر الأزلي، الذي لا يحيط به جسم يحصره ولا مكان يحويه، أن يتخذ لنفسه بشراً بتجسده وهيكله يحل فيه ومحلاً يخاطب الناس منه. ولم يحوه الجسد الذي تدرعه ولا حصره مسكنه ولا حكمه ولا حده هيكله الذي خاطب الناس منه، بل هو المحيط به الحاوي له الظاهر عليه

phrase *lÁ kayfiyyata li-'l-AzalÐ* was necessary, since the divine cannot be fully compared to it, because the divine is not created; but it has always been existent, even before the creation of the Messiah's body, in which He later dwelt, as the light did in its body. Though it will be a second step to compare terms that appear together, we may see that *°asad* and *°ism* are used as synonyms, however, the human body, more specifically the one that was taken by the divine, is not referred to by *°ism*, but by *°asad* instead. *ism* is still used as an inanimate, physical entity, whereas *°asad* appears as the human body, or more specifically, the Messiah's body or flesh. The analogy of the light and Sun frequently appears in Patristic literature, so the imagery *YammÁr al-BaÒrÐ* (and as we will soon see: *AbÙ RÁ'iÔa*) uses here relies on Greek roots.

YammÁr al-BaÒrÐ makes the term *°ism* the basis of distinction between person and *hypostasis*, as we can see it in the demonstration of divine *hypostases* for the opponents: "We have not named them three persons, and nobody should imagine out of what we said that we named them persons, since person means **body** for us, which is limited by its diameters and limbs, which distinguish them in contrast to other **bodies**. Instead, we have called them three *hypostases* in Syriac: (ܡܘܨܬܐܝܢܐ)." ¹²⁷ In this case, body is a physical entity with dimensions and parts. If *šalÒ* is translated as person, this body can also be imagined as an animate one, but it is more probable that this occurrence refers to a living, biological-physical entity or a unit which has parts and dimensions. It is also noteworthy that *°ism* is used in a definition where divine *hypostases* are introduced, since it offers a parallel with Muslim anthropomorphism, *°ism* being the term used by Muslim authors to refer to God as (having) a body. ¹²⁸ *YammÁr al-BaÒrÐ*, as well as Muslim orthodoxy rejects this view. ('Person' as *šalÒ* is rather used by Jacobite theologians, when they refer to the three *hypostases*; as an example, let us mention

¹²⁷ al-BAÑRĪ, *YammÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ'il wa-'l-aÊwiba*, 162,1-3

لم نسميها ثلاثة أشخاص، ولا توهم من أحد علينا أن سميها أشخاصاً، لأن الشخص عندنا كل جسم محدود بأقطاره وجوارح تفصل بينه وبين ما سواه من الأجسام. بل سميها بلسان سرياني ثلاثة أقانيم.

On the question of *ousia-hypostasis* see VANYÓ, László, *Bevezetés az ókeresztény kor dogmatörténetébe*, Budapest, Szent István Társulat, 2009. p. 415.

¹²⁸ Martin asserts that anthropomorphism appeared first in the claims of some Muslims declaring that God has a physical body (*Êism*). "Corporealism ... was not based on any occurrence of the term with that sense in the Qur'Án, but on literal understandings of Qur'Ánic descriptions of God as having a physical body, ... on the ground that God exists and only that which has physical extension can exist." C.f. MARTIN, R. C., *Anthropomorphism*, p. 103.

As for the verses: "Often cited were such passages as the Throne Verse (2:255; cf. 20:5) which suggests that God is seated on a throne in heaven and the passages that suggest God has hands (e.g. 3:73; 5:64; 48:10) and eyes (e.g. 20:39; 52:48; 54:14)." C.f. *Ibid.* p. 103.

The explanation of the term can be found at van ESS, J., *TashbDÍ wa-tanzDÍ*, pp. 341-44; p. 342., too, in a similar sense.

AbÛ RÁ'îÔa.¹²⁹ This term, if used in relation to the divine, however, is rejected by Muslim theologians, too.¹³⁰)

Concluding we may say that *'ism* in ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ's use is a corporeal entity, a physical being, which is created (in time), and cannot be pre-eternal. It is inanimate, composite and compound, is subject to partition and division. A body is capable of mixing and mingling, but cannot affect or limit the divine principle. Its creation is a sign of divine omnipotence. In the majority of the cases no special reference is made to its being a body of an animal or a human, so a physical corporeal entity is the best circumscription we can give for it. ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ's *Êism* is close to the τó στερεόν of Patristic literature in connotation with the meaning of a solid, firm body, and we have seen various collisions with the plurality of meanings of σῶμα, as well.

ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ's Jacobite contemporary, AbÛ RÁ'îÔa uses the term frequently in his treatise on Incarnation, in a way that offers ground for comparison. But while the body of the Messiah is mainly referred to by the term *Êasad*, other bodies and their embodying are expressed by *Êism* and *taÊassum*. In one of his analogies, he talks about the fire that cannot be perceived due to its subtlety, unless it embodies in any body (referred to as *Êism*). But the fire does not change away from its essentiality in the embodiment, neither does the body in which it embodies.¹³¹ The bodies that are referred to in the action of embodiment are wood, candle, gold, or silver, so 'body' is used as a reference to a physical entity, just as in the case of ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ. Another example needs to be mentioned since it is really similar to an example by ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, thus its Patristic origin may be confirmed by its collective usage in Christian circles. The example is that of the light and the Sun. AbÛ RÁ'îÔa refers to the creation of the Sun's light three days before that the body as dwelling place would have been created, establishing that neither the body nor the light of the Sun changed away from their essentiality.¹³² A difference is to be remarked, though: while ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ uses

¹²⁹ ABØ RÁ'ÍÓA, *Die Schriften des Jacobiten ÍabÐb Ibn Êidma AbÛ RÁ'îÔa*, Ed. GRAF, Georg, Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium vol. 130.; *Scriptores Arabici* tom. 14., Louvain, Peeters, 1951., pp. 11, 107, 109, 110, 11, 163-65.

¹³⁰ C.f. HAYEK, M., *ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, La première somme de théologie chrétienne en langue arabe, ou deux apologies du Christianisme*. p. 83.

¹³¹ ABØ RÁ'ÍÓA, *al-RisÁla al-×Ániyya li-AbÐ RÁ'îÔa al-TakrÐtÐ fÐ al-taÊassud*. In: *Die Schriften des Jacobiten ÍabÐb Ibn Êidma AbÛ RÁ'îÔa*, Ed. Georg GRAF, Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium vol. 130.; *Scriptores Arabici* tom. 14., Louvain, Peeters, 1951. pp. 27-64., (Later on: ABØ RÁ'ÍÓA, *FÐ al-taÊassud*.) p. 31.

ما تقولون في النار التي من جوهرها لا تبصر ولا تحس ولا تقع تحت شيء من الحواس البطة للطفها دون أن تتجسم ببعض الأجسام إما حطب وإما شمع وإما ذهب وإما فضة وغير ذلك من الأجسام. أفتررون النار هي بتجسمها ببعده هذه الأجسام الموصوفة متغيرة أم متبدلة عن ناريتها أو الأجسام المتجسمة فيها إلى غير حالها الأولى. وانما النار نار أبداً وإن تجسمت ببعده الجسوم. والجسم جسم أبداً وإن تجسّمته النار.

¹³² ABØ RÁ'ÍÓA, *FÐ al-taÊassud*, p. 31.

this example to elucidate dwelling, AbÛ RÁ'îÔa applies it as an analogy for incarnation, and to demonstrate that this occurrence does not infer change upon the “participants.” AbÛ RÁ'îÔa also refers to the Torah, to give the example a greater emphasis.

The Melkite counterpart, Theodore AbÛ Qurra uses the term rarely, with the meaning of a physical entity. He divides corporeal entities to animate ones, *aÊsÁm nafsÁniyya* and inanimate ones, *aÊsÁm Êayr nafsÁniyya*. He then places human bodies parallel to them (referred to by the word *Êasad*), and then establishes that all these are made up of the four elements: fire, air, water and earth.¹³³ In this, he resembles ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ: a common heritage must have been known to Christian authors, without respect to the denomination they belonged to.

As for the Muslim counterparts, it was already mentioned above that al-KindÐ uses the term *Êism*, but no definition is given for it. However, when al-KindÐ defines the soul, *nafs*, he mentions *Êism* and *Êirm* as synonyms.¹³⁴ The same term is to be noticed in the definition of place, *makÁn*.¹³⁵ On the basis of the context, *Êism* is a physical (probably inanimate) body which has dimensions. When describing elements, the author refers to them as the smallest constituents of bodies: here, *Êism* is to be understood again as an inanimate, physical, and composite body that is made up from parts.¹³⁶ The same could be our conclusion on the basis of the definition of contingency,¹³⁷ odour,¹³⁸ and cleaving.¹³⁹ In the definition of nature, body appears as governed by a faculty.¹⁴⁰ In a definition for philosophy,¹⁴¹ it can be an inanimate physical entity or a human body, as well. Man consists of body, *Êism*; soul, *nafs*,

وما قولكم في نور الشمس الذي مكث بعد ما خلق ثلاثة أيام غير متجسم بالعين. يعرف ذلك من قرأ التوراة. فتجسم بالعين من غير تغيير عن جوهره الأول وهو نور من قبل أن يتجسم ومن بعد تجسمه.

¹³³ ABØ QURRA, Theodore, *Maymar fÐ wuÊÛd al- ÊÁliq wa- 'l-dÐn al-qawÐm*, p. 178.

¹³⁴ al-KINDÏ, *RisÁla fÐ ÊudÛd al-aÿyÁ' wa-rusÛmihÁ*, p.165.

النفس تمامية جرم طبيعي ذي آلة قابل للحياة؛ ويقال: هي استكمال أول لجسم طبيعي ذي حياة بالقوة؛ ويقال: هي جوهر عقل متحرك من ذاته بعدد مؤلف

¹³⁵ Ibid., p. 127.

المكان نهايات الجسم؛ ويقال: هو التقاء أفقي المحيط والمحاط به

¹³⁶ Ibid., p. 128.

الأسطقس - منه يكون الشيء، ويرجع إليه منحلأ، وفيه الكائن بالقوة؛ وأيضاً: هو عنصر الجسم، وهو أصغر الأشياء من جملة الجسم.

¹³⁷ Ibid., p. 170.

المماسة - توالى جسمين ليس بينهما [من] طبيعتهما ولا من طبيعة غيرهما إلا ما لا يدركه الحس؛ وأيضاً هو تناهى نهايات الجسمين إلى خط مشترك بينهما

¹³⁸ Ibid., p. 172.

الرائحة - خروج هواء محتقن في جسم عارض فيه، مخالطة له قوة ذلك الجسم

¹³⁹ Ibid., p. 176.

الملازقة - إمساك نهايات الجسمين جسماً بينهما

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 179.

قول الفلاسفة في الطبيعة: تسمى الفلاسفة الهيلولي طبيعة، وتسمى الصورة طبيعة، وتسمى ذات كل شيء من الأشياء طبيعة، وتسمى الطريق إلى السكون طبيعة، وتسمى القوة المدبرة للأجسام طبيعة

¹⁴¹ Ibid., p.173.

وحدها أيضاً فقالوا: الفلسفة معرفة الإنسان نفسه؛ وهذا قول شريف النهاية بعيد الغور: مثلاً أقول: إن الأشياء إذا كانت أجساماً ولا أجسام، وما لا أجسام إما جوهر وإما أعراض، وكان الإنسان هو الجسم والنفس والأعراض، وكانت النفس جوهرأ لا جسمأ، فإنه إذا عرف ذاته عرف الجسم بأعراضه والعرض الأول والجوهر الذي هو لا جسم؛ فإنن إذا علم ذلك جميعأ، فقد علم الكل؛ ولهذه العلة سمي الحكماء الإنسان العالم الأصغر.

and accidents. According to Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Hādī Abū Radda, the editor of *Rasāʾil al-Kindī*, the broad use of *Ēism* as a term is a later development.¹⁴² This then means that ʿAmmār al-Baʿrī attests to the term's early formation, preceding Muslim authors in its use. His exact, consistent use of the term with the meaning of a physical, biological entity seems to correspond to al-Kindī's interpretation (even if the latter author does not consider this term of primary importance). However, al-Kindī's usage of the term when referring to an animate body is not paralleled by Christian examples.

In al-Ēwārizmī's *Mafātīḥ al-ʿUlūm*, *Ēism* is defined according to different fields: we can see it in *kalām* first: "According to the theologians, bodies are composed of parts that cannot be [further] divided, and these are the atoms. ... According to them, body is a collection of atoms, which has length, breadth, and depth."¹⁴³ In philosophy, he gives a definition for the natural body and another for the mathematical body.¹⁴⁴ Body may belong to human beings, too, but it is rather the physical body itself that is concentrated on. The 'body' referred to in the field of *handasa* is also a physical one that has three dimensions.¹⁴⁵ In the light of al-Ēwārizmī's definitions, it is the field of theology in which some interaction might have taken place. ʿAmmār al-Baʿrī's usage of *Ēism* as a composite and compound physical entity may be paralleled with al-Ēwārizmī's definition for the term's theological use.

Ibn Fūrak's *Kitāb al-Īdūd* highlights only one aspect of the physical body: its being composite.¹⁴⁶ In this respect, he reflects Neo-Platonic classification, and might be paralleled to ʿAmmār al-Baʿrī. We have seen though that the latter's understanding of the concept is much richer and appears in a variety of contexts: in this, he seems to precede Muslim authors.

In his *Kitāb al-Īdūd*, Ibn Sīnā gives three definitions for *Ēism*.¹⁴⁷ Just like in the case of the intellect, Ibn Sīnā is aware of the confusion concerning the various understandings of *Ēism*. He says that people call continuous and limited quantities that have

¹⁴² al-KINDĪ, *Risāla fī ʿĪdūd al-aṣyāʾ wa-rusūmihā*, p. 165.

¹⁴³ al-ĒWĀRIZMĪ, *Mafātīḥ al-ʿUlūm*, p. 83.

وعند المتكلمين أن الأجسام مؤلفة من أجزاء لا تتجزأ وهي الجوهر الفرد. ... والجسم عندهم المجتمع من الجواهر طولاً وعرضاً وعمقاً.
¹⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 165.

الجسم الطبيعي هو المتمكن الممانع المقاوم والقائم بالفعل في وقته ذلك كهذا الحائط وهذا الجبل وذلك الإنسان. الجسم التعليمي هو المتوهم الذي يقام في الوهم، ويتصور تصوراً فقط

¹⁴⁵ Ibid. p. 218.

¹⁴⁶ Ibn FŪRAK, *Kitāb al-Īdūd fī ʿl-uŪl*, p. 21.

حد الجسم: هو المؤلف

¹⁴⁷ Ibn SĪNĀ, *Kitāb al-Īdūd*, pp. 22-23.

حد الجسم. الجسم اسم مشترك يقال على معان فيقال جسم لكل كم متصل محدود ممسوح فيه أبعاد ثلاثة بالقوة ويقال جسم لصورة ما يمكن أن يفرض فيه أبعاد كيف شئت طولاً وعرضاً وعمقاً ذات حدود متعينة ويقال جسم لجوهر مؤلف من هيولى وصورة بهذه الصفة. والفرق بين الكم وبين هذه الصورة أن قطعة من الماء أو الشمع كلمة بدلت شكله تبدلت فيه الأبعاد المحدودة الممسوحة ولم يبق واحد منها بعينه واحداً فيه بالعدد وبقيت الصورة القابلة لهذه الأحوال وهي جسمية واحدة بالعدد من غير تبدل ولا تغير ولذلك إذا تكاثفت وتخلخت لم تستحل صورة الجسمية واستحالت أبعاده فإذن فرق بين الصورة الجسمية التي هي من باب الكم وبين الصورة التي هي من باب الجوهر

three dimensions bodies. Another understanding defined by him comprises limited forms in which dimensions may be imposed in length, breadth, and depth. And a third meaning of *Ēism* in Ibn SĒnÁ's description refers to composite substances that are made up from matter and form. In the light of this classification, ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrĒ's interpretation belongs to the third group. Ibn SĒnÁ goes on to explain that different meanings are due to a difference in approach: the core of the interpretation may either be the quantity or the substance. But this is more elucidated than ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrĒ's concept, given that ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrĒ is representative for the early formation of the concept and term, while Ibn SĒnÁ for a later, more developed stage.

Al-ÀmidĒ, in his *al-MubĒn*, defines body as a compound (physical) entity that consists of at least two atoms.¹⁴⁸ (By this time, this interpretation must have become widely accepted, since even his contemporary, MÛsÁ ibn MaymÛn (d. 603 AH/AD 1205) also refers to it in the *Guide for the Perplexed*.¹⁴⁹) He then goes on to define the mathematical body on the basis of dimensions and the possibility of division.¹⁵⁰ All these examples show that the differentiated definition of 'body' as expressed by the term *Ēism* is a later development in Muslim thought.

And finally, let us see how al-ÉurÁnĒ defines this term in his *al-TaÝrĒfÁt*. He puts down that a body is a substance, which can receive three dimensions (i.e., as accidents), and it is a composite, compound substance. He also defines the mathematical body saying that it can be divided in all three dimensions. According to this description, the end of the surface is the end of the natural body, but it can be used as a demonstrative subject for sciences.¹⁵¹ These two descriptions show that *Ēism* is an inanimate, physical body here, as well. As for its being a composite and compound substance, this idea had already been present in 9th-century authors' works.

ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrĒ's interpretation and usage is recurrent in all these later works, so an early Muslim – Christian interaction is likely to have happened in this field. Later Muslim

¹⁴⁸ al-ÀMIDĪ, S., *al-MubĒn fĒ šarĪ maÝÁnĒ alfÁÛ al-ĪukamÁ' wa-'l-mutakallimĒn*, p. 110.

وأما الجسم: فعبارة عن المؤلف عن جوهرين فردين فصاعداً
¹⁴⁹ IBN MAYMØN, M., *DalÁlat al-ĪÁ'irĒn*, Maktabat al-ŌaqÁfa al-DĒniyya, Cairo, 1974. pp. 196-197.
 المقدمة الأولى معناها أنهم زعموا أن العالم بجملته أعني كل جسم فيه هو مؤلف من أجزاء صغيرة جداً لا تقبل التجزئة لدقتها ولا للجزء الواحد منها كم بوجه. فإذا اجتمع بعضها على بعض كان المجتمع ذا كم، وهو جسم حينئذ ولو اجتمع منها جزئان

¹⁵⁰ al-ÀMIDĪ, S., *al-MubĒn fĒ šarĪ maÝÁnĒ alfÁÛ al-ĪukamÁ' wa-'l-mutakallimĒn*, p. 111.

وأما الجسم التعليمي: فعبارة عن بعد قابل للتجزئة في ثلاث جهات متقاطعة على حد واحد تقاطعاً قائماً

¹⁵¹ al-ÉURÉÀNĪ, *KitÁb al-TaÝrĒfÁt*, pp. 86-87.

الجسم : جوهر قابل للأبعاد الثلاثة، وقيل: الجسم هو المركب المؤلف من الجوهر. الجسم التعليمي: هو الذي يقبل الانقسام طولاً وعرضاً وعمقاً، ونهايته السطح، وهو نهاية الجسم الطبيعي، ويسمى: جسماً تعليمياً، إذ يبحث عنه في العلوم التعليمية: أي الرياضة الباحثة عن أحوال الكم المتصل والمنفصل، منسوبة إلى التعليم والرياضة، فإنهم كانوا يبتدؤون بها في تعليمهم ورياضتهم لنفوس الصبيان، لأنها أسهل إدراكاً.

works are more detailed, but it is due to an elaboration that is a result of a long-term development of *kalÁm* and philosophy.

3. *'asad*¹⁵²

According to de Boer, *Êasad* is usually used as a synonym of *Êism*, applied to the human body, or even for the bodies of higher beings (angels etc.). In its plural form, as *a°sÁd*, it is used for minerals, too.¹⁵³ On the basis of Afnan's lexicon, we also know that it is the equivalent of the Greek term *σῶμα*.¹⁵⁴ If we turn to Lampe's *σῶμα*, we will see that some of its meanings (neglected so far) will offer parallels to this term. Lampe brings man's body at the first place, subdivided into the earthly body, (related to soul and their connexion), then its relation to Christ (His human body, similar to all men's bodies, not converted into divine nature, indwelt by Logos, united with Logos, in relation to deity; Logos not sullied by contact with body).¹⁵⁵

Furthermore, it is the Greek term, *σὰρξ*, which allows us to understand better the meaning of *Êasad*. The Greek text of the Gospel of John (1,14): "Καὶ ὁ λόγος *σὰρξ* ἐγένετο καὶ ἐσκήνωσεν ἐν ἡμῖν" is particularly illustrative. According to Lampe, this word can mean 'flesh,' 'body, as an integral part of man.' It appears many times in relation with 'its resurrection.' It can also mean 'man,' and as for Christological texts, they use this term to refer to the 'action of Incarnation,' or the 'human nature of Christ,' and 'Christ's body.'

In ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ's text, when appearing alone (i.e. without being accompanied by other terms referring to corporeal connotations), *Êasad* is mostly used to raise the question whether the body assumed by the divine may be considered the body of God. It also refers to human body, as an entity that will resurrect. As for the first field: the analogy of the relation of the body of light and the appearance of light through it was introduced above to describe the body of the Messiah and the divine appearance through it. We could see in that analogy that the body of the light was referred to by the term *Êism*, but when the body of the Messiah was mentioned, the author switched from the usage of *Êism* to the term *Êasad*. In the following example we can observe the same thing: when the body the Messiah took for Himself is referred to, it is again the term *Êasad* which is used:

¹⁵² HAYEK does not provide a translation for this term.

¹⁵³ de BOER, T., *Djism*, p. 555.

¹⁵⁴ AFNAN, M. S., *A Philosophical Lexicon in Persian and Arabic*, p. 50.

¹⁵⁵ LAMPE, G. W., *A Patristic Greek Lexicon*, p. 1366.

“It is astonishing that some people may claim that what made them call him one substance, one *hypostasis*, is the will to make the verity of unification between the divine and the human necessary. [By this, they also wanted to make] the rules of duality [necessary] in every respect concerning the unity of the one Messiah, who consists of these two. Then they called the **body** of the Messiah the **body** of God, and thus, though they wanted to escape from establishing two hypostases, and setting up two substances and denying the unity of the Messiah, they fell into something even more severe. It is because in their calling the **body** the **body** of God, there is an establishment of the duality of the two substances in the one Messiah, necessarily: i.e. God, and His **body**. And this would mean the establishing of their duality together with the negation of the unity of the Messiah who consists of them, and to whom the substance of both is attached.”¹⁵⁶

Interpreting the body of the Messiah as the body of God would imply a dualistic approach. This argumentation might not only be addressed to Muslims, but fellow Christians, namely the Orthodox. Nestorius had taught that in the incarnation two distinct *hypostases* were conjoined in Jesus Christ. The teaching of Chalcedon, according to which there was one *hypostasis* in Christ, was denounced by Nestorians. The example aims at demonstrating that such a unity would actually imply a dualistic interpretation.

Right after this part, as an explanation for this idea, another analogy is introduced in the text,¹⁵⁷ relating that a human being consists of his body and soul, and if his body were considered as the body of the soul, and his soul as the soul of the body, it would be dualistic as well. Interestingly enough, when talking of the human, both *Ēasad* and *badan* are used to refer to his body, though *badan* prevails, as the word mostly used for human beings, or their torsos. In the end, a conclusion is drawn, as follows:

“If not, then where is the unity of the human being, who has a soul and a **body**, if the **body** of the Messiah is called the **body** of the pre-eternal God, and the Pre-eternal is called the divinity of the **body**? By this, the unity of the Messiah, whom both His divinity and humanity is attached to, would get invalidated, and by this, the duality of the divine and the human would become necessary, because this would necessarily exclude their unity and composition.”¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁶ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ'il wa-Ðl-aĒwiba*, pp. 197,15-198,2:

والعجب لعقول قوم زعموا أنه دعاهم إلى تسميته جوهرأ واحداً وقنوماً واحداً إرادة إيجاب حقيقة الاتحاد بين اللاهوت والناسوت، والقواعد الاثنينية في الوجوه كلها على وحدانية المسيح الواحد القائم منهما. ثم سموا **جسد** المسيح **جسد** الله، فوقعوا من إثبات القنومين وإقامة الجوهرين وإبطال وحدانية المسيح في أعظم مما هربوا منه. وذلك لأن في تسميتهم **الجسد** **جسد** الله إثبات اثنينية الجوهرين في المسيح اضطراراً، أي الله **وجسده**. وذلك مع إيجاب ثنائيتهم وإبطال وحدانية المسيح القائم منهما المضاف إليه الجوهر من كليهما

¹⁵⁷ Ibid. p. 198,2-10

¹⁵⁸ Ibid. p. 198,7-10

وإلا فأين توجد وحدانية الانسان الواحد الذي له النفس والبدن، إذا قيل **لجسد** المسيح **جسد** الله الأزلي، وللأزلي لاهوت **الجسد**. بطلت بذلك وحدانية المسيح المضاف إليه لاهوته وناسوته، وأوجبت به اثنينية الإله والإنسان بإيجاب تعطيلهما عن الاتحاد والائتلاف، لا محالة

We can see that this conclusion of the above-mentioned analogy uses the term *badan*, when referring to the body of the human, and *Ēasad*, when the body of the Messiah and the so-supposed “body of the pre-eternal God” is described. There seems to be a differentiation between the two terms’ denotations, as well as it can be considered a hierarchy of meanings.

The question may be investigated from another approach: the body as the body of “God” may only be referred to if the Son is specified among the three *hypostases*. “The Messiah – eulogy – is God, but God is not the Messiah, since the name ‘God’ refers to the Messiah, and to others: the Father and the Spirit. This is why it is impossible to say. “the **body** of God” or that “Mary born God” without first pointing at the Messiah and saying that the **body** is the **body** of the Messiah who is God in all.”¹⁵⁹ In every instance in this quotation, the “body of God” or the body of the Messiah is described by the term *Ēasad*. (At this point, it is important to refer to the specifically Nestorian nature of the argumentation, as far as Mary as God-bearer is concerned. Nestorians taught that the Virgin was a woman and gave birth to a human being in the nature of his humanity, so she cannot be called Theotokos.¹⁶⁰ This example is probably not articulated against Muslims, but Orthodox Christians instead.)

The body as the body of God is examined through scriptural evidence, too. Examples are cited from the Gospel of Matthew,¹⁶¹ Luke,¹⁶² etc.¹⁶³ Finally, let us remember, that it is the term *Ēasad*, which appears when it comes to the body of the human being that will resurrect:

“the Messiah is who vivifies the two worlds by His power, and the cause of His appearance on the world was that He wanted to save humankind from their error, and to drive them from the obedience of Satan to the obedience of their Lord, and to fill their mind with certainty concerning what He had told them: that their **bodies** would resurrect and go to the [eternal] happiness, which He had prepared for those who are the first among them regarding godliness.”¹⁶⁴

This is the first instance that we have seen the term *Ēasad* as referring to human bodies, but apparently what justifies it is the fact that a resurrected body is beyond the earthly sphere; it is

¹⁵⁹ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-Pl-aĒwiba*, p. 199,7-10

وذلك أيضاً لأنه إن كان المسيح جل ثناؤه إلهاً، فليس الله هو المسيح، لأن اسم الله واقع على المسيح وعلى غير المسيح أي الأب والروح. فلذلك استحال أن يقال **جسد** الله وإن مريم ولدت الله، دون يبدأ بذكر المسيح فيقال **الجسد** المسيح والذي هو إله على كل

¹⁶⁰ See also VANYÓ, László, *Bevezetés az ókeresztény kor dogmatörténetébe*, p. 499.

¹⁶¹ Ibid. p. 200,3-8

¹⁶² Ibid. p. 200,9-10

¹⁶³ The author probably used an Arabic translation, though it is not explicitly laid down. Arabic translations of the New Testament are numerous and rather diverse, thought to have been made from Greek, Syriac, and Coptic exemplars. The earliest manuscripts seem to date from the ninth century. The oldest dated manuscript of the version (Sinai Arab. 151) comes from 867. The translations probably are not more than a century or two older.

¹⁶⁴ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-Pl-aĒwiba*, p. 229,14-17

كذلك المسيح محبي العالمين بقوته، إذ كان سبب ظهوره في العالم ليستنقذ الناس من ضلالتهم ويجذبهم من طاعة إبليس إلى طاعة ربهم وليشبع عقولهم يقيناً بما بشرهم به من قيامة **أجسادهم** ومصيرها إلى النعيم الذي أعده لأولي الصلاح منهم

a higher form which is then worthy of being referred to by the same term that delineates the body the Messiah took.

Concluding we may say that the body, or flesh is the object of assumption, and as such, must be clarified whether is or is not the body of God. The term usually refers to the body of the Messiah, and scarcely to an entity which is to resurrect. In this sense this is an organic body, which does not have a soul in itself, so it might be compared to the Latin term, *caro*. On this basis, we can already understand why it is chosen as the basis for the derived form, *incarnatio*, i.e. *taĒassud*.

Patristic connotations as mentioned above on the authority of Lampe are similar to these ones expressed by ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ's *Ēasad*, so Patristic use of σῶμα may have had an influence on the Christian Arab understanding of *Ēasad*, either as the Messiah's body or resurrection body. But in so far the Messiah's body is concerned; it is even more probable that the term σὰρξ had the primary influence on its formation.

As for ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ's Jacobite contemporary, AbÛ RÁ'iÔa, he is not as consistent in the use of terminology as the Nestorian author. He sometimes refers to the Word's incarnation in a body by the word *Ēism*,¹⁶⁵ while incarnation itself is referred to by the term *taĒassud*. In other instances he uses the same roots to give a description for the action of incarnation by the body, referred to as *Ēasad*, e.g. when the Muslim opponent asks if the incarnation of the incarnating one is an action or a part of the incarnating one. The response first concentrates on the incarnating one, establishing that His essence comprises both the body (*Ēasad*) and incarnation (*taĒassud*). As for the incarnation of the incarnating one, it is neither an act nor a part, but a way to the action. As for the body, two approaches are possible: if the divine essence is concentrated on, it cannot be taken for His part, but if the combined one (i.e. the Messiah that is the combination of the divine essence and the body) is in the centre, then the body is considered to be its part. In this, AbÛ RÁ'iÔa may be paralleled to ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, since *Ēasad* is the body of the Messiah, or His flesh.¹⁶⁶

As for Theodore AbÛ Qurra, he uses this term more frequently. In some instances, a differentiation between kinds of bodies can be observed: suffice us to refer to the example we cited above, in which we could see that corporeal entites are referred to by the term *Ēism* in general, while human body is expressed by the term *Ēasad*. In other instances *Ēasad* denotes

¹⁶⁵ ABØ RÁ'ÍÓA, *FD al-taĒassud*, p. 31.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

a physical entity, e.g. when he speaks of the earth.¹⁶⁷ The unity of the human is described as consisting of an inner soul and a visible body, *Ēasad*.¹⁶⁸ In the other appearances, the term always refers to a body of a human being. So even if some inconsistency can be noticed, the average denotation of the term is that of a human body in Theodore AbŪ Qurra's text.

The absence of Muslim use of *Ēasad* as a theological term until al-ĒurĒĀnĒ could be seen as an additional proof for its presence in Arabic language in a Christological sense as *caro* for the first time. Early Muslim authors ignore it as a theological term. As for al-ĒwĀrizmĒ, he uses it in its plural form, in his chapter on *al-kĒmyĀ'*,¹⁶⁹ with the meaning of 'elements.' As for al-ĒurĒĀnĒ, he has an entry on *Ēasad* as a living body and incarnated being. The core of his definition is a spirit, *rŪĪ*, which manifests in a body (it can be of fire, *nĀrĒ*, then it is a demon, *Ēinn*; or it can be of light, *nŪrĒ*, then it is an angel or a human being).¹⁷⁰ It is to note that al-ĒurĒĀnĒ defines here the theosophical use rather than the theological. If we concentrate on a spirit's appearance through a body, in this respect ŸammĀr al-BaŒrĒ's use and al-ĒurĒĀnĒ's definition show close similarity. Thus, its later appearance in Muslim Sufi terminology indicates a possible Christian influence.

4. *Badan*¹⁷¹

According to Afnan, even this term can be considered to be the translation of $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha$, but we can think of a parallel with $\sigma\alpha\rho\xi$, too. As for $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha$, the following meanings mentioned by Lampe¹⁷² will appear in ŸammĀr al-BaŒrĒ's text: 'the earthly body of man, its connexion with the soul;' 'its moral nature.' Lampe mentions meanings in connection with 'resurrection,' 'the body of Christ: as created, hungering, suffering and dying: in contradistinction to the divinity, similar to all men's bodies.' As for $\sigma\alpha\rho\xi$, the senses that are in connection with Incarnation offer parallels: the human nature of the divine, Christ; Christ's body.'

Our first example introduces *badan* as a corporeal entity, a body, and as such, it is composite, set up of its elements:

¹⁶⁷ ABŒ QURRA, Theodore *Maymar fĒ wuĒĒd al-ĒĀliq wa-'l-dĒn al-qawĒm* p. 181.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid. p. 206.

¹⁶⁹ al-ĒWĀRIZMĪ, p. 258.

¹⁷⁰ al-ĒURĒĀNĪ, *KitĀb al-TaĀrĒfĀt*, p. 86.

الجسد: كل روح تمثل بتصرف الخيال المنفصل، وظهر في جسم ناري، كالجن، أو نوري كالأرواح الملكية والإنسانية، حيث تعطي قوتهم الذاتية الخلع واللبس، فلا يحصرهم حبس البرازخ.

¹⁷¹ In HAYEK's translation: 'corps'; C.f. Ed. HAYEK, *Apologie et controverses*, p. 86.

¹⁷² LAMPE, G. W., *A Patristic Greek Lexicon*, p. 1366.

“Sometimes the Wise, the Preacher was harmful in His providence, when He brought forward heat or cold, or when He delayed them from their [ordinary] timing; this is what the intelligent and the learned can take as a sign for the fact that there is no benefit for their living, and the elements of their **bodies** cannot subsist without the contrariety of these times and the difference of these periods that befall them.”¹⁷³

Apart from being a composite entity, in this quote, *badan* is referred to as the body of human beings (since it belongs to the intelligent and the learned, i.e. to a group of human beings), so we may say that this term refers to an animate, intelligent body. This idea is more explicitly expressed by ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ when he introduces the composite entity of *badan* as a result of divine combination enlivened by a knowing soul: “His wisdom, as it can be understood from the perfect execution of His composing their **bodies**, and His enlivening them with a knowing soul, is a sign that He is not miserly in His keeping them alive.”¹⁷⁴ This point is emphasized elsewhere, too, since a composite body, if looked at from the aspect of its being made up and combined, will be a sign for the existence of the Creator.

“These four elements that the world is composed of are present in the structure of your **body**, your mind cannot deny it. You do not need a clearer and more evident sign for the existence of your Creator than the testimonies of the intellect based on the Creator’s composing your **body** out of these contrary and opposing elements, and His combining it with a knowing soul that he has inserted in it by His power and wisdom.”¹⁷⁵

Badan denotes a structured human body, composed of elements, and combined with a soul, i.e. it is described as an animate entity. Its being set up from the four elements may remind us of what Theodore AbÛ Qurra referred to when describing *Êism* and *Êasad*. Though terms may differ, ideas expressed by them run parallel. Turning back to *badan*, however, it is not only the soul it may be combined with, but instead of being animate, if referred to as being combined with spirit, it will denote a spiritual entity, created by God:

“We do not know the modality of His setting these or those in order, nor [His order] concerning the illnesses that befall them or their children. Likewise, if we knew necessarily

¹⁷³ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba*, p. 100,18-21

ثم قد كان الحكيم الواعظ في تدبيره أحياناً من مضرة تقديم الحر والبرد وتأخيرها عن أوقاتها، ما يستدل به ذوو العقول والعبر على أنه لا صلاح لشأن معاشهم ولا قوام لطبائع أبدانهم إلا بتضاد هذه الأوقات واختلاف هذه الأزمان الجارية عليهم

¹⁷⁴ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba*, p. 107,15-16:

وحكمته فيما ولي من إتقان تأليف أبدانهم وانعاشهم بأنفسٍ علامة، تدل على أنه لا يبخل بإبقائهم على الحياة

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 97,3-6:

فهذه الأربعة الأركان التي منها ألفت دار العالم موجودة في بنية بدنك لا ينكرها عقلك. فلا دليل تحتاج إليه على وجود خالقك أوضح وأظهر من شواهد العقل من تأليفه بدنك من هذه الطبائع المتضادة المتقومة وإنشائه بنفسٍ علامةٍ وربكها فيه بقدرته وحكمته

Another example that refers to the combination with the soul is Ibid., 107,18-20: “What He showed them of His generosity in their misery, and announced to them of his potency in His reviving them, and demonstrated for them of His wisdom when combining their souls with their **bodies**, may address the intellects openly.”

بل ما أبداهم به من جوده في يؤسهم وأعلن لهم من قدرته في انعاشه إياهم وأظهر لهم من حكمته في تأليف أنفسهم بأبدانهم، قد يخاطب العقول جهرأ

that God had created the world and that which is in it, and He had created our **bodies** and combined them with spirits, we still do not know how he created the world and how he combined spirits with our **bodies**, nor do we know when death befalls any of us. But this does not nullify our knowledge concerning His creating us or His creating these and setting them in order...¹⁷⁶

ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ sometimes uses *badan* as an animate entity, combined with a soul, *nafs*; but in other instances, such as this latter one, body is combined with a spirit, *rŪĪ*, so it is then a “spiritual” entity. In every instance, *badan* denotes the human body. The author uses the same combination when declaring that *badan* and *spirit* form the unity of man; emphasis being laid on unity and the way this unity comes into being:

“had it not been understood from us when we informed you on [the fact that] as the spirit of man has incarnated by his **body**; and as his **body** is animate by his spirit: the two of them set up the unity of man by their combination, by the **body** of man and the spirit of man. And it is not the **body** of the spirit and not the spirit of the **body**. Even if a man dwelt in a mansion, he and his mansion would never make up a single unity. The mansion would be attached to him forever, but the mansion would be attached to its inhabitant as a property, but not to a single unity, which is set up from the inhabitant and the mansion.”¹⁷⁷

This point will also be illustrative when we look at the question of the unity or duality of the Messiah. It is to note that when the body as “flesh” is referred to, as taken by the Messiah, it is usually the term *Ēasad* which is used, but the body of a compound human being that has soul or spirit, i.e. which is animate or spiritual, is rather described by the term *badan*.

Badan may be combined with a soul or a spirit, then they form a compact entity, and are even born together, but ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ emphasizes that the spirit is not born of flesh.

“If you know the truth of these things according to the verity of the states in which they [exist], you will be sure that your mother – even if she gave birth to you as a complete man with **body** and spirit – did not give birth to you by **body** and spirit. She gave birth to you as a man with **body** and spirit only by your body that is subject to birth, growth and decrease or increase, and not by your spirit which transcends these things, these states and disabilities.”¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁶ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ'il wa-Ðl-aĒwiba*, p. 120,10-16

وليس، إذ لم نعلم كنه تدبيره في هؤلاء وهؤلاء من الأمرين والآفات الحالة بهم وبأطفالهم، كما أنا إذا علمنا ضرورة أن الله خلق الدنيا وما فيها وخلق أبداننا وركب فيها أرواحاً، ثم سينزل الموت بكل واحد منا لا محالة إلى يومنا هذا، ولا نعلم كيف خلق الدنيا ولا كيف ركب الأرواح في أبداننا ولا متى يحل الموت بواحد منا -، فليس ذلك مما يبطل علمنا بخلقها أيها وتدبيره لها...

¹⁷⁷ Ibid. p. 201,13-17

أولم يفهم عنا ما أخبرناك به من أن روح الإنسان إذ هي متجسدة لبدنه، وبدنه إذ هو متنفس بروحه، فأقاما بانتلافهما وحدانية الإنسان قبل بدن الإنسان وروح الإنسان، لا بدن الروح ولا روح البدن. ولو أن إنساناً سكن منزلاً لما أقام هو والمنزل وحدانية واحداً. إليه يضاف المنزل أبداً، بل تثبت إضافة المنزل إلى فلان ساكنه خاصة لا إلى واحد قائم منه ومن المنزل

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 190,15-191,2

This statement is already preparing the establishment of the unity of the Messiah. Human unity of body and soul or body and spirit offers an analogy for the Messiah's combination of divine and human parts. It is also significant in establishing that the divine part is born together with the human, but is not originated by the human. In disputes with Muslims, such an establishment is of crucial importance; but at the same time, it serves to elucidate why Nestorians do not consider Mary *Theotokos*.

We have seen that ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ pairs body sometimes with soul, in other instances with spirit. Though soul and spirit have differing senses in his usage, let us draw attention to the fact that as far as their connection to body or man is concerned, ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ does not make a strong and consistent distinction. However, the idea of body combined by spirit and soul comes from Greek thought, prevalent in Patristic usage, thus familiar to Christian authors from Patristic schools; and is to be further elaborated in Muslim thought later on. As an example, let us refer to the tenth-century scholar al-TawÎddÐ, who distinguishes between the roles of the two. He says that it is soul what makes a man, but it is spirit which makes him alive.¹⁷⁹

Human body, *badan* is important as an entity subject to perception, feeling, experiencing pain and joy as a first step of deduction or drawing conclusions:

“As He wanted them to be the ones who take these virtues by way of acquisition through their deeds, so that their exultation and happiness should be perfect, he moulded them in a form that can receive pain and joy. He then filled the world where they were born, and in which He executed their creation, with useful and harmful things. If they bear the pains in their aching **bodies** for Him, they will deserve compensation from Him for this. If they get trained by what reaches them from this world's joys and pains, they will get to know the quiddity of happiness and hardship, and will infer from it the modalities of their Lord's reward and punishment. They will try hard to satisfy Him due to their wish [to acquire] His reward, and to avoid His discontent for fear of His punishment.”¹⁸⁰

We have seen in the chapter on intellect that in the argumentation and allegorical story of Theodore AbÛ Qurra experience and bodily perception may be a source for gaining

فمتى عرفت حقيقة هذه الأمور على حقيقة ما هي عليها من حالاتها، أيقنت بأن أمك، وإن كانت ولدتك إنساناً كاملاً ذا روح وبدن، فأنها لم تلد روحك وبدنك. إنما أمك ولدتك إنساناً ذات [!] روح وبدن من قبل بدنك القابل للولاد والتربية والنقصان والزيادة، لا من قبل روحك العالية عن هذه الأمور وعن هذه الحالات والعاهات

¹⁷⁹ al-TAWÎDĪ, AbÛ ÍayyÁn, *al-ImtÁÝ wa-'l- mu'Ánasa*, Cairo, 1939-44. p. 114.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid. pp. 108,19-109,3

إذ أراد أن يكونوا هم المكتسبين تلك الفضائل بأعمالهم لتكمل بذلك غيبتهم وسرورهم، جبلهم على بنية قابلة الآلام واللذات جميعاً. ثم ملأ دار مولدهم، التي قدم فيها خلقهم، أمور المنافع والمضار، لكي إذا تجشموا له الشدائد في إبدانهم الأئمة استحقوا لها منه المكافأة عليها، ولكي إذا تدرّبوا أيضاً بما يمسهم من لذاتها وأوجاعها، فعرفوا بذلك ماهية السرور والمكاره، استدلوا على كيفية ثواب ربههم وعقابه، فاجتهدوا في مرضاته رغبة في ثوابه واجتنبوا مسأخه خوفاً من عقابه.

knowledge of the right or forbidden things. Theodore AbŪ Qurra's approach was rather ethical, based on reciprocity, but experiencing harm or goodness could lead to an understanding of good and bad, reward and punishment. In this example *badan* is used as a starting point, the approach is not ethical but rather sensory, but sensation can serve as a basis for an analogy which leads to a knowledge of reward and punishment as well. The two analogies show similarities, so we may think of rhetorical schools and Patristic tradition as a shared source for Christian authors in this field.

Badan, as human body is occasionally even used metonymically: as a part it stands for the whole of a human being. It appears as something that God set free to take what it wants [!], but given that a body does not have will, it is clear that what is referred to is the whole human being: "He let them know, including what is possible for them to get rid of in many of their situations, that as He created them to be able to commit what is beneficial for them or what corrupts them, He also set their **bodies** at liberty to take things that may do harm for them or that which is beneficial for them."¹⁸¹ It is obvious that not bodies but human beings are set at liberty. The parallel which we saw in the allegory of Theodore AbŪ Qurra, i.e. human beings are free to choose between right and wrong (ethically as well as physically), further confirms this interpretation, since the means of differentiation is the intellect in both cases.

Badan, human body offers opportunity for Divine providence to show: "He created for them the food and drinks that nourish their **bodies**."¹⁸² If looked at from the viewpoint of the outcome, then this example implicitly gives a proof for the existence of the Creator, who wants the benefit of His creatures. Human body and its needs can serve as signs for intellect to arrive at a proof for God's creative action. At the same time, divine providence is a manifestation of divine goodness, which is central in Christian teaching.

Badan is a part of the Messiah, and as such, is of great importance: "As for the growing **body** that is formed of matter, its creation and unification happened at the same time, after that it had not been existent in this structure and form."¹⁸³ Body is described as growing, i.e. subject to change. As it is formed out of matter, it is created in time, which is the time of its union with the divine substance as well. The Messiah's unity is frequently paralleled to the

¹⁸¹ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ'il wa-Ðl-aÉwiba*, 118,18-20:

وأعلمهم، بما أمكنهم من التحرر منها في كثير من حالاتهم، أنه كما خلقهم مستطيعين لإتيان ما يصلحهم ويفسدهم من الأعمال، كذلك أطلق أبدانهم التناول ما يضرهم وينفعهم من الأمور.

¹⁸² Ibid. p. 121,4-5

وخلق لهم ما يقيم أبدانهم من الطعام والشراب.

¹⁸³ Ibid., p. 185:1-2

وأما البدن النامي المصور من المادة فكانت جبلته واتحاده جميعاً معاً، بعد أن لم يكن على هيئة صورته موجوداً

unity of man, consisting of body and soul or spirit. Apart from being described as consisting of a human and a divine part, He is also described as a combination of a body and a spirit, which left His body at the time of death. “Had he come down from the cross alive in a form in which His spirit had left His **body**...,”¹⁸⁴ as if the divine part is to be compared to the spirit and the human to the body.

We need to investigate the Messiah’s body, *badan* as a means: a way for the Messiah to appear, in order to deliver the message to humankind and to be sacrificed. As for body as a means, a frame or ‘temple’ in which the divine could appear, it can make us remember what al-ÉurÉÁnÐ wrote in his entry on *Éasad*. Terms differ, but ideas are close. In ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s interpretation, body as the means for the Messiah to appear is further detailed: “He had even earlier known that there was no way to dismiss their doubts concerning His death except for His own, **bodily** appearance”¹⁸⁵ Body is not only a means for manifestation and appearance, but also for sacrifice:

“Till He [the Son] sacrificed His **body** and blood as a sacrifice for Him [the Father], according to the custom that the Father had imposed upon them earlier/in the time of the Old Testament, i.e. to sacrifice the **bodies** and blood of animals, in order that He should forgive their sins. By His incurring the viewers of His death on the cross, which was followed by the resurrection to life, abolishing the pleasures, he contradicts this desire which is followed by the strike of death.”¹⁸⁶

This quotation indicates that there is difference between *badan* and *ism*, since the latter is used to denote the body of animals, while the former refers to the (human) body of the Messiah. Till now, *ism* was seen as an inanimate, physical body. As the body of animals, it could be considered animate in this case, as well. Humans’ bodies are referred to by the word *asad*, so a hierarchy of meanings is discernible here. Remembering the previous metonymical use of *badan*, we can interpret the sacrifice of the Messiah’s body as more holistic, probably as a total surrender of His self, or his human part.

If we accept that there is a hierarchy of meanings as far as different kinds of bodies are concerned, it is no wonder that the term *badan* is used when ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ establishes that the bodies of human beings will appear in a new, spiritual form after the resurrection:

¹⁸⁴ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-Ðl-aÉwiba*, p. 236,16

فلو نزل عن الخشبة على هيئة ما فارقت روحه بدنه حياً

¹⁸⁵ Ibid. p. 234:11

علم بسابق علمه أنه لا محيص إلى دفع الشك عن قلوب العوام في موته إلا بإظهاره لهم دونه بدنه

¹⁸⁶ Ibid. p. 258,15-19

حتى إذا بذل بدنه ودمه له قرباناً كالسنة التي اجراها قديماً على أهل جوهرهم من تقريب أجسام الحيوان ودمائها ليكفر خطاياهم، كان بتجشمه بشاعة ميته على الصليب الذي كان يعقبه نهوض الحياة إبطالاً للذة، فيناقض تلك الشهوة التي كانت عاقبتها صرعة الموت

Further examples: Ibid. pp. 261, 262, 263 (here the term *asad* is used)

“the **bodies** will be regenerated in a new, spiritual structure, which stands above and transcends enjoying desires and pleasures.”¹⁸⁷ It implies that this kind of body, i.e. the resurrected entity is of a higher kind, probably equal to the Messiah’s human part.

So, according to ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, *badan* is a composite entity, a result of divine combination (which is a proof of the existence of a Creator and divine providence); combined with a soul or a spirit. It is sometimes used metonymically, referring to man. It is also a part of the Messiah, too.

ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s Jacobite contemporary, AbÛ RÁ’iÔa, uses *badan* for human body only if it is contrasted to the body taken by the Messiah, which, in this case, is expressed by *Êasad*. When discussing the incarnation with the Muslim opponent, he says that the Word was born from Mary only by His body (expressed by *Êasad*), which was taken from Mary, and with which the Word unified; so the Word was born of her in a spiritual-bodily (expressed by *ÊasadÁnÐ*) way. AbÛ RÁ’iÔa compares this to human birth; since human beings are born of their mothers as embodied (expressed by *mutabaddin*) spirits. Without the unity of spirits with bodies (*badan*), the birth from mothers would be impossible.¹⁸⁸ We need to remark that there is difference between the Nestorian and the Jacobite authors’ approaches. While Nestorians refute the idea of Mary’s being Theotokos, Jacobites, on the basis of their belief in the hypostatic union of the Messiah, accept Mary as Theotokos. ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ uses the term *badan* to express one of the two “components” of the Messiah, while AbÛ RÁ’iÔa strictly uses it in order to refer to a human body, though, in more general terms the two authors agree in its use as human body. As for the use of *Êasad*, both of them use this term in order to refer to the flesh of the Messiah when contrasted to other bodies. Apart from the terms, another similarity is to be discerned here. Argumentation is based on the analogy of a human spirit embodied in the body in both cases. It shows that this argument must have come from a common source, probably from Patristic literature, upon which Christian authors relied without respect to the denomination they belonged to. I have not found representative examples for the use of *badan* in Theodore AbÛ Qurra’s works.

¹⁸⁷ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-Ðl-aÊwiba*, p. 265,2

ثم جددت الأبدان على بنية روحانية سماوية ارتفعت وتعاليت على أن تتعم بالشهوات واللذات...

¹⁸⁸ ABØ RÁ’IÓA, *FD al-taÊassud*, p. 47.

فإنما ولد لحال الجسد المأخوذ من المرأة المتحد بها لأنها ولدت منها روحانية جسدية. أوليس القول في ولود الأدميين من أمهاتهم شبيه بها في بعض أنحاءه في ولود الكلمة من مريم. والمولودون من أمهاتهم أهم أرواح من غير أبدان أم أرواح متبدنة. وإذ لم يلدن أرواحاً مجردة تنفي عنها ولودها متبدنة. فكما أن الأرواح لو لم تكن متحدة بالأبدان لم يكن سبيل إلى أن يولدن من الأمهات وقد يولدن منهن لاتحادهن بالأبدان مع أول خلقتهن. هكذا القول في الكلمة المتجسدة ولدت لحال الجسد المأخوذ من مريم المتجسد بها لا مجردة من الجسد كما ظننتم.

Turning to Muslim thinkers, we see that al-Kindī does not provide a definition for this term, but it appears in his definition for other terms, especially in medicine,¹⁸⁹ where it is a term that refers to human body; two times in the definition of philosophy,¹⁹⁰ where it refers to an animate body, which has soul, *nafs*. In the definition of human virtues¹⁹¹ and chastity/righteousness¹⁹² it is the body of a human being. Al-Kindī also refers to the definition of nature according to Hippocrates,¹⁹³ in which he uses *badan* to express the human body. Other Muslim authors of books of definitions do not define it, since by later stages *Ēism* became the standard theological term for body. However, early MuʿtazilīDs used *badan* as “the instrument and matrix of spirit”, *Ālat al-rŪĪ wa-qĀlibuhĀ*.¹⁹⁴ This shows similarities with ʿAmmĀr al-BaʿOrĪ’s usage, since *badan* both in the case of the human and the Messiah serves as a basis of the combination with the spirit. Christian influence on Muʿtazilī usage is thus very likely in this field.

5. Terms appearing together: synonyms or terms with differing connotations?

In this part, terms that appear together will be examined, in order to see how their denotations may be compared to each other. In the following example the terms *ʿism*, *Īlqa*,¹⁹⁵ and *Ēu × × a*¹⁹⁶ appear as synonyms:

„Then you find that the thickness of the elements of the earth that your **bodily form** was formed of is present in you. Your **body** accepts growth, and your **corpse** accepts weaning after [the time of] childhood and infancy in order to be fed by the plants of the earth and the

¹⁸⁹ al-KINDĪ, *RisĀla fĪ ĪudŪd al-aṣyĀʿ wa-rusŪmihĀ*, p. 171.

الطب - مهنة قاصدة لإشفاء أبدان الناس بالزيادة والنقص وحفظها على الصحة
¹⁹⁰ al-KINDĪ, *RisĀla fĪ ĪudŪd al-aṣyĀʿ wa-rusŪmihĀ*, p.172.
 والموت عندهم موتان: طبيعي، وهو ترك النفس استعمال البدن؛ والثاني إماتة الشهوات - فهذا هو الموت الذي قصدوا إليه
 Ibid, pp. 173-174.

فأما ما يحد به عين الفلسفة فهو أن الفلسفة علم الأشياء الأبدية الكلية، إنيتها ومانياتها وعللها، بقدر طاقة الإنسان. السؤال عن البارئ، عز وجل، في هذا العالم، وعن العالم العقلي؛ وإن كان في هذا العالم شيء فكيف هو الجواب عنده؛ هو كالفلسفة في البدن، لا يقوم شيء من تدبيره إلا بتدبير النفس، ولا يمكن أن يعلم إلا بالبدن بما يرى من آثار تدبير النفس [فيه]، ولا يمكن إلا بالبدن بما يرى من آثار تدبيرها فيه - فهكذا العالم المرئي لا يمكن أن يكون تدبيره إلا بعالم لا يرى، والعالم الذي لا يرى لا يمكن أن يكون [معلوماً] إلا بما يوجد في هذا العالم من التدبير والآثار الدالة عليه.

¹⁹¹ Ibid., p. 177.

الفضائل الإنسانية هي الخلق الإنساني المحمود؛ وهي تنقسم قسمين أولين: أحدهما في النفس، والآخر مما يحيط بدن الإنسان من الآثار الكائنة عن النفس

¹⁹² Ibid., p. 177.

وأما العفة - فهي تناول الأشياء التي يجب تناولها لتربية أبدانها وحفظها بعد التمام وانتظام امتثالها والإمساك عن تناول غير ذلك

¹⁹³ Ibid., p. 179.

قول بقرات فيها: اسم الطبيعة على أربعة معانٍ: على بدن الإنسان، وعلى هيئة بدون الإنسان، وعلى القوة المدبرة للبدن، وعلى حركة النفس

¹⁹⁴ al-ŠAHRĀSTĀNĪ, Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-KarĪm, *al-Milal wa-ʿl-niĀl*, Eds. MUHANNĀ, AmḌr ʿĀĪḌ - FĀʿŪR, ʿĀĪḌ Īsan, Beirut, DĀr al-Maʿrifa, 1993, Vol. I, p. 69.

¹⁹⁵ HAYEK does not provide a translation for this term.

¹⁹⁶ HAYEK does not provide a translation for this term.

strength of its herbs. You will infer from this that you are formed the same way [as the earth is] and your disposition comes from its soil. You will then know that you have subsistence and existence only in it, by it, and upon it.”¹⁹⁷

It can be seen that in this case the three terms all refer to the body or the bodily form of the human being and no great difference is discernible on the basis of the context. Bodily form, *Īlqa* is a term that is to be introduced here. Its translation as such is taken from Afnan, and it can be considered to be the translation of the Aristotelian ἡ μορφή.¹⁹⁸ Since this form – to the best of my knowledge – does not appear again in the text, it is hard to draw further implications on the basis of this sole example. It may probably be understood as the outward form, appearance, or as a synonym of other terms that have bodily connotations. The other new term is $\hat{E}u \times \times a$ that can be translated as body, cube.¹⁹⁹ So it is not necessarily a living, organic body, but a solid body that has three dimensions. Yet, *Yammār al-Ba'ŌrḌ* uses it to refer to a living body, so we may interpret it as an animate body or a corpse. The two terms introduced here could not be found in the Muslim authors' books of definitions. It may imply that these were not crucial in Muslim philosophy and theology in the 9th and the following centuries.

Used together with *badan* and *ʿism*, $\hat{E}u \times \times a$ can also mean a form that consists of a body, *badan* and soul, *nafs*, as in the following example:

“Whatever is united with the soul (the share of humanity and the portion of sonship which are necessary for him), like other **bodies** of beasts and the other **bodies** of animals, then, according to the necessary truth, it is right for the **body** of the human to be called one of the two parts of the **form** of the human, and one of the two substances of the human's sonship.”²⁰⁰

Badan and *ʿism*, as bodies of beasts and animals are used as synonyms in the first part of the quote. The corpse or form, i.e. $\hat{E}u \times \times a$ includes the meaning of *badan*, since the latter is just one of its two parts. The usage of this term attests to the initial confusion of terminology, since on the authority of Afnan we can see that this term comes to denote a physical entity, a cube in translations, while a ninth-century theologian uses it to denote a form that comprises human body and soul. (In this part of the quote, *badan* is used as the human body; referred to as a substance.)

¹⁹⁷ al-BAÑRĪ, *Yammār, Kitāb al-Masā'il wa-'l-a'Ēwiba*, pp. 96,19 – 97,2

ثم تجد غلط طباع الأرض التي منها صورت **خلقتك** أنها فيك. وتستدل، من قبول **جسمك** للنماء و**جنتك** للفظم بعد الصغر والطفولية مما تغتديه من نباتها وقوة أعشابها، على أنك عليها صورت ومن تربتها جبلت. ثم تعلم أن لا قوام لك ولا وجود لك إلا بها وفيها وعليها.

¹⁹⁸ AFNAN, *A Philosophical Lexicon in Persian and Arabic*, p. 92.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 46.

²⁰⁰ al-BAÑRĪ, *Yammār, Kitāb al-Masā'il wa-'l-a'Ēwiba*, p. 187,2-5

ومهما كان مع النفس متحداً كخيرية أبدان البهائم وسائر أجسام الحيوان من سهم الأنسية وحظ البنوة الواجبين له دونهما، بل قد يحق على الحقيقة الواجبة أن يسمى بدن الانسان أحد جزئي **جثة** الانسان وأحد جوهرى بنوة الانسان

The following examples show a close link between the connotations of *'ism* and *badan*: “And this is despite of the difference of these times: dryness of the summer and its heat after the humidity and cold of winter and the rigidity of the countries of daylight, which is for the sake of the **bodies** of men and the **corpses** of animals and their comfort, it is what mind cannot imagine.”²⁰¹ As seen in examples that contain just one of these two terms, the body of human beings is referred to by the term *badan*. As for *'ism*, we have seen above in the examples where it was used on its own, that it meant an inanimate, physical body. Here, as related to *badan*, it gains a new meaning: an animate body, that of an animal. The second quote does not seem to differentiate between the two terms, since both of them express the idea of an animate body. “... this would make his **corpse** weak and his **body** sick”²⁰² We may consider them synonyms. When used together, the connotations of these terms is relativised, and may gain new meanings.

The terms *'asad* and *badan* as synonyms may be approached from more than an aspect: “If **bodies** remain without what is enough for them, or, I mean the least of the quantity upon which their **bodies** can subsist and their **flesh** may survive, they will die, if they get less than this as their food.”²⁰³ The two terms are used with the same meaning in this case, as bodies of human beings. They are also similar in connotation, as far as divine transcendence is concerned, which stands above them: “The divinity of our Lord is greater and higher than every analogy, [it] is like the place of the spirit in the human, since it stands high above the things that befall [their] **flesh** and **bodies**.”²⁰⁴ In this respect, there is no difference between the meanings of the two terms. Another approach where the parallel appearance of *'asad* and *badan* may be examined places these terms and then *nafs* and *rŪ'ī* as pairs of synonyms: “You subsist in your **body** and **spirit**; and your humanity can only exist in the combination of the two natures and the harmonisation of the two substances: the **flesh** and the **soul**. Do you claim that your mother gave birth to your **body** and **soul** together, at the same time?”²⁰⁵ This citation shows first that the pairs *badan* – *rŪ'ī* and *'asad* – *nafs* are synonyms, and in the third case

²⁰¹ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ'il wa-'l-aÉwiba*, p. 100,14-16:

ذلك مع ما في اختلاف هذه الأزمان من يبوسة الصيف وحره بعد رطوبة الشتاء وبرده، وجمود دول النهار من صلاح أبدان الأنس وأجسام الحيوان وراحتها، ما لا تخيله عقل.

²⁰² Ibid., p. 119,18

... أنحل ذلك جسمه وأسقم بدنه.

²⁰³ Ibid., p. 121,9-11

فإن الأبدان قد تبقى على دون ذلك من كفافها، بل أعني أقل قليل القدر الذي تقوم عليه أبدانهم وتحيا عليه أجسادهم، وتهلك إن قصرُوا دون ذلك في أغديتهم

²⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 191,3-4:

لاهورت ربنا جلّت وتعالّت عن كل قياس، موضع الروح من الإنسان، في علوها وارتفاعها عن الأمور الحادثة على الأجساد والأبدان.

²⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 188,10-12:

إذ أنت قائم ببدنك وروحك ولا وجود لأنسيتك إلا باجتماع الطبعين وانتلاف الجوهرين من الجسد والنفس. فهل تزعم الآن أن أمك ولدت نفسك وبيدك في وقت جميعاً معاً،

their use is that of a hybrid type when *badan* is paired with *nafs*. As it is demonstrated by Lampe under the heading of $\sigma\tilde{\omega}\mu\alpha$, there existed a Patristic tradition in interpreting the unity of body and soul and their simultaneous creation. If we take into consideration that both terms may be regarded the translations of the Greek $\sigma\tilde{\omega}\mu\alpha$, then we may suppose that the same idea survives in Arabic Christian literature.²⁰⁶ The last approach for the two terms' parallel appearance shows synonymity. When used on their own, they were seen as human body and the body of the Messiah; used together; their similar meanings are further enhanced.

“As He had promised people that He would vivify their **flesh** after the death, and He made them see a proof for that in the resurrection of his **flesh** ... from death, the same way, as He had promised the resurrection of their **bodies** and their diffusion in the soil, He wanted to show them a proof for that in His **body**. So he was buried in the grave dead, and He resurrected from the soil alive.”²⁰⁷

Here both terms may refer to the body of man, but also, even to the body of the Messiah. Again, on the authority of Lampe, it is to be remarked that $\sigma\tilde{\omega}\mu\alpha$ is widely used in Patristic literature, too, in order to express Christ's and man's resurrection body. Given that the idea is broader than the term, it would be exaggerated to suspect direct influence on the basis of this similarity, but a parallel is undeniable.

Finally, *asad* and *ism* also appear together, but the previous differentiation between them recurs: “He is nothing else but the Messiah and the Son of God, and He is not like the other human **bodies** and **corpses** of animals which have a portion of the sonship related to God and its share.”²⁰⁸ As seen when appearing on its own, *asad* refers to human body, flesh, and *ism* to a lower category, to the bodies of animals.

6. Derived terms: *ismAnD*²⁰⁹ and *asadAnD*²¹⁰ i.e. bodily and corporeal

An examination of derived forms (e.g. by the addition of the *nisba* ending) can contribute to our understanding of terms with bodily connotations. These terms mostly appear together with other simple ones already examined above, or in themselves, as synonyms, contrasted to concepts meaning ‘sapiential, spiritual.’ Let us first see an example for the latter

²⁰⁶ C.f. LAMPE, G. W., *A Patristic Greek Lexicon*, p. 1362.

²⁰⁷ al-BANŪRĪ, Yammār, *Kitāb al-Masā'il wa-'l-a'wāb*, p. 237,3-6

وأيضاً فكما أنه وعد الناس أن يحيي أجسادهم بعد الموت وأراهم برهان ذلك في إقامة صرعة جسده من الموت، كذلك إذ وعدهم أن يقيم أبدانهم وينشرها في التراب، أحب أن يريهم برهان ذلك في بدنه فيدفن في القبر ميتاً وينبعث من التراب حياً

²⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 187,8-9

فليس هو غير المسيح ولا غير ابن الله أيضاً كغيره ما سواه من أجساد الأتس وأجسام الحيوان البائنة عن حظ بنوة الله وسههما

²⁰⁹ In HAYEK's translation: ‘corporeal’ C.f. Ed. HAYEK, *Apologie et controverses*, p. 87.

²¹⁰ In HAYEK's translation: ‘charnel’ C.f. Ed. HAYEK, *Apologie et controverses*, p. 87.

case: “If His potency and faculty are mentioned – eulogy –, we do not imagine them as **corporeal** and **bodily** potencies or faculties, like the potency of the camel, the elephant, the lion or the bull, or whatever may resemble them; but we can be certain that they are spiritual and sapiential faculties and not **bodily**, **corporeal** ones.”²¹¹ In this context, it is not possible to differentiate between the meaning of the two adjectives. On the basis of their roots, *°ismÁnĎ* could translate as ‘connected to a physical entity’ and *°asadÁnĎ* as ‘belonging to flesh.’ This minor difference, the relatedness to an inanimate or a living body, cannot be felt in the given example. But as the two adjectives stand in contrast to ‘spiritual’ and ‘sapiential,’ they are probably meant to refer to living, organic (animate) bodies.

As for *°ismÁnĎ* and *°asadÁnĎ* when appearing with other terms: we may see them with the term *°ism* in connection with causes and faculties:

“As for potency, faculty, and ability, they have two causes. One of them is **bodily**, **corporeal**, and this is the faculty that is there in the **bodies** of animals as a disposition. We may see a camel as it carries a thousand *manÁ*’s,²¹² or an elephant that can strike a camel by its strength, or a lion that can take a bull as its prey. [We could go on with] similar actions that are related to the faculties of bodies. The other [cause] is psychical, spiritual, namely the intellect, which is the faculty of the soul that creates these subtle things out of nothing, as we can see in the making of the bodies, the moulding of forms, the composition of (bodily) structures, and similar things that the wisdom of the soul and the reflexion of the intellect is capable of.”²¹³

Here we could see that *°ismÁnĎ* and *°asadÁnĎ*, as adjectives referring to kinds of faculties, were contrasted to psychical, spiritual. In this context, there is no distinction between the meanings of the two adjectives; both express relatedness to the physical world. We also get to know that bodily faculty, potency and ability are present in the body, and have no connection with the soul. As the body to which these features are related is a living, organic one, *°ismÁnĎ* and *°asadÁnĎ* are likely to refer to relatedness to living, animate beings, like the ones enlisted in the example.

°asadÁnĎ appears alone, too, as contrasted to the spiritual, *rÜÁnĎ* in the definition of *hypostasis*, *qanÜm*: “[everything is necessarily one of the following four things: substance, accident, faculty...] Or it may be a *hypostasis* of a substance. Like ÝAbdallÁh by his *anima*

²¹¹ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÉwiba*, p. 132,17-20

وإذا ما ذكرت منه القدرة والقوة عز جلاله، لم نتوهمهما قوةً وقدرةً جسمانيةً كقوة البعير والفيل والأسد والثور وما أشبه ذلك من الحيوان، بل يحق لنا أن نوقن بأنها قدرة روحانية حكمانية لا جسمانيةً جسمانيةً

²¹² *ManÁ*’ is a weight equal to two rotls.

²¹³ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÉwiba*, p. 157,16-19

أما القدرة والقوة والاستطاعة فإن لها علتين مختلفتين، احدهما جسمانية جسمانية وهي القوة المطبوعة في أجسام الحيوان كما قد نرى بعبيراً يحمل ألف مناء وفيلاً يصرع بقوته بعبيراً وأسدأ يفترس بقوته ثوراً، ونحو ذلك من الأفاعيل التي تنسب إلى قوات الأجسام، والأخرى نفسانية روحانية أعني العقل الذي هو قوة النفس المخترع هذه اللطائف التي نرى من صنعة الاجرام وتصوير الأشكال وتأليف البنيان ونحو ذلك من الصناعات المقذور عليها بحكمة النفس وروية العقل.

and **body** among men, or Gabriel, the angel, by the property of his *hypostasis* among angels, or any other spiritual or **corporeal** *hypostasis* that is similar to these.”²¹⁴ In this definition corporeal and spiritual are adjectives of *hypostases*. It is to note that in the example which is to explain the meaning of the *hypostasis* the name ÝAbdallÁh is used. It implies that ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ addresses this elucidation to a Muslim counterpart. ÝAbdallÁh’s body, as a human body, consistently, is referred to by the term *badan*.

The same terms (*ÊasadÁnÐ* and *rÛÍÁnÐ*) are contrasted in the following extract, but this time stress is laid on the lack of any relation between them. This is why there was no point in incarnation by an angel, it had to be a human being instead: “If He had incarnated an individual of the angels instead of His incarnation by a human individual, His life and dignity would not have included all the creation, since there is no relationship between the purely spiritual ones and the purely **corporeal** beings concerning the essence of their substance, at all.”²¹⁵ A similar classification was seen in the previous example, Gabriel being the spiritual *hypostasis* and ÝAbdallÁh the corporeal one. In spite of the *nisba*-ending, the plural forms show that the two terms are not used as attributes here, but as nouns. What corporeality and spirituality refers to in this case is the substances of these beings. (As for the question of incarnation, it will be investigated in the next subsection.)

This differentiated usage of derived terms is quite unique. I could only find a parallel at Theodore AbÛ Qurra, who enlists the five senses and tells which body part they belong to. Parts of the body are referred to as *aÝÁÁ’ ÊasadÁniyya*, i.e. limbs belonging to the body.²¹⁶ In this, no further special implication may be observed.

7. *Ta°assud* – incarnation

Though we have seen various terms for body and corpse, when it comes to *incarnatio*, it is *°asad* which forms a basis for a derived form to express it: i.e. *ta°assud*.²¹⁷ This term and the concept it refers to appear in various contexts. First of all, it is a cause of new revelation on sonship and the relationship between the persons of the Trinity:

²¹⁴ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba*, p. 162,9-11

وإما قنوم من الجوهر، فهو كعبد الله بنفسه وبدنه من الأنس، وكجبرائيل الملاك بخاصة قنومه من الملائكة، وما أشبه ذلك من الأقانيم الروحانية والجسدانية.

²¹⁵ Ibid., p. 218,1-3

لو تجسد شخصاً من أشخاص الملائكة بدل تجسده شخصاً من أشخاص الناس، لم تعم حياته وكرامته الخليقة كلها، فإنه لا قرانة بين الروحانيين محضاً وبين الجسدانيين محضاً في ذات الجوهر أصلاً

²¹⁶ ABØ QURRA, Theodore, *Maymar fÐ wuÊÛd al-ÊÁliq wa-’l-dÐn al-qawÐm*, p. 173.

²¹⁷ In HAYEK’s translation: ‘s’incarnar’ C.f. Ed. HAYEK, *Apologie et controverses*, p. 86.

“We inform you that in the previous periods of mankind there has been no specific reason for notification, but when the **incarnated** Son appeared, His contemporaries needed to be talked to and be informed on His great grace, i.e. His **incarnation** by a human [being] of their substance; and thus He needed to inform them on his sonship related to His Father, and the fatherhood of His Father which is related to Him, and the pre-eternity of the Spirit that emanates from the essence of His Father for them.”²¹⁸

The first term in this quote is the active participle, which could be circumscribed on this basis as ‘taking flesh for Himself.’ The second appearance is an infinitive form, governing an object. Its circumscription would be ‘His taking a human for Himself as flesh.’ In this case the human’s body is referred to, i.e. his flesh as a means for the Messiah’s appearance. Given that incarnation made the Messiah perceivable for humankind, further revelation became necessary, in order to make the complexity of the Trinity known to people.

Incarnation, *ta’assud* mostly refers to a necessary step for the Messiah’s coming into being. It is thus a happening, or an action. “As soon as He had been conceived in a human being, created in time, and he grew in him, by His **incarnation** and by the taking of that being for himself, the Pre-eternal and the human became one Messiah, created in time.”²¹⁹ Incarnation is the clue to the Messiah’s unity; it is the starting point of His existence as a unique being. This fact is further emphasized in other instances, e.g. in the following case: “the pre-eternal substance – in the eternity of His pre-eternity, before His **incarnation** by a created human [being] and His unification with him – had not been Messiah, and not even inside the meaning of ‘the Messiah.’”²²⁰ This approach looks at incarnation and the existence from another point of view. It places the Pre-eternal, i.e. the Son in the centre, who, without incarnation, cannot be considered Messiah.

Incarnation is not the action of the Godhead, and is not carried out by all the three *hypostases*, but is exclusively the action of the Son: “And He didn’t say anything that would imply that all the three *hypostases* had **incarnated** and taken Him with themselves. He testified of Himself as being a unique Son by His divinity and humanity, but not as [being] a

²¹⁸ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÉwiba*, p. 167,4-7

نخبرك أنه لم يخصص في سالف دهور الأعقاب الماضية قبل الإنجيل علّة احتيج لها إلى إعلان ذكرها، حتى ظهر الابن متجسداً فاحتاج أهل عصره حينئذ إلى أن يخاطبهم ويخبرهم بعظيم نعمته عليهم في تجسده بشراً من جوهرهم، ويعلن لذلك بنوته لأبيه وأبوة أبيه له وأزلية الروح الفائضة من ذات أبيه لهم.

²¹⁹ Ibid., p. 179,15-16

بل لما حبل في الإنسان حديثاً نما فيه بتجسده وأخذه معه حديثاً، صار الأزلي والبشري حديثاً مسيحياً واحداً

²²⁰ Ibid., p. 180,4-5

كذلك لم يكن الجوهر الأزلي، في قدوم أزليته قبل أن يتجسد بالبشري المخلوق ويوحده معه، مسيحياً ولا داخلاً في معنى المسيح أصلاً

unique Father or a unique Spirit.”²²¹ Later on a more detailed justification is given to show why the action of *ta'assud* is impossible on the behalf of the Father:

“Had the Father – eulogy – **incarnated** in the human instead of the Son, and had He taken the human into His Fatherhood with Himself as the Son has taken him with Himself into His sonship, then – similarly – he should have called the human Father, together with the Pre-eternal. It would have been impossible to relate the sonship of the temporal human to the fatherhood of the Father in this statement.”²²²

The impossibility of the Spirit’s incarnation is justified the same way: “And also, had the Spirit **incarnated** [in the human, then the human] would have deserved to be called Holy Spirit with Him, but this is a name that transcends being given to composite, combined things,²²³ and it is impossible to be described in compound bodies that were created in time”²²⁴ This latter case also shows that corporeal nature excludes to share spiritual features.

Given the fact that in the Messiah a divine and a human substance form a union, it must be clarified that *ta'assud* cannot affect the divine or interact with it:

“As the Son **incarnated** by this human [being] and took him with himself to his sonship; the partial came to be called the Son of God (the Father) together with the Pre-eternal. No absurdity follows from it regarding the Father, and no lack can enter [the essence of] the Son because of this. In the previous eternal duration He had always called the ones close to Him and those who obey Him his Sons and beloved ones – out of grace and generosity. It did not enlarge his glorification and did not debase His generosity and grace. But it had never been possible to call any of His creatures Father or Spirit.”²²⁵

This quote does not emphasize the unity of these two *hypostases*, but accentuates the action of incarnation as the starting point of the human’s taking a share of the divine sonship. Incarnation paves the way for the partial or relative, i.e. the human part, to be attached to the divine Son, but as he is the one being attached to the pre-eternal; the other one is the active one who takes it for Himself as flesh, no real, substantial interaction is possible between the

²²¹ Ibid., p. 202,7-10

ولم يقل في شيء من ذلك قولاً يدل على أن الأقانيم الثلاثة تجسدت وأخذته معه، لأنه كان يسهل على نفسه أنه بلاهوته وناسوته ابن واحد لا أب واحد ولا روح واحد

²²² al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ'il wa-'l-aĒwiba*, p. 205,9-12

فلو كان الأب جل ثناؤه تجسد البشري بدل الابن وأخذه معه في أبوته كما أخذه الابن معه في بنوته، إذ لا لوجب على قياس ذلك أن يسمى البشري مع الأزلي أباً. فكان ذلك مستحيلاً أن ينسب إلى بنوة الإنسان الزمني بأبوة الأب في هذا القول.

²²³ In the edited text another word, names *الأسماء* can be found, but it must be a reading error and should be things, أشياء in the original one. So, I translated it in this latter sense.

²²⁴ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ'il wa-'l-aĒwiba*, p. 205,13-15

وكذلك أيضاً لو تجسد الروح لاستحق أن يسمى معه روح القدس، وهذا اسم يتعالى عن أن تسمى به الأسماء المؤلفة المركبة، ويستحيل أن يوصف في الأجساد المحدثة المكونة.

²²⁵ Ibid., p. 205,4-8

إذ تجسد الابن بهذا البشري وأخذه معه في بنوته فسمى النسبي مع الأزلي ابن الله الأب، لم تلزم الأب شناعة ولا دخلت على الابن منه منقصة. فإنه قد كان لم يزل في سالف الدهر يسمى أوليائه وأهل طاعته بفضله وكرمه له أبناءً وأحباباً. فلم يزد ذلك تعظيمه ولا أهان بجموده وكرمه ولم يستجز منذ قط أن يسمى أحداً من خلقه أباً ولا روحاً

two. In the *KitÁb al-MasÁ'il wa-'l-aÊwiba*, divine transcendence is always stressed, so it must be made clear that incarnation is a deliberate action on the divine's behalf, which does not change this transcendence. Divine transcendence is equally important for the Muslim opponent, so it is not surprising that this idea, as common ground between them, is highlighted to such a degree.

The subject of incarnation raises several theological questions; one of them is its cause. As we will see it later in the chapter on creation in details, divine generosity is of fundamental importance in every action God carries out towards humankind; the same motivation is beyond incarnation.

“Isn't it that the Wise – eulogy – stands above doing anything in vain, without aim? His **incarnation** and union were not in vain or without an aim, either. His generosity, open-handedness, goodness, and might were those [factors,] which enticed Him to create His creatures and bring them into being, and these are also what enticed Him to fulfil His grace and complete His beneficence by His **incarnation** in a human [being] of His creatures. This was in order to make the portion of sonship, the splendour of His lordship necessary for the human, too, by His **incarnation** in him. [And also in order that] the honour that He gave to that one human individual, representing all of them, should prevail over all creation.”²²⁶

This description contains ideas that can be considered common ground with the Muslim opponent. Such is the thought that God does not do anything in vain. But it is Christian teaching which gives divine goodness a central role in motivation. Incarnation is seen as the fulfilment of beneficence, as the ultimate goodness towards creation, since this is what makes humankind take share in the Son's lordship and sonship.

Another group of theological questions deals with the outcome and results of incarnation, such as the fact that *ta'assud* in one individual made it possible for all humanity to share the Messiah's grace of resurrection (just as the sin of Adam resulted in consequences that are shared by all human beings).²²⁷ The reason why only one individual was chosen as a subject of incarnation is also investigated (in a similar way and with a similar outcome).²²⁸ The question whether incarnation made humankind free from sin or not is of theological nature, as well, with a strongly dialectical argumentation.²²⁹ On the other hand it is important to know whether humankind deserved the Incarnation, because if so, than it is not necessary

²²⁶ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ'il wa-'l-aÊwiba*, p. 215,9-15

ألا أن الحكيم عز جلاله متعال عن أن يفعل شيئاً عبثاً لغير معنى. كذلك لم يكن تجسده وتأحيده عبثاً بلا معنى، بل جوده وكرمه وصلاحه وجبروته التي دعتة إلى أن أبداع وأنشأ خلقه، هي التي دعتة أخيراً إلى انتقام نعمته واستكمال إحسانه بتجسده بشرياً من خلقه. وذلك ليجب للبشري بتجسده إياه حظ بنوته وسنا ربوبيته وليعم الخليقة كلها شرف ما أناله الشخص الواحد الأنسي المستخص من جميعها.

²²⁷ Ibid., p. 218,1-11

²²⁸ Ibid., pp. 217-218.

²²⁹ Ibid., pp. 220-21.

to give thanks for it, but if not, then God's gift was not properly given.²³⁰ All these questions may be easily answered by declaring that incarnation is a grace.²³¹ Grace will play an important role when examining creation, as well. On the authority of Lampe, we may say that the same idea had been expressed by $\sigma\alpha\rho\xi$ in Patristic literature.²³²

AbŪ RĀ'ĪŌa, as we could see it above, uses various terms for incarnation and embodiment. We have seen that he used the terms *taĒassum* and *tabaddun* as embodiment, but when referring to the Messiah's taking flesh, he also uses *taĒassud*. In the example we have seen above he concentrates on the quiddity of incarnation, which is neither to be described as an act nor as a part, but as a way to the action: i.e. manifestation, appearance, etc.²³³

Theodore AbŪ Qurra scarcely uses this term. A representative example would be his summary for what Christians teach: i.e. that God sent His Son from Heaven to a pure woman, by whom He incarnated, from whom He was born as God and human, and then grew in this world like any of us.²³⁴ We cannot find further implications in this example; but it is undeniable that this term must have been widely used in Christian circles to express incarnation, without respect to denomination.

The reason *ta'assud* is not a term to be found in *kalĀm* is Muslim rejection for incarnation. The question of incarnation is a Christological issue, and it is not unexpected that approaches differ. Islam refuses the Trinitarian Christian teaching, according to which Jesus, the *Logos*, (as established in the Gospel of John,) was God; and the Word became flesh: i.e. Jesus was God incarnate, and the Son of God. The Qur'Ān says that Jesus never claimed these things. In Muslim theology, the *Kalima* is created, and calling Jesus the Word of AllĀh cannot mean his deification; it is merely a confirmation of His being a prophet. As a prophet of God, Jesus is a manifestation of God, who transmits God's message. The fundamental reason for the Muslim rejection of the Incarnation is that Jesus' divine filiation is explicitly rejected in the Qur'Ān, as well as it states that God neither begets nor is begotten.²³⁵ As for ŸammĀr al-BaŌrĪ's epoch, the ninth century, Incarnation was a central theme in disputes between Christians and Muslims. On the authority of Beaumont we may say that Christian teaching relied upon the fact that Jesus did not have a human father, while Muslims, e.g. the

²³⁰ Ibid., pp. 221-22

²³¹ al-BANŪRĪ, ŸammĀr, *KitĀb al-MasĀ'il wa-'l-aĒwiba*, p. 249,17

²³² LAMPE, pp. 1224-25.

²³³ ABŪ RĀ'ĪŌA, *FD al-taĒassud*, p. 28.

²³⁴ ABŪ QURRA, Theodore *Maymar fĪ wuĒĪd al-ĒĀliq wa-'l-dĒn al-qawĒm*, p. 263.

²³⁵ C.f. *SŪrat al-ĪlĀŌ*: 112,3

ninth-century apologist, ÝAID ibn RabbÁn al- al-ÓabarÐ (d. c. 870) appealed to Adam’s lack of human parents as a refutation of the Christian idea of Incarnation.²³⁶ Also in this epoch, MuÝtazilites and other theologians argued that a God limited by a body could not be omnipresent,²³⁷ and given that the same agument was present in Christian authors’ works, too, interaction is likely to have happened in this field.

8. *IttiÁÆ* – assumption:²³⁸ the Son’s action of taking, assuming a body for Himself

This term rarely occurs on its own. It is either used together with incarnation, as a term of a similar meaning, or together with governed nouns as objects: i.e. any of the terms of bodily connotations, meaning the Son’s taking, assuming a body/a form/an abode etc. for Himself. In the first examined example *ittiÁÆ* appears as the action of the Son: taking a human form in order that the Messiah should come into being: “The existence of the complex Messiah in His complexity was due to the **assumption** and unification as well.”²³⁹ We must underline that assuming [a form] is used together with unification, and it lets one interpret the two actions as complementary.

IttiÁÆ usually governs the noun *Êasad*. This complexity raises the question whether the body should be called the body of God.²⁴⁰ *IttiÁÆ* governing the noun *Êasad* gives the reader the impression that it might eventually be replaced by *ta°assud*, as well:

“But, as the Father – eulogy – wanted to complete His eternal generosity towards His creation and fulfil His previous grace upon His whole created world, and wanted to inform all the angels and people on the splendour of the name of His Fatherhood that He had concealed before: He **assumed** a body by His pre-eternal Son, who is born of Him. [This body is] of His creation. He took it with Him into His sonship, and by this he made for Him and for everyone of the same substance (angels and men) the share of His Fatherhood necessary. By this, they all deserved the heritage of His valuable and noble treasures, which he had prepared for them in His kingdom. His **assuming** the body for His Son (and not for Himself or for His Spirit) fit

²³⁶ BEAUMONT, Mark, *Christology in Dialogue with Muslims*, Oxford, Regnum Books, 2005, pp. 2-3. (Later on: BEAUMONT, Mark, *Christology in Dialogue with Muslims*, 2005.)

²³⁷ MARTIN, R.C., *Anthropomorfism*, p. 106.

²³⁸ In HAYEK’s translation: ‘assomption’ C.f. Ed. HAYEK, *Apologie et controverses*, p. 85.

²³⁹ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba*, p. 185,3

وكذلك كان وجود المسيح المجتمع بكماله مع الاتحاد جميعاً معاً

²⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 196,3

ألا أنا قد نقر ونؤمن بأن الله اتخذ له جسداً غير أنه لم يجب منذ قط أن يسمى جسد الله

His wisdom and greatness and is more proper for His grace and clemency than its **assuming** for Himself and for His Spirit.”²⁴¹

This quote demonstrates that our hypothesis concerning the possibility of replacing *ta^oassud* with this compound structure is verifiable. Assuming a body for the son/for Himself expresses the meaning of incarnation.

The object of the action of assuming, i.e. the human [being] whose body is taken, has power over the others consequently: “The human [being], selected from our substance turned to have power over all the creatures right after that his Artificer had **assumed** it as a **body** [for Himself].”²⁴² Given that the same consequence is mentioned in the case of incarnation elsewhere, assuming and a governed noun is seen synonymous with it. In the case of incarnation we have seen that it is a way of the Son’s action and manifestation, a method of His conveying the divine message. His assumption, being a way to similar outcomes is synonymous with it in this, as well.

A last remark to make: the use of this term is significant in the debate of Christians and Muslims concerning Jesus as the Son of God, since this idea is not acceptable for Muslims. But the Qur’án also uses the verb *ittaláEa*, as an action of God, who took Jesus for Himself, which does not suggest physical generation but a relation of adoption.²⁴³ ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ uses this term to refer to an action of the Son of God, the object of which is a body, so there is a difference in denotations. Yet, the use of this very term by ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, i.e. expressing an idea by a terminology known to Muslims, might be an attempt to find common ground with them.

9. *ta^oassud*, *itti^lÁE* and their composition or parallel with other terms

Ta^oassud, and *itti^lÁE* are used together or alternately when the author cites Scriptural evidence in His answer to the supposed Muslim opponent’s question. Citations appear from the Old Testament (*ÝalÁ lisÁn DÁwud; wa-yaqÙl IšÝya*), and from the New Testament (Matthew, John).²⁴⁴

²⁴¹ Ibid., pp. 205,15-206,1-2

ولكن إذ أراد الأب عز جلاله أن يكمل جوده القديم على خلقه ويتم نعمته السابقة على كافة بريته ويعلم للملائكة والناس أجمعين ما كان أخفاه قديماً من سناء اسم أبوته، اتخذ بابنه الأزلي المولود منه جسداً من خلقه وأخذه معه في بنوته وأوجب له ولأهل جوهره من الملائكة والأنس بذلك حظ أبوته ليستحقوا باجمعهم وراثته ذخائره النفيسة الكريمة التي أعدها لهم في ملكوته. فكان اتخاذ الجسد لابنه دون نفسه وروحه أشكل بحكمته وعظمته وأولى بفضله ورافته من إتخذه له وروحه

²⁴² Ibid., p. 226,9-10

كذلك بشرنا المنتخب من جوهرنا صارت الخلائق كلها له ملكاً بعد ساعة اتخذ صناعه له جسداً

²⁴³ BEAUMONT, Mark, *Christology in Dialogue with Muslims*, p. 9.

²⁴⁴ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÉwiba*, pp. 206-9

As for non-scriptural appearances: our first example shows how *taĒassud*, *ittiĀĀE*, and *badan* are rendered side by side.

“Due to His grace and might, He sculpted a pure and clean form of their substance, and He **incarnated** it, and **assumed** it as a garment for His divinity, in order to make the right of pre-eternal sonship necessary for him, and to make him equal to Himself in this sonship. We know that the matter out of which your **body** was formed, is of the solidity of your father, then, out of the sperm were formed a **body** and limbs. After the creation of the **body** and its parts had been fulfilled, a living soul was created in it, but not from the solidity of your father. ... Your soul was not begotten by your father, and it is not of the nature of the sperm, and yet, you became a son of your father, verily.”²⁴⁵

This extract introduces new ideas, since incarnation happens in a form (*šabaĀ*), not a body this time. As a parallel for the Son’s incarnation in the pure form, the composition of the human body and soul is presented here. Human body is expressed by *badan* and it is combined with *nafs*, while incarnation, the Messiah’s taking flesh for Himself is still derived from *Ēasad*, so this is what refers to His flesh. A hierarchy of meanings is discernible here. Another point which is worthy of examining here is the sequence of man’s creation and growth, as it is described here, since it may paralleled to the *ĪadĒ*× on man’s creation: “The creation of each of you is completed in his mother’s womb for forty days in the form of a drop, then he becomes a clot of blood for the same interval, then a morsel of flesh for the same period, ...”²⁴⁶ Of course, the establishment of a direct relationship between the two would be far-fetched. However, this tradition may be found in al-BuĀrĒ’s and Muslim’s *ŌaĀĒĪs*, al-TirmiĒĒ’s *Sunan*, etc. which implies that this tradition had been widely known and accepted in the ninth century, when ŸAmmĀr al-BaŌrĒ wrote the *KitĀb al-MasĀ’il wa-l-aĒwiba*. When explaining Christian teachings, he might have used deliberately an imagery known to and accepted by Muslims.

Many terms appear in the following example: e.g. incarnation and assumption are used together, and body, as *asad*, is governed by the verbs or verbal nouns of *taassada* and *ittalaĒa*. The quote raises the question whether *asad* is the body of God.

²⁴⁵ al-BAÑRĪ, ŸAmmĀr, *KitĀb al-MasĀ’il wa-l-aĒwiba*, p. 193,12-18

أنحط من جوهرهم بفضلهم وجبروته شبحاً زكياً طاهراً فتجسده واتخذة لباساً للاهوته ليوجب له بذلك حق البنوة التي لم تزل فتصيره معه فيها مثله: كما قد نعلم من المادة التي كون بدتك منها بدنأ، وإنما كانت من صلب ابيك، ثم صور من النطفة بدن وجوارح وأوصال. حتى إذا كمل خلقة البدن وجوارحه خلقت فيه من بعد نفس حية لا من صلب ابيك، ... ونفسك لم يلدتها أبوك ولا من طباع نطفته، فصيرت من زرع ابيك ابنأ وحضن بحق لا بيك

²⁴⁶ C.f. al-NAWAWĪ, *Forty Hadith*, translated by IBRAHIM, E. – JOHNSON-DAVIES, D., Damascus, DĀr al-Qur’Ān al-KarĒm, 1977. , p. 37.

إِنَّ أَحَدَكُمْ يُجْمَعُ خَلْفَهُ فِي بَطْنِ أُمِّهِ أَرْبَعِينَ يَوْماً ثُمَّ يَكُونُ عَلَقَةً مِثْلَ ذَلِكَ ثُمَّ يَكُونُ مُضْغَةً مِثْلَ ذَلِكَ ...

“We would say: we establish and believe that God **assumed** a **body** for Him, but it is not necessary to call it the **body** of God. That is, as He raised a single Messiah and a single Son when He **incarnated** by it, the **body** has to be attached to the Messiah, because if it’s not, [it will have to be called] the **body** of God, even if the **incarnation** was on the behalf of God originally, and not on the behalf of the Messiah, and even if God has never **incarnated**.”²⁴⁷

Here *ittiĪĀĒ* is the action of God, as it is in the Qur’Ān’s terminology. But the object, instead of the person of Jesus, is a body, or flesh. It is elucidated here that at the moment of assumption and incarnation, a single Messiah came into being, thus the body is attached to Him, and not to God. According to both Christian and Muslim teachings, God cannot have a body.

If assumption, *ittiĪĀĒ* is used together with *Ēasad, haykal, maĀll*: it raises the question whether this action introduces any change in the divine nature, and if there is any composition between the two natures. This is examined in the next example:

“As the Word of God **assumed** this human [being] as a **body, frame and abode** for himself, the human [being], who was the object [of this assumption], deserved the right of sonship and its portion together with the other, the **incarnating** one; and they became equal in this sonship. He equalized him in everything we have mentioned: lordship, possession, power and property. It was impossible to make him equal to Himself in the pre-eternity of His essence and the spirituality of His substance. [This happened] without the Pre-eternal’s being affected by any contingency, composition, mingling, commixing, corruption or anything that comes from the created **bodies**, their consequences and transformation, since He transcended and stood above everything that the created and generated estimative faculties may perceive.”²⁴⁸

The main idea of this example is that divinity excludes tangibility by the corporeal nature. As for the terms, let us remember that the Qur’Ān uses the verb *ittalaĒa*, as an action of God, who took Jesus for Himself. In this example *ittiĪĀĒ* is an action of the Word of God,²⁴⁹ i.e. the Son. Replacing God with the Son, by adding the word *Kalima*, and then using the term *ittiĪĀĒ*, is a fruitful “manipulation” of terminology, in which ŸAmmĀr al-BaŌrĒ probably aims at expressing a Christian idea in a way acceptable for the Muslim opponent. The objects

²⁴⁷ al-BAŅRĪ, ŸAmmĀr, *KitĀb al-MasĀ’il wa-’l-aĒwiba*, 196,3-7

قلنا: إلا أنا قد نقر ونؤمن بأن الله اتخذ له جسداً غير أنه لم يجب منذ قط أن يسمى جسد الله. وذلك أنه إذ أقام، في وقت تجسده إياه، منه ومن البشري الذي تجسده، مسيحاً واحداً وابناً واحداً، وجب أن يضاف الجسد إلى المسيح إلا جسد الله، وإن كان التجسد في الأصل كان لله لا للمسيح، ولو لم يتجسد الله أبداً

²⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 213,11-17

إذ اتخذ الله الكلمة ذلك البشري له جسداً وهيكلًا ومحلاً، استحق البشري المتحمل لذلك حق البنوة وحظها مع المتجسد الآخر واستويا جميعاً. وهنالك أيضاً ساواه في كل ما ذكرنا من ربوبيته وملكه وجميع سلطانه وجميع ماله، ما لم يمكن مساواته فيه من أزلية ذاته وروحانية جوهه ذلك، من غير أن ينال الأزلي في شيء من ذلك مماسة أو تركيب أم اختلاط أم امتزاج أم فساد أم شيء مما يجري من الأجسام المخلوقة من نتانجها واستحالتها، بل أعلى وأرفع من كل ما أدركته الأوهام المحدثة المكونة

²⁴⁹ The phrase is „*AllĀh al-Kalima*” in the original text. But instead of translating it as God, the Word, I interpret it as the *Verbum Dei*, the Word of God. I followed this practice in each case.

of assumption are *Ēasad*, *haykal*, *maġall*, which, being used in the same syntactical role, are synonymous in the first sentence. Body means a frame, a dwelling place in this context. However, as we could see it on the authority of de Boer above, *haykal* is used in Muslim philosophical terminology as a term referring to the physical world as whole as well as the planets, because the world-soul and the spirits of the stars dwell in them like the soul of man in its body. Here we may find a parallel with ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ's interpretation as far as the dwelling of a spirit in a body is concerned, but the meaning of *haykal* is more specific. It is to be noted here that *haykal* is usually not defined in Muslim books of definitions, and may originally be a specific Christian (Nestorian) term. Boer interprets its Muslim usage on the basis of dwelling, so quite probably there is Christian influence in this field. Only al-ĒwÁrizmÐ mentions it when classifying Christian groups, but he introduces this term with the meaning of a temple.²⁵⁰ The term is probably not widely used in this sense in the ninth century, either; at least, I could not find any occurrences in the other two Christian authors' texts, which may imply that its use by ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ is his own invention due to a Nestorian tradition. J. Pelikan emphasizes that in the Council of Ephesus in 431 an anathema was pronounced upon the "man-worshiper Nestorius" and his theology of the incarnation as the indwelling of Logos. Orthodoxy identified itself with the anathema, while Nestorians continued to resist it and to declare that their view of the relation between the divine and the human in Christ was the only correct one, and that they hold the truth of the gospel. It was the council of Nicea to which Nestorian theologians declared their loyalty, the first two synods being normative for Nestorian teaching. In disputes with the adherents of Ephesus and Chalcedon, the common starting point of Nestorians were "the dogmas that are in accordance with the faith," namely those of Nicea and Constantinople. It was the continuity between the first two councils and those that followed at issue in the disputes. Nestorians denied continuity, so they repeated and preserved most of the emphases characteristic of the theology of the indwelling Logos in the fourth and fifth centuries. Many of the favourite biblical texts were the same. Prominent was the use of John 2:19 "Destroy this temple and in three days I will raise it up." In many ways it was the key passage in Nestorian definition of the nature of the union between divine and human in Christ. Almost verbatim from Nestorius, the leading Nestorian theologian of the seventh century, Babai the Great declared: "Thus we adore God in the temple of his humanity, because he dwells in it as in a temple, united with it eternally." The sixth-century Thomas of Edessa and the seventh-century Babai held it that the

²⁵⁰ al-ĒWÁRIZMĪ, *MaġÁtĪ al-ÝulÙm*, p. 90.

الهيكل بيت الصور فيه صور الأنبياء عليهم السلام وصور الملوك وقد ذكرت مراتبهم في الدين وأسماء رؤسائهم في باب الأخبار

frankincense presented to the Christ child by the Magi had as its purpose to show that he who was born is the temple of God.²⁵¹ It is then not unexpected that *haykal*, the word of Syriac origin meaning temple is employed here as “temple.” The second half of the quote introduces body, *Êism* as created, and as such, it is subject to contingency, composition, mingling, commixing, corruption and transformation. All these kinds of change are body-related. The hierarchy of meanings appears in the phenomenon that the Messiah’s body is referred to by the word *Êasad*, i.e. flesh; while human bodies, or more generally, created bodies are denoted by the term *Êism*.

Incarnation (*taÊassud*) takes place together with assumption (*ittiÎÁÆ*), which has as its objects ‘temple’ (*haykal*) and dwelling place (*maÎall*):

“We have informed you in the beginning of our treatise that He had not made him equal to Himself in substance, but only in what the substance might be described by: i.e. might, grace, majesty, and greatness. [And He did not make him equal to Himself in things] that belong to nature and substance. So this is what He took for Himself as a garment, and **incarnated** in and **assumed** for Himself as His **temple** and **dwelling place**.”²⁵²

The first sentence of this quote refers to the intangibility of the divine; in a dispute with a Muslim opponent it is crucial to emphasize that nothing can affect the godly substance. Thus incarnation is compared to taking on a garment, which further accentuates that no inward or substantial change may reach the divine substance. Incarnation at the same time may be replaced by assumption and an object, which is the assumption of a frame or a dwelling place. Reference to the body by the name ‘temple’ is from the approach of the divine substance, since the divine cannot have a body. ‘Dwelling place,’ *maÎall* refers to the state of inhabitation, dwelling, i.e. *ÎulÛl*, in this sense the body is a sign for the existence of the divine, it is a means in which He can appear.

It is established concerning both incarnation, *ta°assud* and unification, *ittiÎÁAd* that it is impossible to know their method/modality, as we can see it in the following example.

“There is also no answer to the question of the mode of God’s **incarnation** and the **union** of the **body** with the **incarnating** [one] from the aspect of this sonship. What we are obliged to answer is the question whether He **incarnated** and whether He **unified** [with the body]. As for the meaning of His **incarnation** and **union**, we have already given an answer to it by the one

²⁵¹ PELIKAN, J., *The Spirit of Eastern Christendom (600-1700)*, Chicago – London, The University of Chicago Press, 1975. pp. 39-40.

²⁵² al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba*, p. 224,15

قد أخبرناك في صدر كلامنا أنه لم يساوه في الجوهر بل إنما ساواه في الأمور التي يوصف بها الجوهر من العز والنعمة والجلال والعظمة، وليست عن الطباع والجوهر، وذلك الذي تدرعه وتجسده واتخذة هيكله ومحلّه

that you have heard. As for how He **incarnated** and how He **unified** [with the body]: there's no way to perceive and answer it.²⁵³

This extract is of interest due to two reasons. One of them is that incarnation implies the union with the body. The other reason is a parallel it offers with Islamic thought, as van Ess assumes it: “Theologians, however, used *bi-lá kayf* rather in the sense of “without qualifying God in a way only to be applied to His creation; they presented it as a middle course between a literal acceptance of the anthropological statements in the Scripture (= *takyǾf, tašbǾh*) on one side and their metaphorical interpretation in the Muʿtazilī sense (*taʿwǾl = taʿyǾl*) on the other.”²⁵⁴ ʿAmmār al-Baʿrī’s example does not refer to God’s essence when emphasizing the *bi-lá kayf* approach, instead, he refers to God’s creative action. However, the approach is the same, and we may see that Christian-Muslim parallels are offered in approach and methodology besides terminology.

The difference between *haykal* and *Ēasad* as well as the difference between *taĒassud* and *Īulūl* can be understood on the basis of this example:

“If he said: why do you call it the “**temple**” of God and not His **body**? Yet, you claim that He **dwelt** in it as well as He **incarnated** by it. We would say: don’t we say that He **incarnated** in it and **dwelt** in it at the same time? This is why we called it God’s “**temple**” and not God’s **body**. **Incarnation** makes the **unification** of two substances necessary, while **dwelling** doesn’t. That is: **incarnation** by two substances in the unity of the Messiah attaches **body** to Him, whereas **dwelling** does not make a unity of the two, thus “**temple**” is attached to it, and it is established for the one who **dwells** in it, forever.”²⁵⁵

According to this example, incarnation implies unity of the two substances, but dwelling doesn’t, so in this case body needs to be called the temple of God. The difference between *haykal* and *Ēasad* is not in the very thing they refer to, since it is body in both cases. Difference is between the action that is examined, since incarnation implies unity, so the body can be referred to in the genitive construction: the body of who incarnates. Dwelling implies another kind of attachment, when body has to be referred to as a manifestation, a temple in which someone or something dwells or appears. This distinction, and calling the body the

²⁵³ al-BAÑRĪ, ʿAmmār, *Kitāb al-Masāʿil wa-ʿl-aĒwiba*, p. 214,12-20

كذلك لا جواب لمسألة عن كيفية تجسد الله واتحاد الجسد مع المتجسد في جهة تلك النبوة، الذي يلزمنا الجواب فيه من السؤال أن هل تجسد وهل اتحد. فأما معنى تجسده واتحاده فقد أجبنا فيه بالذي سمعت. فأما كيف تجسد وكيف اتحد فلا سبيل إلى دركه والجواب عنه

²⁵⁴ van ESS, J., *Tashbī wa-tanzīl*, p. 344.

²⁵⁵ al-BAÑRĪ, ʿAmmār, *Kitāb al-Masāʿil wa-ʿl-aĒwiba*, p. 201,6-12

فإن قال: فما بالكم تسمون هيكل الله ولا تسمونه جسد الله. وقد تزعمون إنه حل فيه كما تجسده الجواب قلنا: ألا أنا نقول عنه تجسده وحل فيه جميعاً، ولذلك سميناه هيكل الله ولم نسمه جسد الله، لأن التجسد أوجب اتحاد الجوهرين والحلول لم يوجب اتحاد هذا؛ أي التجسد من الجوهرين بوحدة المسيح إليه يضاف الجسد، والحلول لم يبق منهما وحدانية واحدة، يضاف إليه الهيكل فتثبت إضافته إلى ساكنه أبداً

temple of God (i.e. the means by which He can manifest and convey His message) is important in a debate with Muslims, who can not accept God's having a body.

Another difference between *taĒassud* and *ĪulŪl* can be approached from the viewpoint of the incarnating divine person:

“Had the Father and the Spirit also **incarnated** by him [the human] and taken him into their property the same way as they **dwelt** in Him [the Son], he [the Messiah] would have called himself Father and Spirit in many cases. Had the **inhabitation** made the same thing necessary as **incarnation** and union do, he would not have rather called himself pre-eternal Son instead of calling himself Father and Spirit, since the Father and the Spirit **dwelt** in Him, just as the Son **dwelt** in him.”²⁵⁶

Christian teaching of Trinity implies that all three *hypostases* are one, thus the Father and the Spirit dwell in the Son. If the Son dwells in the human, then the other two *hypostases* dwell in Him as well. Dwelling does not imply a bodily attachment (as seen in the previous paragraph, where body could be referred to by the genitive construction as the body of God), so the Messiah's body is only attached to the Son, who incarnated in it. Dwelling does not even imply unity, as seen above and as demonstrated in the following quote:

“We have to know on the basis of this that it is not due to the **dwelling** of the divinity in humanity that the unity of the Messiah and the unity of His sonship came into being. It is due to the Son's specification by the property of humanity by way of **incarnation** and their unity. This is why we could speak of the **body** of the Messiah and not the **body** of God. And as the unity of the Messiah is not due to the **dwelling**, this is why the “temple” is called the “**temple**” of God and not that of the Messiah.”²⁵⁷

There is a point to remark here, namely that dwelling is on the behalf of the divinity, and not only the Son. This is why the body, which is the body of the Messiah, cannot be attached to the Messiah or to the Son only as a temple, but has to be referred to as the temple [not body!] of the divine, or God. Another remark we have to make here, is that incarnation is described here as the specification by the property of humanity.

Since dwelling, inhabitation has turned up in various contexts; it is time for us to concentrate on this term a bit more. First, we need to mention that the use of the term is unparalleled in the contemporary authors' texts, but it is not unexpected if we consider the

²⁵⁶ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ'il wa-'l-aĒwiba*, p. 202, 11-14

فلو أن الأب والروح أيضاً تجسداً وأخذاه في خاصتهما كما حلا فيه، سمي نفسه أيضاً في كثير من المواضع أباً وروحاً. ولو كان الحلول أوجب ما أوجب التجسد والاتحاد لم يكن بات يسمي نفسه ابناً أزلياً من أن يسمي نفسه أباً وروحاً لحلول الأب والروح فيه كما حل فيه الابن

²⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 202:15-18

ولكن من ههنا يجب أن نعلم أنه ليس من قيل حلول اللاهوت في الناسوت قامت وحدانية المسيح وحدانية بنوته، بل من قيل اختصاص الابن خاصة الناسوت بالتجسد وبالتوحيد من بينهما. فلذلك قلنا جسد المسيح بلا جسد الله. وإذ لم تقم وحدانية المسيح من جهة الحلول سمي الهيكل هيكل الله لا هيكل المسيح

term as a Nestorian one. *ĪulŪl* is not widely defined by Muslim authors either, which may imply its being a Christian technical term, even if its use is not widely documented in the 9th century. It is not unexpected, since, as van Ess puts it, Islam rejects, under the notion of *ĪulŪl* (ἐνοίκησις), the form of anthropomorphism typical for Christianity, namely, incarnation.²⁵⁸ The only exception in Sunnī theological definitions is Ibn FŪrak, who defines it as an attribute of a substance, as dependence on place and firm, fixed existence in it,²⁵⁹ in which he shares ʿYammār al-BaʿŪrī’s approach. However, pantheistic Sufis and extremist ShĪʿī theologians used extensively the term either as an infinitive noun, *ĪulŪl* or as a verb, *Īalla*. On the one hand, ninth century Sufism, uses *ĪulŪl* to express the idea of divine infusion²⁶⁰ while later Sufis meant intrusion by it.²⁶¹ On the other hand, extremist ShĪʿī used the verb *Īalla* to indicate that God takes place in the persons of the ShĪʿī imams.²⁶² It is obvious here that Muslim uses of *ĪulŪl* are under Christian influence. Needless to say that both pantheistic Sufis and extremist ShĪʿī theologians are condemned by Sunni and ShĪʿī theologians and accused of importing Christian ideas. As an example, let us examine how al-ʿEurĒānī defines *ĪulŪl*:

“Circulating **inhabitation** is the expression of the unity of two **bodies** in a way that one of them is a sign for the other, as the **inhabitation** of the water in the rose, the circulating one is the **inhabiting** one, while the one in which circulation is taking place is the **dwelling place**. **Inhabitation** in proximity expresses that one of two **bodies** holds the other; like the **inhabitation** of water in the jug.”²⁶³

Al-ʿEurĒānī uses the term *Ēasad* when he refers to body, so it is a physical entity that we need to think of, but it might be a sign of Christian influence that he used the term which denotes ‘flesh’ in Christian usage. Especially the first definition, working with the simile of the water in the rose, referring to one of the two components as a sign for the other, is very close to the interpretation we saw in ʿYammār al-BaʿŪrī’s case. Even if the Word is not a body, but is present in the flesh as water in the rose, i.e. the flesh is an outward sign of it, as it

²⁵⁸ VAN ESS, J., *TashbĪl wa-tanzĪh*, p. 342.

²⁵⁹ Ibn FŪRAK, *Kitāb al-ĪudŪd fĪ l-uŪl*, p. 24.

حد الحلول: هو الكون في المكان والاعتماد عليه والسكون فيه، ومنه قولهم حل الماء في الجب، وحل الدهن في القارورة، وذلك من صفات الجوهر

²⁶⁰ MASSIGNON, Louis, *Essai sur les origines du lexique technique de la mystique musulmane*, Paris, Geuthner, 1922, p. 223.

²⁶¹ Ibid., p. 236.

²⁶² al-ASŪYARĪ, AbŪ l-Īsan, *Maqālāt al-islāmiyyĪn wa-iltĪf al-muŪallĪn*, Ed. RITTER, M. Hellmut, Wiesbaden, Steiner, 1963, p. 14.

²⁶³ al-ʿEURĒĀNĪ, *Kitāb al-TaʿrĪfāt*, p. 104.

الحلول السرياني: عبارة عن اتحاد الجسمين بحيث تكون الإشارة إلى أحدهما إشارة إلى الآخر، كحلول ماء الورد في الورد، فيسمى الساري: حالاً، والمسري فيه: محلاً.
الحلول الجوارى: عبارة عن كون أحد الجسمين ظرفاً للآخر، كحلول الماء في الكوز.

is the case of the rose the inhabiting water. Christian influence is very probable in this case, as well.

IttiĪĀÆ is what leads to humanisation, *ta'annus*, but at the same time this action results in union between the two *hypostases*: “We can also say that the Word of God, who stands above every analogy, is the one who originated and **assumed** the human for Himself as humanity. By His **humanisation** (i.e. His dressing in armament) their **union** was necessary, and the **unity** of the Messiah originated in their combination.”²⁶⁴ Assuming a human for Himself, i.e. dressing in him, as one takes on armament, is synonymous with humanisation. Humanisation implies the unity of the two *hypostases*, at the same time it appears in the text as being on the same level with combination. Thus the combination of these two parts is also synonymous with humanisation.

Four terms: *taĒassud*, *badan*, *ta'annus*, *Ēasad* appear in a long description. This example contains descriptive parts, as well as similes.

“the soul **incarnated** by the **body** and the **body** by the soul, and by their combination a single human being originated. Thus the **body** was called the **body** of man and the soul the soul of man, and not the **body** of the soul or the soul of the **body**. If the soul had not combined with the **body**, the unity of man would never have come into being out of them. We can say it in other words and ways, too: the Word of God **became human**, but not in the following ways, as one can say e.g: the water froze, i.e. congealed in itself/its essence and became ice. Or not as milk became cheese, i.e. it clot in itself and thus turned cheese. Or as one can say: the youngster turned into a man, i.e. he grew up in himself and became a [grown] man. It is rather in the meaning when one says that someone armed himself, i.e. he wore armament, or someone equipped himself: i.e. he dressed in armour, or someone wore a turban, i.e. he put on a turban. It does not mean that this person became a turban or weapons or armament. It is this way when we say that the Word of God **incarnated** and **became human**, that is: he created a **body** and he put it on. He created a human being, and wore it as an armament, combined it with His *hypostasis* in order to appear in it, and in order to make His words and deeds appear through it. He also did it in order to unify this human being with Himself in His sonship. Beginning with the time of the **assumption** and **unification** their position is that of a single Messiah. It is necessary to speak of the **body** of the Messiah and the humanity of the combined Son; and it is not the humanity of God, or the humanity of the divinity, ...”²⁶⁵

²⁶⁴ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ'il wa-'l-aĒwiba*, p. 197,9-10

هكذا وعلى هذا نقول: إن الله الكلمة تعالى على كل قياس هو الذي بدأ واتخذ البشري له ناسوتاً، ومع تأنسه أي تدرعه وجب اتحادهما وقامت وحدانية المسيح بانتلافهما

²⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 196,8-197,3

كما أنه إذ تجسدت النفس بالبدن والبدن بالنفس فقام منهما بانتلافهما انسان واحد، سمي البدن بدن الانسان والنفس نفس الانسان لا بدن الانسان ولا نفس الانسان، ولو لم تألف النفس بالبدن لم تقم وحدانية الانسان منهما أبداً.

The first sentence sets incarnation in a new context, since it speaks of incarnation as a reciprocal action of body and soul: it elucidates that from the approach of the coming into being of the single human being, incarnation is a mutual action shared by both components. The second sentence obviously serves dialectical purposes. As Muslim accusation of belief in corporeality of the divine needs to be turned down, it has to be demonstrated that the Messiah's body is not God's body. (This part may be addressed to other Christian denominations, as well.) The simile of the body's and soul's reciprocal incarnation, which results in the origination of a single human being, serves as the basis for establishing that the body is the human's body and not that of the soul. This analogy is necessary for demonstrating that Christians (especially Nestorians) do not claim God's having a body in the person of the Messiah. The example of the human being is of fundamental importance, since in the following the Logos is introduced as having become human. Similes play an important role at this point in demonstrating that humanity and body did not become integral parts in the divine; but are taken up without changing anything inside. Examples of water turning into ice, milk turning into cheese, youngster turning into a grown person imply an interior change, but the Son's incarnation and humanisation is not so: these have to be contrasted. An interesting parallel is offered by A. S. Tritton, who examines what *nafs*, *rÛÎ*, and *ÝaqI* mean for Muslims. As for *nafs*, he defines it in the following way: "It is primarily a knower (*ÝallÁma*) and knowledge is its form; it clothes itself with body which thus becomes man."²⁶⁶ In this, he relies on the work of a tenth-century Muslim author, AbÛ ÍayyÁn al-TawÛdÐ (d. c. 1023), who uses the word *badan* for body, and the word *labisa* for clothing, as done by the soul.²⁶⁷ Though direct connection cannot be demonstrated in this field, the similarity in the usage of terms is striking, so Christian influence in the formation of the idea is possible.

Humanisation, *ta'annus* is only possible through a human body, *Éasad*: "He appeared [in a] **humanised** [form], in a **body** coming from the world, in order to save them all through it."²⁶⁸ The example further accentuates that this action is not an internal change, but needs an outward "tool," as well.

وقد نقول أيضاً بلفظة أخرى ونحو آخر إن الله الكلمة تأنس لا على معنى قول القائل: الماء ملح، أي جمدان بذاته فصار ملحاً. وكقوله إن اللبن تجبن أي إعتقد بذاته فصار جبناً. وكقوله الصبي ترجل أي شب بذاته فصار رجلاً، بل على معنى قول القائل: إن فلاناً تدرع أي لبس درعاً، وكقوله إن فلاناً تسلح أي لبس سلاحاً، وكقوله إن فلاناً تعمم أي لبس عمامة، لا أنه صار عمامة أو سلاحاً أو درعاً. كذلك بقولنا أن الله الكلمة تجسد وتأنس أي أحدث جسداً فلبسه وخلق إنساناً فتدرعه وألفه إلى قنومه ليظهر به وليظهر به قوله وأعماله وليوحده معه في بنوته. قلنا فأمرهما جميعاً في وقت **الإنشاء والاتحاد** مسيح واحد، وجب أن يقال ناسوت المسيح وناسوت الابن المجتمع، لا ناسوت الله ولا ناسوت اللاهوت، وإن كان الله هو الكلمة المنفرد وحده **لاتخاذ** إياه ناسوتاً، لا أن الناس متضرع الناسوت في الأصل كان المسيح المجتمع عليه.

²⁶⁶ TRITTON, A. S., *Man, nafs, rÛÎ, ÝaqI*, In: Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 3 (1971) 34, p. 492.

²⁶⁷ al-TAWÛDÛ, AbÛ ÍayyÁn, *al-ImtÁÝ wa-'l-mu'Ánasa*, Cairo, 1939-44, p. 202.

²⁶⁸ al-BAÑRÛ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ'il wa-'l-aÉwiba*, p. 239,9

Incarnation (*taĒassud*) is in a complementary relation with *ta'annus*. A necessary means for these actions is a human body (*Ēasad*) which, through the state of dwelling (*ĪulŪl*), comes to be interpreted as the 'temple' (*haykal*) of the divine:

“As the Word of God **incarnated** by the human [being] and there the Divine **humanised** by the human [being], and the human [being] divinised by the Divine, the two of them made up the unity of the Messiah by their **union**: both the human and the divine were attached to the one Messiah, who came into being as [a result of] their combination. Thus the **body** may be called the **body** of the Messiah, and the divinity is the divinity of the Messiah. They did not set up from this **dwelling** a unique Messiah to whom his dwelling place would be attached according to his divinity, forever. The dwelling place of God was called his “**temple**,” and not the dwelling place of the Messiah.”²⁶⁹

Reciprocity is emphasized here: as the divine humanised, the human divinised in this action. The Word's incarnation means the humanisation of the Divine as well. Dwelling, inhabitation does not mean an everlasting attachment, it just implies a temporary attachment of the body as a temple to the divine.

Since humanisation has appeared in several instances as related to incarnation, assumption or unity, it is worth looking at it in detail. We have seen that in ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ's use it does not appear on its own, and it means the taking of the human as a property for the divine. ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ's Jacobite contemporary, AbŪ RÁ'iÔa also uses it in a similar meaning. We can mostly see his *ta'annus* by the side of *taĒassud*, incarnation, mainly with the meaning of humanisation, sometimes with the meaning of humanity. E.g. we may see a question-answer dialogue with the Muslim opponent concerning the motivation for Incarnation. AbŪ RÁ'iÔa first uses the structure *yaÒDr insÁnan* and then the term *ta'annus*, so 'becoming human' and humanisation are synonyms. (The motivation, according to the Christian part's answer, is grace,²⁷⁰ in which ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ's standpoint is paralleled.) This is a shared Christian teaching, which apparently needed to be emphasized in discussions with Muslims. AbŪ RÁ'iÔa also uses *ta'annus* in order to express the Messiah's humanity, e.g. when he describes His death: “His death is a human death from the viewpoint of His **humanity**, and it is not divine, from the viewpoint of His divinity.”²⁷¹ In this example

ظهر متأنساً بجسدٍ من أهل العالم ليخلصهم جميعاً على يديه

²⁶⁹ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ'il wa-'l-aĒwiba*, p. 201,18-202,3

كذلك إذ تجسد الله الكلمة البشري فتأنس هنالك الإله بالبشري وتأله البشري بالإله وأقاما باتحادهما وحدانية المسيح، وأضيف البشري والإله إلى المسيح الواحد المجتمع منهما. فقيل للجسد جسد المسيح وللاهوت لاهوت المسيح. فلم يقيما من ذلك الحلول مسيحاً واحداً يضاف إليه بيت المسكن على الإضافة إلى الله أبداً، فقيل مسكن الله أي هيكل لا مسكن المسيح

²⁷⁰ ABØ RÁ'IOÁ, *FÐ al-taĒassud*, pp. 35-36.

²⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

لأن موته موت أنسي من جهة تأنسه لا إلهي من جهة لاهوته.

ta'annusih is contrasted to *lÁhÛtihi*, so it denotes the result (i.e. the human part) instead of the action (becoming human, humanisation). This interpretation is unparalleled at ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ. Joint appearance with *taÉassud* can be discerned when AbÛ RÁ'iÔa writes of the One God of three *hypostases* among which one, the Son of the Father, the Word incarnated and humanised by way of the pure Mary.²⁷² Both in the use of *ta'annus* together with incarnation, and in the context (i.e. by way of Mary) this example can be compared to those of ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ. Another point of similarity is that just as ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, AbÛ RÁ'iÔa also emphasizes that humanisation cannot affect the divine: “Saint is the God who **became human** for us without change and He remained in His divine state.”²⁷³ So the transcendence of the divine is always emphasized in debates. A last example for similarities between them (due to the congeniality of Christian teachings) shows that incarnation and humanisation are a way for the divine to appear.²⁷⁴

Ta°assud and *°asad* are a necessary step and a necessary part of the Son of God, as it is demonstrated in the following example:

“We have informed you that there is no Son of God except the Messiah, and there is no existence for the Messiah except by the joining of the two *hypostases*. Thus it necessarily follows from this that the one born of Mary and taken in this union is not the Son of God on his own, without the other. The other is also not the Son of God on his own, without the **body** that He made his **dwelling place**, after His **union** with the **body**. After the time of the **incarnation**, the **dwelling**, the **union**, and the pregnancy, whenever the Son of God is mentioned, the one and the other which was taken in the union are mentioned together, in one name and meaning. If it were right to call only one of them – on his own, without the other – the Son of God after the time of their union, then the one who had always been the Son of God would be more worthy to be called the Son of God without the other, even after the time of the **union** and **incarnation** of the Son of God.”²⁷⁵

First, let us remember, that according to AbÛ RÁ'iÔa, the essence of the Messiah comprises both the action of the incarnation and the body – as we have seen it above. In this, there is an undeniable parallel between the two authors. As for the rest of the quote, it introduces a new

²⁷² al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ'il wa-'l-aÉwiba*, p. 70.

²⁷³ ABØ RÁ'ÍÓA, *FD al-taÉassud*, p. 89.

قدوس الله الذي تأنس من أجلنا بغير تغيير وبقي على حال لاهوته

²⁷⁴ Ibid. p. 152.

وقد يجب علينا إثبات ما ادعينا من التجسد والتأنس وزهور الله بذلك مناجياً للبشر لخلصهم وانقاذهم من الضلالة...

²⁷⁵ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ'il wa-'l-aÉwiba*, p. 185,13-20

قد أخبرناك ... أنه لا إبن الله إلا المسيح، ولا وجود للمسيح إلا باقتران القنومين. فمن الاضطراب إذن أن المتحد من مريم ليس هو، على انفراده دون الآخر، إبن الله، ولا الآخر أيضاً، على انفراده من بعد اتحاده بالجسد دون الجسد الذي جعله هيكله، إبن الله. بل متى ذكرت إبن الله منذ وقت **التجسد والحلول والاتحاد والحمل**، فقد جمعت الأحد المتحد في الاسم والمعنى جمعاً معاً. ولو استقام أن يسمى احدهما على انفراده دون الآخر من بعد الاتحاد والتجسد إبن الله، لكان الأحد الذي لم يزل إبن الله أولى بأن يدعى على انفراده إبن الله دون الآخر من بعد الاتحاد والتجسد إبن الله

approach as far as the denotation of the name ‘Son of God’ is concerned, i.e. what it means after the occurrence of Incarnation. He equates the Messiah with the Son of God; at the same time he differentiates between the pre-incarnation Son of God and the post-incarnation Son. The latter only refers to the divine substance, the Second Person of the Trinity, while the former, as it is equal to the Messiah, comprises the divine as well as the human substance. When describing the human *hypostasis*, ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ uses the expression ‘the one born of Mary and taken in this union.’ Reference to the human part of the Messiah as such may be a sign that the author had in mind a Muslim reader. Jesus, as a prophet is often referred to as the son of Mary in Muslim usage; such a reference could be a common ground. ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ then goes on to emphasize that the one born of Mary, i.e. the son of Mary is not the Son of God (on his own, without the divine substance). In this, we may see again an implication that a Muslim reader is addressed; at the same time, this part may target fellow Christians. The one born of Mary is not the Son of God, thus Mary is not Theotokos: a specifically Nestorian idea is also emphasized here. Incarnation and union happen at the same time, and the use of ‘dwelling place’ for body refers to a union in which the divine is not affected by the body.

Conclusion

We have seen a variety of terms in a variety of contexts in this chapter. Most of the terms appeared in discussions of the Messiah, His body, incarnation, and humanisation. Analogies, human, bestial or inanimate physical bodies were introduced as parallels. Their denotations are not always the same; however, the exact understanding of the concept may always be derived from the context. In the case of terms that refer to body, there is a hierarchy of meanings, and the majority of terms had a meaning in which it was most frequently used in spite of slight differences in different contexts. *Éirm* is the “lowest,” used in a philosophical sense and with the meaning of an atom, or a substrate that can carry accidents. However, Muslim authors’ interpretation of *Éirm* as having three dimensions is not present in Christian authors’ works. *Éism* is a corporeal, physical, inanimate and composite entity, created in time; and in some instances it refers to the bodies of animals. In this field, some interaction might be discerned, since both Christian and Muslim authors consider *Éism* a composite and compound entity, but the descriptions of Muslim philosophy that refer to dimensions can not be paralleled with Christian examples. *Éasad* expresses human body in the majority of cases, it can refer to the resurrection body, it has a higher rank in this hierarchy; and it is also the

object of assumption as the Messiah's flesh. The term that expresses Incarnation is derived from this one. *Badan* is the composite entity, combined with soul or spirit and mostly used to refer to the body of the human, or the human body which is assumed by the Son of God. In a high portion of examples examined above we could see these last two terms appear as synonyms. As for the actions, assumption (and an object) and incarnation were seen as synonymous as well. In some contexts other terms appeared: dwelling, inhabitation, frame, and bodily form were introduced. We have seen that ideas expressed by the Greek equivalents in Patristic literature may have influenced the use and reference of the same connotations in 9-th century Christian use. In some cases, Muslim terminology could be paralleled to that of ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, but in many cases the same terms were missing in contemporary Muslim usage; thus, their later appearance in Muslim authors' works might have been influenced by earlier Christian interpretations.

Chapter III

The Terminology of eternity (*azalĒ*, *azaliyya* – pre-eternal vs. *sarmad* – perpetuity vs. *qidam*, *qadĒm* – eternal²⁷⁶ vs. *baqÁ'*, *bÁqin* – permanent)

The terms *azalĒ*, *azaliyya*; *sarmad*; *qidam*, *qadĒm*; *baqÁ'*, *bÁqin* are frequently used ones in Islamic philosophy and *kalÁm*, meaning eternity and permanence. In his notes to Ibn Rušd's (d. 1198) *TahÁfut al-TahÁfut*, Van Den Bergh refers to three terms as frequently used by the twelfth century in Islamic philosophy: *qidam* as eternity in general (Greek αἰδιότητα); and, as Aristotle distinguishes it: *azalĒ*, as eternal *a parte ante*, the ungenerated (ἀγένητον) and eternal *a parte post*, *abadĒ* (ἄφθαρτον). Van Den Bergh adds that *dahr*, timeless eternity (αἰών), which stands for *aevum* in scholastic philosophy, is used by Plato and Aristotle, and becomes especially important in Neoplatonism.²⁷⁷ In the ninth century, as attested by ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrĒ's *KitÁb al-MasÁ'il wa-'l-a'wiba*, two of these terms (*qidam* and *azalĒ*) can already be found in Christian usage. Apart from these, ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrĒ's usage includes *sarmad* and *baqÁ'* as well. Two of ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrĒ's terms are frequently used ones, appearing in various contexts, indicating that they, as well as the concepts expressed by them, are already well-known and widely understood ones. The other two terms are less frequently used, thus only minor implications concerning their 9th-century use and understanding can be recognized here. I will first examine the two terms that are not frequently used, later on, I will investigate those ones that are used in a variety of contexts and study their implications. Then I aim at drawing parallels with the Muslim counterpart's use of the same ones.

1. *Sarmad*²⁷⁸ - perpetuity

Let us start with the term *sarmad* – perpetuity, as ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrĒ understands it. *Sarmad* is considered to be the translation of the Greek term αἰδιος,²⁷⁹ which, as Lampe

²⁷⁶ In translating *azalĒ*, *azaliyya* as pre-eternal and *qidam*, *qadĒm* as eternal, I benefited from M. E. Marmura's translation of the same terms as such. C.f. al-GHAZĀLĪ, *The Incoherence of the Philosophers*, ed. and Tr. MARMURA, M. E., Provo, Utah, Brigham Young University Press, 2000.

²⁷⁷ AVERROES, *TahÁfut al-TahÁfut*, Ed. Van Den BERGH, S., London, Gibb Memorial Trust, 1978. p. 54.

²⁷⁸ HAYEK does not provide a translation for the term.

²⁷⁹ AFNAN, M. S., *A Philosophical Lexicon in Persian and Arabic*, p. 125.

demonstrates it, is used in Patristic literature in the following senses: ‘eternal, everlasting’ in general, referring to the Trinity, to God, to the Son, or to the Holy Ghost; or it may appear simply as a substance. Lampe also refers to a second meaning, i.e. ‘perpetual’. If used as a noun, it means eternity in general, or that of the Father, sometimes shared with the Son, sometimes only that of the Son. It can be a divine quality bestowed upon man.²⁸⁰

To the best of my knowledge, there are only two *loci* in the *KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-a^owiba*, where the author uses this term. The first *locus* is the following: “We would say: You have laid down that *hyle* is created, created in time, and it is the origin of elements. But what has the Creator of the *hyle* produced it of? Is it of another – earlier – matter? Or is it [made] of another, even earlier [matter]? [If so,] you refer to the endless **perpetual**.”²⁸¹ The second appearance is in this context: “Whenever God placed them [the righteous] on a higher rank, He would have to make the erring ones equal to them in what [the righteous] deserved from Him for their righteous deeds, then He should raise [the righteous ones] a degree higher again, and it turns into the endless **perpetual**.”²⁸² It seems that ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ uses this term in the meaning of infinity, instead of *lÁ-nihÁya*. Interestingly enough, we may see the phrase “*allaÆÐ lÁ nihÁyata/intihÁ’a lahu*” in his text sometimes, but the abstract noun: *(al-)lÁ-nihÁya* is not used. These two examples do not imply specific philosophical or theological connotations, so we do not have to consider this one a technical term. However, it is used in the sense of ‘perpetual,’ which offers a parallel to one of the senses in which its Greek counterpart is used in Patristic literature.

Among the Muslim authors who are examined here, al-ÉurÊÁnÐ is the first to define *sarmad* in its adjectival form (“Perpetual is what has no beginning or end.”)²⁸³ It may imply that till the 14th century this term may not have been used widely, in this, we clearly see Christian usage preceding the Muslim one. On the other hand, as we could see it in the introduction of this chapter, ðädiótËç might have been generally translated as *qidam*, eternity in general, so its translation by the term *sarmad*, consequently its use might have been secondary.

²⁸⁰ LAMPE, G. W., *A Patristic Greek Lexicon*, pp. 47-48.

²⁸¹ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-AÆwiba*, p. 99,18-21

قلنا: فقد أقررتم أن الهبولى محدثة مخلوقة وهي عنصر الطبايع، وحادثها من أي شيء جعل الهبولى؟ أمن مادة أخرى تقدمتها؟ أو كانت من متقدمة أيضاً قبلها، فتحيلون ذلك إلى السرمد الذي لا انتهاء له

²⁸² Ibid., p. 123,12-14

ومهما رفع حالهم مرتبةً فالحق بهم العصاة فيما استحقوا هم منه، لفضلة بلانهم وتقدم حسناتهم، الارتفاع عنها إلى رتبة أعلى منها، فتحول ذلك إلى السرمد الذي لا نهاية له

²⁸³ al-ÉURÉÀNĪ, *KitÁb al-TaÝrÐfÁt*, p. 134.

السرمدي ما لا أول له ولا آخر

2. *baqÁ'*, *bÁqin* – permanence, permanent

According to Afnan, this idiom is used as the translation of the Greek philosophical terms ἡ μωνή or τό εἶναι.²⁸⁴ As for the latter, Lampe enumerates its several meanings in Patristic literature in connection with the ‘being’ of God and His creation,²⁸⁵ while the former appears as ‘abode, lodging; dwelling place.’²⁸⁶

BaqÁ' or *bÁqin* is rarely used by ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ. To the best of my knowledge, this is the only *locus*:

“We would say: as for the **permanent** structure, and the perfect world: all [the people] are equal in them. The difference is that while these will be happiness and joy for the righteous; they would be suffering and sadness for the erring ones. Since **permanence** in Heaven and the knowledge of its continuity is happiness and joy for those who stay there, while all the **permanence** in suffering and the certain knowledge of the continuity of punishment is suffering and sadness for those who stay there.”²⁸⁷

We may notice that no philosophical terminology enters here; only theological influence may be observed, given that ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ uses the term in the meaning of the hereafter, not as a technical term. If we now return to its Greek counterparts, we will see that these examples do not indicate the same connotations that τό εἶναι does, so it will be left out of consideration now. As for ἡ μωνή, with its meanings ‘abode, lodging; dwelling place;’ it shows a similarity of meaning with the *baqÁ'* of the example we have examined above. The term of the citation was translated as ‘permanence,’ in a special context referring to the hereafter; so in this sense it may also be interpreted as ‘dwelling, abode.’

As for the Muslim counterparts examined here, Ibn FÙrak is the first among them to define *al-bÁqÐ* as a technical term denoting permanence: “the definition of the **permanent**: it is what exists without being generated.”²⁸⁸ As we will soon see it, this meaning is quite close to how ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ uses the term *azalÐ*. If we compare Ibn FÙrak’s understanding of *al-bÁqÐ* to that of ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, we may also notice that while the former emphasises its being not generated, i.e. its existence without beginning, the latter stresses its being endless: the aspects differ. The same can be noticed in an example by an extra Muslim author,

²⁸⁴ AFNAN, M. S., *A Philosophical Lexicon in Persian and Arabic*, p. 32.

²⁸⁵ LAMPE, G. W., *A Patristic Greek Lexicon*, pp. 417-19.

²⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 880.

²⁸⁷ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ'il wa-'l-AÉwiba*, p. 124,7-10

قلنا: أما البنية الباقية والعالم الكامل فقد يستون فيها جميعاً غير انهما يكونان غبطة وسروراً لأهل الصلاح وأفة وشقوة على أهل الطلاح. لأن البقاء في النعيم والعلم بدوامه غبطة لأهله وسرور، وطول البقاء في العذاب ويقين العلم بدوام العقاب شقوة على أهله ووبال.

²⁸⁸ Ibn FØRAK, *KitÁb al-ÍudÙd fÐ 'l-uØÙl*, p. 22.

حد الباقي: هو الكائن بغير حدوث.

al-MÁturĎdĎ (d. 944), whose definition is as follows: “**Permanence** is generation in the beginning of time.”²⁸⁹ Later authors do not define the term. We may thus see that rare and not specific Christian usage (as it can be seen in the example of ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrĎ) and the scarce appearance in Muslim books of definitions show similarity; but it also needs to be emphasized that while the Christian author approaches it as endlessness, Muslim writers understand it as having no beginning.

3. *AzalĎ, azaliyya* – pre-eternal²⁹⁰

According to Afnan, *azalĎ* may be the translation of αἰδιος,²⁹¹ which has a variety of meanings in Patristic literature. Among them is ‘eternal, everlasting’ in a general sense, or more specifically, it was also used when referring to the Trinity, to God, to the Son, or to the Holy Spirit. It appeared also as a substance. Lampe refers to a second meaning, i.e. ‘perpetual’. If used as a noun, it means eternity in general, or that of the Father, sometimes shared with the Son, sometimes only that of the Son. According to Van Den Bergh, *azalĎ*, as eternal *a parte ante* corresponds to ungenerated (ἀγένητον). This term, in Lampe’s classification means the uncreated, unoriginated. Its general implications are ‘eternal pre-existence, unity, and immortality.’ In Non-Christian usage, in Greek philosophy, whence it entered Christian terminology, it was not only applied to the divinity, but to matter and the soul. In Christian theology it usually refers to the divine nature of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, or the whole Trinity.²⁹²

ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrĎ uses this term in seven main contexts.

1. First we see it when he disputes the pre-eternity of matter: “from this approach, the claim of those who say that *hyle* is **pre-eternal** is refuted. [They] claim that the Artificer made a variety of substances out of [the pre-eternal *hyle*], merely outlining the forms of ideas [out of the already existing *hyle*]. But the *praedicatum* of what has always existed is **pre-eternal** transcendence and impossibility to receive contingency or to change from a state to another.”²⁹³ Another example: “What share does the

²⁸⁹ Reference in: MaÊmaÝ al-BuÎ× al-IslÁmiyya, *ŠarĤ al-muÒÒalaĤ al-kalÁmiyya*, Mašhad, 1415/1995, pp. 60-61, which cites al-MÁturĎdĎ saying:

البقاء هو الكون في مستأنف الوقت؛ معه غير أولاً.

²⁹⁰ HAYEK’s translation for *azaliyya* is ‘éternité.’ C.f. Ed. HAYEK, *Apologie et controverses*, p. 85.

²⁹¹ AFNAN, M. S., *A Philosophical Lexicon in Persian and Arabic*, pp. 5-6

²⁹² LAMPE, G. W., *A Patristic Greek Lexicon*, p. 15.

²⁹³ al-BAÑRĤ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba*, p. 98,1-3

ومن هذه الجهة تبطل دعوى المدعي الهبولى الأزلية الذي زعموا أن منها أنجع الصانع أنواع الجواهر وقدر أشكال الصور. وذلك إن حكم ما لم يزل قائماً أزلية الاعتلاء والامتناع من قبول الحدثان والاستحالة من حال إلى حال.

eternity of the *hyle* have in the **eternity** of **pre-eternity** if they claim that it is forced by and obeys to Whom differentiates it and divides it, and creates accidents in it (i.e. by delineating forms and changing it from a state to another)?”²⁹⁴ On the basis of the above-mentioned examples, pre-eternal is an attribute or a *praedicatum*; it is used in the meaning of ‘without beginning,’ something that ‘has always existed,’ ‘had not been preceded by non-existence.’ It is also important to note, that on the basis of these pieces of textual evidence, one may clearly discern that pre-eternal cannot be affected by contingency, change, and division. Though it is usually *kawn* (generation) contrasted to *fasÁd* (corruption) in philosophical texts, ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ expresses this contrast by establishing that something that is not generated, can not be affected by change, i.e. corruption. Till now we could see that once *azaliyya*, pre-eternity appeared alone, and two times together with *qidam*, eternity. When used together, no overt difference can be recognized, *qidam* and *azaliyya* are used as synonyms. The joint appearance of the two terms is also remarkable, since they usually appear separately in philosophy and *kalÁm* terminologies, because *qidam* usually denotes eternity in time, while *azaliyya* refers to eternity out of time. On the basis of Lampe’s classification it is understandable why the pre-eternity of matter is discussed. It must be an echo of Greek philosophical ideas whence ἀγέννητος was applied to matter. Since the discussion of the eternity of matter is not a crucial question in a debate between Christians and Muslims, we may think of a heritage that ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ transmits here. It can be considered as a proof for his being educated in a rhetorical school, and being trained in Hellenistic knowledge. Another point to be made here is that Lampe translates ἀγέννητος as ‘eternal pre-existence.’ There might have been a word combination also in Greek that is reflected in ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s *qidam azaliyya*.

2. We can find the term in a similar context later on, when ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ disputes the pre-eternity of creatures:

“If you could say: why hadn’t He created them ten thousand years before the time He created them? Then you could also say: and why not one hundred thousand years before those ten thousand years? Then you could even say: one hundred thousand times thousand years or even more than that. In the end of your question you could say that creatures are **pre-eternal**, they have no beginning. This is clear ignorance, and

²⁹⁴ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aĒwiba*, p. 98,12-14

أو أي سهم يوجد في قدم الهيولى في قدم الأزلية عند زعمهم أنها منقادة مقهورة لدى من فصلها وبعضها وأحدث الأعراض فيها من تقدير الأشكال والإحالة من حال إلى حال؟

impossible, unattainable that something that was created in time and the making of which has a start should become **pre-eternal** that has always [**pre-eternally**] existed.”²⁹⁵

Created beings cannot be pre-eternal, since that would mean they have no beginning. This is a contrast which is not acceptable. Laying down that Christians refute such ideas creates a common ground with Muslim opponents in disputes. Another example:

“If we said: He has always been creating His creatures in time and He has always been generating them, like the elements that carry out their actions according to their nature, all the time; then the claim would be impossible and would contradict to itself. It is because when we said that He has always been creating His creatures in time, we made both **pre-eternity** and createdness-in-time necessary for His creation. And it is the same to say that the Creator has always created His creation in time, or to say that what is created in time has always existed.”²⁹⁶

In these examples we could see that *azaliyya* means to have no beginning; the term is used as an attribute. In both cases it can be understood that *azaliyya* excludes being generated and having a beginning in time. At the same time, it is important to put down that Christians, as well as their Muslim opponents in disputes, do not accept the eternity of matter and creatures, since the only eternal substance is God. The second example contrasts pre-eternity, *azaliyya* with createdness-in-time, *ĪudŪ*×, which is remarkable, since philosophical texts usually juxtapose eternity, *qidam* with creation in time *īldá*×. On the basis of this pair of opposites and the one *Yammár al-BaÖrÐ* used in the example of the previous point (the contrast of *kawn* and *fasÁd* expressed by *azaliyya* and contingency, change) indicates that the author is aware of the existence of such opposing pairs, but uses his own terminology instead of the canonized one. It may be due to the fact that *Yammár al-BaÖrÐ* is an early author, flourishing in the period when the delineation of terminology was still in progress.

3. *Yammár al-BaÖrÐ* also uses this term in order to refer to the Creator, God. It can be done in various ways. We will see *azalÐ* as an attribute, then as a divine name; then its abstract noun form, i.e. *azaliyya*, as an attribute again.

²⁹⁵ al-BAÑRĪ, *Yammár, KitÁb al-MasÁ'il wa-'l-aĒwiba*, pp. 106,20-107,4

وذلك إن كان جاز لك أن تقول ما باله لم يخلقهم قبل الوقت الذي خلقهم فيه بعشرة آلاف عام، جاز لك أن تقول: وألا قبل العشرة آلاف عام بمائة ألف عام؛ ثم تقول أيضاً بعد ذلك بمائة ألف عام وأكثر من ذلك، إلى أن تقول في منتهى مسألتك أن الخلاق أزلية لا بدوء لها، وذلك الجهل المبين المحال الممتنع أن يصير ما أحدث خلقه وأبدأ صنعته أزلياً لم يزل.

²⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 150,18-21

وإن قلنا، بل لم يزل لخالقه محدثاً مكوناً كالطبايع الفاعلة أفعالها طبيعياً أبداً، استحالت الدعوى وتناقضت في نفسها. لأننا إذا قلنا لم يزل لخالقه محدثاً، أوجبنا للخلاق اسم الأزلية والحدوث جميعاً، وسواء على القائل أن يقول لم يزل الخالق يحدث خلقاً، أم يقول لم يزل المحدث موجوداً أزلياً.

ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ mostly uses *azalÐ* as an adjective, attached to a word that refers to God, this way the term describes a divine attribute. On the basis of its attribution to names that refer to God by His *essence* or *nature* (i.e. names that describe Him as He is, namely: God); and names that describe Him on the basis of his actions, we will see what other meanings pre-eternity may imply. First, let us see the use of pre-eternal as an attribute, attached to a divine name.

“If you said that [the ceramist] turned [the *hyle*] away from its materiality by inserting accidents in it, this way you would affirm that contingency and corruption enters matter. You would attach the possibility of change and corruption to every essence that have always existed and have always been perfect [i.e. the *hyle*]. At the same time you blame the claim of those who say that the **Pre-eternal** Artificer inserted accidents into the essence of His substance, and he produced these elements and forms and figures out of it.”²⁹⁷

The Creator (i.e. the Artificer) is the only one that can be pre-eternal, He cannot introduce accidents into his own essence, or substance. Pre-eternity and creation are related, and pre-eternity excludes the introduction of accidents to this substance. In another instance ‘Pre-eternal’ appears as the adjective of divinity, God, too: “It is the essence of one divinity, one substance, one Creator. They named what they mentioned of it a **Pre-eternal**, Creator, Worshipped God.”²⁹⁸ Pre-eternity, creative nature and the state of being worshipped are introduced as being on the same level. (As for the last two adjectives: Creator and Worshipped, it shows that the argumentation addresses a Muslim opponent, on the ground that God is to be worshipped for His creation.)

In the next quotation it is Artificer again whom pre-eternity is attributed to at first, but it is the term’s second appearance what we are going to focus on this time: “Your question is also impossible [when you ask:] Does the **Pre-eternal** Artificer need what is substantial and natural for him? It is the same for you to ask: Does the Living, Rational, **Pre-eternal** need his Spirit and Word? Or to say: does the fire need its nature and essence?”²⁹⁹ The second appearance of the term stands here as a noun, a divine name. Its being a divine name would imply its theological nature. However, in

²⁹⁷ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aĒwiba*, p. 99,6-9

وإن قلتم بل قد أحالها بأعراض أدخلها عليها إلى غير الهيولية، أوجبتم بذلك دخول الحدثان والفساد على الهيولي، وألزمتم إمكان الغيار والفساد [على] ذات كل ما لم يزل ولم ينتقص، فيما عبتم من دعوى من زعم أن الصانع الأزلي أدخل الأعراض على ذات جوهره فأنتج منها هذه الطبايع والأشكال والصور.

²⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 161,9-10

فهو ذات لاهوتٍ واحدٍ جوهرٍ واحدٍ خالقٍ واحدٍ. وإن ما ذكروا منها، سموه إلهاً خالقاً أزلياً معبوداً.

²⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 159,13-16

كذلك يستحيل سؤالك: أيجتاج ذلك الصانع الأزلي إلى ما هو له جوهره طبيعي؟ وسواء عليك سألت هل يجتاج الأزلي الحي الناطق إلى روحه وكلمته، أم قلت: هل تحتاج النار إلى حرها وبيسها، أم قلت: هل تحتاج النار إلى طباعها وذاتها.

general we need to know, that this term cannot be found in the Qur'Ān, but appears early in translations, so it must be a philosophical term in its origin. This divine name describes God by His essence or nature. Another implication of this example lies in the context: pre-eternity excludes need. It can also be matched with the action of creation (since it is the attribute of *ŃĀniŃ*), and be paralleled with the following attributes: Living and Rational. (At the same time, this question serves the apologetic aim to defend the teaching of the Trinity: God, as a single substance has always had His Spirit and Word – but this question will be discussed in the chapter on Trinity and unity.) Pre-eternal, as a divine name may also stand alone in order to refer to God, as it does in the following example: “We would say the answer: there is no modality of the **Pre-eternal** and His art, and no similarity of Him or His actions.”³⁰⁰ This last example for *azalĎ* as a divine name shows that pre-eternity must also mean transcendence, since it is not perceivable. It offers an interesting parallel with the teaching of those Muslim theologians who stood up against *takyĎf*, *tašbĎh*, i.e. the acceptance of the anthropological statements in the Scripture; as we could see the parallels “*bi-lĀ kayf*” offered, in the previous chapter.

When used as an abstract noun, i.e. with the *nisba* ending, *azaliyya* appears as an attribute. “In the **eternity** of His **pre-eternity** there was no-one to whom He could have been generous by creating His creatures.”³⁰¹ Eternity, *qidam* and pre-eternity, *azaliyya* appear together as divine attributes, they are used as synonyms. Pre-eternity, as an attribute, is in close relation with another attribute, generosity.

Finally, given that we have classified Pre-eternal as a divine name referring to God's nature, we can get to know that this nature is unique: “We are sure that He is One in His essence, unique in His nature and **pre-eternity**, unparalleled in His substance, and there is no similarity between His acts and those of His creation.”³⁰² This uniqueness is closely related to pre-eternity and stands in opposition with anthropomorphic ideas.

Concluding we may say that pre-eternity, when referring to God, appears as a divine attribute and a divine name.

³⁰⁰ al-BAŃRĬ, ŃAmmĀr, *KitĀb al-MasĀ'il wa-'l-aĔwiba*, p. 194,8

الجواب قلنا: إنه وإن كان لا كيفية للأزلي وصناعته ولا شبه له ولا بفعاله

³⁰¹ Ibid., p. 104,19

لم يكن في قدم أزليته أحد وجود بخلائقه عليه

³⁰² Ibid., p. 149,8-10

أيقنا به واحداً في ذاته متفرداً بطباعه وأزليته، فلا نظير له في جوهره ولا شبه بين أفعاله وأفعال خلقه.

4. In some instances it is not God, but God's divinity, attributes and properties that are referred to as pre-eternal. E.g.:

“These are statements that refer to accidental divinities that are derived from worship and adoration, but it is not a substantial, **pre-eternal** divinity. It is not possible that the Wise should really mean when He says “I exist, but only for you,” especially since He is a **pre-eternal**, substantial God. It is also not possible that He say: I am [a] Living [God] for you, but I am not [a] Living [God] for others, since life is substantial, **pre-eternal** for Him. David also did not mean by saying “Beatitude for the people whose God is the Lord” **pre-eternal** divinity, since the meaning of **pre-eternal** divinity has always been substantial – even before the creation of peoples, and he will always remain like this.”³⁰³

This example shows us that God's divinity and life are both substantial and pre-eternal; as for Life, it may eventually refer to the Holy Spirit.³⁰⁴ In the case of God, what is substantial for Him, it is also pre-eternal; so in this special case substantial and pre-eternal are of equal importance. Let us mention that ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ implicitly refers to the Arabic grammatical presupposition which caused problem for the Muslim mutakallims, according to which verbal adjectives, *ÒifÁt*, are derived from nouns, which in turn indicate entities.³⁰⁵ So if God says he is Living, he must be Living in all relations, hence his being living implies His having life. The next quotation shows the correlation of the pre-eternity of God's life (eventually referring to the Holy Spirit), His Word (eventually referring to the Son) and wisdom (identified with the Word³⁰⁶):

“In the first investigation, witnesses of the bodily forms of creatures made the intellect affirm that there is a substance that created them in time and brought them into being. In the second investigation, the fact that in the **eternity** of His **pre-eternity** he abstained from creating [his creatures], but later on he carried out their making as a donation, [made the intellect] render **pre-eternal** life necessary for him. And the third investigation, on the basis of his perfect government, and of what had previously shown of his care, guided [the intellect to accept] that he carries this out in order to be

³⁰³ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ'il wa-'l-aÊwiba*, pp.170,20-171,5

فهذه أقاويل تدل على آلهة عرضية أي مشتقة من العبادة والسجدة، لا إلهة جوهرية أزلية. لأنه غير جائز أن يعني الحكيم بقوله: أكون لكم ولا أكون لغيركم، سيما هو إله جوهرى أزلي. كما لا يجوز أن يقول: أكون لكم حياً ولا أكون لغيركم حياً، إذ الحياة له جوهرية أزلية. كذلك لم يعن داود بقوله "طوبى للشعب الذي الرب إلهه" اللاهوت الأزلية، لأن اللاهوت الأزلية لم تزل معانيه جوهرية قبل خلق الشعوب ولا نزول عما لم يزل عليها منها أبداً.

³⁰⁴ C. f. WOLFSON, *The Philosophy of the Kalam*, p. 121.

³⁰⁵ C. f. GRIFFITH, S., *ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ's KitÁb al-BurhÁn: Christian KalÁm int he First Abbasid Century*.

In: *Le Muséon*, 96(1983)1-2, p. 169.

³⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

generous to others. It witnesses to the substantiality of his Word and the **pre-eternity** of His Wisdom, necessarily.”³⁰⁷

This example was already introduced in our investigation of intellect, *Ýaql*, which implies that senses and intellect together can lead to an understanding and cognition of the pre-eternal, creating substance. The first appearance of *qidam azaliyya* implies more than ‘existence without beginning,’ it is rather a long period of pre-existence (compared to the world’s creation in time) which is referred to. The substantiality of the word and the pre-eternity of wisdom, as in the previous example, is of the same degree here, too.

Let us now turn to the pre-eternity of the properties (in God): “As each of the **pre-eternal** properties deserve to be called perfect substances due to their greatness, because they stand above names of faculties, necessary accidents, and partition; and there is no distinction or difference in their substance: they will not be three perfect substances if counted together, just one general substance.”³⁰⁸ The properties already refer to the *hypostases*, as pre-eternal properties are considered substances, but the question of the pre-eternal Trinity and the persons will be discussed later. Suffice it to mention that properties stand above names of faculties, accidents, and partition, and as such, can be considered pre-eternal. God’s Word (Logos, eventually the Son) is also described as pre-eternal: “In the **eternity of His pre-eternity**, He (eulogy) has not been void of His wisdom in a way that he would gain it later for Himself by way of acquisition; instead, we mean [by His wisdom] His **Pre-eternal** Word that has always been a substantial property belonging to the entity of His substance and the essence of His nature.”³⁰⁹ According to this quotation, God’s Word is pre-eternal, and it indicates that the second *hypostasis* has no beginning, has always existed, and it is not generated. Not only is His Word pre-eternal, but also His other attributes as well. We may also see what attributes cannot belong to God: “As for pieces and parts, they are

³⁰⁷ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aĒwiba*, p. 152,5-9

فإنه كما عن الشواهد من أشكال الخلائق اضطرت العقول في الفحص الأول إلى وجود إثبات جوهر أحدثها وأنشأها، والفحص الثاني من تبرعه بصنعتها بعد إمساكه قديماً عن خلقها إلى إيجاب الحياة له أزلياً، كذلك ما دل الفحص الثالث من إحكام سياسته لها وما تقدم من سابق همته بأن يوجد على غير بها، يشهد على جوهرية كلمته وأزلية حكمته اضطراباً

³⁰⁸ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aĒwiba*, 171,21-172,4

كذلك إذ كل واحد من الخواص الأزلية مستحقة أن تسمى جوهرًا كاملاً لعظمها وعلوها عن أسماء القوى والأعراض المضطربة والأجزاء والأبعاض، ثم لم يكن بينها في الجوهر تباين ولا اختلاف، لم تصر، إذا هي جملت، ثلاثة جواهر معدودة كاملة، بل جوهرًا واحداً عاماً شاملاً.

On the question of three *hypostases* and one *ousia* see VANYÓ, László, *Bevezetés az ókeresztény kor dogmatörténetébe*, Budapest, Szent István Társulat, 2009., p. 417.

³⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 133,4-6

فإنه لم يكن في قدم أزليته جل تناؤه من حكمته صفرًا ثم اكتسبها لنفسه من بعد اكتساباً، بل نعني بها كلمته الأزلية التي لم تنزل له خاصية جوهرية من عين جوهره وذات طباعه.

not attributes of who is not a body and who has always existed in His **pre-eternity**. Instead, these are attributes of composite, compound bodies that were created in time.”³¹⁰ Here God is defined as pre-eternal, and at the same time we understand that pre-eternity and distinction or division exclude each other.

5. The question of the Trinity, its pre-eternity, and the pre-eternity of its *hypostases* is a crucial question for Christians. Sometimes we read Scriptural evidence for the pre-eternity of the three *hypostases*, e.g in the following case: “their Gospels inform us about this and things like this altogether and in detail, too, when they call the **Pre-eternal**, Living, Speaking [one] Father, [when they call] His **eternal** Word [!] and his **Pre-eternal** life Spirit.”³¹¹ We can observe the parallel appearance of *qadĒm*, eternal and *azalĒ*, pre-eternal, used as synonyms in this context, as well. Both terms refer to the persons of the Trinity, meaning that they have no beginning, and are not generated. Sometimes the pre-eternity of God’s fatherhood, sonship and Holy Spirit all appear together:

“As He wanted to prove its truth in their hearts, He informed them on the **pre-eternity** of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, in order to warn their minds of the verity of the sonship, which belongs to their humanity that is unified with the **pre-eternal** Son, who declared that He had descended from Heaven and had already existed before Abraham.”³¹²

In other instances when pre-eternity of the *hypostases* is referred to, it is only concerning fatherhood and sonship:

“If we set up an analogy to [grasp] what intellect cannot understand, contrasting the contrariety and difference between two different and contradictory things with the difference between the Fatherhood and Sonship of the **Pre-eternal**, and the created beings and their sonship, [we would see] that the difference between the two [kinds of] fatherhood and sonship is innumerable times greater and further than the farthest difference between two contrary and different things.”³¹³

³¹⁰ Ibid., p. 152,17-18

قلنا: أما الأجزاء والأبعاد فليس من صفات ما ليس بجسم بل ما لم يزل موجوداً بأزليته. بل ذلك من صفات الأجسام المحدثة المؤلفة المركبة.

³¹¹ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmĀr, *KitĀb al-MasĀ'il wa-'l-aĒwiba*, p. 165,17-18

فهذا ونحوها ما يخبر انجيلهم في التجميل والتفصيل في تسميتهم الأزلي الحي الناطق أباً، وكلمته القديمة وحياته الأزلية روحاً.

Probably „Son” is missing after „Word.”

³¹² Ibid., p. 250,12-14

ولكنه إذ أراد أن يحقق صحة ذلك في قلوبهم أخبرهم بأزلية الأب والابن والروح القدس، لينبه بذلك عقولهم إلى صحة بنوة بشريتهم المتحدة مع الابن الأزلي الذي كان أخبر أنه نزل من السماء وكان قبل إبراهيم.

³¹³ Ibid., p.166,13-17

بل لو قسنا أبعاد ما يكون يمكن العقول دركه، من التضاد والخلاف بين شينين مختلفين متضادين، إلى الخلاف بين أبوة الأزلي وبنوته وبين المخلوقين وبنوتهم، لكان الخلاف بين الابوتين والبنوتين أعظم وأبعد من أبعد ما يكون الخلاف بين الشينين المتضادين المختلفين، بأضعافٍ وأضعافٍ لا يحصى عددها.

The quotation informs the reader on the fatherhood and the sonship of the Pre-eternal, as compared to human, or more generally, worldly relations. It can be understood that both persons (Father and Son) and their relationships to each other (relation of Father to Son, relation of Son to His Father) are pre-eternal. This relation's distance from worldly fatherhood-sonship is incomprehensible, as it can be read in the introduction of this quotation. The establishment of this distance is essential; it is to make the Muslim opponent understand that Christian teaching does not include a worldly father-son relationship, i.e. begetting and generating. Pre-eternal fatherhood and sonship are inconceivable; this is why ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ's main demonstrative tool is used here, which is analogy, *qiyás*.

Another example for the pre-eternity of the *hypostases* according to the Scripture is the following: "He said: Go, and baptize the peoples in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, and know that the **pre-eternal** Father has always had a **pre-eternal** Son."³¹⁴ It can be seen then, that though ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ aims at disputing in a rational manner in order to transmit his message to the Muslim opponent, his book is also designed for the Christian reader, who may be enforced by examples based on the Scriptures.

The next example shows the correlation of divinity, substances, *hypostases*, and properties: "As each of them[: the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit (eulogy)] is a perfect god, i.e. a perfect, **pre-eternal** substance, a perfect, **pre-eternal** *hypostasis*, the three of them do not form three perfect gods or three perfect substances; rather, they are three perfect *hypostases* and three perfect properties together."³¹⁵ All the four aspects are equal in pre-eternity.

The following quotations show the correlation of pre-eternal divine properties and *hypostases*:

"If one says it is [true for] every substance that there is no possibility for partition and division in it, and there is no possibility for the existence of countable *hypostases* in it, then we answer that we have adopted for these **pre-eternal** properties the names of known *hypostases*, for they are perfect, stand above names of faculties and necessary accidents, and not because they are *hypostases* like the known *hypostases*."³¹⁶

³¹⁴ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ'il wa-'l-aÉwiba*, p. 250,3-5

فقال: انطلقوا فعمدوا الشعوب باسم الأب والابن والروح القدس، أي أعلموا أنه لم يزل للأب الأزلي ابن أزلي...

³¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 174,9-12

كذلك، إذ كان كل واحد من الأب والابن والروح القدس في خاصته جل وتعالى إله كامل أي جوهر أزلي كامل وقنوم أزلي كامل، لم يكن ثلثها في الجملة ثلثة آلهة كاملة ولا ثلثة جواهر كاملة بل في الجملة ثلثة أقانيم كاملة وثلاث خواص كاملة.

³¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 174, 18-175,3

The persons of the Trinity are referred to as *properties* of the substance. Their pre-eternity implies perfection, transcendence, so they cannot be called faculties or accidents. Pre-eternity makes a property equal to a *hypostasis*.

The next example shows that pre-eternity, in the case of a property, excludes division, partition and change. “If it is possible for the properties of limited created beings who were generated in time to unify with one another in some bodies without any difference coming into being in them because of this, then it is more possible and necessary in the **pre-eternal** properties that stand above division, partition and limitation.”³¹⁷ It is obvious on the basis of these examples that a pre-eternal property is a circumscription for divine *hypostasis*. This second example contrasts pre-eternity, *azaliyya* with createdness-in-time, since the created beings which are generated in time are referred to by the term *muḷda* × *a*, so it confirms our previous remark, according to which Ḳammār al-BaḲr replaces the pair of philosophical texts *qidam – iḡdā* ×, by *azaliyya – iḡdā* ×. (The latter term and its Greek equivalent will be examined in the next chapter.)

There are other examples where God’s substance is called pre-eternal. Both the individual *hypostases* and the Godhead are referred to as pre-eternal substance(s). All the three *hypostases* are one in pre-eternity, they have the same substance; pre-eternity is the aspect of their unity, as it is in the following example: “It did not deem permissible for the Messiah – given that a cause appeared, due to which there emerged a need to explain the quiddity of the **pre-eternal** substance – to mention the names of the Father, the Son, and ignore to mention the name of the Spirit.”³¹⁸ The Godhead is referred to by this adjectival phrase: pre-eternal and substance. The unity of the pre-eternal is fundamental in the debate with a Muslim opponent, this is why its union is emphasized before speaking of the three “names,” i.e. the three *hypostases*. The pre-eternal substance is one,³¹⁹ while Trinity can be referred to by pre-eternal properties, as seen above, or pre-eternal essences, entities as the following example demonstrates: “Altogether we describe them One Lord, One God, One Creator, One Worshipped,

ولعل من يقول إن كل جوهر لا يوجد فيه إمكان التجزؤ والتباين، فلا إمكان فيه وجود الأقسام المعدودة، فنجيبه بأننا أجرينا على هذه الخواص الأزلية أسماء الأقسام المعروفة، لكمالها وعلوها عن أسماء القوى والأعراض المضطرة، لا لأنها أقانيم كالأقسام المعروفة.

³¹⁷ al-BAḲRĪ, Ḳammār, *Kitāb al-Masā’il wa-’l-aḲwāb*, p. 204, 13-15

إذا أمكن في خواص الخلائق المحدثة المخلوقة المحدودة أن يتحد بعضها بعضاً ببعض الأجسام بلا فرقة تحدث لذلك منها، فذلك في الخواص الأزلية المتعالية عن التباين والتبعيض والتجزؤ والتحديد، أمكن وأوجب...

³¹⁸ Ibid., p.p 251,20-252,2

كذلك المسيح لم يستجز، إذ حضرت علة احتيج بها إلى وصف مائة الجوهر الأزلي بكمال خواصه، أن يذكر اسم الأب والابن ويغفل ذكر اسم الروح.

³¹⁹ C.f. VANYÓ, László, *Bevezetés az ókeresztény kor dogmatörténetébe*, p. 417.

since you know that each of them in his property is a **pre-eternal**, perfect entity, and the three of them together are unified in one divinity, one substance that includes countable *hypostases*.³²⁰ We have to add a remark here: i.e. entity/essence and property are mentioned together, on the same level.

6. The pre-eternity of the Son, or the Messiah deserves a section of its own, since it may be even further differentiated, as referring to one of the Messiah's two substances or His birth. The divine, pre-eternal part of the Messiah may be defined as a disposition: "The human unified in his sonship with the **pre-eternal** disposition, which is related to His Father, but He did not unify with the human sonship, which is related to the human's mother."³²¹ We can see here that the divine part of the Messiah is considered to be a pre-eternal disposition. At the same time, it is emphasized here that the divine is not affected by this union. We can find pieces of scriptural evidence, too, where the pre-eternal "constituent" of the Messiah is referred to as a substance:

"Can't you see that Matthew witnesses to His humanity originating from the human substance, descending from David's seed, from Abraham, and John [witnesses to] His **pre-eternity** and **eternity** that belong to His divinity, the Creator of everything, by whom it is possible for everything to subsist, and in whose hand there is the reign of everything. Mark and Luke witness to the unification of the **Pre-eternal** and the human in one sonship and one Messianic being, as they completed their statements on Him and named Him Jesus, the Messiah, Son of God."³²²

ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ uses the four gospels in order to support the dogma of the unity of the Messiah. He cites gospels that confirm either the humanity or the divinity of the Son, and together they attest to the truth of the unity; while separate references to the Messiah's humanity and divinity confirm the Nestorian view according to which these never mix. He also mentions two gospels that confirm the presence of both substances in the Son, and in these *loci*, pre-eternity and eternity appear together again. In order not to confuse the two substances, ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ makes their differences clear, as well: "This is clear that the **Pre-eternal** God who fills every place with His

³²⁰ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ'il wa-'l-aĒwiba*, p. 175,13-16

ثم ننعنتها في الجملة رباً واحداً وإلهاً واحداً وخالقاً واحداً ومعبوداً واحداً، لعلمك بذلك أن كل واحد منها في خاصته عين أزلي كامل وثلاثها في الجملة متوحدة في لاهوت واحدة جوهر واحد شامل لأقانيم معدودة.

³²¹ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ'il wa-'l-aĒwiba*, p. 183,15-16

كذلك اتحد البشري في بنوته بالهيئة الأزلية المنسوبة إلى أبيه، لم يتحد هو معه في بنوته البشرية المضافة إلى أمه.

On the Nestorian view of Christ's "double" birth see VANYÓ, László, *Bevezetés az ókeresztény kor dogmatörténetébe*, p. 509.

³²² Ibid., p. 208,14-17

أفلا ترى متى يشهد بأنه إنسان بناسوته من جوهر الإنس من زرع داود من نسل إبراهيم، ويوحنا أنه أزلي قديم بلاهوته وهو خالق كل وبه قوام كل وبيده ملكوت كل. ومارقوس ولوقا يشهدان اتحاد الأزلي والبشري في بنوة واحدة ومسيحية واحدة، إذ أكمل القول فيه وسمياه يسوع المسيح ابن الله

presence and does not change place, who raises the dead by His command through understanding and power, is not equal to the human who has fears, who cries, and who is affected by sadness.”³²³ This example also offers a parallel to another topic, already examined above, i.e. anthropomorphism. As far as the aspects of Islamic anthropomorphism – rejected by mainstream Islam – are concerned, we can differentiate between anthropomorphism proper, concerning God’s outward appearance, His shape (μorpή); God’s actions like speaking, sitting, etc.; His feelings like wrath, satisfaction, the so-called anthropopathisms; and “passive” anthropomorphisms inasmuch as God may be the object of human perception: when He is seen, heard, etc. The third category is interesting for us here, since ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ distinguishes between the Messiah’s two parts, i.e. the divine, omnipotent and the one who has human feelings or emotions on this basis. In a disputation with a Muslim opponent, it is essential to show that Christians are not to be accused of anthropopathism. For the importance of this issue let us see an example by al-ÉÁÎÛ (d. c. 868):

„We would not believe that a people of religious philosophers [*mutakallimÛn*], physicians, astronomers, diplomats, arithmeticians, secretaries and masters of every discipline could say that a man who, as they themselves have seen, ate, drank, urinated excreted, suffered hunger and thirst, dressed and undressed, gained and lost [weight], who later, as they assume, was crucified and killed, is Lord and Creator and providential God, eternal and not newly created, who lets the living die and brings the dead back to life and can create at will a great deal more for the world, ...”³²⁴

On this basis we may be certain that this differentiation, which appears in ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s text, is an answer to such Muslim criticism of Christian belief.

A last aspect of the Son’s and the Messiah’ pre-eternity is that of His birth. In the case of the Second Person of the Trinity it is essential to be laid down. As for the Messiah, the author’s aim is to show that His divine part is pre-eternal, which has always been

³²³ Ibid., p. 211,10-12

وهذا بين أن الإله الأزلي الذي لا يخلو منه موضع ولا ينتقل من مكان إلى مكان ومحبي الموتى أمر بفهم وسلطان، ليس البشري الذي فزع وبكى ومضته الأحران .

³²⁴ al-ÉÁÎÛ, ÝAmr ibn BaÎr, *KitÁb al- AÏbÁr*, In: ROSENTHAL, Franz, *The Classical Heritage in Islam. Transl. from the German by Emile and Jenny Marmorstein*, London, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1975, p. 45. See the Arabic text in: al-ÉÁÎÛ, ÝAmr ibn BaÎr, *KitÁb al-AÏbÁr*, In: al-ÍIMYARĪ, AbÛ SaÝÐd NašwÁn, *al-ÍÛr al-ÝÐn*, Ed. MUÑÓAFÀ, KamÁl, Beirut, DÁr ÀzÁl li-’l-ÓibÁÝa wa-’l-Našr wa-’l-TawzÐÝ, 1985, p. 282.

لما صدقنا ولا قبلنا أن قوماً متكلمين، وأطباء ومنجمين، ودهاة وحساباً، وكتبة وحذاق كل صنعة، يقولون في إنسان رأوه يأكل ويشرب، ويبول وينجو ويجوع ويعطش، ويكتسى ويعرى، ويزيد وينقص، ثم يقتل بزعمهم ويصلب: إنه رب خالق، وإله رازق، وقديم غير محدث، يميت الأحياء ويحيي الموتى، وإن شاء خلق أضعافاً للدنيا

born. As for the Messiah, as the combination of the divine and the human, he is born in time.

“We claim that the Messiah is born of His Father in a **pre-eternal** way, and we do not say that His Father has born Him in both of His substances. We say that both substances are born, [one of them] from His Father, and [the other] from His mother. Both parents are His parents from the aspect which is substantial and natural for them. His Father had **eternally** born Him in a divine way in His divinity, and His mother bore Him in His humanity, in time.”³²⁵

His birth being eternal and pre-eternal is referred to together, so the two terms appear as synonyms in this context, as well. However, distinction is made between the eternal and pre-eternal birth, which takes place substantially in the divinity of the Father and the Son; and the birth in time, which is substantial for the Messiah’s human part and takes place by way of His Mother.

As it is usual, analogies are also used in the argumentation, this is what we can see in the following example. “If examples and analogies fail, since they fall short to express the greatness of this birth, we just use the analogy of the Sun and the soul to lay down the **pre-eternity** of His birth, this is a unique state, without start, termination, change, and end.”³²⁶ The analogy of the Sun is a frequently used one in Christian literature; however, it is adapted here to the birth of the Messiah; otherwise it is more generally adapted to the Trinity.

The Messiah’s two *hypostases* are born in different ways. The pre-eternal part, i.e. the Second Person of the Trinity has always been born, while the human part was born at a given point in time. “As the One who has always existed (eulogy) was born of His Father **pre-eternally**, he deserved the sonship due to the substantial birth from His Father, then, because of his grace and beneficence, he wanted to share His sonship with the human substance, in order to make the fatherhood related to His Father necessary for the human, too.”³²⁷ The example concentrates on the modality of the pre-

³²⁵ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aĒwiba*, p. 191,11-14

وقد نقول في المسيح أيضاً أنه مولود من أبيه ميلاداً أزلياً، ولا نزع أن أباه ولده بجوهريه جميعاً. بل نقول إن كل واحد مولود من أبيه وأمه إنما هو والده من جهة ما هو منه جوهرى طبيعى، أي أبوه ولده ميلاداً إلهياً قديماً من جهة لاهوته، وولده أمه بشرياً زمنياً.

According to M. Hayek, in expressing this idea, ÝAmmÁr al-BaŌrĒ follows the Catholicos Timothy’s practice. C.f. HAYEK, M., *ÝAmmÁr al-BaŌrĒ, La première somme de théologie chrétienne en langue arabe, ou deux apologies du Christianisme*. In: Islamochristiana, (1976) 2, p. 81.

³²⁶ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aĒwiba*, p. 192,16-20

وإن كانت الأمثال والمقاييس تبطل وتقصّر على عظمة تلك الولادة، فإنما ضررنا القياس من الشمس والنفس على ثبات أزلية ولاده، وذلك على حال واحدة بلا ابتداء ولا انقضاء ولا تغيير ولا انقطاع.

³²⁷ Ibid., p. 193,9-11

eternal part only, and here we can see that pre-eternal birth is substantial birth, as well. In such a context, when referring to the divine, pre-eternal and substantial are synonyms.

7. We have already seen that the Holy Spirit appears as the pre-eternal Life of the divine. His pre-eternity is our last subsection in the examination of *azaliyya*: “Then the Son witnessed to whom is in Him: the Spirit and the **pre-eternal** Life, as he said to His apostles that the Holy Spirit – being the Spirit – is the Spirit of Truth that emanates from the essence of the Father.”³²⁸ Here we understand that Life and Spirit are synonyms, and further than this, we get to know that this Life or Spirit emanates from the Father. The Holy Spirit, as the third person is pre-eternal. The same statement on the emanation can be read in the next quotation: “He declares His sonship in relation to His Father, and the fatherhood of His Father in relation to him, and the **pre-eternity** of the Spirit that emanates from the essence of His Father.”³²⁹ The Spirit is equal to the two previous divine persons in His pre-eternity: “As the Holy Spirit was like the Father and the Son in His divinity, lordship, power, and **pre-eternity**,...”³³⁰ So the Spirit, as a divine *hypostasis* or a property is equal to the previously mentioned other two divine persons in pre-eternity.

The meanings in which ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ used the term are similar to the ones enumerated by Lampe, so the Nestorian author can be considered a continuer of Greek Patristic ideas in this field. When discussing the pre-eternity of matter and creatures, he seems to use *azalÐ* with the same meaning as that of the Patristic term ἀγένητον. In other fields the meanings of both ἀγένητον and ἄϊδιος were carried on.

His contemporary Melkite Theodore AbÛ Qurra does not use the term as often as the Nestorian author, but on the basis of a representative example we may say, that in his usage ‘pre-eternal’ is in contrast with ‘created in time’: “From this we know that what does not receive change and corruption in anything is **pre-eternal**, and what receives change is created in time.”³³¹ Such a substance (i.e. the one that does not change and cannot be corrupted) is not

فإذ كان الذي لم يزل، جل ثناؤه، مولود من أبيه أزلياً استحق البنوة لولاده من أبيه جوهرياً، ثم أحب بنعمته وفضله أن يشترك جوهر الإنسان في بنوته ويوجب حق أبوة أبيه

³²⁸ Ibid., p. 165,12-13

ثم شهد الابن من فيه بأنها هي الروح والحياة الأزلية، إذ قال لرسله إن روح القدس بأنها هي الروح الحق الذي هو فائض من ذات الأب،...

³²⁹ al-BANĀRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ'il wa-'l-aĒwiba*, p. 167,7

ويعلم لذلك بنوته لأبيه وأبوة أبيه له وأزلية الروح الفائضة من ذات أبيه ...

³³⁰ Ibid., pp. 252,19-253,1

إذ كان روح القدس في إلهيته وربوبيته وسلطانه وأزليته كالأب والاب...

³³¹ ABØ QURRA, Theodore, *Maymar fÐ wuĒÛd al-ĒĀliq wa-'l-dÐn al-qawÐm*, p. 191.

ومن ذلك عرفنا أن الذي لا يقبل تغييراً ولا فساداً في شيء، هو أزلي، والذي يقبل تغييراً هو محدث

generated. In this, he shares ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ's view, but the latter uses this term in a much wider range of contexts. Interestingly enough, the slight difference in the usage of the philosophical pair of opposites (*kawn - fasÁd*) is discernible at AbÙ Qurra, too. He, as well as ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, contrasts the receptivity of corruption (*lÁ yaqbal ... fasÁdan*) to *azaliyya*. This confirms our hypothesis, according to which Christian authors of the 9th century flourished in a period in which the delineation of terminologies – philosophical as well as theological – had not been completed yet.

As for the Muslim counterparts, we see that al-KindÐ gives a definition only for this term out of the four. Does it mean that in the 9th century, in Islamic use concepts and terms concerning permanence and eternity were not further differentiated? As for al-KindÐ's definition, it is as follows: “**pre-eternal** is what has never been non-existent and what does not need anything in his subsistence. What does not need anything in his subsistence does not have a cause, and what does not have a cause is permanent forever.”³³² This definition shows a similar understanding of the concept with that of ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, since both of them use it as ‘having no beginning’, and al-KindÐ's ‘having no cause’ may be paralleled to ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ's ‘not having been generated.’ However, this aspect is not emphasized in ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ's examples, who can be considered more theological in his approach, while al-KindÐ's definition is philosophical.

A century later: in al-ËwÁrizmÐ's *MafÁtÐÍ al-ÝulÙm*, this term is described in the field of *kalÁm* (like *qidam*): the author puts it among the basic concepts of Muslim *mutakallims*.³³³ *AzalÐ* is given a brief definition as follows: “**pre-eternal** is an existent [thing] that has always existed and will not cease existing.”³³⁴ The meaning which is expressed in the first phrase of the definition is reflected in ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ's use, too, though the connotations are much richer than merely ‘having no beginning.’ However, the second half of the definition, i.e. ‘will not cease existing’ is not implied by the Christian author. In this, he seems to be more exact than the Muslim writer.

The other authors do not give definitions for this term till al-ËurËÁnÐ's *al-TaÝrÐfÁt*. Before defining *azalÐ*, al-ËurËÁnÐ first defines *al-azal*, too: “**Pre-eternity** is the continuity of existence in periods that are estimated to have no end in the past [= beginning], as

³³² al-KINDĪ, *RisÁla fÐ ÍudÙd al-aşyÁ' wa-rusÙmihÁ*, p. 169.

الأزلي - الذي لم يكن ليس، وليس بمحتاج في قوامه إلى غيره؛ والذي لا يحتاج في قوامه إلى غيره فلا علة له، وما لا علة له فدائم أبداً.

³³³ al-ËWÁRIZMĪ, *MafÁtÐÍ al-ÝulÙm*, p. 83.

في مواضع متكلمي الإسلام

³³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 83.

الأزلي (هو) (الكائن) (الذي) لم يزل ولا يزال.

everlasting [perpetuity] is the continuity of existence in periods estimated as having no end in the future.”³³⁵ Then, he goes on to define pre-eternal:

“**Pre-eternal** is what had not been preceded by non-existence. Know that the existent can be categorized into three groups, there is no fourth kind. One of them is pre-eternal and everlasting, and this is God (eulogy); the other is neither pre-eternal nor everlasting, and this is this world, and the third is everlasting but not pre-eternal, and this is the world of the hereafter. Its contrary is impossible, since what is said to be eternal is impossible to become non-existent. Pre-eternal is what has always existed, and what has always existed has no cause for its existence.”³³⁶

The connotations can be paralleled with those of ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, even more than with the definition given by al-KindÐ. Al-ÉurÊÁnÐ, like ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, concentrates on the endlessness in the past (i.e. “beginninglessness”), and leaves “will not cease existing” out of consideration. The endlessness in the future is expressed by *abad* in his definition, which is contrasted to pre-eternity. Even if contrasted in this case, the two meanings are rather complementary, as the point which distinguishes between them is the present. As far as the implicit allusion can be understood, the two make up a continuum.

No parallel appearance of *qidam* and *azaliyya* can be observed in books of definitions. It is not unexpected, since *qidam*, as we will soon see, is not defined by the majority of these books at all, or, if done so, only a general description is given. However, ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s usage of the term *azalÐ* is more differentiated than that of his contemporary, al-KindÐ, even if he leaves the possible reference to the future out of consideration. But calling a substance the ‘One who has always existed’ may have the implication that He will always exist in the future, as well. Given that both authors worked in the ninth-century, slightly differing interpretations may witness to the process of the early formation of this concept. But it is not to be questioned that ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ is among the earliest ones to have used this term in such a wide variety of contexts, while a clear form on the Muslim side appears only among the definitions of the much later al-ÉurÊÁnÐ.

³³⁵ al-ÉURÉÀNĪ, *KitÁb al-TaÝrÐfÁt*, p. 27.

الأزل استمرار الوجود في أزمنة مقدره، غير متناهية في جانب الماضي، كما أن الأبد استمرار الوجود في أزمنة مقدره غير متناهية في جانب المستقبل.

³³⁶ Ibid., p. 27.

الأزلي، ما لا يكون مسبوقاً بالعدم. (و)أعلم أن الموجود أقسام ثلاثة لا رابع لها، فإنه إما أزلي وأبدي، وهو الله سبحانه وتعالى؛ أو لا أزلي ولا أبدي، وهو الدنيا؛ أو أبدي غير أزلي، وهو الآخرة. وعكسه محال، فإن ما يثبت قدمه امتنع عدمه. (وقيل) الأزلي الذي لم يكن ليس، والذي لم يكن ليس لا علة له في الوجود.

4. *qidam, qadĪm* – eternity, eternal³³⁷

QadĪm is the translation of the Greek term *πρότερος*.³³⁸ Its verbal form, *προτερεύω* is frequently used in Patristic literature with the meaning of ‘to be before time;’ sometimes referring to the Son, or even to the flesh of Christ.³³⁹

As for *YammĀr al-BaĪrĪ*, he uses *al-QadĪm* as a name that stands for God: “It is impossible [to describe] the **Eternal**, Omnipotent, and Wise (eulogy) by the qualities of need and vanity.”³⁴⁰ The term is also adopted as the attribute of the divine substance, i.e. the One:

“It is impossible that the One should be three and the three should be One. The number ‘one’ cannot be equal to the number ‘three’. What we mean is that this **Eternal** One substance has always existed in three substantial properties, without distinction and difference between them. The three properties together form this **eternal** one substance, which is not three in a specific meaning, and it is not partitioned in its entity and integrity. It is not three from the aspect of its unity, it is just three properties.”³⁴¹

Eternal is an attribute of the One substance, but given that it is made up of the three properties, they are also eternal on the basis of this context. As we have seen above, in such contexts eternal and pre-eternal are synonymous; since *YammĀr al-BaĪrĪ* uses *azalĪ*, too, in such descriptions. Just as in the case of *azalĪ* – *azaliyya*, the nominal version of *qadĪm*, i.e. *qidam* may also be used as a divine attribute, too:

“It is clear for reason that He had not been prevented in His **eternity** from creating what He created (in time), and then He would bring them into life by His might – [sometimes] by potentiality to generate them, [sometimes] restraining from their making. The fact that in His **eternity** He abstained from creating [in time] what He later created [in time] is the sign for His earlier deliberation in abstaining [from creation], and His intention, free will to create [in time] what he later created.”³⁴²

³³⁷ HAYEK’s translation: ‘*éternité, éternel.*’ C.f. Ed. HAYEK, *Apologie et controverses*, p. 89. So he considers it as a synonym of *azaliyya*.

³³⁸ AFNAN, M. S., *A Philosophical Lexicon in Persian and Arabic*, p. 227.

³³⁹ LAMPE, G. W., *A Patristic Greek Lexicon*, pp. 1189-90.

³⁴⁰ al-BAÑRĪ, *YammĀr, KitĀb al-MasĀ’il wa-’l-aĒwiba*, p. 104,13-14

أما الخلتان من الحاجة والعبث فهما لعمرى منتفیان عن القديم القادر الحكيم جل جلاله.

³⁴¹ al-BAÑRĪ, *YammĀr, KitĀb al-MasĀ’il wa-’l-aĒwiba*, p. 149,1-6

قلنا: أما أن كون الواحد ثلاثة والثلاثة واحد، فذاك لعمرى لا يمكن كونه، وذلك أن العدد الواحد لا يكون العدد الثلاثة. فأما المعنى الذي إليه نقصد في قولنا، فأنا نعني أن ذلك الجوهر الواحد القديم لم يزل موجوداً بثلاث خواص جوهريات غير متباينات ولا مفترقات. وجميع الثلاث الخواص هو ذلك الجوهر الواحد القديم الذي - أي ليس هو ثلاثة بمعنى خاصة - لا يتبعض ولا يتجزأ بعينه وكماله، ولا هو ثلاثة، بمعنى ما هو واحد، واحدة، بل ثلاث خواص.

³⁴² *Ibid.*, pp. 150, 22-151,3

فقد بان للعقول بهذا أنه قد كان لم يزل في قدمه عن خلق ما أحدث من خلقه ممسكاً ممتنعاً، ثم أنشأ منها بطولٍ واقتدارٍ على كونها والامتناع لو شاء من صنعتها. فقدم إمساك كما أخبرنا عما أحدث منها حديثاً هو الدليل على أن إمساكه قديماً كان بمشيئة وإرادة، وإحداثه ما أحدث أخيراً تعمداً واختياراً

It is emphasized here that the Creator has not always been creating (i.e. in His eternity, *qidam*). We have just seen in the previous subsection that *azaliyya* can also be used to express the same idea. The two terms' synonymity is thus further confirmed. At the same time, apart from being a technical term, in this case we may think of an ordinary meaning, such as the pluperfect.

The next quotation underlines the same idea, while it emphasizes that eternity excludes acting because of need, or the incitement of nature:

“Is it possible to imagine of this **eternal**, living substance, the Artificer of these creatures, that it was His nature to incite Him to create them, in order to keep Him subsistent and for the benefit of His own essence? [He would then be] like these animals, which have to follow their nature according to their disposition, and which need what keeps them subsistent. We have found that in His **eternity** He had not needed what He created from them later [in time], and He had stood above the need for what He brought into being of them afterwards.”³⁴³

Eternity excludes need, just as we have seen above in the case of pre-eternity, *azaliyya*. In this field, the two terms are synonymous, as well. Another possible interpretation of *qidam* in this case is that it means the bygone time before creation.

The eternity of the Father is sometimes referred to, e.g.: “He is born of the **eternal** Father...”³⁴⁴ A specific aspect of the Father's eternity is His eternal generosity:

“The Father (eulogy) wanted to fulfil His **eternal** generosity towards His creation and complete His previous beneficence for all His created beings. He wanted to inform all the angels and people on the splendour of the name of His fatherhood, which He had hidden before [in [His] **eternity**]. So he took a body from His creation by way of His **pre-eternal** Son who was born from Him...”³⁴⁵

Here eternal appears as an attribute of another divine attribute. The second appearance refers to God's divinity, but at the same time, may be considered an appellative, in the meaning of the pluperfect. Eternal fatherhood is related to pre-eternal sonship, thus we may see that the two terms are used as synonyms again.

The eternity of the Messiah (or His divine substance) appears more frequently thus indicating that this issue is of greater interest for the author. The idea of the Messiah's eternity

³⁴³ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ'il wa-'l-aÊwiba*, p. 151,12-18

فقلنا: هل يجوز التوهم على ذلك الجوهر الحي القديم صانع هذه الخلائق أن تكون طبيعته حملته على خلقه إياها التماساً لقوام شأن طباعه وإصلاح ذات نفسه، كهذه الحيوان المجبولة على لزوم سبل طبائعها، المحمولة على التزام ما يقيم ذات حياتها. فوجدنا قدم غناه عما أحدث منها أخيراً، واعتلاءه عن الحاجة إلى ما أنشأ منها حديثاً...

³⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 206,15-16

وإنه مولود من الأب القديم مولفاً من الأركان الأربعة المخلوقة المحدثه أصلاً.

³⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 205,15-18

ولكن إذ أراد الأب عز جلاله أن يكمل جوده القديم على خلقه ويتم نعمته السابقة على كافة بريته ويعلم للملائكة والناس أجمعين ما كان أخفاه... قديماً من سناء اسم أبوته، اتخذ بابنه الأزلي المولود منه جسداً من خلقه

emerges first in a question of the opponent: “If he says: Inform us on this Messiah, who is one with us in His messianic [being]. Is He **eternal** or created in time?”³⁴⁶ The posing of the question itself attests to its importance in Christian-Muslim Christological dialogue. On the other hand, the Messiah’s pre-eternity was mentioned above, in a similar context, the two terms thus appear as synonyms in this field, too. In the answer to this question, we get to know that the divine substance of the Messiah is eternal. “This is why it must be said that the Messiah in the meaning of His messianic [being] is created in time. The **eternal** of His two substances had existed before the union. Just like an **eternal** fire and a piece of coal (which is created in time) become one ember (which is created in time), or as an **eternal** fire and a wick (which is created in time) become one lighted wick.”³⁴⁷ These analogies and similes are common heritage for Christians, and they come from Patristic tradition, so it is not ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ who invented them. Just as in the field of terminology, he is a continuer of Patristic traditions in topology, as well. If we think of the examples that were mentioned above, we may see that the term *qadÐm*, eternal is used in the same meaning with *azalÐ*, pre-eternal. This example is remarkable, since the metaphor of the fire and the lamp is widely used in Arab Christian literature, but especially to refer to the Trinity. Here, we find them adapted to the two substances of the Son. But to demonstrate how well-known and widely used these analogies are, let us see an example how al-ÉÁÎÛ reflected on this:

„Despite all this, they believe that there are three gods, two secret and one visible, just as a lamp requires oil, a wick and a container. The same applies [in their opinion] to the substance of the gods. They assume that a creature became creator, a slave became master, a newly created being became an originally uncreated being, but was then crucified and killed with a crown of thorns on the head, and then disappeared, only to bring himself back to life after death. ...”³⁴⁸

The eternity or createdness of the Messiah’s two substances are further elucidated: “Isn’t it true that the humanity that is created in time and comes from Abraham is firm in Him? And at

³⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 179,4-5

فإن قال: فاخبرونا عن هذا المسيح الذي هو في مسيحيته معنا واحداً. أقدم هو أم محدث؟

³⁴⁷ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÉwiba*, pp. 179,17-180,1

لذلك وجب أن يقال إن المسيح في معنى مسيحته حادث. وإن القديم من جوهره لم يزل قبل الاجتماع. كما أن ناراً قديمة وفحمة حديثة يصيران حديثاً جمرةً واحدة. وكما أن ناراً قديمة وقتيلة محدثة يصيران سراجاً واحداً.

³⁴⁸ al-ÉÁÎÛ, ÝAmr ibn BaĪr, *KitÁb al-AĪbÁr*. In: ROSENTHAL, Franz, *The Classical Heritage in Islam. Transl. from the German by Emile and Jenny Marmorstein*, London, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1975, p. 45. See the Arabic text in: al-ÉÁÎÛ, ÝAmr ibn BaĪr, *KitÁb al-AĪbÁr*, In: al-ĪMYARĪ, AbŪ SaÝÐd NašwÁn, *al-ĪŪr al-ÝÐn*, Ed. MUÑOAFÀ, KamÁl, Beirut, DÁr ÀzÁl li-’l-ÓibÁÝa wa-’l-Našr wa-’l-TawzĪÝ, 1985, p. 282.

ثم هم - مع ذلك أجمع - يرون أن الآلهة ثلاثة: بطن اثنان وظهر واحد، كما لا يد للمصباح من الدهن، والفتيلة، والوعاء فكذلك جوهر الآلهة، فزعموا أن مخلوقاً استحال خالقاً، وأن عبداً تحول رباً، وأن حديثاً انقلب قديماً، إلا أنه قد قتل وصلب بعد هذا، وفقد، وجعل على رأسه أكاليل الشوك، ثم أحيا نفسه بعد موته

the same time: the **eternal** divinity which is the Creator of Abraham is also present in Him.”³⁴⁹ In such a context pre-eternal was also used, as we could see it above; if they can be used in the same context, it implies their synonymy.

Another similarity between the contexts of eternity and pre-eternity is the use of the Scriptural evidence for them. In the case of eternity examples like the following one can be found: “As you have heard it, John gives the *euangelion* of the **eternal** divinity of His essence that is of the substance of His Father and the nature of His parent.”³⁵⁰ In this context eternal refers to the divinity.

As a last parallel to *azaliyya*, we may mention that eternity can also refer to the birth of the Son. Let us remember the example for the Son’s pre-eternal birth quoted above: in the same example eternal birth was also mentioned. There is Scriptural evidence to accentuate it, too: “From the Old Testament; the Father says it through the tongue of His prophet, David: “O, Lad, you have been being born from **eternity**.” It is clear and obvious that the Messiah is addressed here, who had been born of His Father in His divinity; and at the same time He is found to be a child born of His mother in His humanity.”³⁵¹

Among the Muslim authors who are examined here, al-ĒwÁrizmĒ is the first to mention *qidam*. He puts it among *kalÁm* terms, just as he did when describing *azaliyya*, but it is placed among the specific terms of *uÒÙl al-dĒn*,³⁵² and without being defined. If we look at the context it is used in,³⁵³ we will see that it appears in the meaning of an attribute. For example, he mentions the *dahriyya*, who believe in the eternity of endless time; while there is proof that the world is created in time by God. *Qidam* is contrasted to ‘beginning in time.’ He uses the term *qadĒm* as a divine attribute, and then uses the term when he establishes that God’s attributes, *ÒifÁt* are eternal. The way this term appears shows its importance in dialectics, too, i.e. we may understand that eternity is a point of crucial importance for different religions and denominations as far as the Creator and His creation are concerned.

³⁴⁹ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aĒwiba*, p. 212,18-20

ألا والإنسانية المحدثة من إبراهيم فيه ثابتة، واللاهوت القديمة خالفة إبراهيم فيه موجودة.

³⁵⁰ Ibid. p. 209,3

ويوحنا يبشر كما سمعت عن ذات لاهوته القديمة من جوهر أبيه من طباع والده

³⁵¹ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aĒwiba*, p. 206,11-13

أما من العتيقة فيقول الأب على لسان داود نبيه أي: "منذ قديم آياتك أيها الصبي ولدت". وهذا بين واضح أن المسيح المولود باللاهوت قديماً من الأب هو المقول أيضاً، إذ ألفي طفلاً مولوداً بناسوته من الأم.

³⁵² al-ĒWÁRIZMĪ, p. 94.

في وصف الأبواب التي يتكلم فيها المتكلمون من أصول الدين

³⁵³ Ibid., p. 94.

أولها القول في حدوث الأجسام والرد على الدهرية الذين يقولون بقدم الدهر، والدلالة على أن للعالم محدثاً وهو الله تعالى. والرد على المعطلة وإنه عز وجل قديم عالم قادر حي وإنه واحد. والرد على الثنوية من المجوس والزنادقة وعلى المثلثة من النصارى وعلى غيرهم ممن قالوا بكثرة الصانعين وأنه لا يشبه الأشياء. والرد على اليهود (وعلى) غيرهم من المشبهة، وإنه ليس بجسم. وقد قال كثير من مشبهة المسلمين بأنه جسم، تعالى الله عما يقولون علواً كبيراً وإنه جل جلاله عالم قادر (حي) بذاته. وقال الجمهور غير المعتزلة إنه عالم بعلم (و)حي بحياة (و)قادر بقدره، وإن هذه الصفات قديمة معه والكلام في الرؤية ونفيها (وإثباتها). وإن إرادته محدثة أو قديمة

Ideas expressed by these two terms are similar to those of ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ. Al-ËwÁrizmÐ's contemporary, Ibn FÙrak, defines *al-qadÐm* as follows: “**eternal** is what is extremely earlier in his existence than others.”³⁵⁴ Ibn FÙrak defines it on the basis of its existence in terms of time, but leaves the question of being generated out of consideration. From this point of view, we may consider it an attribute. His usage, compared to that of ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, is common usage.

In the eleventh century, as it can be seen in Ibn SÐnÁ's Book of Definitions, the terms *qidam*, *qadÐm* are defined in a more differentiated way.³⁵⁵ We may see a definition according to common usage, i.e. if something is older than another thing, thus this thing can be considered *qadÐm*, old. We then read definitions according to philosophical usage, in which *qadÐm* is defined as eternal concerning time, or eternal concerning essence. In the end, we get to know that only God is eternal in essence, thus we enter the field of theology, too. Eternal is used by ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ in order to refer to time, and it is an attribute of the divine essence, as well, but his usage represents a momentum in the early formation of this concept. The meaning of the term is more differentiated and the definition is more exact and elaborated, but this is due to the fact that Ibn SÐnÁ's work was written in a later, more developed stage of philosophy, while ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ's interpretation reflects the formation of early *kalÁm* terminology.

Al-ÀmidÐ's *al-MubÐn* defines only one term among the above-mentioned ones, and that is *qadÐm*.³⁵⁶ He defines it on the basis of its self-sufficiency, since it does not need a cause for its existence, so we can understand it to be a substance. As such, this term may refer to God. The term may also indicate something that has no beginning in its existence. Both philosophical and theological approaches are discernible here. As for its reference to God, this definition reflects an idea that can be found at ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, too.

The last example I am going to examine is al-ËurÊÁnÐ's *al-TaÝrÐfÁt*, where we can find the definition of *qadÐm*, classified in the same way as we have seen in Ibn SÐnÁ's case.³⁵⁷ He defines *qadÐm* as an existent (*mawÊÙd*), which does not need a cause for its

³⁵⁴ Ibn FØRAK, *KitÁb al-ËudÙd fÐ 'l-uÒÙl*, p. 20.

حد القديم: هو المتقدم في الوجود على غيره بشرط المبالغة.

³⁵⁵ Ibn SĪNĀ, *KitÁb al-ËudÙd*, p. 44.

القدم يقال على وجوه فيقال قديم بالقياس وقديم مطلقاً والقديم بالقياس هو شيء زمانه في الماضي أكثر من زمان شيء آخر هو قديم بالقياس إليه وأما القديم المطلق فهو أيضاً يقال على وجهين يقال بحسب الزمان وبحسب الذات أما الذي بحسب الزمان فهو الشيء الذي وجد في زمان ماضٍ غير متناه وأما القديم بحسب الذات فهو الشيء الذي ليس لوجود ذاته مبدأً أوجبه فالقديم بحسب الزمان هو الذي ليس له مبدأً زمني والقديم بحسب الذات هو الذي ليس له مبدأً يتعلق به وهو الواحد الحق تعالى عما يقول الجاهلون علواً كبيراً.

³⁵⁶ al-ÀMIDĪ, S., *al-MubÐn fÐ šarĪ maÝÁnÐ alfÁÛ al-ËukamÁ' wa-'l-mutakallimÐn*, pp. 118-119.

وأما القديم: فقد يطلق على ما لا علة لوجوده؛ كالباري - تعالى. وعلى ما لا أول لوجوده وإن كان مفتقراً إلى علة؛ كالعالم على أصل الحكيم.

³⁵⁷ al-ËURÉĀNĪ, *KitÁb al-TaÝrÐfÁt*, p. 198.

existence; i.e. it is a self-sufficient substance. *QadĪm* may refer to its existence as having no beginning, then it is to be understood as temporal eternity. Essential eternity is introduced indirectly, as contrasted to essential createdness-in-time. Eternal in essence is more specific than eternal in time. Eternal is also defined as a being whose existence has no beginning; and also as something that has neither starting point nor end. This last approach is not seen at ÝammÁr al-BaÒrĪ, whose use of eternity refers to endlessness in the past only. The other aspects show similarities, but as al-ÉurÊÁnĪ's work was written in a later, more developed stage of philosophy, while ÝammÁr al-BaÒrĪ's interpretation reflects the formation of early *kalÁm* terminology, obviously, the former shows greater elaboration and a higher degree of exactness.

Conclusion

We have seen that the term '*sarmad*' is not a technical term, and is scarcely used by ÝammÁr al-BaÒrĪ. Still, he precedes Muslim authors, since the word is not found in Muslim books of definitions till the 14th century.

'*BaqÁ*' is a rare term in ÝammÁr al-BaÒrĪ's text, and it can either be taken for an appellative, or as a term used in a theological sense, as the 'hereafter.' We can also think of Patristic influence if we interpret it as the translation of 'dwelling' [in heaven or hell]. I demonstrated that ÝammÁr al-BaÒrĪ's text shows '*bÁqin*' as having no end, while Muslim interpretation emphasizes its not being generated. I considered this difference as an indication which shows that ÝammÁr al-BaÒrĪ used the term in an early stage, and which attests to the early formation of its denotation. Muslim examples show a later understanding of the concept.

'Not being generated' or rather 'not having a beginning' is the meaning that gives the core of ÝammÁr al-BaÒrĪ's understanding of *azalĪ*, which I introduced in its various contexts. We have seen it as a divine name, a divine attribute, an attribute of a substance, a property, or of another attribute. As a term referring to God and the divine *hypostases*, it can be paralleled to Greek Patristic terms. When compared to Greek Patristic use, we have seen that it appeared in a wider sense in ÝammÁr al-BaÒrĪ's text. Muslim authors defined the term as a self-sufficient being, as something that has no beginning, and what is not generated.

القديم يطلق على الموجود الذي لا يكون وجوده من غيره، وهو القديم بالذات. ويطلق القديم على الموجود الذي ليس وجوده مسبوقاً بالعدم، وهو القديم بالزمان. والقديم بالذات يقابله المحدث بالذات، وهو الذي يكون وجوده من غيره؛ كما أن القديم بالزمان يقابله المحدث بالزمان، وهو الذي سبق عدمه سبقاً زمنياً. وكل قديم بالذات قديم بالزمان، وليس كل قديم بالزمان قديماً بالذات، فالقديم بالذات أخص من القديم بالزمان، فيكون الحادث بالذات أعم من الحادث بالزمان، لأن مقابل الأخص أعم من مقابل الأعم، ونقيض الأعم من شيء مطلق أخص من نقيض الأخص. وقيل القديم ما لا ابتداء لوجوده الحادث، والمحدث ما لم يكن كذلك، فكان الموجود هو الكائن الثابت، والمعدوم ضده. وقيل القديم هو الذي لا أول ولا آخر له.

These connotations could all be found at ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, too. It is in fact not surprising that we find much overlap at such a broad conceptual level, since all of these thinkers presumably relied on identical sources translated from the Greek and Syriac and interacted in a similar intellectual and cultural milieu.

QadÐm was used by ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ as the synonym of *azalÐ*, in the meaning of ‘ancient, having no beginning.’ It appeared in the same contexts as the previous one; and the same parallels could be drawn on the basis of a comparison with Muslim authors as in the previous case. We know that Muslim philosophical thought differentiated between the meanings of the two (i.e. *qidam* and *azaliyya*), but ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ attests to the early formation of this term, so this differentiation is not yet reflected.

Chapter IV

The Terminology of Creation

(IbdÁ' and ibtidÁ' - beginning, commencement vs. ibdÁÝ – direct creation vs. ibtidÁÝ – instauration vs. ðtirÁÝ – creation ex nihilo vs. ðalq – creation vs. ðldÁ× - creation ex nihilo vs. ÒinÁÝa, making vs. takwÐn – generation vs. inšÁ' – bringing into being)

ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ uses a wide range of terms to express the idea of creation. These are *ibdÁ'* and *ibtidÁ'*; *ibdÁÝ* and *ibtidÁÝ*; *ðtirÁÝ*; *ðalq*; *ðldÁ×* (and *ðudÙ×*); *ÒinÁÝa* (and *ÒanÝa*); *takwÐn*; and *inšÁ'*. They can almost all be paired with a corresponding Greek philosophical term (vid. Afnan), but most of the Greek terms can be found in Christian theological works, too, as we can see it on the authority of Lampe. As a first step, I compare ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ's use of these Arabic terms with the Greek ones, and then check their special connotations according to Church Fathers. I also check how terms and concepts appear in Muslim use, and try to find evidence that shows to what degree ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ (or Christian authors in general) can be considered mediators between Greek and Muslim uses in this field.

1. *IbdÁ'* and *ibtidÁ'*, i.e. beginning, commencement

As for *ibdÁ'*³⁵⁸ (and *ibtidÁ'*³⁵⁹) i.e. beginning, commencement, in translations it usually stands for the Greek philosophical term ἡ ἀρχή.³⁶⁰ The latter appears in various contexts in Greek Patristic literature³⁶¹ with denotations such as beginning (in time, or before time, i.e. in eternity); a starting point; origin or source; cause. If referring to Creation, it can be an action of the Father or the Son; and it can refer to Incarnation, too.

The IVth stem appears scarcely in ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ's text. Literally, it means to start, but it is usually used together with terms referring to creation more directly, so it probably has a stronger connotation beyond the meaning of giving a start to something. E.g. "Or do you averse from this [fleeing] to the acknowledgement that things were brought into being and **commenced** in time, [and] not of matter."³⁶² The context here shows that ÝAmmÁr

³⁵⁸ HAYEK translates it as 'inauguration' C.f. Ed. HAYEK, *Apologie et controverses*, p. 85.

³⁵⁹ In HAYEK's translation: 'instauration' C.f. Ibid.

³⁶⁰ AFNAN, M. S., *A Philosophical Lexicon in Persian and Arabic*, pp. 24-25.

³⁶¹ LAMPE, G. W., *A Patristic Greek Lexicon*, pp. 234-36.

³⁶² al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ'il wa-'l-aÊwiba*, p. 99,9-10

al-BaÖrÐ uses inauguration, *ibdÁ'* in a theological sense, namely that God created things. Staying paired with *inšÁ'*, and appearing in a passive form, it is evident that inauguration is carried out by an active performer of the act, i.e. the result is caused, originated or created. *InšÁ'* will be discussed later, but let us notice even at this point that the two terms are used as synonyms. We have already read above on the question of the pre-eternity of created beings, let us return to the end of the corresponding citation: “This is clear ignorance, and impossible, unattainable that something that was created in time and the making of which was **inaugurated** should become pre-eternal that has always [pre-eternally] existed.”³⁶³ All the words in the direct contextual environment of this term (*ildÁ'×*, *lālq*, *ÒanÝa*) refer to the creative action. Though in this sentence *ibdÁ'* itself is rather used in the meaning of a start, together with the context it gains an extra connotation of the creative action. And finally: “life is truly necessary for Him, who had willingly abstained from what he could have done, and later **inaugurated** what he **inaugurated** deliberately and by His potency.”³⁶⁴ The wider context discusses the question of creation – why God had not done it before the time He decided to perform it – so inauguration gains a wider meaning that comprises the connotation of the creative action.

The VIIIth stem of the same root can be found in the text many times. The first example shows it in the meaning of ‘beginning, start:’ “The same way, the receptivity of the generated form that is made up of these four elements for contingency and accidents witnesses to their creation in time and that their existence has a **beginning**.”³⁶⁵ It is worth looking at the context, too, even if the other terms will be discussed only later in detail: *ibtidÁ'* has a concrete meaning of start, inauguration, but being used together with *ÍudÛ'×*, it gains an extra connotation which refers to the creative action. The object of the action is the existence of other beings: this further implies the creative meaning. The next examples also show a reference for the creative action: “We can also say that the Word of God who stands above every analogy, is the one who **originated** and assumed the human for Himself as humanity.”³⁶⁶

أو ترجعون من ذلك هرباً إلى الإقرار بأن الأشياء أنشئت أو أبدنت حديثاً لا من هيولى
³⁶³ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ'il wa-'l-aĒwiba*, p. 107,3-4

³⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 151,4

³⁶⁵ Ibid., 97,14-16

³⁶⁶ Ibid., 197,9-10

وذلك الجهل المبين المحال الممتنع أن يصير ما أحدث خلقه وأبدأ صنعته أزلياً لم يزل
فالحياة، لمن أمسك عما استطاع فعله بإرادته ومشينته، ثم أبدأ الذي أبدأ تعمداً وقدرةً، واجبة بحق لا محالة
وكذلك قبول الكون ما أنشئ منها من الطبائع الأربع للحدثان والأعراض يشهد على حدوثها وابتداء كونها اضطراراً
هكذا وعلى هذا نقول: إن الله الكلمة تعالى على كل قياس هو الذي بدأ واتخذ البشري له ناسوتاً

However, in some cases the term simply means beginning, as in the case of the description of the Son's birth: "The *hypostasis* of His divinity has always been born from the Father and will always be born in one way/state. It has no **beginning** and no termination."³⁶⁷ Here *ibtidá'* is used as beginning, and it can refer to either the birth or the Son. Since the Son cannot be created, just like the birth, it must mean beginning here. The same meaning appears in the description of His humanity,³⁶⁸ where it is put down that human birth, as well as the existence of the human part, has a beginning. The term appears in other contexts, too, with the meaning of 'beginning', even if the context contains other terms that refer to the creative action. Let us see some examples: "There is no modality of the Pre-eternal and His attributes, and there is nothing similar to Him or His deeds. Just as in the case of light: He created it as clear light in the **beginning** of creation (as He said it in the book of Genesis),"³⁶⁹ In this case, the term is used together with creation, but the meaning of the participle is 'beginning.'

We can notice the same meanings that could be seen in the Greek philosophical and Patristic usage. It was mentioned above that $\eta \acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\eta$ could mean simply a beginning in time, but also, the origin and source. \acute{Y} AmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ can be considered a continuer of these traditions, since he used the term with the meaning of beginning, in contexts referring to creation, so originating was also included in the connotation. As for the inauguration of making and the beginning of creation, on the basis of what Gardet writes, we may even think of a Qur'Ánic parallel: the text frequently contrasts "the first creation" with "the second," that of the resurrection of the body. In this case the expression *bada' al-Ìalq*, "he originates creation"³⁷⁰ is used, so the root *bd'* suggests the idea of a "beginning" which involves a continuation.³⁷¹

\acute{Y} AmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ's Muslim contemporary, al-KindÐ does not define the term on its own. But it appears as an attribute in the definition of causes (*Ýilal*).³⁷² The direct translation of the term as used by al-KindÐ would be inauguration, beginning, but as a cause, it implies a

³⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 192,4-5

وذلك أن قنوم لاهوته لم يزل مولوداً من الأب ولا يزال مولوداً منه على حال واحدة. فلا ابتداء له ولا انقضاء
³⁶⁸ al-BAÑRĪ, \acute{Y} AmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ'il wa-'l-aÈwiba*, 192,7-10

فأما ولاده من الأم حديثاً مرة واحدة ابتدت وانقضت، وقد كان في وقت ولاده من الأم بناسوته مولوداً هنالك أيضاً من الأب بلاهوته، فاتفق الولدان في ذلك الوقت جميعاً معاً. ثم انقضى الذي ابتداء وبقي الذي لا بدء له على ما لم يزل عليه بلا انقضاء

³⁶⁹ Ibid., 194,8-9

وإن كان لا كيفية للأزلي وصفاته ولا شبه له ولا بفعاله، فإنه كما في النور الذي خلقه نوراً مبيئاً في مبتدى الخلق
³⁷⁰ e.g., *SÙrat YÙnus*, 10,4; 10,34 and *SÙrat al-Naml*, 27,64, etc. C.f. The Koran Interpreted. A Translation by A. J. Arberry. Accessed at: <http://arthursclassiconovels.com/koran/koran-arberry10.html>

يبدؤ الخلق ثم يعيده
³⁷¹ GARDET, L., *IbdÁÝ*, In.: IE. Second edition, vol. III., pp. 663-65. (later on: GARDET, L., *IbdÁÝ*), 663.

³⁷² al-KINDĪ, *RisÁla fÐ ÌudÙd al-aşyÁ' wa-rusÙmihÁ*, p. 169.

العلل الطبيعية الأربع : ما منه كان الشيء، أعني عنصره. وصورة الشيء التي بها هو ما هو. وابتداء حركة الشيء التي هي علته. وما من أجله فعل الفاعل مفعوله

more direct action, an effect, and a factor in the coming into being of the caused things. No Muslim author dedicates an entry for this term till al-ÉurÉÁnĎ, who brings definitions for the term from the field of poetry and grammar, but these will be left out of consideration. He then introduces another concept, *al-ibtidÁ' al-ÝurfĎ*³⁷³, but there is no such term in the fields of philosophy or *kalÁm* in his classification. So we may say that ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrĎ's use of the term may be paralleled in his contemporary's use, but in general, he seems to precede Muslim authors. At the same time, as Qur'Ánic parallels could be discerned, we may see that when addressing Muslim opponents, he aimed at the use of familiar terminology.

2. *ibdÁÝ, ibtidÁÝ* - direct creation, original creation

Afnan does not offer a Greek equivalent for *ibdÁÝ*; even for *MubdiÝ* a sole hypothetical option is offered: γεννητής.³⁷⁴ Lampe only offers translations and *loci* for the noun derived from the same roots: i.e. ἡ γεννησις. In Patristic literature it means generation, engendering, birth; so accordingly, *MubdiÝ* as γεννητής is Generator or Engenderer.³⁷⁵

The fourth stem – to the best of my knowledge – appears scarcely in ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrĎ's text. The two examples I could find appear in verbal forms, as follows:

“By my life, if you thought that by the things He wanted to **create**, and the creatures He wanted to bring into being, He only aimed at His own interest and the subsistence of the essence of His own substance, like the elements we have mentioned, then it would be right for you to say that perhaps his will had always been a will of necessity and not one of choice.”³⁷⁶

In this example no object is explicitly named for the creative action, but as it appears parallel to ‘bringing into being,’ which has creatures as its object; the context unmistakably makes it clear that *ibdÁÝ* expresses creation. A common feature in ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrĎ's usage of different terms denoting creation is that he emphasizes its not being a result of a need, but its being urged by divine grace and goodness instead. This example shows the denial of need, but the next one introduces the goodness, generosity as motivation:

³⁷³ He then introduces another concept, customary beginning, which is a traditional formula, such as “in the name of God” intended to introduce the following main formula or text, etc. C.f. al-ÉURÉÁNĬ, *KitÁb al-TaÝrĎfÁt*, p. 18.

الابتداء العرفي يطلق على الشيء الذي يقع قبل المقصود فيتناول الحمدلة بعد البسمة

³⁷⁴ AFNAN, M. S., *A Philosophical Lexicon in Persian and Arabic*, pp. 25-26.

³⁷⁵ LAMPE, G. W., *A Patristic Greek Lexicon*, p. 312.

³⁷⁶ al-BAÑRĬ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ'il wa-'l-aĎwiba*, p. 133,20-134,3

فلمعري لئن ظننت أن الأمور التي شاء أن يبدعها والخلائق التي أراد أن ينشئها، إنما تعمد بها صلاح شأن نفسه وقوام ذات جوهره، كالطبايع التي ذكرنا، إذن لاستقام أن تقول عسى إرادته لم تنزل إرادة اضطرار لا إرادة اختيار

“Isn’t it that the Wise – eulogy – stands above doing anything in vain, without aim? His incarnation and union were not in vain or without an aim, either. His generosity, open-handedness, goodness, and might were those [factors,] which enticed Him to **create** His creatures and bring them into being, and these are also what enticed Him to fulfil His grace and complete His beneficence by His incarnation in a human [being, one] of His creatures.”³⁷⁷

The verbs translate best as ‘create,’ and we have to note that the context introduces it as a synonym of *inšÁ’*, i.e. bringing into being, in both cases. Given that *MubdiÝ* is a divine name in Islamic use; its appearance here shows that AmmÁr al-BasrĪ aimed at using familiar terminology for Muslims.

The VIIIth stem also appears scarcely. In two cases the same meaning is used, in the case of its third appearance, ‘introducing sg. new,’ or ‘make up’ is a better translation. The context of the first appearance is a discussion of the question if there are two creators or just one.

“Making any useless thing cannot belong to the Omnipotent, Wise, nor can it concern His creation. Had his intention by the creation of this been the will of creating the whole world, and had He then created only a part of it, and then left another part to be completed by someone else, it would have been ignorance and impotence, necessarily. And it cannot be an attribute of Who had the potency – by His Wisdom – to **create** a part of creatures *ex nihilo*.”³⁷⁸

IbtidÁÝ is used in a parallel manner with *Īalq*, in a synonymous sense. It is also used together with the phrase *lÁ min šay’*; so if it is to be translated *ex nihilo*, then creation denoted by *ibtidÁÝ* excludes pre-existent matter. This action, or the faculty, potency for this action implies omnipotence. The second appearance is a transition between start and creation:

“If He – eulogy – had known that there could come a time in which their creation would be more adequate for them and more proper for them than the time he **instaurated** in order to carry their creation out in it, then he would have made use of this knowledge for his care for them to intent their creation in that time instead of the time in which he brought them into being, even if that would have been ten thousand years earlier, and He would have not put them in a disadvantage by this.”³⁷⁹

³⁷⁷ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aĒwiba*, pp. 215,9-15

ألا إن الحكيم عز جلاله متعال عن أن يفعل شيئاً عبثاً لغير معنى. كذلك لم يكن تجسده وتأحيده عبثاً بلا معنى، بل جوده وكرمه وصلاحه وجبروته التي دعت إلى أن أبداع وأنشأ خلقه، هي التي دعت أخيراً إلى إتمام نعمته واستكمال إحسانه بتجسده بشرياً من خلقه

³⁷⁸ Ibid., pp. 102,17-103,2

فليس افتعال ما لا نفع فيه من شأن القادر الحكيم ولا من خلقته. وإن كان تعمد بخلق ذلك إرادة خلق دار العالم كلها جملاً فخلق منها بعضاً وأهمل خلق بعض ليطمه غيره، فذلك من جهل أم عجز لا محالة. وليست أيضاً من صفات من قدر بحكمته على ابتداع طرف من الخلائق لا من شيء

³⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 106,10-14

Here *ġalq* and *inšÁ*’ also appear as parallel meanings, so even if *ibtidÁÝ waqt* would read best as producing time, it has an additional connotation which refers to the creative action.

The last occurrence of the word introduces it not as a term but as an appellative, since it is evidently in the sense of invention: “The first [quality] is the existence of the legislation of the religion of the truth, which matches the laws of the Benefactor, the Generous; not like the aberrant legislation which was **invented** by the guides of aberration, as made up in their scriptures and religions.”³⁸⁰ This usage may also be compared to Islamic terminology, since this term carries a connotation like that of the Islamic *bidÝa*.

So far, we have seen that it is possible to find similarities between AmmÁr al-BasrÐ’s terminology and Greek sources. Besides Greek origins that influence the formation of these concepts and terms, we have to investigate their development in Muslim thought. *IbdÁÝ* is translated as absolute creation, primordial innovation by L. Gardet.³⁸¹ He then goes on to assert that the term is not Qur’Ánic; even if the Qur’Án calls God *BadÐÝ*, Absolute Creator, Innovator.³⁸² On this basis, the *maÒdar* of the IVth stem comes to express the actual act of God. *IbdÁÝ* belongs to the vocabularies of ŠÐÝism; *falsafa* and *Ýilm al-kalÁm* give it a further technical meaning consonant with the SunnÐ idea of “creation.”³⁸³ In ŠÐÝÐ thought, *ibdÁÝ* is thought of in connection with the divine *kun*, the “Be!” word that brings into existence.³⁸⁴

In philosophy, al-KindÐ, in his *RisÁla fÐ ÍudÙd al-ašyÁ*’, defines *ibdÁÝ* as the displaying of the thing (the existent) from nothing, i.e. creating it *ex nihilo*.³⁸⁵ ÝAmmÁr al-BasrÐ does not emphasize the *ex nihilo* approach in his use of the fourth stem, only in the case of the eighth. There is some similarity, but we cannot consider it a perfect agreement.

According to Gardet, for later *falÁsifa*, Ibn Rušd, Ibn SÐnÁ, and al-FÁrÁbÐ, *ibdÁÝ* denotes the absoluteness of the creative (emanative) act in the production of beings that have no reason for existing in their own essence, emanatism being of a Neoplatonic kind. But while

فلو كان في سابق علمه جل اسمه أنه قد كان يمكن أن يتأتى وقت يكون خلقهم فيه أصلح لهم وأعود عليهم من الوقت الذي ابتدعه لينشئ فيه خلقهم، لكان أجدى العلم عنيه بهم أن يتعمد لخلقه في ذلك الوقت دون ذلك الوقت الذي فيه أنشأهم، ولو كان متقدماً له بعشرة آلاف عام، ولا يضمن بذلك عليهم

³⁸⁰ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÈwiba*, p. 129,18-19

فالأولى وجود شرائع دين الحق الملائمة لسنن المنعم الجواد فيه جملأ، دون ما ابتدع أئمة الضلالة من شرائعها الزائغة فيما افتعلت من كتبها وأديانها

³⁸¹ GARDET, L., *IbdÁÝ*, , 663.

³⁸² The two verses II, 117 and VI, 101 assert that God is "Creator (*BadÐÝ*) of the heavens and the earth"

³⁸³ GARDET, L., *IbdÁÝ*, pp. 663-64.

³⁸⁴ "The Creator (*BadÐÝ*) of the heavens and the earth, when He decrees a thing, He says to it only "Be!", and it is" (Qur’Án, II, 117)

³⁸⁵ al-KINDĪ, *RisÁla fÐ ÍudÙd al-ašyÁ’ wa-rusÙmihÁ*, p. 165.

ŠĎÝĎ thought emphasizes the divine imperative *kun* and its immediacy, *falsafa* accentuates an absolute production of being in the idea of *ibdÁÝ*.³⁸⁶

As for Ibn ŠĎnÁ's *ĪudÙd*, it defines the term as a name that can refer to two concepts. The first concept means the establishment of an existent out of nothing, without any mediation; and the second concept is that an existent thing should have an absolute existence coming from a cause, without a mediator; this thing could not exist [in itself], and it had lost completely what it had in itself [after coming into being].³⁸⁷ As for his first definition, he shares ÝAmmÁr al-BasrĎ's interpretation, even if the addition of 'without intermediary' seems to be a later development. The second definition, which approaches existence on the basis of causes, is clearly philosophical and more specific than ÝAmmÁr al-BasrĎ's usage. It is not unexpected, since Ibn ŠĎnÁ's *ĪudÙd* represents a later stage of philosophical thinking.

In *Ýilm al-kalÁm*, *ibdÁÝ* was fully accepted into the vocabulary of the *mutakallimÙn*. It bears the same fundamental meaning, but its connotations are certainly closer to those it has in al-KindĎ than to those it has in Avicenna or the ŠĎÝĎs. The *TaÝrĎĎfÁt* of al-ÉurÉÁnĎ summarizes with precision the usage of Muslim theologians in this matter; he prepared a rather detailed entry on *ibdÁÝ*. For him, the primary sense of the term is creation *ex nihilo*. His distinction between *ibdÁÝ*, *takwĎn* and *ĪĎÁ×* is particularly interesting.

"In the terminology of philosophers, *ibdÁÝ* and *ibtidÁÝ* mean the creation of a thing not preceded by matter or time, such as the intellects."³⁸⁸

So far this definition can be paralleled to what ÝAmmÁr al-BasrĎ said and how al-KindĎ defined the term. The previous authors mostly emphasized the *ex nihilo* background; the lack of anteriority as such is a new element in the definition.

"...*IbdÁÝ* and *ibtidÁÝ* oppose *takwĎn*, i.e. generation, which means creation preceded by matter. Also, *ibdÁÝ* and *ibtidÁÝ* oppose *ĪĎÁ×*, creation in time which is preceded by time. The opposition between them is contrariety, even if they [both] are [kinds of] existence, given that **direct creation** is an expression of the absence of any anteriority of matter, and generation is the expression of the anteriority of matter. The opposition between them is compulsory opposition, since one of them is existential, while the other one is non-existential. This is known on the basis of the definition of two opposing things. ..."³⁸⁹

³⁸⁶ GARDET, L., *IbdÁÝ*, p. 664.

³⁸⁷ Ibn ŠĎnÁ, *KitÁb al-ĪudÙd*, pp. 42-43.

الإبداع اسم مشترك لمفهومين أحدهما تأسيس الشيء لا عن شيء ولا بواسطة شيء والمفهوم الثاني أن يكون للشيء وجود مطلق عن سبب بلا متوسط وله في ذاته أن لا يكون موجوداً وقد أفقد الذي له من ذاته إفقاداً تاماً

³⁸⁸ al-ÉURÉÁNĎ, A. i. M., *KitÁb al-TaÝrĎĎfÁt*, p. 18.

³⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

ÝAmmÁr al-BasrĎ also uses these terms in a differentiated way, or we can say at least that he uses different terms for the creative action, and does not use only one of them to express this action. However, he never contrasts these terms and their meanings in such a way, he rather uses them as synonyms.

“... ‘**Direct creation**’ is the bringing into being of an existent [thing] *ex nihilo*. ...”³⁹⁰

This portion of the definition is in perfect agreement with the way ÝAmmÁr al-BasrĎ uses the term.

“... ‘**Direct creation**’ is said to [be] the foundation of an existent [thing] without another/out of no-thing, while creation is the foundation of an existent [thing] from another. ...”³⁹¹

This opposition cannot be found in ÝAmmÁr al-BasrĎ’s usage, he uses the two terms as synonyms instead.

“... God (eulogy) said: “the (**direct**) **Creator** of the heavens and the earth” (Cow, 117). And also: “the creation of man” (Palm, 4). So ‘**direct creation**’ is more general than creation, this is why He said “the (**direct**) **Creator** of the heavens and the earth” and “the creation of man,” and he didn’t say the ‘**direct creation**’ of man.”³⁹²

Al-ÉurĒĀnĎ’s examples demonstrate the differences between the two kinds of creative action: the heavens and earth are created *ex nihilo*, while Adam was created from dust. The former is expressed by *ibda’*, while the latter by *ġalq*. ÝAmmÁr al-BasrĎ also refers to Scriptural evidence in some cases, but instead of the Qur’Ān, he cites Old and New Testament *loci*. E.g. in the case of *bada’* the Book of Genesis is referred to, as we could see it above. When using this term, no scriptural quotations are used. He usually uses scriptural evidence to underpin something, but not in order to contrast meanings, so his approach differs somewhat from that of al-ÉurĒĀnĎ.

Concluding we may say that ÝAmmÁr al-BaĎrĎ’s use of the terms can be paralleled to those appearing in Muslim thought. However, one has to admit that these terms came to be much more sophisticated in later stages of *kalĀm* as the latter’s terminology became increasingly philosophical.

³⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 18.

³⁹¹ al-ÉURĒĀNĎ, A. i. M., *KitĀb al-TaĎrĎfĀt*, p. 18.

³⁹² Ibid. p. 18.

الإبداع والابتداع (أيضاً)، (في اصطلاح الحكماء) هو إيجاد شيء غير مسبوق بمادة ولا زمان، كالعقول، وهو يقابل التكوين، لكونه مسبوقاً بالمادة، ويقابل الإحداث لكونه مسبوقاً بالزمان، والتقابل بينهما تقابل التضاد إن كانا وجوديين، بأن يكون الإبداع عبارة عن الخلو عن المسبوقية بمادة، والتكوين عبارة عن المسبوقية بمادة؛ ويكون بينهما تقابل الإيجاب والسلب إن كان أحدهما وجودياً والآخر عديمياً، ويعرف هذا من تعريف المتقابلين.

والإبداع (هو) إيجاد الشيء من لا شيء. وقيل الإبداع تأسيس الشيء عن شيء، والخلق إيجاد شيء من شيء. قال الله تعالى: "يدع السموات والأرض" (البقرة/117) وقال: "خلق الإنسان" (النحل/4)، والإبداع أعم من الخلق، ولذا قال: "يدع السموات والأرض"، وقال: "خلق الإنسان" ولم يقل يدع الإنسان

3. *ÎdÁ*×, production, creation and *ÎudÛ*×, creation in time³⁹³

ÎdÁ×, production, creation and *ÎudÛ*×, creation in time can be paired with different Greek terms. As for *îdÁ*×, it may stand for the Greek ποῖσθαι; *ÎudÛ*× is ποίησις or γίγνεσθαι. As for the derived form, *muldi*×, it corresponds to εἰδοποιός, ποιητικόν.³⁹⁴ In Greek Patristic literature ποίησις is used in general to refer to making; to creating, the act of creation, and to that which is created.³⁹⁵ Γίγνεσθαι appears as ‘being made/created, become’ in the Church Fathers’ texts,³⁹⁶ while εἰδοποιός is the Creator, the Giver of forms,³⁹⁷ and ποιητικόν is creative, productive.³⁹⁸

As for the Muslim counterparts, as it is asserted by Anawati,³⁹⁹ “the beginning of the world,” *ÎudÛ*× comes from the *maÔdar* of *Îada*×*a*, which signifies: ‘to appear, to arise, to have come into being recently;’ ‘to take place, to happen.’ Muslim thinkers use the term with two meanings: one denotes the existence of a thing after its nonexistence, in a temporal extension: this is *al-ÎudÛ*× *al-zamÁnÐ*, to which temporal eternity (*al-qidam al-zamÁnÐ*) corresponds. For the *mutakallims*, *ÎudÛ*× *al-ÝÁlam* bears only the sense of a beginning in time. They take this “beginning” of the world as their basis for proving the existence of God. The other meaning is that of the hellenizing philosophers, in particular Avicenna: *ÎudÛ*× denotes contingency: the fact of a being’s existing after not having existed, but in an ontological or essential extension, which does not necessarily involve time. This is *al-ÎudÛ*× *al-ÆÁtÐ*. From this point of view the *falÁsifa* affirm the *ÎudÛ*× *al-ÝÁlam* and its eternity.⁴⁰⁰

Let us now see if ÝAmmÁr al-BaÔrÐ can be seen a mediator between Greek and Muslim uses of the terms under consideration in this subsection. Before examining his examples, let us remember that an early (Christian) use of the term *îdÁ*× with the meaning of creation has already been established by M. Maróth, though he points at its not being widely used before the eleventh century.⁴⁰¹

First we will examine examples for ÝAmmÁr al-BaÔrÐ’s use of the first stem, for which examples include the following: “The same way, the receptivity of the generated form

³⁹³ HAYEK translates *îdÁ*× as ‘production, création,’ *ÎudÛ*× as ‘création,’ and *Îada*×*Án* as ‘contingence.’ C.F. Ed. HAYEK, *Apologie et controverses*, pp. 85, 87.

³⁹⁴ AFNAN, M. S., *A Philosophical Lexicon in Persian and Arabic*, pp. 67-68.

³⁹⁵ LAMPE, G. W., *A Patristic Greek Lexicon*, p. 1108.

³⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 315.

³⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 407.

³⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 1109.

³⁹⁹ ANAWATI, G. C., *ÎudÛ*× *al-ÝÁlam*, In: EI, Second Edition. III., p. 548

⁴⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 548.

⁴⁰¹ MARÓTH, M., *The Correspondence between Aristotle and Alexander the Great*, pp. 77-78.

(of what was made up of these four elements) for contingency and accidents witnesses to their **coming into being** and that their existence has a beginning.”⁴⁰² Here the term means ‘to appear, to arise, to have come into being (recently); ‘the existence of a thing, after its nonexistence,’ but it is hard to judge whether this coming into being refers to time, or is meant in an ontological, essential extension. It is not only the connotation of the term which has to be observed here, but the argumentation, too: the beginning of the world could be a basis for proving the existence of God. It is an argument accepted by both Muslims and Christians, so in this case ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ uses an idea that is familiar for his opponents, too.

In the next quotation, the meaning of the term is the same: “If the *praedicatum* of what has always existed is natural transcendence and abstention from receiving accidents, then the same way, the *praedicatum* of what is found to receive the contingency of accidents is that its existence **came into being** and was created, necessarily”⁴⁰³ However, it is to be noted here that the term is used parallel to *ìalq*, suggesting that they have a synonymous meaning. While philosophy usually contrasts *ìldÁ*× with *qidam*, here its opposite is *mÁ lam yazal*, so it is closer to *azaliyya*.

The next example is of particular interest, since the root *Ìd*× appears in different stems in it.

“If we said: He has always been **creating** His creatures in **time** and He has always been generating them, like the elements that carry out their actions according to their nature, all the time; then the claim would be impossible and would contradict to itself. It is because when we said that He has always been **creating** His creatures in **time**, we made both pre-eternity and **coming into being** necessary for His creation. And it is the same to say that the Creator has always **created** His creation in **time**, or to say that what is **created** in **time** has always existed.”⁴⁰⁴

We find the active participle of the IVth stem, meaning ‘Creator (in time), or originator,’ accordingly, the IVth stem verb means ‘to create in time, originate,’ and the passive participle ‘created in time, originated.’ Given that all the other forms have transitive meanings, i.e. there is an actor carrying the action out, apart from ‘coming into being,’ *ÌudÙ*× also gains an extra meaning of being created, originated. No opposition to *qidam* is discernible; instead, it is *azaliyya* which appears as a contrasting term.

⁴⁰² al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÈwiba*, p. 97,14-16

وكذلك قبول الكون ما أنشئ منها من الطبائع الأربع للحدثان والأعراض يشهد على حدوثها وابتداء كونها اضطراباً

⁴⁰³ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÈwiba*, p. 98,10-12

فإن كان حكم ما لم يزل الاعتلاء والامتناع من قبول الأعراض طبيعياً، كذلك حكم ما ألقى لحدثان الأعراض قابلاً حدوث الكون والخلق اضطراباً

⁴⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 150,18-21

وإن قلنا بل لم يزل لخلانقه محدثاً مكوناً كالطبائع الفاعلة أفعالها طبيعياً أبداً، استحالت الدعوى وتناقضت في نفسها. لأننا إذا قلنا لم يزل لخلانقه محدثاً، أوجبنا للخلانق اسم الأزلية والحدوث جميعاً، وسواء على القائل أن يقول لم يزل الخالق يحدث خلقاً، أم يقول لم يزل المحدث موجوداً أزلياً

The first stem appears in two different forms in the following quote: “The Messiah – as far as His being the Messiah is concerned – is **nascent**, he **came into being** after he had not been existent.”⁴⁰⁵ It is hard to judge whether merely coming into being in time is meant here, or contingency in an ontological, essential extension without respect to time. As far as the Messiah’s birth is concerned, coming into being is a proper translation, but coming into being after not having existed may carry connotations of essential extension.

If the divine is concentrated on, essential extension may be the main meaning: “As for what occurs because of this unity as an arising [thing] between them, it will be attached to the human, who was brought to these privileges, who was granted these gifts uniquely, and nothing can affect the Pre-eternal in this [unity], nor can anything **come into being** in Him.”⁴⁰⁶ It is probably not only ‘coming into being in time’ what is meant here, but contingency, too. “From that time on, the Son of God is not more related to his pre-eternal substance than to his temporal one, and He is not more related to the name of divinity and eternity than to the name of **contingency**.”⁴⁰⁷ In this last example, the extension of time has no importance; it is rather His existence after not having existed which is stressed here.

After having examined the infinitive of the Ist stem, *ÍudÛ×*, let us turn to the IVth stem, *aÍda×a*. Let us first see an example where *aÍda×a* appears among other terms referring to the creative action: “This is clear ignorance, and it is impossible and unattainable that something that was **created in time** and the making of which was inaugurated should become pre-eternal that has always [pre-eternally] existed.”⁴⁰⁸ In this case, *aÍda×a* can also mean ‘to start in time, make happen in time’, as *uÍdi×a Íalquhu* implies it. (*UÍdi×at* also appears elsewhere as a synonym of being disposed; so this kind of creation may also mean a fashioning of the created one’s disposition.)⁴⁰⁹ *UÍdi×a*, as usual in ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒÐ’s usage, is contrasted to *azaliyya*. In another instance we may read an example in which corruption

⁴⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 179,11

بل المسيح من جهة مسيحيتيه حادث حدث بعد أن لم يكن مسيحاً

⁴⁰⁶ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÉwiba*, p. 183,9-11

فأما ما عرض من هذا الاتحاد بحادث بينهما، فإنه يضاف إلى البشري المجتذب إلى هذه الفضائل، المنعم عليه بهذه المواهب خاصة، من غير أن يكون عرض الأزلي في ذلك عارض ولا حدث به حادث

⁴⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 187,12-13

وابن الله منذ ذلك الوقت ليس أولى بجوهره الأزلي في جوهره الزمني، ولا باسم اللاهوت والقدم أولى منه باسم الحدوث

⁴⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 107,3-4

وذلك الجهل المبين المحال الممتنع أن يصير ما أحدث خلقه وأبدأ صنعه أزلياً لم يزل

⁴⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 125,7-11

كما أنه إذ جبل طبيعة الذنب على المرادة والنكر وطبيعة الخروف على اللين والسكون ولا يجدان إلى خلاف ما جبلا عليه من تقلبهما محيصاً، لم يحسب لين الخروف له برأ ولا مرح الذنب له فجوراً. ولا أيضاً يستحقان بما أحدثت عليه غرائزهما ثوباً ولا عقاباً

appears as created in time in the earth, or this corruption may simply be understood as being introduced, caused in the element.⁴¹⁰

Terms referring to the creative action usually appear in contexts that introduce signs for the existence of the Creator. Our next example offers an interesting parallel with genesis, generating and creation:

“then [if] he [i.e. the opponent] said: what can prove that the faculties of these elements (heat, cool, humidity, dryness) are generated and created? We would say: the proof for this is their subservience and subjugation for the combination, sequence, and commixion, which are **created in time** in them, and their receptivity for the change and transfer from one condition to another, to which they are exposed in this.”⁴¹¹

Iḏá× can even be a sign or a proof for genesis and creation (*takwḏn, ḏalq*), at the same time, in this context, another possible interpretation of the passive form is just “happen.” If *iḏá*× is a proof for the other two actions, it implies that there is some distinction between their meanings in this case. If we approach the form on the basis of the first stem, which means coming into being, then the fourth stem may be understood as ‘to cause to come into being,’ and its passive form may mean ‘be caused’ or ‘created in time’, or it may just be interpreted as happen. *Iḏá*× is a sign for creation, which later becomes a proof for the existence of the Creator. Apart from parallel meanings that show generation and creation are synonymously used, we can see that a circumscription of corruption (subservience and subjugation for the combination, sequence, and commixion, which are created in time in them, and their receptivity for the change and transfer from one condition to another) appears as a juxtaposed meaning. *Kawn* is usually contrasted to corruption in philosophical texts; but here, its derived form, *takwḏn* and the synonymously used *iḏá*× appear together with the changes that may stand for corruption.

Terms referring to the creative action usually introduce objects of creation. Let us mention such an example, as the term appears when incarnation is described, as well: “It is this way when we say that the Word of God incarnated and became human, that is: he **created** a body and he put it on. He created a human being, and wore it as an armament, combined it with His *hypostasis* in order to appear in it, and in order to make His words and deeds appear

⁴¹⁰ Ibid., p. 97, 16-17

⁴¹¹ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ'il wa-'l-aĒwiba*, p. 97,9-11
 ثم قال: وما الدليل على أن قوى هذه الأركان من الحرارة والبرودة والرطوبة واليبوسة مكونة مخلوقة؟
 قلنا: الدليل على ذلك تدللها وانقيادها لما أحدث فيها من التأليف والتسلسل والامتزاج، ثم قبولها لما عرض لها في ذلك من الغبار والتنقل من حال إلى حال

through it.”⁴¹² In this case the object of creation is a human body or flesh, which became a part of the Messiah. The quote also demonstrates that one of the Messiah’s two parts is not pre-eternal.

Another field terms referring to creation usually appear in is the discussion of the cause or motivation of creation. As for *īldā*×, it is an action of God, which he carried out deliberately, not because of need or constraint.

“It is clear for reason that He had not been prevented in His eternity from creating what He **created (in time)**, and then He would bring them into life by His might – [sometimes] by potentiality to generate them, [sometimes] restraining from their making. The fact that in His eternity He abstained from **creating [in time]** what He later created [in time] is the sign for His earlier deliberation in abstaining [from creation], and His intention, free will to **create [in time]** what he later created.”⁴¹³

We may also see that *īldā*× appears together with *qidam* in this paragraph. But while philosophical texts usually juxtapose the two (something is either created in time or eternal), they are both referring to the same substance in ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s usage: in his eternity (*qidam*), God had refrained from creating in time (*īldā*×), which he carried out later.

The same idea, abstention from creation, and then carrying it out later is a proof for His deliberation and omnipotence (as we could see it in the case of *qidam*).⁴¹⁴

Terms referring to creation also appear in argumentation concerning the means of creation. In the following example *ālda*×*a* (as a synonym of *kawwana*) appears to demonstrate that this action is volitional:

“we truly know, as we found His essence standing above these attributes, and we have found that He has a creation that **comes into being** in time, and which had been **created in time** and **generated** by Him, that He had **created** it in **time** by way of command and determination, without movement and process, [He carried it out by His] will and intention, without effort and support (by anyone else).”⁴¹⁵

⁴¹² Ibid., pp. 196,8-197,3

كذلك بقولنا أن الله الكلمة تجسد وتأنس أي أحدث جسداً فلبسه وخلق إنساناً فتدرعه وألفه إلى قنومه ليظهر به وليظهر به قوله وأعماله وليوحده معه في بنوته.

⁴¹³ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aĒwiba*, p. 150, 22-151,3

فقد بان للعقول بهذا أنه قد كان لم يزل في قدمه عن خلق ما أحدث من خلقه ممسكاً ممتنعاً، ثم أنشأ منها بطولٍ واقتدارٍ على كونها والامتناع لو شاء من صنعتها. فقدم إمساك كما أخبرنا عما أحدث منها حديثاً هو الدليل على أن إمسাকে قديماً كان بمشيئة وإرادة، وإحداثه ما أحدث أخيراً تعمداً واختياراً

⁴¹⁴ Ibid., p. 151, 15-18

فوجدنا قدم غناه عما أحدث منها أخيراً، واعتلاءه عن الحاجة إلى ما أنشأ منها حديثاً، يشبع القلوب يقيناً بأنه قدرها بهمة رقيقة ثم أنشأها بعين عالية ليجود بها على غيره وينعم بها على من من أجله أنشأ خلقه، لا ليسد بها حاجة نفسه أو يقيم بها شأن طباعه

⁴¹⁵ Ibid., p. 149,16-18

بل بحق نعلم، إذ وجدنا ذاته متعالية عن هذه الصفات ثم وجدنا له خلقاً حادثاً أحدثه وكونه، أنه انما أحدث ذلك أمراً وحكماً دون حركة وعلاج أو مشيئة أو إرادة دون كلفة ومؤونة

In the case of the most important terms for creation, ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ emphasizes that the means of the creative action is not bodily. In order to avoid accuses of anthropomorphism, he emphasizes the volitional nature of the divine action. (As for *îlġá×* and *takwġn*, they are used as synonyms even in passive participial forms elsewhere.⁴¹⁶)

Finally, let us mention that the terms which express creation, often appear as synonyms. As for *ġalq*, it is a synonym of *îlġá×* when the two terms are used as passive participles.⁴¹⁷ The Creator, when moulding and forming *hyle*, introduces accidents in it, i.e. He creates them in time in it.⁴¹⁸ The verb is synonymously used with *anša'*, too: “Vision/contemplation brought us [to establish] a source/entity, which is prior to them, and who **created** them in **time** and **brought** them **into being**.”⁴¹⁹ A similar example was cited in the chapter on *Ýaqł*, but it was a substance (and not a source/entity) that carried the creation in time out there.⁴²⁰ When appearing in an infinitive form, the term is used synonymously with *ÒanÝa*: “that which is said in this respect has come to an end, and intellects are forced by this analogy [to accept] that the Maker of these creatures is one, omnipotent; He has no helper in His **making** them and no supporter in His **creating** them [**in time**].”⁴²¹ *ġlġá×* and *ÒanÝa* are

⁴¹⁶ Ibid., p. 97,19-21

ثم أن الماء والنار جميعاً منقادين لتستعملهما أنى شئت وكيف أردت، وتسخرها لك عندما تحدث فيها وتستعملها بذلك على أنها محدثة مكونة

⁴¹⁷ e.g. al-BAÑRġ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ'il wa-'l-aĒwiba*, p. 99,11

بل نزع من أن الهيولى محدثة مخلوقة

Ibid., p. 99, 12

إن كنتم تعنون بأن الهيولى المحدثة المخلوقة

etc., as in Ibid., p. 179,7; p. 179, 12, ...

Ibid., p. 99, 18:

فقد أقررتم أن الهيولى محدثة مخلوقة

These two can even be paired with 'perceivable' and 'imaginable': Ibid., p. 100,1:

فإن أوجبتم أن الأشياء كلها المحسوسة والموهومة مخلوقة محدثة

⁴¹⁸ “What share does the eternity of the *hyle* have in the eternity of pre-eternity if they claim that it is forced by and obeys to Whom differentiates it and divides it, and **creates** accidents in it (i.e. by delineating forms and changing it from a state to another)?” Ibid. p. 98,12-14

أو أي سهم يوجد في قدم الهيولى في قدم الأزلية عند زعمهم أنها منقادة مقهورة لدى من فصلها وبعضها وأحدث الأعراض فيها من تقدير الأشكال والإحالة من حال إلى حال؟

⁴¹⁹ Ibid. p. 150,2-3

انتهت بنا الروية إلى وجود عين متقدم لها هو أحدثها وأنشأها

⁴²⁰ “In the first investigation, witnesses of the bodily forms of creatures necessitated for the intellect to affirm that there is a substance that **created them in time** and brought them into being. In the second investigation, the fact, that in his infinite pre-existence he had abstained from creating [his creatures], but later on he carried out their making as a donation, [forced the intellect] to render pre-eternal life necessary for him. And the third investigation, on the basis of his perfect government, and of what had previously shown of his care, guided [the intellect to accept] that he carries this out in order to be generous to others. It witnesses to the substantiality of his Word and the pre-eternity of his wisdom, necessarily.” Ibid., p. 152,5-9

فإنه كما عن الشواهد من أشكال الخلائق اضطرت العقول في الفحص الأول إلى وجود إثبات جوهر أحدثها وأنشأها، والفحص الثاني من تبرعه بصنعتها بعد إمساكه قديماً عن خلقها إلى إيجاب الحياة له أزلياً، كذلك ما دل الفحص الثالث من إحكام سياسته لها وما تقدم من سابق همته بأن يوجد على غير بها، يشهد على جوهرية كلمته وأزلية حكمته إضطراراً

⁴²¹ Ibid., pp. 103,21-104,1

انتهى القول في هذا الوجه واضطرت العقول عند هذا القياس إلى أن صانع هذه الخلائق واحد قادر حكيم لا عوناً له في صنعته ولا موازراً له في إحداثها

synonyms in passive participial forms, too.⁴²² Another parallel is offered either by passive or active participial forms of *ilḏá×* and *ta'lḏf*: if something is created in time, it is also composite, and it must have a Creator (in time) or a Composer.⁴²³ Even the action or the fact of being generated can be a proof of the existence of a Creator. *ilḏá×* and *ta'lḏf* can be accompanied by *tarkḏb*: so all three actions may be considered synonymous.⁴²⁴ When used in a passive participial form, *muḏa×* is contrasted with eternal, *qadḏm*.⁴²⁵

Concluding we may say that *ilḏá×* may sometimes be understood as an appellative, not a term, in the meaning of giving a start, make happen; otherwise it is used together with other terms that refer to the creative action, such as *takwḏn*, *ḵalq*, *inšá'*, *ÒanÝa*, *ta'lḏf*, and *tarkḏb*. This meaning is somewhere in the middle between philosophical and theological uses. When a source or entity, *Ýayn*, or when a substance, *Éawhar* is mentioned as the One who carries this action out, it is closer to philosophical terminology and interpretation. When it is God, or God, the Logos (especially in the case of incarnation), theological aspects are stronger. We need to mention that even disposition appears as a related meaning among these examples.

Remaining still at the same root, we need to examine another form, *Íada×Án*, i.e. contingency. When examining the term that refers to coming into being, *ÍudŪ×* we saw above the following citation: “If the *praedicatum* of what has always existed is natural transcendence and abstention from receiving accidents, then the same way, the *praedicatum* of what is found to receive the **contingence** of accidents is that its existence came into being and was created, necessarily.”⁴²⁶ So the same root can express contingency. The same idea is expressed when pre-eternity is contrasted with the receptivity for contingency, as we have seen above in the case of ‘coming into being.’⁴²⁷ The reverse idea is also given: something

⁴²² Ibid., p. 97,13

Ibid., p. 154,1

⁴²³ Ibid., p. 103,10

⁴²⁴ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ'il wa-'l-aÉwiba*, p. 152,18

⁴²⁵ Ibid., p.179,4-5

Ibid., p.180,1

⁴²⁶ Ibid., p. 98,10-12

فإن كان حكم ما لم يزل الاعتلاء والامتناع من قبول الأعراض طبيعياً، كذلك حكم ما ألفي لحدثان الأعراض قابلاً حدوث الكون والخلق اضطراراً
⁴²⁷ “If the *praedicatum* of what has always existed is natural transcendence and abstention from receiving accidents, then the same way, the *praedicatum* of what is found to receive the **contingence** of accidents is that its existence came into being and was created, necessarily” Ibid. p. 98,10-12

فإن كان حكم ما لم يزل الاعتلاء والامتناع من قبول الأعراض طبيعياً، كذلك حكم ما ألفي لحدثان الأعراض قابلاً حدوث الكون والخلق اضطراراً

ولم يكن أنجع الجريان والغيار في أعيانها إلا وهي محدثة مصنوعة

حواسهم لا تدرك صناعات فاعلاً، إلا محدثاً مصنوعاً

ذلك صفة من كان مؤلفاً محدثاً وله مؤلف محدث

بل ذلك من صفات الأجسام المحدثة المؤلفة المركبة

فأخبرونا عن هذا المسيح الذي هو في مسيحيته معنا واحد. أقديم هو أم محدث؟

كما أن ناراً قديمة وفتيلة محدثة يسيراً سراجاً واحداً

that cannot receive contingency must be pre-eternal.⁴²⁸ This term has a scarce appearance and the remaining examples⁴²⁹ express the same idea.

There is one form left that has the same roots, the active participle, *ĪĀdi*×, i.e. contingent, created (in time), coming into being. For the sake of brevity, only those examples are mentioned that can add any new implications to what was said above. E. g. there is an instance when *Yammār al-Ba'Or* uses *ĪĀdi*× instead of *mu'Ādi*×: “We would say: You have laid down that *hyle* is created, created in time, and it is the origin of elements. But what has the **Creator** of the *hyle* produced it of? Is it of another – earlier – matter? Or is it [made] of another, even earlier [matter]? [If so,] you can go on like this perpetually, without end.”⁴³⁰ We could see it in the meaning of ‘coming into being,’ paired with the creative action,⁴³¹ or, in the case of the Messiah, as we could see it above, it is also ‘coming into being,’ or ‘nascent.’⁴³² This unique appearance can not be a characteristic of a different Christian interpretation and usage, but it is really interesting, since *ĪĀdi*× in Muslim *kalām* and philosophy can only mean ‘created in time.’ This example offers a remarkable contrast, but further examples would be necessary to underpin it with a greater certainty. We have seen the following citation above when examining *Īada*×*a*, as ‘happen, come into being;’ accordingly, a participle in such a context does not stand for an attribute, but rather an appellative: something that happens, comes into being: “As for what occurs because of this unity as an arising [thing] between them, it will be related to the human, who was brought to these privileges, who was granted these gifts uniquely, and nothing can affect the Pre-eternal in this [unity], nor can anything **come into being** in Him.”⁴³³

There is no definition given for these terms by al-Kindī, but the term *ĪĀdi*× appears in his definition for the perceiving faculty, in the meaning of occurring, created in time.⁴³⁴ Al-Ēwārizmī gives more definitions for different forms and stems, but none of them is defined

⁴²⁸ Ibid., p. 98,1-2

وذلك إن حكم ما لم يظل قائماً أزلية الاعتلاء والامتناع من قبول الحدثان والاستحالة من حال إلى حال

⁴²⁹ Ibid., p. 99,7; 183,4

⁴³⁰ al-BANRĪ, *Yammār, Kitāb al-Mas'āl wa-'l-a'wāwiba*, p. 99,18-21

قلنا: فقد أقررت أن الهيولي محدثة مخلوقة وهي عنصر الطبايع، وحادثها من أي شيء جعل الهيولي؟ أمن مادة أخرى تقدمتها؟ أو كانت من متقدمة أيضاً قبلها، فتحيلون ذلك إلى السرمذ الذي لا انتهاء له.

⁴³¹ “and we have found that He has a creation that comes into being in time,” Ibid. p. 149,16-17

ثم وجدنا له خلقاً حادثاً أحدثه وكونه

⁴³² “The Messiah – as far as His being the Messiah is concerned – is **nascent**, he came into being after he had not been existant.” Ibid., p. 179,11

بل المسيح من جهة مسيحيته حادث حدث بعد أن لم يكن مسيحياً

See also Ibid., p. 179,17.

⁴³³ Ibid., p. 183,9-11

فأما ما عرض من هذا الاتحاد بحادث بينهما، فإنه يضاف إلى البشري المجتذب إلى هذه الفضائل، المنعم عليه بهذه المواهب خاصة، من غير أن يكون عرض الأزلي في ذلك عارض ولا حدث به حادث

⁴³⁴ al-KINDĪ, *Risāla fī Īud'ūd al-aṣyā' wa-rus'ūmihā*, p. 167.

القوة الحساسة - هي التي تشعر بالتغير الحادث في كل واحد من الأشياء، مثالها أن تشعر به من أعضاء البدن ومما كان خارجاً عن البدن

as a philosophical term; instead, they are introduced as *kalÁm* terms. The first one to be mentioned is *al-muÁda*×: “**Created in time** is what exists after not having existed.”⁴³⁵ Then, he introduces *ÁudÙ*× and *muÁdi*× together: “the seventh section in *uÒÙl al-dÐn* of which *mutakallims* speak: the first of them is the establishment that bodies are **created in time**, and the response to the *dahriyya*, who claim that the world is eternal; and the indication that the world has a **Creator in time**, and it is God (eulogy).”⁴³⁶ It is remarkable that even the subsection in which the author introduces these terms shows that the terminology is that of theology, and the concepts expressed by them belong to the field of theology, too. The meanings of the terms are the same that we could see at ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ. However, a difference can be discerned: al-ËwÁrizmÐ refers to the classical pair of oppositions, i.e. *ÁdÁ*× v.s. *qidam*, while ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ mostly contrasted the former with *azaliyya*. This difference may be due to the fact that al-ËwÁrizmÐ is a later author, by whose era terminology had already been more elaborated.

The Muslim theologian, Ibn FÙrak, defines two of these stems: *al-ÁÁdi*× and *al-muÁda*×: “The definition of what is/was created (in time): [it is] what exists (i.e. comes from) a preceding [thing, cause]. That which comes into being and that which is created in time are the same.”⁴³⁷ Even though ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ does not refer explicitly to causality, his approach is similar, since everything that is created in time needs a Creator, i.e. a cause. Ibn FÙrak’s definition is rather philosophical, while ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s one is theological. Ibn FÙrak also refers to *ÁÁdi*× in the definition of action, in a plural form. The context shows that it is used in the meaning of beings created in time.⁴³⁸ In this, he may also be compared to ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ. The same term appears in the definition of acquisition, in the meaning of ‘coming into being.’⁴³⁹ *ÁudÙ*×, as the action of coming into being, is present in his definitions for two different things,⁴⁴⁰ two contrary things,⁴⁴¹ repetition,⁴⁴² and

⁴³⁵ al-ËwÁrizmÐ, *MafÁtÐl al-ÝulÙm*, p. 83.

المحدث هو الكائن بعد أن لم يكن

⁴³⁶ al-ËwÁrizmÐ, *MafÁtÐl al-ÝulÙm*, p. 94.

الفصل السابع في أصول الدين التي يتكلم فيها المتكلمون

أولها القول في حدوث الأجسام والرد على الدهرية الذين يقولون بقدوم الدهر، والدلالة على أن للعالم محدثاً وهو الله تعالى

⁴³⁷ Ibn FØRAK, *KitÁb al-ÁudÙd fi ’l-uÒÙl*, pp. 5-41., p. 20

حد المحدث: ما وجد عن أول. الحادث والمحدث سواء

⁴³⁸ Ibid., p. 20

حد الفعل: المخترع الذات، وكونه لذلك لا يتعلق إلا بالرب سبحانه، المبتدع لسائر الحوادث والأعيان

⁴³⁹ Ibid., p. 20.

حد الكسب: هو حال وحكم يتصرف به القادر منا عند تعلق قدرته بالحادثة بالمقدور به

⁴⁴⁰ Ibid. p. 22.

حد الغيرين: ما جاز مغايرة أحد الشئيين للآخر إما بزمانين أو مكانين أو بحدوث أو تقدم أو وجود أحدهما مع عدم وجود الآخر

⁴⁴¹ Ibid. p. 22.

حد الضدين: ما يتناقبان في المحل الواحد في الزمن الواحد من جهة الحدوث، وقد يكونان مثلين أو مختلفين

⁴⁴² Ibid. p. 22.

(Ever)lasting.⁴⁴³ He also refers to it as contrasted to existence and non-existence, as it can be understood from the context, as coming into being.⁴⁴⁴ In all these, the interpretation of ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ is paralleled.

Ibn SÐnÁ dedicates a definition on its own for *ilÁ*×; but differentiates between a kind that happens in time and another kind which has no relation to time. The kind related to time is making one exist after not having existed in time; the other is rather concentrating on the emanation of existence without respect to time.⁴⁴⁵ It is the first meaning that is usually represented in ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ's book. But if we think of what he in particular, and all Christian authors in general write on the emanation of existence out of time (either in the case of the Son who has always been born; or the Spirit), it shows some similarity. It is even possible that Christian understanding of the emanation of existence might have influenced Muslim thought in this field.

As for al-ÀmidÐ's *al-MubÐn*, the terms examined above do not appear among his definitions, except for the active participial form of the first stem. On the basis of this, we can understand what an infinitive or a IVth stem form could mean for him. "As for what is **created in time/comes into being**: this [name] is given to express what needs a cause, even if it has not been preceded by non-existence, like the world. This name is also given to what is preceded in its existence and preceded by non-existence. Thus if the world is called eternal by them, it is an expression for its not having been preceded by non-existence, and if it is called **coming into being/created in time**, it is an expression for its need for a cause for its existence."⁴⁴⁶ On the basis of al-ÀmidÐ's defining *ÍÁdi*× as needing a cause for its existence, *ilÁ*× could probably be understood as the action of that cause: i.e. causing something to come into being, bringing into being. In this respect, al-ÀmidÐ's conception is consenting with ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ's approach. However, al-ÀmidÐ contrasts eternal to created in time, which indicates either that he relies on a different tradition from that of ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, or that by his time the delineation of terminologies had reached a more developed stage.

حد الإعادة: هو الحدوث بعد وجود كان قد تقدم وتخلله عدم بينهما

⁴⁴³ Ibid. p. 22.

حد الباقي: هو الكائن بغير حدوث

⁴⁴⁴ Ibid. p. 35.

⁴⁴⁵ Ibn SĪNĀ, *Kitāb al-Īudūd*, pp. 43-44.

الإحداث يقال على وجهين أحدهما زمني والآخر غير زمني ومعنى الإحداث الزمني إيجاد شيء بعد أن لم يكن له وجود في زمان سابق ومعنى الإحداث الغير الزمني هو إفادة الشيء وجوداً وليس ... في ذاته ذلك الوجود لا بحسب زمان دون زمان بل في كل زمان كلا الأمرين

⁴⁴⁶ al-ÀMIDĪ, S., *al-MubÐn fÐ šarĪ maÝĀnÐ alfĀŪ al-ĪukamĀ' wa-'l-mutakallimÐn*, p. 118.

وأما الحادث: فقد يطلق ويراد به ما يفترق إلى العلة وإن كان غير مسبوق بالعدم؛ كالعالم. وعلى ما لوجوده أول وهو مسبوق بالعدم. فعلى هذا: العالم إن سمي عندهم قديماً فاعتبار أنه غير مسبوق بالعدم، وإن سمي حادثاً فاعتبار أنه مفترق إلى العلة في وجوده.

Al-Éur°ÁnÐ's *al-TaÝrÐfÁt* follows the alphabetical order in introducing terms and definitions, so we will follow this order, too, in his case. The first one to appear is the infinitive of the IVth stem, *iġdÁ×*, i.e. the production of something that has the anteriority in time.⁴⁴⁷ Let us also remember that the same concept was introduced (in a contrasting way) in his definition for *ibdÁÝ*, too: while *ibdÁÝ* had no anteriority of time and matter, *iġdÁ×* was introduced as having the anteriority of time.⁴⁴⁸ As for *ÎÁdi×*, its definition is as follows: "What **comes into being** is preceded by non-existence, and it is called a **coming into being** in time. [The term may also] express a **coming into being** that needs another [i.e. a cause], and it is called an existential **coming into being**."⁴⁴⁹ A really similar interpretation is expressed in al-Éur°ÁnÐ's definition for coming into being:

"**Coming into being** is an expression for the existence of an existent [thing] after its nonexistence. The existential coming into being means that the existent needs another [thing, cause] for its existence. **Coming into being** in time means that a thing is preceded by nonexistence in a temporal sense. The first one is absolutely more general than the second one."⁴⁵⁰

We can see that later Muslim use is more specific than early Greek usage as it appears at Church Fathers. ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ's interpretation already includes those two meanings that can be discerned at later Muslim thinkers: the existence of a thing after its nonexistence, in a temporal extension, i.e. *al-ġudÙ× al-zamÁnÐ*; and contingency: a being's existence after not having existed, in an ontological or essential extension, which does not necessarily involve time, i.e. *al-ġudÙ× al-ÆÁtÐ*. His usage also shows parallels with *mutakallims*' usage of 'beginning in time' as a basis for proving the existence of God. So in this case it is quite probable that Christian authors in general, and ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ in particular, influenced later Muslim interpretations; or at least, they represent a transition between the two.

4. *İtirÁÝ* – creation, invention

There is no Greek equivalent for *İtirÁÝ* (creation, invention) to the best of my knowledge. It is a scarcely used term even by ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ. We have seen it among

⁴⁴⁷ al-ÉURÉÀNĪ, A. i. M., *KitÁb al-TaÝrÐfÁt*, p. 22.

⁴⁴⁸ Ibid. p. 18.

⁴⁴⁹ al-ÉURÉÀNĪ, A. i. M., *KitÁb al-TaÝrÐfÁt*, p. 93.

⁴⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 95.

الإحداث إيجاد شيء مسبوق بالزمان
الحادث ما يكون مسبوقاً بالعدم، ويسمى حدوثاً زمانياً، وقد يعبر عن الحدوث بالحاجة إلى الغير، ويسمى حدوثاً ذاتياً
الحدوث عبارة عن وجود الشيء بعد عدمه. (و) الحدوث الذاتي هو كون الشيء مفتقراً في وجوده إلى الغير. (و) الحدوث الزماني هو كون الشيء مسبوقاً بالعدم سبباً زمانياً، والأول أعم مطلقاً من الثاني

the definitions of intellect, *Ýaql*, in a participial form: “[the other cause] is psychical, spiritual, namely the intellect, which is the faculty of the *anima*/soul that **creates** these subtle things, which we can see in the making of the bodies, the moulding of forms, the composition of (bodily) structures, and similar making actions that can be carried out by the wisdom of the *anima* and the reflexion of the intellect.”⁴⁵¹ It is to be noted, that the root is used together with *ÒanÝa*, *taÒwÐr*, *ta'lÐf*, i.e. with a term referring to the creative action and with others that express its modality. As a verb, we may see it as follows: “And also, if you investigated the names and attributes by which the servants named and described their Lord, you would find that all of them are produced and inspired by the Books of God that had been sent down, and in which He had informed them on His names and attributes He had chosen for Himself; and it was not the people who had **invented** them on their own.”⁴⁵² As it can be seen, ‘creation *ex nihilo*’ is somewhat modified in this context. ‘*Ex nihilo*’ can be accepted, but instead of creation, it is rather invention, making up.

Among the Muslim authors examined here, it is only Ibn FÙrak who mentions the term. His definition for action was already referred to above. The same definition contains the current term in participial form, and the context shows that it means ‘invented/started *ex nihilo*.’ So Ibn FÙrak seems to share ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s interpretation in this case.⁴⁵³ As a conclusion we may say, that apparently ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ used this word as a term before its having been defined as an idiom of a special connotation by Muslim authors.

5. *Ēalq*⁴⁵⁴ - creation

Origination, creation, i.e. *Īalq* corresponds to the *ποιεῖν* of Greek philosophical texts.⁴⁵⁵ The same term is widely used in Greek Patristic literature, too. Lampe enumerates several meanings, but the most important ones are referring to God’s creation. As for Islamic use, we know that God is called *ĒÁliq* by virtue of His creation (*Īalq*) of man, made of clay.⁴⁵⁶

⁴⁵¹ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aĒwiba*, p. 157,16-19

الأخرى نفسانية روحانية أعني العقل الذي هو قوة النفس **المخترع** هذه اللطائف التي نرى من صنعة الاجرام وتصوير الأشكال وتأليف البنين ونحو ذلك من الصناعات المقدور عليها بحكمة النفس وروية العقل

⁴⁵² al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aĒwiba*, p. 167,10-13.

كما أنك لو فحصت عن الأسماء والصفات التي سمى ووصف بها العباد ربهم، لوجدتها إنما أنتجت واستوحيت جميعها من كتب الله المنزلة التي فيها أخبرهم بما اختار من أسمائه وصفاته لنفسه لا أن الناس اخترعوا لها من تلقاء أنفسهم

⁴⁵³ Ibn FØRAK, *KitÁb al-ĪudÙd fi ’l-uÒÙl*, p. 20.

حد الفعل: **المخترع** الذات، وكونه لذلك لا يتعلق إلا بالرب سبحانه، المبتدع لسائر الحوادث والأعيان

⁴⁵⁴ HAYEK does not provide a translation for the term.

⁴⁵⁵ AFNAN, M. S., *A Philosophical Lexicon in Persian and Arabic*, p. 92.

⁴⁵⁶ C.f. *SÙrat al-RaĀmÁn*, 55,14:

One of the central themes in the Qur'Ān is that reflection upon creation (*ġalq*) ratifies God's peerless authority to command and his unique prerogative to be worshipped. This indicates that the proper response to him is submission to his will.⁴⁵⁷ Let us see, what position Christian usage takes between the two.

1. ÝammĀr al-BaŖrĒ uses the term *ġalq* in various contexts in the meaning of creation, but whether it is to be understood *ex nihilo* or creation out of pre-existing matter is not clear. The first appearance would leave the question open: "We would say: what is your argument against who denies that the Creator had matter out of which he formed something? And if he said: if He had no possibility to **create** the substances *ex nihilo* in His *potency* and in the eternity of His pre-eternity, then He could only bring them into being from His own nature and produce them from the essence of His own substance."⁴⁵⁸ It is remarkable that creation *ex nihilo* is referred to by adding the expression *lĀ min šay'*; and it is contrasted with the word *iftaÝala*. The explicit appearance of *lĀ min šay'* shows that the lack of some kind of anteriority (i.e. pre-existing material) is not necessarily included in the connotation of the term. The second appearance would indicate the *ex nihilo* interpretation: "we would negate this, since we are sure that the One who had the potency to **create** His creations *ex nihilo*, can not be ignorant or impotent to create His creatures completely, entirely – for intelligible and useful reasons."⁴⁵⁹ In this sentence no anteriority of matter can be presumed. Another example introduces the creation of human *anima*, soul, i.e. *nafs*; which is referred to by the same term, *ġalq*, but it is explicitly expressed that soul is not created of something else (e.g. pre-existing matter):

"As we know of the matter, out of which your body was generated as a body, it came from the solidity of your father; then, out of the blister a body, limbs and members were formed. When the **creation** of the body and its limbs had been complete, a living soul was **created** in it, not of the solidity of your father, ... and your soul was not bred by your father and not of the elements of the blister."⁴⁶⁰

and: GARDET, L., *IbdĀÝ*, In.: IE, Second edition, Vol. III., p. 663.

⁴⁵⁷ PETERSON, D. C., *Creation*, In: EQ, Leiden, Brill, 2005. Vol. I., pp. 472-80, p. 472.

⁴⁵⁸ al-BAŖRĒ, ÝammĀr, *KitĀb al-MasĀ'il wa-'l-aĒwiba*, p. 98,5-8

فقلنا: فما حجتكم على من أنكر أن يكون لدي الخالق مادة افتعل منها شيئاً؟ فقال: بل إذا لم يكن في قدرته وقدم أزليته إمكان **لخلق** الجواهر لا من شيء، فإنما أنشأها من طباع نفسه وأنتجها من ذات جوهره

⁴⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 102,10-12

قلنا: أنكرنا ذلك من حيث أيقنا بأن الذي قدر بقدرته أن يخلق الخلائق لا من شيء قدير أن لا يكون جهل أم عجز عن أن يخلق خلانقه تامة كاملة لأسباب معقولة نافعة

⁴⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 193,13-16

كما قد نعلم من المادة التي كون بدنك منها بدنأ، وإنما كانت من صلب أبيك، ثم صور من النطفة بدنأ وجوارح وأوصال. حتى إذا كملت **خلفة** البدن وجوارحه **خلقت** فيه من بعد ذلك نفس حية لا من صلب أبيك، ... ونفسك لم يلدأ أبوك ولا من طباع نطفته

For the first instance in this example, the creation of the body is introduced as the action of its generation and formation of pre-existing matter, and at the same time, *Īalq* is used in a parallel way with *takwĒn* and *taŌwĒr*. When *Īalq* is used for the second time, it refers to the creation of the soul, which is carried out of no pre-existing matter. So we may see that *Īalq* can refer to a creative action, no matter what is created (a “thing”, i.e. an existent being whatsoever, a human body or a soul). Let us remember a parallel we’ve seen in the chapter on terms of bodily connotations. Our example of the *ĪadĒ*× on the sequence of man’s creation can be cited here again.⁴⁶¹ We can not say that there is a direct relationship between the *ĪadĒ*× and ÝAmmÁr al-BaŌrĒ’s example, but we need to remember that the tradition referred to may be found in al-BulÁrĒ’s and Muslim’s *ŌalÁĒs*, al-TirmiĒĒ’s *Sunan*, etc., which implies that this tradition had been widely known and accepted by the time of ÝAmmÁr al-BaŌrĒ. He might have intended to use an imagery known and accepted by Muslims. The sequence of creation is referred to by the same term: *Īalq*, in both instances. Another example for *Īalq* referring to production out of pre-existing matter – though producing a large amount out of a small quantity – is a reference to an action mentioned in the New Testament: “It is clear that the one whose nature was overcome by the power of hunger, is not the essence which out of four loaves of bread **created** [a quantity] that satisfied the hungry stomachs of thousands. Both things are related of the One Messiah.”⁴⁶² This example is somewhere in the middle: since there is pre-existent matter (four loaves of bread), but the outcome is much more than that, there is addition and multiplication in the action of *Īalq*. ÝAmmÁr al-BaŌrĒ does not seem to have used the term in a firm, strictly limited sense, as far as *ex nihilo* is concerned, just only as a term that refers to a kind of creative action.

2. Another group of examples show the term *Īalq* in a context where the number of creators is discussed. E.g. the alleged opponent may ask: “What do you negate to be the **creation** of two who are in agreement and cooperate, and not of two contraries that are in opposition. Both could have **created** kinds of creatures that are beneficent for

⁴⁶¹ al-NAWAWĪ, *Forty Hadith*, translated by IBRAHIM, E. – JOHNSON-DAVIES, D., Damascus, DÁr al-Qur’Án al-KarĒm, 1977, p. 37. “The creation of each of you is completed in his mother’s womb for forty days in the form of a drop, then he becomes a clot of blood for the same interval, then a morsel of flesh for the same period, then there is sent to him the angel who blows his soul into him.” C.f.

إِنَّ أَحَدَكُمْ يُجْمَعُ خَلْقُهُ فِي بَطْنِ أُمِّهِ أَرْبَعِينَ يَوْمًا ثُمَّ يَكُونُ عَلَقَةً مِثْلَ ذَلِكَ ثُمَّ يَكُونُ مُضْغَةً مِثْلَ ذَلِكَ ثُمَّ يَنْبَعُثُ اللَّهُ مَلَكًا فَيُؤَمِّرُ بِأَرْبَعِ كَلِمَاتٍ وَيُقَالُ لَهُ اكْتُبْ عَمَلَهُ وَرِزْقَهُ وَأَجَلَهُ وَشَقِيٌّ أَوْ سَعِيدٌ ثُمَّ يَنْفَخُ فِيهِ الرُّوحَ ...

⁴⁶² al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aĒwiba*, p. 210,5-7

وهذا واضح أن الذي غلب سلطان الجوع على طباعه ليس بالذات التي خلقت من أربع أرغفة ما أشبع به بطون ألوف جائعة: وكلا الأمرين قبلا في المسيح الواحد

the world and those who live in it, and this way they [could have] cooperated in a single, harmonizing management/arrangement.”⁴⁶³ In this approach, creation would not be a unique, absolute action; it could belong to more than one actor. According to this idea creation would be followed by arrangement or management, i.e. *tadbDr*, which is also an important divine action, in close relation to creation. This is refuted, e.g. by the following argument: “Or how could the agreement of this **creation** and the perfection of this government have come [into being] by the will of two impotent, weak endeavurers?”⁴⁶⁴ The word *Īalq* may refer to the created beings and the action of the creation itself, too. We get to know that creation is in close connection with its outcome: i.e. harmony; it is a starting point of a perfect government; and there is also a reference made to its actor: the will of (one or more – as it is under discussion in this example –) endeavurers. The demonstration of the unity of the One who carries creation out is essential, since later on all the persons of the Trinity are referred to as Creators. It is thus a point of fundamental importance that needs to be proven before moving forward to the discussion of the number of *hypostases*.

There are examples e.g. on the basis of the New Testament: “John says: the Word has always been existent, and the Word has always been with God, and God has always been the Word, and it has always been with God. And everything was **created** by Him, and without Him nothing that later existed could have been generated.”⁴⁶⁵ Here the Word is an actor or a means in creation, but at the same time He is in unity with God, the creator. Another point which is worthy of attention is that *Īalq* and *takwDn* are used as synonyms. The Son’s participation in creation seems more active on the basis of the next example: “He says I am the Son of God, and I only do the acts of my Father and I **create** as my Father does.”⁴⁶⁶ Basically the same saying is repeated a bit later in the text,⁴⁶⁷ which indicates that this teaching is of great importance. The unity of the creative action serves to underline the unity of the creative *hypostases*, as well.

⁴⁶³ Ibid., p. 102,6-8

فما الذي أنكرتم أن يكون من **خلق** إثنين متوافقين متعاونين لا متضادين متقارمين، وكل واحد منها **خلق** من أنواع الخلاق ما فيه صلاح العالم وأهله؛ وكذلك تعاوننا في تدبير واحد متفق

⁴⁶⁴ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aĒwiba*, p. 103,19-21

أو كيف تأتي اتفاق هذا **الخلق** وإحكام هذه سياسة بمشيئة متكلفين عاجزين ضعيفين

⁴⁶⁵ Ibid. p. 208,11-12

وقال يوحنا: لم يزل كان الكلمة، والكلمة كان عند الله والله هو الكلمة هذا لم يزل لدى الله. وكل به خلق ودونه لم يكون شيء مما كان

⁴⁶⁶ Ibid. p. 212,16-17

ويقول إني ابن الله وإنما أعمل أعمال أبي، أخلق كما يخلق أبي

⁴⁶⁷ Ibid. p. 252,18-19

فقال إني أفعل كما يفعل أبي وأخلق كما يخلق أبي

Finally, let us see examples that indicate that all the three persons are one in their creation. In the first, lengthy case the author demonstrates that the three *hypostases* are all creators, but they should not be counted as three, since their will for creation is one.⁴⁶⁸ Again, unity in the action of creation proves the unity of persons and vice versa. In this case, the author uses active participial forms for Creator: *ĒĀliq*, *ÑĀniŸ*, and *BĀri*'. Accordingly, just as the verbal nouns, the corresponding verbs that refer to the creative action are to be concerned synonymous. We need to notice that *BĀri*' also offers Biblical parallels, given that this term is also used in the Old Testament to denote Creator.⁴⁶⁹ The other example is really similar in form and content,⁴⁷⁰ the three participles appear as synonyms, and two of the forms appear as synonymous verbs, too (*Īalq*, *ÒanŸa*). What makes the persons unified in the creative action is the one will (*irĀda* and *mašD'a*); out of which and out of the one power (*sulŌĀn*) the whole creation was generated. Creation, *Īalq* and generation, *takwDn* are used as synonyms. *Ēalq* and *takwDn* are then closely related to *tadbDr*, too, and in the end of this demonstration the connection between *Īalq* and *irĀda* is accentuated.

3. A third group of examples can show that the created world is a sign of the existence of the Creator, e.g.: "he will be told: yes, you can find that the created world is created, and [from this] you will know, that it has a sole Creator who **created** it without process, effort, tiredness, and movement."⁴⁷¹ The way of gaining such knowledge is not specified here, but we have seen elsewhere (e.g. in the discussion of *ŸaqI*) that the author uses sign-inference in such cases. It is to note that all forms: the created world, its attribute: 'created,' the Creator, and the verb create are all derived from the same stems.
4. A fourth group of examples shows God's creation to have a given outcome: e.g. He **created** humankind in a structure that necessarily needs food and drink for

⁴⁶⁸ Ibid. p. 253,6-12

فأما قولك: فكيف يكون خالق وخالق وخالق ثلاثة خالقين، فلعمري إن لو عدناها كما وصفت خالقاً وخالقاً وخالقاً لكانت لا محالة ثلاثة خالقين. فأما إن كنا نسمي كل واحد منها خالقاً صانعاً بارياً لا دون صاحبيه، لأنها تخلق بهوى واحد وإرادة واحدة، فليس يلزمنا أن نسميها خالقاً وخالقاً وخالقاً تصير في الجملة لا محالة ثلاثة خالقين. إنما كان يلزمنا أن نعدّها خالقاً وخالقاً وخالقاً تصير في الجملة ثلاثة خالقين، لو قلنا إن كل واحد منها بقوة وإرادة منه وله خاصة دون صاحبيه

⁴⁶⁹ C.f. e.g. FREYTAG, G. *Lexicon arabico-latinum*, I., Beirut, Librairie du Liban, 1975, pp.101-102., and GESENIUS, W., *Handwörterbuch über das Alte Testament*, Berlin, Göttingen, Heidelberg, Springer-Verlag, 1962., pp. 113-114.

⁴⁷⁰ Ibid. p. 253,20-254,4

نقول إن الأب جل ثناؤه خالق صانع بارئ والابن خالق صانع بارئ وروح القدس خالق صانع بارئ، وليست ثلاثة صانعين ولا هي في العدد أيضاً خالق وخالق وخالق، وإن كان كل واحد منها إذا أنت أفردته بخاصته سميته خالقاً بارياً صانعاً. وذلك أن جميعها يخلق ويصنع بإرادة واحدة ومشينة واحدة. وعن تلك الإرادة الواحدة والمشينة الواحدة والسلطان الواحد تكونت جملة الخليقة، لا أن كل واحد من ثلاثة يخلق ويصنع ويدير بإرادته ومشينته منه وله دون صاحبه. بل إرادة الأب وخالقه هي إرادة الابن وخالقه وإرادة الروح وخالقه

⁴⁷¹ Ibid. p. 214,10-11

بل يقال له نعم قد تجد خلقاً مخلوقاً وتعلم أن له خالقاً واحداً خلقه من لا علاج ولا كلفة ولا تعب ولا حركة

subsistence;⁴⁷² He **created** them to feel pain,⁴⁷³ or in a bodily form that can be affected,⁴⁷⁴ etc. It is not specified how creation was carried out: its being *ex nihilo* or not is not emphasized in such cases.

5. In the fifth group we can mention the objects of creation. Obviously, everything that exists is the object, the outcome of creation, but there are some instances where the objects are more explicitly named. It can be the (physical) bodies of existents,⁴⁷⁵ the world and what is in it, and human bodies combined with spirits,⁴⁷⁶ etc.
6. As a sixth group, we could mention contexts where the cause or the motivation for creation is discussed. We get to know that it is grace, generosity and beneficence;⁴⁷⁷ sometimes only generosity is mentioned.⁴⁷⁸ It is many times emphasized that creation is a good deed and is not due to a need of the Creator,⁴⁷⁹ (c.f. the example cited at *ibtidÁÝ* too, where deliberate creation is contrasted to force). A uniquely important point for Christian teaching is to be added here: even the creation of the Messiah is a grace.⁴⁸⁰ It is not the nature of God that forced Him to create.⁴⁸¹
7. A seventh group deals with the means of creation, which is specified as his potency, more specifically the potency of Wisdom.⁴⁸² From another approach, it can be said that He created by His Word and Spirit.⁴⁸³ Yet from another approach, creation by God's hands is to be discussed, and the result is that it has to be understood

⁴⁷² Ibid. p. 101,6-7

خلقهم على هذه بنية المضطرة إلى ما يقيهما من الطعام والشراب ...

⁴⁷³ Ibid. p. 107,6-8

خلقهم ألمين متوجعين مضرورين مأوفين ... ولم يخلقهم كاملين غير ألمين مأوفين ولا مانتين؟

⁴⁷⁴ Ibid. p. 107,10

خلقهم على هذه الهيئة القابلة للإيثار

⁴⁷⁵ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ'il wa-'l-aÊwiba*, p. 103,13

خلق الأجسام

⁴⁷⁶ Ibid. p. 120,11-12

كما أنا إذا علمنا ضرورة أن الله خلق الدنيا وما فيها وخلق أبداننا وركب فيها أرواحاً

⁴⁷⁷ e.g. 104,14

خلق هذه الخلائق تفضلاً وجوداً وإنعاماً

⁴⁷⁸ e.g. Ibid., p. 105,6

ثم خلقهم فيها وجاد بها عليهم

⁴⁷⁹ e.g. Ibid., p. 106,7-8

خلقهم بنعمته وجوده لا حاجة كانت به إليهم

⁴⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 255,7-8

خلقهم واجتذبهم إلى فضائل نعمه، وهي نعمة الخلق بالمسيح

⁴⁸¹ e.g. Ibid., p. 151,18

لا ليسد بها حاجة نفسه أو يقيم بها شأن طباعه

⁴⁸² Ibid., p. 132,20-133,2

ونعلم أنه جل ثناؤه إنما لطف بخلق هذه الطبائع وتأليف هذه الجواهر وتقدير هذه الأشكال وتدبير هذه الأمور بحكمته التي هي قدرة لا بقدرة سوى حكمته

⁴⁸³ Ibid., p. 153,1

خلق الخلق بكلمته وروحه

metaphorically.⁴⁸⁴ It is an issue of importance in Muslim theological discourses as well, and with such argumentation, the author expresses that he shares the rejection of anthropomorphism. We may also mention in this group of examples the modality of creation: as we have seen, it was carried out without effort, movement, etc.⁴⁸⁵

8. A rare example, but parallel to Muslim usage: *Īalq* is used to express the “first” and the “second” creation, which is resurrection.⁴⁸⁶
9. Finally, let us remember that *Īalq* is frequently used together with other words referring to the creative action, e.g., *inšÁ’*, *ĪudŪ×*, *ibtidÁ’* and *ÒanÝa*.⁴⁸⁷ And scarcely though, but *bara’* is also used.⁴⁸⁸ Parallels can also be mentioned when the past participle, *maĪŪq* is used.⁴⁸⁹ And the passive participle, as an adjective, appears frequently following words like created beings (*ĪalÁ’iq*),⁴⁹⁰ animals,⁴⁹¹ substances,⁴⁹² the human part of the Messiah,⁴⁹³ bodies,⁴⁹⁴ etc. It can also be used as an appellative, meaning ‘created being(s),’⁴⁹⁵ created beings with the meaning of humanity,⁴⁹⁶ the human part of the Messiah.⁴⁹⁷

We could see that the meanings seen in Greek Patristic usage are recurring in ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s usage, and in a more differentiated way. As for the Muslim counterparts, al-KindĪ does not give a definition for this term. He uses its passive participle though, as an appellative two times: once in the definition of *istiÝmÁl*, use, and once in the definition of the will of a created being, *irÁdat al-maĪŪq*. As for the first one: “Use has its cause in will, and it can be the cause of other suggestions. It is the change, and it follows of all these causes that are the Creator’s action. This is why we say that the Creator (eulogy) turned His **created beings** favourable for one another, reproducing one another, and moving by one

⁴⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 161,14-16

وإن كان الله عز جلاله قد ذكر في بعض كتبه أنه خلق خلقاً أو فعل فعلاً بيده أم بذراعه، فإنك إذا تبينت قوله فوجدته يعني بذراعه وبيده أمره ونهيه وإرادته المتولين عن كلمته وروحه

⁴⁸⁵ C.f. Ibid., p. 214,12-14.

⁴⁸⁶ E.g. Ibid., p. 109,10-11

أو ليس إذ كان جل توحي خلقهم على هذه البنية السقيمة كمال سرورهم بها بما أزمع به من خلقهم بعدها على بنية كاملة

⁴⁸⁷ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aĒwiba*, p. 106,9-10

ولا شك أن قد كان لم يزل بجوده مزماً أن يخلق وقتاً فينشئ فيه خلقهم، ولم يكن ليتمكن ذلك إلا بحدوث فعل وابتداء صنعة

⁴⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 159,18

أو إلى أي شيء مما خلق وبرأ

⁴⁸⁹ E.g. Ibid., p. 95,7: *maĪŪq* + *ÒanÝa*; Ibid., p. 97,10: *maĪŪq* + *mukawwan*; Ibid., p. 99,11, 12, 18: *maĪŪq* + *muĪda×*; Ibid., p. 153,20: *maĪŪq* + *maÒnŪÝ*;

⁴⁹⁰ E.g. Ibid. p. 121,1

⁴⁹¹ E.g. Ibid. p. 166,11

⁴⁹² E.g. Ibid. p. 170,11

⁴⁹³ E.g. Ibid. p. 180,5

⁴⁹⁴ E.g. Ibid. p. 213,16

⁴⁹⁵ E.g. Ibid. p. 166,1, 9

⁴⁹⁶ E.g. Ibid. p. 166,15

⁴⁹⁷ E.g. Ibid. p. 192,13

another.”⁴⁹⁸ As for the second one: “The will of a **created being**: is a faculty of the soul, which leans towards use by a motivation which made it lean to it.”⁴⁹⁹ The meaning cannot be further distinguished, we cannot decide whether this production is in time or with/out the anteriority of matter, but it is clear that the creator, *BÁri*’ produced these beings. On the basis of these examples, *lálq* is the creative action of the Creator.

Among the Muslim books of definitions, Ibn SĎnÁ’s is the first to give a definition for the term: “**Creation** is a common name. It is used to refer to the emanation of existence in whatever way it may happen/as it is. It is also used to refer to the emanation of existence that comes into being from matter and form – in whatever way it is. It is used to refer to the second meaning if there is no preceding existence of any kind in *potentia*, like the correlation of matter and form in existence.”⁵⁰⁰ His approach is clearly philosophical, but the contents of the definitions are reflected in ÝAmmÁr al-BaÖrĎ’s use, too.

The Muslim theologian al-Éur°ÁnĎ does not dedicate an entry on its own for the definition of this term and concept. This is remarkable, since the philosopher (Ibn SĎnÁ) dedicates a definition for it while the theologian does not. But as we have seen above, he introduces *lálq* by contrasting it to *ibdÁÝ*.

“In the terminology of philosophers, *ibdÁÝ* and *ibtidÁÝ* mean the creation of a thing not preceded by matter nor time, such as the intellects. *IbdÁÝ* and *ibtidÁÝ* oppose *takwĎn*, i.e. generation, which means creation preceded by matter. Also, *ibdÁÝ* and *ibtidÁÝ* oppose *iĎdÁ×*, creation in time which is preceded by time.” ... ‘Direct creation’ is said to [be] the foundation of an existent [thing] out of nothing, while **creation** is the foundation of an existent [thing] from another. God (eulogy) said: “the (‘direct’) Creator of the heavens and the earth” (Cow, 117). And also: “the **creation** of man” (Palm, 4). So ‘direct creation’ is more general than creation, this is why He said “the (‘direct’) Creator of the heavens and the earth” and “the creation of man,” and he didn’t say the ‘direct creation’ of man.”⁵⁰¹

⁴⁹⁸ al-KINDĬ, *RisÁla fĎ ĨudĎd al-ašyÁ’ wa-rusĎmihÁ*, p. 175.

الاستعمال - علته الإرادة، وقد يمكن أن يكون علّة لخطرات أخر، وهو الدور، يلزم جميع هذه العلل التي هي فعل الباري، ولذلك نقول إن الباري عز وجل صير مخلوقاته بعضها سوانح لبعض، وبعضها مستخرجة لبعض، وبعضها متحركة ببعض

⁴⁹⁹ Ibid. p. 175.

إرادة المخلوق - هي قوة نفسانية تميل نحو الاستعمال عن ساحة، أمالت إلى ذلك

⁵⁰⁰ Ibn SĬNÁ, *KitÁb al-ĨudĎd*, p. 43.

الخلق اسم مشترك فيقال خلق لإفادة وجود كيف كان ويقال خلق لإفادة وجود حاصل عن مادة وصورة كيف كان ويقال خلق لهذا المعنى الثاني بعد أن يكون لم يتقدمه وجود ما بالقوة كتلازم المادة والصورة في الوجود

⁵⁰¹ al-ÉURÉÀNĬ, *KitÁb al-TaÝrĎfÁt*, p. 18.

الإبداع والابتداع (أيضاً)، (في اصطلاح الحكماء) هو إيجاد شيء غير مسبوق بمادة ولا زمان، كالعقول، وهو يقابل التكوين، لكونه مسبوقاً بالمادة، ويقابل الأحداث لكونه مسبوقاً بالزمان،...

والإبداع (هو) إيجاد الشيء من لا شيء. وقيل الإبداع تأسيس الشيء عن شيء، والخلق إيجاد شيء من شيء. قال الله تعالى: "يديع السموات والأرض" (البقرة/117) وقال: "خلق الإنسان" (النحل/4)، والإبداع أعم من الخلق، ولذا قال: "يديع السموات والأرض"، وقال: "خلق الإنسان" ولم يقل يديع الإنسان

We could see that *Īalq* can be carried out of another existent [thing], so, according to al-Ēur°ĀnĎ, this is not the *ex nihilo* kind of creation. This interpretation can be found at ÝAmmĀr al-BaÒrĎ, but as we saw, he is not as consistent in its usage as the Muslim author. ÝAmmĀr al-BaÒrĎ represents the early formation of terminology, while by al-Ēur°ĀnĎ' s time terms had already been more delineated.

Concluding we may say that ÝAmmĀr al-BaÒrĎ' s usage of this term is more differentiated than the meaning of its hypothetical Greek correspondent, ποιεῖν. However, he is not consistent in his use of it, since sometimes *ex nihilo* creation may be understood under it, sometimes a kind of creation that has an anteriority of matter. Given that his age is a period when the terminologies of theology and philosophy were on their way to separation, this kind of inconsistency is not surprising. What is more unexpected is that though *Īalq* is a Qur'Ānic term, it appears relatively late in Muslim usage if compared with Christian one. ÝAmmĀr al-BaÒrĎ' s usage could be classified into nine main subdivisions on the basis of co-occurrences with other terms, themes, and meanings. As for the themes mentioned on the basis of ÝAmmĀr al-BaÒrĎ' s examples, we may see that Muslim usage can be paralleled to his interpretation where *Īalq* is not considered to be *ex nihilo*. The question of the number of creators is not raised in the Muslim works examined here, but it is not startling: if *tawĪĎd* is endorsed it is not acceptable to discuss the number of creators. As for ÝAmmĀr al-BaÒrĎ, his work is an apology that is to answer objections on the basis of the same *tawĪĎd*. He needs to establish the unity of the Creator, since he needs to establish the unity of the Trinity, as well. The third theme around which ÝAmmĀr al-BaÒrĎ' s examples could be grouped is the idea that the created world is a reflection, a sign, or a proof of the existence of the Creator. Even if not in the books of definitions, but we have seen that it is an important idea in Muslim thought – as it was referred to above, in the preliminary lines of this subsection, on the basis of Gardet. In this case, we may think of a common and parallel line of the development of thought. As for the objects of creation and the given outcome that could be discerned on them, these details are not given in Muslim definitions, but it is reasonable, since a definition needs to say that *Īalq* is production and the outcome is an existent (thing), which is actually always included in definitions.

ÝAmmĀr al-BaÒrĎ' s argumentation that creation is *iĪsĀn, niÝma, tafaĀĀul, ĒUĎ*: i.e. beneficence, grace, divine gift, and generosity is remarkable. Creation as goodness cannot be found in Muslim books of definition, and it is rather a marginal matter in the manuals of Muslim theology. Although the Qur'Ān itself enumerates creation as goodness in the Chapter *al-RaĪmĀn* for instance, Muslim theologians were interested more in *Īalq* as *ÒunÝ*, i.e.

creation as making. It may rather be contrasted with what was referred to above, on the basis of Gardet, that creation ratifies God's authority to command and his prerogative to be worshipped. As for ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ's examples mentioning the means of creation, this idea is not reflected among definitions by Muslim authors either. ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ's idea of "first" and "second" creation may rather be paralleled to Muslim usage of *ibtidÁ'* and *ibdÁÝ*; it is not the word *Ìalq* which is used by Muslim thinkers to refer to this contrast. As for the synonyms in ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ's text that appear alongside the term *Ìalq*, we have seen instances where they appear in Muslim definitions, too, though, given that definition needs to clarify the accurate use of a term, these terms are used in order to contrast them with *Ìalq*, not as synonyms. We need to remark, finally, that ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ's differentiated use of the term already in the 9th century is not paralleled in contemporary Muslim usage, so we may think of his (or more generally of Christian) influence in the formation of its interpretation in later Muslim usage.

6. *ÑinÁÝa, ÒunÝ* – making

And the active participle of the same root stands for τεχνίτης or δημιουργός.⁵⁰² The terms ἡ τέχνη and ἡ πραγματεία are not listed by Lampe, so probably the two terms are not frequent in Greek Patristic literature in these forms. As for προῤξις, it is used as conduct, or act in general (either good or evil).⁵⁰³ Τεχνίτης means artificer, craftsman, and artist. This term refers to skilled workers in general, including makers of perfumes, cooks, hairdressers, etc. The same term refers to God as an architect of the universe, a supreme artist, a designer of the human body, the moulder of man, and the maker of the moral and spiritual order. Lampe also mentions that the term is used in contexts where distinction is made between God as Creator *ex nihilo* and the τεχνίτης who employs pre-existent matter. Τεχνίτης is used for the Logos, too, or to the Father in relation to Son, and finally, for νοῦς as an architectonic principle of universe.⁵⁰⁴ The term δημιουργός mostly means craftsman, author.⁵⁰⁵

As for ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, he uses this term in a variety of contexts, with – accordingly – a range of (slightly) varying denotations.

1. First of all, we can find the term referring to the creative action, but it is not always clear, whether it is meant to be *ex nihilo* or not. To the best of my knowledge, there are

⁵⁰² AFNAN, M. S., *A Philosophical Lexicon in Persian and Arabic*, pp. 151-52.

⁵⁰³ LAMPE, G. W., *A Patristic Greek Lexicon*, p. 1127.

⁵⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 1392.

⁵⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 342.

two instances where ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ uses the term together with the expression *ex nihilo*: “[it] is proper [for Him] to be able to **make** something out of nothing.”⁵⁰⁶ In this respect, the term is synonymous with *ibdÁÝ* or *Ìalq*, when used together with the expression *lÁ min šay’*. Another example: “Isn’t it ignorance if someone claims that wills and determinations cooperate in the *ex nihilo* making of existent [thing]s?”⁵⁰⁷ So *ex nihilo* creation or making is in exclusive correlation with the existence of several Makers; if the *ex nihilo* act is accepted, it is to be considered a sign of the divine unity.

2. Another approach that shows a synonymous relation between *ÒanÝa* and *Ìalq* is that the number of makers is discussed by using this term, as well. E.g.: on the behalf of the hypothetical opponent: “What denies that there should be two co-operators in the **making** of all creatures?”⁵⁰⁸ And as an answer: “How could there be two wills in the precision of the **making** of the creatures we see?”⁵⁰⁹ The perfection of making should be considered a sign, and a proof of divine unity, even according to the supposed opponent: “... we may see a proof in the precise **making** of these creatures and the precision of this order altogether [showing that the] Maker, Creator, Handler is One, Living, Wise.”⁵¹⁰ And this last thought is expressed again but referring to the unity of the Trinity, as follows: “All of them creates and **makes** by one will and one determination. Out of this one will, one determination and one power has the totality of creation been generated. It is not the case that each one of the three would create, **make** and set up [an] order by his own will and own determination that belong to Him only and not to His partner[s].”⁵¹¹
3. As a third similarity, *ÒanÝa* also has objects. Obviously, everything that exists as a result of divine making is the object, the outcome of the creative action, but there are some instances where the objects are more explicitly named. As a typical one, let us mention bodies (*aÈrÁm*), on the basis of an example we have already seen in several differing cases. “[the other cause] is psychical, spiritual, namely the intellect, which is

⁵⁰⁶ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÈwiba*, p. 104,8-9

... بحري أن يقوى على صنعة شيء لا من شيء...

⁵⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 103,21-22

أو ليس الجهل بمن ادعى تعاون الإرادات والمشينات في صنعة الأشياء لا من شيء أولي؟

⁵⁰⁸ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÈwiba*, p. 103,4

فما أنكر أن يكون متعاونين في صنعة جميع الخلائق؟

⁵⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 103,17

وكيف يمكن أن تكون إرادتان في إحكام صنعة ما نرى في هذه الخلائق؟

⁵¹⁰ Ibid., p. 152,13-14:

فما لنا فيما نرى من إتقان صنع هذه الخلائق وإحكام هذا النظام دليلاً في الجملة على أن صانعها وباريها وسانسها واحد حي حكيم

⁵¹¹ Ibid., pp. 253,23-254,3

وذلك أن جميعها يخلق ويصنع بإرادة واحدة ومشيتة واحدة. وعن تلك الإرادة الواحدة والمشيتة الواحدة والسلطان الواحد تكونت جملة الخليقة، لا أن كل واحد من ثلاثة يخلق ويصنع ويدير إرادته ومشيتته منه وله دون صاحبه

the faculty of the *anima*/soul that creates these subtle things, which we can see in the **making** of the bodies, the moulding of forms, the composition of (bodily) structures, and similar **making** actions that can be carried out by the wisdom of the *anima* and the reflexion of the intellect.”⁵¹² Here we see that the action of *ÒanÝa* is related to moulding, *taÒwÐr* and combination, *ta'lÐf*. (The usage of the latter, i.e. *ta'lÐf* might go back to Greek roots, and may be paralleled with atomism, like that of Democritus. As Gardet asserts it, the atomism of Islamic *kalÁm* derives from Greek sources, as well, e.g. Democritus and Epicurus. It indicates then, that Christian apologetics and Islamic theories of atomism rely on the same tradition.)⁵¹³ This idea is in agreement with the Neo-Platonic differentiation mentioned in the chapter on body, i.e. the differentiation which divides existent things to incorporeal and corporeal entities, the former being the cause of the latter.

4. As it was seen in the case of *Ìalq*, here also a group of examples may be collected according to the discussion of the cause or the motivation for creation. We get to know that it is a determination of the divine, not a necessity, and it is a gift. “It is clear for the intellect that in His eternity, He had always abstained from and withheld of creating His creatures, which He later created in time. And then He brought into being from them [what he pleased], by grace and potency over their generation, or by the abstaining from their **making**, if He pleased.”⁵¹⁴ Again, it is to be noted, that *Ìalq*, *ìdÁ×* and *ÒanÝa* are used parallel, as synonyms. The other example has been cited above, let us now concentrate on its first part:

“In the first investigation, witnesses of the bodily forms of creatures forced the intellect to affirm that there is a substance that created them in time and brought them into being. In the second investigation, the fact that in his infinite pre-existence he had abstained from creating [his creatures], but later on he carried out their **making** as a donation, [forced the intellect] to render pre-eternal life necessary for him. And the third investigation, on the basis of his perfect government, and of what had previously shown of his care, guided [the intellect to accept] that he carries this out in order to be

⁵¹² Ibid., p. 157,16-19

الأخرى نفسانية روحانية أعني العقل الذي هو قوة النفس المخترع هذه اللطائف التي نرى من صنعة الاجرام وتصوير الأشكال وتأليف البنين ونحو ذلك من الصناعات المقدور عليها بحكمة النفس وروية العقل

⁵¹³ C.f. GARDET, L., *Djuz*. In: IE, Second edition, Vol. II., Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1965. pp. 607-8. and GARDET, L., *Dharra*. In: IE, Second edition, Vol. II., Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1965. pp. 219-20.

⁵¹⁴ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝammÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ'il wa-'l-aÉwiba*, p. 150,22-151,2

فقد بان للعقول بهذا أنه قد كان لم يزل في قدمه عن خلق ما أحدث من خلفه ممسكاً ممتنعاً، ثم أنشأ منها بطول واقتدار على كونها والامتناع لو شاء من صنعتها

generous to others. It witnesses to the substantiality of his Word and the pre-eternity of his wisdom, necessarily.”⁵¹⁵

The wider context absolutely emphasizes that the creative action is a gift of the divine, but if we look at the direct context, we can see that making is carried out as a donation. This approach makes it synonymous with *ʾIalq*. The action is volitional, since the Maker had abstained from carrying it out before he eventually did so.

5. As in the case of *ʾIalq*, a group of examples could be cited around the theme of the means of creation, or, in this case, the modality of making. E.g. the question of using “limbs” while making in general is raised, when the possibility of the existence of two co-operating Makers is discussed.

“Cooperation in act(ion)s is of various kinds. There can be a doer of something using his limbs, like someone who elevates a heavy thing from the earth, but his limbs are not able to carry it, so he asks help from someone else to carry it. Or, e.g. a builder of an edifice needs a helper who cooperates in its building. [Such are] other similar actions, [too,] the actors of which need their limbs in their **making**.”⁵¹⁶

This making might as well be interpreted as a simple action, but given that the whole simile is introduced in order to elucidate the impossibility of the existence of two Makers, it must be referring to a creative action. As for the modality of making, there are other examples to unfold it, even if the first one just indicates: there’s no modality (or at least we cannot understand or know it) of the Creator and His making: “The Pre-eternal has no modality, nor do His **makings** do, and there is nothing similar to Him or to his actions”⁵¹⁷ The wider context brings many verbs and infinitives which put *ÒanÝa* in a framework where its meaning is best understood as referring to the creative action. But it can also be interpreted as an appellative, as ‘act.’ The exact modality of the creative action cannot be known, but a negative description is given: “As for how He created and how He **made** without movement and procedure, there is no way to know it and give information on it.”⁵¹⁸ The *bi-lÁ kayf* approach of Muslim

⁵¹⁵ Ibid., p. 152,5-9

فإنه كما عن الشواهد من أشكال الخلائق اضطرت العقول في الفحص الأول إلى وجود إثبات جوهر أحدثها وأنشأها، والفحص الثاني من تبرعه بصنعتها بعد إمساكه قديماً عن خلقها إلى إيجاب الحياة له أزالياً، كذلك ما دل الفحص الثالث من إحكام سياسته لها وما تقدم من سابق همته بأن وجود على غير بها، يشهد على جوهرية كلمته وأزلية حكمته إضطراراً

⁵¹⁶ al-BANŖĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MaŞÁ’il wa-’l-aĒwiba*, p. 103,4-7

إن التعاون في الأفاعيل على ضرروب شتى: إما فاعل شيئاً بجوارحه، كالمستقل من الأرض شيئاً ثقيلاً تعجز جوارحه عن حمله فيستعين بغيره في حمل ذلك، أو كيباني بناء يحتاج إلى عون يعاونه في بنائه، ونحو ذلك من الأفاعيل التي يحتاج فاعلها إلى استعمال الجوارح في صنعتها

⁵¹⁷ Ibid., p. 194,8

لا كيفية للأزلي وصنائه ولا شبه له ولا بفعاله

⁵¹⁸ Ibid., p. 214,14-15

وأما كيف خلق وكيف صنع من لا حركة ولا علاج، فلا سبيل إلى معرفته والإخبار عنه

authors is employed here, which shows that ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, when addressing Muslim opponents, aimed at using shared views, in order to make his point acceptable for the reader.

6. As a last similarity with *Ìalq*, it may be mentioned that the passive and active participles of the form are used to express that this action is a sign, a proof for the existence of the Actor: “The world is composed of opposing, disagreeing elements, I mean the earth, the water, the fire and the air. Our first proof for their being **made** and for the essence of a **Maker** is the combination of these elements that we see and the moderation of their faculties despite of the differences of their natures and the opposition of their substances...”⁵¹⁹ This making may be a synonym of creation, as the wider context suggests it, or it may be interpreted as, composition or combination. It is the phrase *ta'ldf arkÁn* which expresses the combination of elements. The use of the vocabulary can be compared to that of Islamic atomism.

It has to be mentioned that the same form may refer to action, too, without being specified as creative. Such is the case when the same term is used to express human actions and deeds and those of God. By this contrast, the unity of the Trinity is proved.

“From this approach our claim has to be verified, according to which the distance of the similarity between the substance of the Creator and the substances of His creatures; and between his **making/action** and the **makings/actions** of His creatures is the proof of the trinity of His properties and the unity of His substance. That is: the substance of the source/the entity, to which His Life and Word are attached, i.e. His Wisdom; and [to which] His Life [is attached], which is the entity of His Spirit, [all these] are one, and have always existed.”⁵²⁰

This example shows a transition between the two meanings. As for the Maker, *ÒanÝa* best translates as making in His case, but as far as creatures are concerned, action may be just as verifiable. Even if belonging to the divine, or the Messiah, *ÒanÝa* can still refer to a mere action: “We know this on the basis of witnesses of God, from His Old and New scriptures, and then from the witnesses of the Messiah: His **actions** are proofs coming from Him which prove this.”⁵²¹ In other instances the plural form of the

⁵¹⁹ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ'il wa-'l-aÈwiba*, p. 95,7-9

العالم دار مؤلفة من أركان متضادة متقاومة، أعني الأرض والماء والنار والهواء. فأول دليلنا عليها أنها مصنوعة وان له صانع ما نرى من تأليف هذه الأركان واعتدال قواها مع اختلاف طبائعها وتضاد جواهرها

⁵²⁰ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ'il wa-'l-aÈwiba*, p. 149,20-23

فمن هذه الجهة وجب تحقيق قولنا إن بعد الشبه بين جوهر الخالق وجواهر خلقه وبين صنعته وصناعات خلقه هو الدليل على تثليث خواصه ووحداية جوهره، أي جوهر العين، المضاف إليه حياته وكلمته التي هي عين حكمته، وحياته التي هي عين روحه، واحد لم يزل

⁵²¹ Ibid. p. 206,8-9

نعلم ذلك من شهادات الله في كتبه القديمة والحديثة، ثم شهادات المسيح من بعد في صنائعه دلائل تدل على ذلك منه

Messiah's *ÒanÝa* is used together with *afÁÝÐl*, which further stresses its interpretation as action.⁵²² In the case of the Messiah, the same root is used to refer to His conduct: *ÒanÝa bi-nafsih*.⁵²³ In the case of God, it may refer to His treatment of someone (e.g. enemies, *ÒanÝat AllÁh bi-aÝdÁ'ikum*), and His management.⁵²⁴ And on the other side, it can be man's behaviour towards God (e.g. *sÛ' ÒanÐÝihim ilayh*),⁵²⁵ and the Messiah (e.g. when the Messiah asks God's pardon for the crucifiers, since man does not know what he does),⁵²⁶ or to other men.⁵²⁷

7. Finally, we can find the term as a synonym of *Ìalq*, used parallel to its passive participle: "What is the proof of the world's being created as a **making** of God?"⁵²⁸ The word is not an appellative referring to a simple action, instead, it is used as a term, and denotes divine making. This interpretation is further enhanced by its being used together with *Ìalq*. The next example contains a variety of terms: "The account of this approach has come to an end, and intellects are forced [to accept] on the basis of this analogy that the Maker of these creatures is One, Omnipotent, he has no help in their **making** and no supporter in creating them in time. Instead, He is the One: their Creator, Elaborator, and the Arbitrator of their management."⁵²⁹ Here we could see that *ÑÁniÝ* appeared also as a divine name, so *ÒanÝa*, as the action of God, must be making in this context. By taking other divine names that refer to God on the basis of His actions into consideration, we may understand that these actions are also in relation with making in this context. Such are creation (given that God is *BÁri'*, Creator), elaboration (on the basis of *Mutqin*) and management (on the basis of God's being *MuÎkim siyÁsatahÁ*). *ÑanÝa* at the same time is used parallel to *ilÐÁ*×, creation in time. This parallel is further emphasized, if we return to an example already seen in the case of *ibtidÁ'*: "It is doubtless that He had always been planning generously that He would create time, in which He would perform their creation, and it was not possible without creating action in time and the inauguration of **making**."⁵³⁰ Creating

⁵²² Vid. Ibid. p. 209,9 and 213,2

⁵²³ Ibid. p. 230,9-12

⁵²⁴ Ibid. p. 231,4

⁵²⁵ Ibid. p. 238,2

⁵²⁶ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ'il wa-'l-aÊwiba*, p. 244,13, 14; and p. 246,3, 6

⁵²⁷ Ibid. p. 256,18-19

⁵²⁸ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ'il wa-'l-aÊwiba*, p. 95,6-7

ما الدليل... على أن العالم مخلوق من صنعته؟

⁵²⁹ Ibid. pp. 103,23-104,2

انتهى القول في هذا الوجه واضطرت العقول عند هذا القياس إلى أن صانع هذه الخلائق واحد قادر حكيم لا عوناً له في صنعتها ولا موازراً له في إحداثها، بل هو الاحد باربها ومتقنها ومحكم سياستها

⁵³⁰ Ibid. p. 106,9-10

(action) in time is synonymous with the inauguration of making, i.e. with making that has a starting point in time. In its passive participial form it is also used as a synonym of *īdā*×. “Their entities would not have been exposed to any inflow and change if they had not been created in time and **made**.”⁵³¹ And: “... because their senses can not perceive a Maker [and/or] Actor except if he’s created in time and is **made**.”⁵³² The same passive participial form is used as a synonym of the passive participle of *īalq*: “... because their senses can not perceive that there should be a living, rational substance, except if it’s created and **made**.”⁵³³ So no such opposition as the one mentioned by Lampe (God as *Creator ex nihilo* v.s. the *τεχνίτης*, expressed by *ÑÁniÝ* who employs pre-existent matter) could be found in these examples.

So far, we have seen that ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s interpretation and use of *ÒanÝa* is parallel to the Greek use of corresponding terms. In the framework of creations, those appearances that denote a creative action were mostly concentrated on, but just as *πρᾶξις* could mean ‘conduct’ in general, examples of a similar kind for ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s *ÒanÝa* were also cited. As for its being an action, it is rather *ποιεῖν* (mentioned as the term corresponding to *īalq*) that could show more similarities with it. As we have seen, Lampe mentions that the term is used in contexts where distinction is made between God as *Creator ex nihilo* and the *τεχνίτης* who employs pre-existent matter. Such differentiation (i.e. using *ÒanÝa* only for employing pre-existent matter) cannot be realized in ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s text.

Not every Christian author shares this approach of the two meanings; e.g. the Melkite Theodore AbÛ Qurra clearly places *īalq* above *ÒanÝa*, as it can be seen in the following example. “But he brought them into being *ex nihilo*, and he created them [*ex nihilo*]. For this, he is not only Maker, but Creator.”⁵³⁴ It is noteworthy that the other terms he uses (*inšÁ*, *ibtidÁÝ*) are also present in ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s text, and the two authors are similar in their use of these terms as synonyms as far as the creative action in general is concerned.

As for the Muslim counterpart, the contemporary author, al-KindÐ does not define the term. His usage of *ÒinÁÝa* appears only in the definition of philosophy, as the art of arts

ولا شك أن قد كان لم يزل بوجوده مزمعاً أن يخلق وقتاً فينشئ فيه خلقهم، ولم يكن ليتمكن ذلك إلا بحدوث فعل وابتداء صنعة
⁵³¹ Ibid. p. 97,13

ولم يكن أنجع الجريان والغيار في أعيانها إلا وهي محدثة مصنوعة
⁵³² Ibid. p. 154,1

لأن حواسهم لا تترك صناعاً فاعلاً، إلا محدثاً مصنوعاً
⁵³³ al-BANĀRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aĒwiba*, p. 153,20

لأن حواسهم لم تترك أن يكون جوهر ذو حياة ونطق إلا مخلوقاً مصنوعاً
⁵³⁴ ABØ QURRA, Theodore, *Maymar fÐ wuĒÛd al-ĒĀliq wa-’l-dÐn al-qawÐm* p. 190.
ولكن من لا شيء أنشأها وابتدعها. من أجل ذلك، ليس هو صناعاً فقط ولكن خالق

(*ÒinÁÝa al-ÒinÁÝÁt*).⁵³⁵ The next author in line, al-ĒwÁrizmĒ defines it among the terms of logic, belonging to the syllogism, but obviously with another meaning that is examined here. Later authors do not define it till al-'ur°ÁnĒ, whose explanation does not refer to the creative act (exclusively), as we can see it in the following example: “**Making**/art is a psychical property, out of which actions emanate which are committed by free will/choice, casually. And it is called the knowledge which is related to the mode of the action.”⁵³⁶ Though it is not the creative act which is described here, but some ideas coincide: e.g. ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrĒ emphasized that making, as referred to by *ÒinÁÝa*, *ÒunÝ*, is not an action of constraint, but one based on free will and choice. As it was not a physical action, when referred to as making, on the behalf of the Creator, al-'ur°ÁnĒ's ‘psychical property’ and ‘the knowledge of the mode of the action’ also run parallel to ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrĒ's interpretation.

It can be clearly seen that ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrĒ used the word sometimes as a term, sometimes as an appellative. Some ideas expressed by him might be considered the continuation of Hellenistic, Patristic ones especially, but there are minor differences as well. Probably this kind of Christian usage runs unparalleled for a long time, as it is indicated by the lack of definitions on the Muslim side.

7. *TakwĒn* – generation, genesis

TakwĒn, generation or genesis is the equivalent of the Greek philosophical terms ἡ γένεσις, αἱ γενέσεις, and τό γίγνεσθαι; *mukawwan*, engendered stands for τό γενόμενον, τό γιγνόμενον.⁵³⁷ The term τό γίγνεσθαι has already been introduced above,⁵³⁸ and on this basis *takwĒn* could be expected to be synonymous with *iĒdÁ×/ĪudŪ×*. As for the remaining terms, only ἡ γένεσις is examined by Lampe. It can refer to origin, source, and beginning: which is denied in relation to the Son's divinity, but is used to describe the Son's generation. The term is also used to refer to the creation of the world *ex nihilo*, or to the creation of man, as an action of the God of the Old Testament. It may also mean the created universe, or the creatures; the action of procreation, generation; Christ's birth, and the human sinful birth.⁵³⁹

⁵³⁵ al-KINDĪ, *RisÁla fĒ ĪudŪd al-ašyÁ' wa-rusŪmihÁ*, p. 173.

⁵³⁶ al-ÉURÉANĪ, A. i. M., *KitÁb al-TaÝrĒfÁt*, p. 152.

الصناعة ملكة نفسانية يصدر عنها الأفعال الاختيارية من غير روية، وقيل العلم المتعلق بكيفية العمل

⁵³⁷ AFNAN, M. S., *A Philosophical Lexicon in Persian and Arabic*, pp. 262-63.

⁵³⁸ C.f. LAMPE, G. W., *A Patristic Greek Lexicon*, p. 315. γίγνεσθαι appears as ‘being made/created, become’ in the Church Fathers' texts.

⁵³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 310.

Given that *takwĎn* as generation is close to *kawn* with the same meaning, I will also investigate whether the Aristotelian pair of contraries, i.e. generation-corruption may be discerned in the examples.

ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrĎ uses the term *takwĎn* less frequently than some of the previous ones, but on the basis of these examples a similar classification is possible.

1. We have seen that many of the previous terms appeared in contexts where the *ex nihilo* question was dealt with. To the best of my knowledge, two such examples exist in the case of *takwĎn*, leaving the reader among doubts as far as the exact understanding is concerned. The first example lets one believe that *takwĎn* may be a creative act *ex nihilo*, while the second one unmistakably denotes the existence of anterior matter. As for the first one, it is as follows: “His potency over their existence and over the elements, out of which He **generated** them *ex nihilo*, witnesses to His not being unable to create them non-mortals, yet, He created them mortals.”⁵⁴⁰ This example is ambiguous, since elements are mentioned as the “material” out of which an existent may be formed, while *lÁ min šay’* is also added. It raises the question whether ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrĎ really uses *lÁ min šay’* as *ex nihilo*, or he just refers to something that came into being after not having existed by this expression. In this latter case, *lÁ min šay’* would mean ‘after not having existed’. The second example is as follows: “As we know of the material, out of which your body was **generated** as a body.”⁵⁴¹ So *takwĎn*, on its own, does not refer to the creative action as being performed *ex nihilo*.
2. As a second group, we have already examined previous terms as referring to the possible number of Creators. To the best of my knowledge, there is one *locus* where ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrĎ uses this term in such a discussion. “By this one will, one determination and one power were all the creatures **generated**.”⁵⁴² As usual, the number of Creators (Generators) is said to be one, so the unity of the creative divinity is emphasized by this action, too. *TakwĎn* is used to express that the motivation is generosity and grace, and also, that it is not a necessity, but is carried out due to a will or determination.

⁵⁴⁰ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aĒwiba*, p.107,12

وذلك أن قدرته على كونهم وكون الطبائع التي منها كونهم لا من شيء، تشهد بأنه لا يعجز عن أن يخلقهم لا مائتين، فخلقهم مائتين

⁵⁴¹ Ibid. p. 193,14

كما قد نعلم من المادة التي كون بدنك منها بدنا.

⁵⁴² Ibid. p. 254,2

وعن تلك الإرادة الواحدة والمشبهة الواحدة والسلطان الواحد تكونت جملة الخليقة

3. There was a subsection in the case of *Īalq* where we could see that creation has a given outcome: the created thing is mortal, has a given form, etc. Another usual recurring group of examples has dealt with the cause and motivation of creation. Both ideas can be discerned in the first example: “What grace is better and generosity greater than His **generating** them, especially in this noble disposition – consisting of life, intellect, rationality, understanding, ability, free choice – after that they had not existed.”⁵⁴³
4. As for the second idea, the motivation, e. g. grace, it can be approached by the presumed question by a hypothetical opponent: “If he ignored the privilege of this grace and said: we do not establish for Him generosity and grace on the basis of His **generating** us, since given that we had not existed, we had not hated non-existence.”⁵⁴⁴ The phrase ‘we had not existed’ is expressed by *lam naku šay’an*, and this further confirms our supposition, that *lÁ min šay’* in *ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ*’s usage may simply mean ‘after not having existed’ in some contexts. The cause is not a force or a need of the Creator, but his will, as it was expressed already in the cases of *Īalq* and *ÒanÝa*, as well: “It is a proof of [the existence of] a Creator, who is earlier than them in time, as a sign/knowing that He **generated** them intentionally and by choice, and it was not a necessity of a force.”⁵⁴⁵
5. And then, we have seen that terms that denote the creative action are often used synonymously; let us examine some examples here, as well. “If we said: He has always created His creatures in time and He has always **generated** them as the elements which fulfil their acts naturally, forever,”⁵⁴⁶ This quotation refers to God, and both actions (creation in time and generation) are described in active participial forms. Their close relation shows that the actions denoted by them are similar. The same parallel appears when the two terms are used as passive participles, side by side. They may refer to elements,⁵⁴⁷ bodies,⁵⁴⁸ or estimative

⁵⁴³ Ibid., p. 105,7

فأية نعمة أفضل وجود أعظم من تكوينه إياهم خاصة على هذه الهيئة الشريفة من الحياة والعقل والنطق والفهم والاستطاعة والاختيار بعد أن لم يكونوا شيئا

⁵⁴⁴ al-BAÑRĪ, *ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aĒwiba*, p. 105,10

فإن جهل فضيلة هذه النعمة وقال: فإننا لا نفرض له في تكويننا خاصة موضع جود ونعمة، لأننا، إذ لم نك شيئا، لم توجد لدينا كراهة العدم

⁵⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 150,10

وتدل على باري متقدم لها، علما بأنه كونها تعمدا واختيارا لا غريزا اضطرارا

⁵⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 150,18

وإن قلنا لم يزل لخلاتفه محدثا مكونا كالطبائع الفاعلة افعالها طبيعيا أبدا

⁵⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 97,21

⁵⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 205,15

faculties.⁵⁴⁹ On the basis of some other examples, it is not only creation in time, which is similar to *takwĎn* in meaning, but also creation, *ġalq*. The following quotation describes the Son on the basis of a citation from the gospel of John. “The Word has always existed, and the Word was at God, and God was the Word, which has always been with God. Everything was created by Him, and nothing was **generated** without Him.”⁵⁵⁰ Its Greek original (Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος, καὶ ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν θεόν, καὶ θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος. Οὗτος ἦν ἐν ἀρχῇ πρὸς τὸν θεόν. πάντα δι’ αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο, καὶ χωρὶς αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο οὐδὲ ἓν) confirms the interpretation of the term as ‘generation, genesis.’ Even if details are not specified (ex nihilo, anteriority of time or matter), the two terms can still be understood as synonyms in the meaning of the creative act. The same pair of synonyms appears when the two terms are used as passive participles when describing elements⁵⁵¹ and existent beings.⁵⁵²

6. Finally, let us see another example, where *mukawwan* is probably not ‘generated,’ but rather ‘happening, coming into being.’

“Do you mean that the divine and the man combined, and out of the two of them one man rose, who is not the same with any of them, one human [being]? Or did they commix and intermingle, and did a nature come into being from them, which is different from what they had been? [Is it] like [the case of] these outcomes that **come into being/occur/happen/are generated** among the clashing bodies which introduce corruption into each other?”⁵⁵³

As we can see, *al-natÁ’iĒ al-mukawwana* are not necessarily outcomes that are generated, but possibly results that come into being, occur, happen; so this form may eventually be an appellative, as well. However, this is the first time that we have come across an example in which corruption, *fasÁd* is mentioned in the proximity of the term denoting generation, which makes its interpretation as a term possible.

As for the Muslim counterpart, according to R. Kruk,⁵⁵⁴ it is the term that denotes ‘bringing into being,’ more specifically used for the artificial generation of minerals, plants

⁵⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 213,17

⁵⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 208,12

لم يزل كان الكلمة، والكلمة كان عند الله والله هو الكلمة هذا لم يزل لدى الله. وكل به خلق ودونه لم يكون شيء مما كان

C.f.: Jn1,1-3

⁵⁵¹ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aĒwiba*, p. 97,10

⁵⁵² Ibid. p. 153,21 and 154,2 (the latter: more specifically ‘kings’)

⁵⁵³ Ibid. p. 213,9

أتعونون أن الإله والإنسان تركيباً فقام منهما إنسان واحد غيرهما، بشري واحد، أم اختلطاً وامتزجاً صار منهما طباعاً حادثاً غير اللذين كانا، كهذه النتائج المكونة من بين الأجسام الهمازة المفسدة بعضها بعضاً

⁵⁵⁴ KRUK, R., *TakwĎn*, In: IE, Second Edition, vol X., pp.147-148.

and animals. Within the mediaeval Islamic cultural sphere, the idea that artificial generation was possible was widespread in less orthodox circles. In the occult sciences (alchemy and magic), the processes of artificial generation are discussed in various contexts.⁵⁵⁵ The idea that underlies the concept of artificial generation is that since nature can transform the four elements into minerals, plants and animals, it is possible for man to repeat this process by imitating nature's procedures.⁵⁵⁶ It is worth noting that Kruk relies on works of ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ's contemporaries. Fields are different, since the works mentioned by Kruk belong to occult sciences, while ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ's apology is theological in nature, but still, there are some similarities. ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ mentions *takwÐn* with similar ideas: the making up of a body out of matter.

On the basis of Kruk's investigation, it is no wonder that the term does not appear in books of definitions (neither those of the theologians or of philosophers) before al-'ur°ÁnÐ. Al-KindÐ may be considered an exception, but he does not define the term, only uses it – to the best of my knowledge – once in his *RisÁla fÐ ÍudÙd al-ašyÁ' wa-rusÙmihÁ'*: „Substance is what subsists in itself, and it is what carries the accidents, without changing its essence. It can have attributes but cannot be an attribute. It is said not to receive **generation** or corruption...”⁵⁵⁷ It is probably coming into being with the anteriority of matter which is meant here, but it is not further specified. The use of the term together with its contrary, i.e. corruption, indicate that the author relies more on the philosophical tradition than ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ.

As for al-'ur°ÁnÐ, he defines the term as follows: “**Generating** means bringing a thing into existence with the anteriority of matter.”⁵⁵⁸ We may also remember that generation was contrasted to ‘direct creation’ on the basis of the same idea.⁵⁵⁹ This interpretation is much more general than that of ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ.

It is noteworthy that the ninth-century Nestorian author preceded Muslim authors in his use of the term in a stricter theological-philosophical sense. Contemporary parallel is

⁵⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 147.

⁵⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 148.

⁵⁵⁷ al-KINDĪ, *RisÁla fÐ ÍudÙd al-ašyÁ' wa-rusÙmihÁ'*, p. 166.

الجوهر هو القائم بنفسه؛ وهو حامل للأعراض لم تغير ذاتيته، موصوف لا واصف؛ ويقال: هو غير قابل للتكوين والفساد

⁵⁵⁸ AL-ÉURÉANĪ, A. i. M., *KitÁb al-TaÝrÐfÁt*, p. 73.

التكوين إيجاد الشيء مسبقاً بالمادة

⁵⁵⁹ As mentioned above: “In the terminology of philosophers, *ibdaÝ* and *ibtidaÝ* mean the creation of a thing non preceded by matter nor time, such as the intellects. *ibdaÝ* and *ibtidaÝ* oppose *takwÐn*, i.e. generation, which means creation preceded by matter. Also, *ibdaÝ* and *ibtidaÝ* oppose *ílda×*, creation in time which is preceded by time.” p. 18.

الإبداع والابتداع (أيضاً)، (في اصطلاح الحكماء) هو إيجاد شيء غير مسبقاً بمادة ولا زمان، كالعقول، وهو يقابل التكوين، لكونه مسبقاً بالمادة، ويقابل الإحداث لكونه مسبقاً بالزمان.

offered in this sense in the writings of early Muslim occult writings. However, *takwĎn* was used first by MĀturĎdĎ theologians extensively to the point where they believed *takwĎn* to be the eighth essential attribute of God. Even though not present among his definitions, Ibn SĎnĀ used it later and in his footsteps, ŃĀfĎs and AšĎarĎs used it as well especially to express the divine command “kun”.⁵⁶⁰

8. *InšĀ'* – bringing into being

As for the last term in this section, *inšĀ'*, there is no Greek equivalent provided for it by Afnan, so in this case we may think of an independent development of a concept and term, appearing for the first time in the Arabic language. ŸAmmĀr al-BaĎrĎ's use of the term may be classified mostly according to the categories used above. He also uses the word *nušŸ'* with the meaning of evolution and growth.⁵⁶¹ If we take into consideration that *inšĀ'* is the infinitive of the IVth stem of the root *n-š-*, even a simple causative meaning may be expected.

1. Let us now turn to the variety of contexts it appears in, in order to see whether its meaning may be more specifically classified. In the case of previous terms we have investigated if creation *ex nihilo* may be implied by them. Let us follow the same steps and look at *inšĀ'* in this framework first. To the best of my knowledge, ŸAmmĀr al-BaĎrĎ uses the term once in order to describe the creative action without the anteriority of matter, and four times to express that a creature is set up of pre-existing material. As for the first group, the example is as follows: “Or you refrain from this, escaping to the establishment that the existent [things] were **brought into being** and commenced in time, not out of [pre-existing] matter.”⁵⁶² Interestingly enough, though paralleled with *ibdĀ'*, commencement, beginning, it can also be understood as a creative action without the anteriority of matter, and also, as creation in time. As for the second group of appearances, examples include:

“[Intellects then] find a proof in the coherence and harmony of [elements], despite of their opposition and disagreement, that these have a Composer who adjusted their

⁵⁶⁰ GOICHON, A-M., *La distinction de l'essence et de l'existence d'après Ibn Sina (Avicenne)* Paris, Desclée, de Brouwer, 1937., pp. 244-259. And: PETERSON, D. C., *Creation*, pp. 474-475.

⁵⁶¹ This term may be paired with a Greek one, i.e. ἀξίσις and ἀκμή, but no specific meanings are enlisted by Lampe, which indicates that the term is not of special importance in Patristic literature.

⁵⁶² al-BAŃRĬ, ŸAmmĀr, *KitĀb al-MasĀ'il wa-'l-aĒwiba*, p. 99,10

أو ترجعون من ذلك هرباً إلى الإقرار بأن الأشياء أنشئت أو أبدنت حديثاً لا من هيولى

opposition and balanced the difference of their quiddity and [the opposition and difference] of what developed out of them. He made them last like that by a perfect Spirit ..., and made them a dwelling place for what He **brought into being** out of them.”⁵⁶³

In this case, there is an anteriority of matter, or more specifically, there are elements out of which *inšÁ'*, bringing into existence is carried out. The second example is not as obvious as this was: “We would say: what is your argument against who denies that the Creator had matter out of which he formed something? And if he said: since He had no possibility to create the substances *ex nihilo* in His *potency* and in the eternity of His pre-eternity, then He could only **bring them into being** from His own nature and produce them from the essence of His own substance.”⁵⁶⁴ Here the lack of clarity is due to the use of the words *ÔibÁÝ nafsih*, the first of which may either refer to ‘elements’ or ‘nature.’ Here probably it refers to nature, since the One who carries the creative action out is not expected to consist of elements. The other specific feature of this example is the opposition between *Íalq LÁ min šay'* and *inšÁ' min ÔibÁÝ nafsih*: both terms need further specification, either *ex nihilo* is intended or a pre-existent material, it has to be mentioned explicitly. Another example refers to *inšÁ'* as a bringing into being from elements: “If you just mean that the pre-existent, created matter, which is created in time is the same as these elements that we mentioned in the beginning when we said that creatures were **brought into being** out of them, we will support what you mean.”⁵⁶⁵ On the basis of this example, *inšÁ'* definitely needs the anteriority of matter. The last example does not add anything to this idea, but let us mention that these bodies (*abdÁn*) are told to be brought into existence out of earth (*arÁ*), which is an interesting addition to the chapter on body and bodily form.⁵⁶⁶ On the other hand, the idea of bringing creatures into being out of elements, can be paralleled to the atomism of Islamic philosophy and *kalÁm*.

⁵⁶³ Ibid., p. 96,2

ثم تستدل، من تماسكها وتالفها مع تقاومها وتناسبها، على أن لها مؤلفاً أصلح تقاومها وعدل اختلاف ماهيتها وما نشأ منها وأدامها به روحاً كاملة... وجعلها مسكناً لما أنشأه منها

Dots can be found in the text, too, since, as Hayek writes it, that word is non readable in the manuscript.

⁵⁶⁴ al-BANŖĪ, YammÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ'il wa-'l-aĒwiba*, p. 98,5-8

فقلنا: فما حجبتكم على من أنكر أن يكون لدى الخالق مادة افتعل منها شيئاً؟ فقال: بل إذا لم يكن في قدرته وقدم أزليته إمكان لخلق الجواهر لا من شيء، فإنما أنشأها من طباع نفسه وأنتجها من ذات جوهره

⁵⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 99,12-13

إن كنتم إنما تعنون بأن الهيولى المحدثّة المخلوقة المتقدمة هي هذه الطبائع التي بدأنا بذكرها فأثبتنا أن الخلائق أنشئت منها، ساعدناكم على معنائكم

⁵⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 188,15-16

2. We have seen many times that the creative action may be a sign for the existence of the Creator. *InšÁ'*, as an action of the Creator and together with *ta'IDf*, can refer to the making of bodies in a way that they should be composed together with spirits.

“These four elements that the world is composed of are present in the structure of your body; your mind cannot deny it. You do not need a clearer and more evident sign for the existence of your Creator than the testimonies of the intellect based on the Creator’s composing your body out of these contrary and opposing elements, and His **bringing it into being** [together] with a knowing soul that he has inserted in it by His power and wisdom.”⁵⁶⁷

In this example, *inšÁ'* does not merely refer to the bringing into being out of pre-existing matter: here, since the action is carried out in a way that apart from elements which make up a body, a spirit is present in it, *inšÁ'* gains an extra denotation either as ‘creation out of nothing’ (as referring to the bringing into being of the spirit) or as ‘combination’ (i.e. combining the body and the spirit, and thus producing a unit).

3. We have also seen that sometimes creation has a given outcome, in examples like creating creatures as mortals, etc. We can find a similar example in the usage of *inšÁ'*, which describes that creatures are brought into being as males and females: “Out of the two he then **brought** children **into being** as males and females.”⁵⁶⁸
4. Another recurring subdivision deals with examples which introduce the objects of the creative act. As an interesting example, *inšÁ'* is mentioned two times together with *sabab*, cause. Their appearance together is not to be translated as ‘bringing a cause into existence’, but rather as ‘producing a cause,’ or simply ‘causing:’

“Then, due to his benevolence, for the flow of love among them, he wanted to **bring** a cause **into being** [i.e. to set up a cause], which will turn them to love. He had not seen any motivation more splendid and more stimulative for that than the continuation of kinship. He also wanted to **bring** a cause in their nature **into being** [i.e. to set up a cause] for relative relations among them, which would turn them to it and make it last among them, and he had not found a more proper and suitable cause for that than the reproduction of offsprings.”⁵⁶⁹

⁵⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 97,3-6

فهذه الأربعة الأركان التي منها ألفت دارالعالم موجودة في بنية بدنك لا ينكرها عقلك. فلا دليل تحتاج إليه على وجود خالقك أوضح وأظهر من شواهد العقل من تأليفه بدنك من هذه الطباع المتضادة المتقاومة وإنشائه بنفس علامته وركبها فيه بقدرته وحكمته.

⁵⁶⁸ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ'il wa-'l-aÉwiba*, p. 114,11

ثم أنشأ منهما أولاداً ذكوراً وإناثاً

⁵⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 114,5-8

ثم شاء أيضاً بلطفه أن ينشئ لإجراء المحبة بينهم سبباً يجيرهم به إليها فلم ير لذلك جريرةً أجل لها ولا ادعى إليها من توصل القرابة. ثم أراد أيضاً أن ينشئ للقرابة بينهم سبباً يلحها به بينهم ويجريها به في طبائعهم، فلم يجد لذلك سبباً أولى بها ولا ادعى إليها من تناسل الموالي

Both times in this example the object of the term was ‘cause.’ If we accept that a cause is not created, generated, or brought into being, then we may consider the term an appellative in this instance. When used with *ʾalq* as its object, it is not to be understood as “bring their creation into being”, but rather, to commence, start their creation. “As, due to His generosity and grace, He wanted to **bring** their creation **into being**, [i.e. start/carry out their creation] and make the cause of reproduction last among them, ...”⁵⁷⁰ And: “Had he **brought** the creation of every individual **into being** separately [i.e. started their creation/completed their creation], instead of this ongoing reproduction among them, ...”⁵⁷¹ Till now, we could see *inšÁ’* with an object as an appellative, having no specific connotation of the creative action. But there are some instances when the interpretation is more specific, e.g. in the following case: “By my life, if you thought that by the things He wanted to create, and the creatures He wanted to **bring into being**, He only aimed at His own interest and the subsistence of the essence of His own substance, like the elements we have mentioned, then it would be right for you to say that perhaps his will had always been a will of necessity/constraint and not one of choice/deliberation.”⁵⁷² Here it must refer to the creative action, since its object is *ʾalÁ’iq*, creatures; and it is also used in parallel to – as a synonym of *ibdÁ’* – direct creation, so no superficial connotation can be supposed in this case.

5. As a fifth frequently seen subdivision, we may examine examples where the term is paired with a cause or motivation for carrying out the creative action. The last example introduced in the previous paragraph can also be cited here: it implicitly says that God has in mind the benefit of others when creating the world and His creatures. All the other examples have one thing in common: i.e. bringing creatures into being is a grace, *niÝma*, or is due to generosity, *ʿUd*. E.g.: “That which **brought** creatures **into being** by His grace, as beneficence for them, and by generosity.”⁵⁷³
6. The sixth recurring subdivision deals with the mode and means of creation. In the case of *inšÁ’* it is the means which can be elucidated. “Isn’t it evident for every wise

⁵⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 114,9

... وكان إذ أراد بجوده وفضله أن ينشئ خلقهم ويجري سبب التناسل بينهم،

⁵⁷¹ Ibid., p. 114,20

... ولو كان بدل هذا التناسل الجاري بينهم، أنشأ خلق كل شخص منهم على حاله من الأولاد

⁵⁷² al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÉwiba*, pp. 133,20-134,3

فلمعمرى لئن ظننت أن الأمور التي شاء أن يبدعها والخالق التي أراد أن ينشئها، إنما تعمد بها صلاح شأن نفسه وقوام ذات جوهره، كالتبائع التي ذكرنا، إذن لاستقام أن تقول عسى إرادته لم تنزل إرادة اضطرار لا إرادة اختيار

⁵⁷³ Ibid., p. 130,19

الذي أنشأ الخلق بنعمته تفضلاً عليهم وجوداً

Other examples include: Ibid., p. 151,17 (*ʿUd*); Ibid., p. 216,1 (*niÝma*); Ibid., p. 249,15 (*niÝma*); etc.

[person] that the Divinity, to whom demons of spiritual nature obeyed for His word is the One who **brought** them **into being** and created them by His potency and faculty?”⁵⁷⁴ The means of the creative act is thus potency and faculty. The example is of further interest, given that here *inšÁ’* and *Īalq* are explicitly used as synonyms.

7. A last subdivision is to be dedicated to synonyms of the term (we have already seen *Īalq*,⁵⁷⁵ *ibdÁ’* and *ibdÁÝ*⁵⁷⁶ above, in the previous subsections). It can appear parallel to *īdÁ×*,⁵⁷⁷ *ÒanÝa*,⁵⁷⁸ and *ta’lDf*.⁵⁷⁹ This list further confirms that there is a problem of inconsistency: as for *ibdÁÝ*, it would suggest that the term may be an *ex nihilo* action. On the basis of what was said above on *Īalq*, it could be interpreted either with or without the anteriority of matter. *īdÁ×* would suggest that the term is referring to a creative action in time. (Let us then mention that *inšÁ’* is sometimes used with the word *waqt*, in order to express that the creative action happens in time: “No doubt, He had always been intent to create time and then **bring** their creation **into being** in it.”⁵⁸⁰ And: “to intent their creation in that time instead of the time in which He **brought** them **into being**.”⁵⁸¹) Both *ÒanÝa* and *ta’lDf* would enhance that this kind of creative action uses pre-existing matter. Finally, it may appear sometimes with a meaning that does not refer to the creative action. It may stand for (re)production and invention, as well. As for the first idea: “As He (re)**produced** the many out of the few, and the few out of the less, ...”⁵⁸² And: “as He created them in a way that He should (re)**produce** them from each other.”⁵⁸³ As for the second one: “These six causes are present in all the tricks of the false ones, when they try to let people down in order to accept the books they made up and religions they **invented**.”⁵⁸⁴ Examples that show the word as

⁵⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 209,18

أوليس هذا بين لكل ذي لب أن الإله الذي خضعت له الشياطين الروحانيون لكلمته هو الذي أنشأها وخلقها بقدرته وقوته

⁵⁷⁵ Other examples include: Ibid., p. 151,1

⁵⁷⁶ Other examples include: Ibid., p. 215,11

⁵⁷⁷ Ibid., pp. 150,3; 151,15-16; 152,6.

⁵⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 151,2

⁵⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 188,16

⁵⁸⁰ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aĒwiba*, p. 106,9

لا شك أن قد كان لم يزل بوجوده مزماً أن يخلق وقتاً فينشئ فيه خلقهم

⁵⁸¹ Ibid., p. 106,13

أن يتعمد لخلقه في ذلك الوقت دون ذلك الوقت الذي فيه أنشأهم

⁵⁸² Ibid., p. 115,7

وفيما أنشأ الكثير منهم من القليل والقليل من أقل من ذلك

⁵⁸³ Ibid., p. 117,22

إذ خلقهم على أن ينشئ بعضهم من بعض

⁵⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 137,10

فهذه الخصال الست في جميع حيل المبطلين في اجترار الناس إلى قبول ما افتعلوا من كتبهم وأنشأوا من أديانهم

an appellative by the side of others where it appears as a term, show that in this case a word of everyday used is turned into a term of specific connotation.

Till al-¹ur^oÁnÐ, we do not find definitions for this term in the Muslim authors' books of definitions. Al-¹ur^oÁnÐ's definition is the following: “**Bringing into being** is the production of the existent [thing] which is preceded by matter and time.”⁵⁸⁵ His general definition has a lot in common with ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ's interpretation, as we could see above.

Seemingly Christian usage, or that of ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ in particular, preceded the term's appearance at Muslim authors with a clearly delineated meaning – as far as it is possible to judge on the basis of books of definitions. For this reason we need to refer to the Qur'Ánic terminology. For example: “Indeed, We have **produced** the women of Paradise in a [new] creation”⁵⁸⁶ and: “And it is He who **produced** you from one soul.”⁵⁸⁷ Probably, ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ used this term as it is a part of Muslim religious terminology, thus acceptable and intelligible for his opponents.

Conclusion

This topic is particularly important since creation is the basis of *kalÁm*. It is also a major point of difference between Muslim theology and philosophy. If that is the case, it is an important question to answer how Muslim theologians worked their terminology out; who influenced them, and what kind of interaction is probable with any other groups. Certainly it could not be those adversaries who denied creation (in time) who played a role in the formation of Muslim terminology. The probable answer is that influence on the formation of these ideas came from Christian theologians, ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ being among the earliest.

As we could see, in most cases ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ's interpretation of the given terms could be paralleled with corresponding Greek terms, indicating that he continued this tradition. Most of his terms are used in different contexts with multiple possible denotations. So his usage can be considered a more detailed and elaborate one. At the same time, it is to be remarked, that in the Muslim uses, whether theological or philosophical, there is a

⁵⁸⁵ al-ÉURÉÀNĪ, A. i. M., *KitÁb al-TaÝrÐfÁt*, p. 48.

⁵⁸⁶ Q 56:35 (Translation taken from here: <http://quran.com/56/35>)

⁵⁸⁷ Q 6:98 (Translation provided by: <http://quran.com/6/98>)

والإنشاء أيضاً إيجاد الشيء الذي يكون مسبوقاً بمادة ومدة

إنا أنشأناهن إنشاء

وهو الذي أنشأكم من نفس واحدة.

hierarchy of meanings, where *takwĎn* is the last in value, as it means the bringing into existence of something preceded by matter. As for ʿAmmĀr al-BaʿOrĎ, setting up such a hierarchy is not possible, as we have seen terms appearing in similar contexts, with close meanings and also used together as synonyms. This could be explained by the fact that he was an early theologian; terminology was not yet precise, and distinctions were not elaborated. We can only say that his most important (since most frequently used) terms are *Īalq*, then *īĎĀ×/ĪudÛ×*, and then *ÒanÝa*. *InšĀ’*, *takwĎn*, and *īĎĀ’/ībtidĀ’* are less frequently used terms; and *īĎĀÝ/ībtidĀÝ* and *īĎtirĀÝ* are the most scarcely used ones. Probably the frequency of appearance is an indicator of the importance of these terms for ʿAmmĀr al-BaʿOrĎ.

However, an important difference that is to be remarked is that in Muslim theology the different terms are treated as attributes, *ÒifĀt*. In the case of ʿAmmĀr al-BaʿOrĎ these are to be understood as divine actions.

Chapter V

The Terminology of Fatherhood-Sonship (*Ubuwwa – Bunuwwa*)

In this chapter, I will concentrate on Greek predecessors, and examine how Patristic ideas are kept, continued and developed by ʿAmmĀr al-BaʿOrĎ. In addition, I will compare briefly his terminology to other Arab Christian theologians. My purpose is to demonstrate the significance of ʿAmmĀr al-BaʿOrĎ within Christian *kalĀm*.

1. Fatherhood

As a first step I examine how the idea of Father appears in Patristic literature. On the authority of Lampe, we may say that *ὁ πατήρ* can refer to men, but in Patristic literature Father is mostly mentioned in a theological sense, denoting God, the Father, God, as universal Father of all creation, but fatherhood is not dependant on creation. God is also referred to as the Father of Christians. An important and typical example is the following: “αὐτός [sc. Christ] υἱοποίησεν ἡμᾶς τῷ π.” (Christ made us sons of the Father) (Athanasius Alexandrinus, *Orationes tres adversus arianos*, I. 38 (M.8.245A)). There are references to the fatherhood of the God of the Old Testament, as well. In the Trinity, Father denotes the first person in

relation to the second, and there is a distinction made between Father and Creator. God's fatherhood of men is distinct from his natural fatherhood of Son.⁵⁸⁸

As for fatherhood, it is expressed by the term ἡ πατριά. According to Lampe, this term can mean fatherhood in general, kinship, lineage, family, and group.⁵⁸⁹ Another term referring to fatherhood (alongside with paternity) is ἡ πατριαρχία. Apart from the meanings just mentioned (i.e. paternity, fatherhood), it can denote divine fatherhood, lineage, descent from father to son, generation.⁵⁹⁰

These examples show that though Father as ὁ πατήρ has a specific notion that can refer to God as Father, most of the connotations enlisted by Lampe are common usage. As for the terms denoting 'fatherhood,' they are more widely used.

YÁmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ's examples of 'fatherhood' appear together with 'sonship,' which shows that these ideas are related ones in the understanding of the author. He mainly deals with the fatherhood and sonship of divine persons, but uses these terms also in order to draw parallels with human fatherhood and sonship (the two being correlative in this case, as well).

A typical example would be the following:

“Even if the attributes of live created beings [or animals] are in accordance with the properties of the substance of the Creator [eulogy] in the name of **fatherhood** and **sonship**, yet there's no accordance between them in the essence of these meanings in any way. If we set up an analogy to [grasp] what intellect cannot understand, contrasting the contrariety and difference between two different and contradictory things with the difference between the **Fatherhood** and **Sonship** of the Pre-eternal, and the created beings and their **sonship**, [we would see] that the difference between the two [kinds of] **fatherhood** and **sonship** is innumerable times greater and further than the farthest difference between two contrary and different things.”⁵⁹¹

On the basis of this citation we can see that fatherhood and sonship in the case of created beings are understood as attributes, while in the case of the divine they are properties. We have seen (on the basis of Lampe's work) that in Trinity, Father denotes the first person in relation to the second, but there is a distinction made between Father and Creator, here fatherhood appears as a property of the substance of the Creator. Obviously, we cannot say that the two terms are synonyms, and in the chapter on creation we have seen that all three

⁵⁸⁸ LAMPE, G. W., *A Patristic Greek Lexicon*, pp. 1050-1051.

⁵⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 1051.

⁵⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 1052.

⁵⁹¹ al-BANŔĪ, YÁmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ'il wa-'l-aĒwiba*, p. 166,11-17

كذلك أيضاً، وإن كانت صفات الحيوان المخلوقة وافقت خواص جوهر الخالق جل وتعالى في اسم الأبوة والبنوة، فإنه لا اتفاق بينهم في ذات المعاني نحو من أنحاء الأمور جميعاً. بل لو قسمنا أبعاد ما يكون يمكن العقول دركه، من التضاد والخلاف بين شينين مختلفين متضادين، إلى الخلاف بين أبوة الأزلي وبنوته وبين المخلوقين وبنوتهم، لكان الخلاف بين الابوتين والبنوتين أعظم وأبعد من أبعد ما يكون الخلاف بين الشينين المتضادين المختلفين، بأضعافٍ وأضعافٍ لا يحصى عددها

hypostases are creators: i.e. both Father and Son, yet, the distinction mentioned in the field of Patristic writings does not seem to be present in an emphasized way. ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ does not give definitions for his terms, but by contrasting ideas (divine and human sonship and fatherhood) he shows that the same terms may be used to denote differentiated meanings. It is in ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ's other surviving work, the *KitÁb al-burhÁn* that he explains that Muslims wrongly assume that Christians attribute corporeality to God with the doctrine of the Incarnation. In ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ's view, it is on the contrary: there is a transcendent fatherhood and sonship, which belongs to the substantial being of God, without any action, as among humans. The misconception comes from the erroneous Muslim interpretation, which does not consider that the essential names belong to God primarily, and that the same names may denote humans only because of God's having graced man with them. Just because these names denote something created in humans, it does not mean that they are also created in God. Predicates belong to God in the strict sense, while to humans only metaphorically.⁵⁹² The following example shows it more explicitly: "How can an intelligent [person] imagine of God's Book that when mentioning the names "Father" and "Son" it should mean by these [words] fatherhood and sonship like the fatherhood and sonship they know on the basis of the fatherhood and sonship of created beings?"⁵⁹³ It is clear then that these terms are derived from the appellatives or "proper names" of F/father and S/son. There is a specific kind of fatherhood and sonship, which belongs to the divine, there is another one belonging to humankind, and a general kind which includes them both.

If we turn to the specific kind of fatherhood and sonship which belongs to the divine, we will see that the Patristic idea, according to which the Father in the Trinity denotes the first person in relation to the second, recurs in ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ's text. Let us cite an example, on the basis of which we have seen that incarnation was the cause of a new revelation; but now we are going to concentrate on the Father-Son relation in it:

"We inform you that in the previous periods of mankind there has been no specific reason for notification, but when the Son appeared through His incarnation, His contemporaries needed to be talked to and be informed on His great grace, i.e. His incarnation by a human [being] of their substance; and thus He needed to inform them on his **sonship** related to His Father, and

⁵⁹² GRIFFITH, S., *ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ's KitÁb al-BurhÁn: Christian KalÁm in the First Abbasid Century*. In: *Le Muséon*, 96(1983)1-2, p. 173.; and HAYEK, p. 59.

⁵⁹³ *Ibid.*, p. 166,18-20

وكيف يجوز لذي عقل أن يتوهم على كتاب الله إذ يذكر اسم الأب والابن أنه عنى بهما أبوة وبنوة كالأبوة والبنوة المعروفة من أبوة من المخلوقين وبنوتهم

the **fatherhood** of His Father which is related to Him, and the pre-eternity of the Spirit that emanates from the essence of His Father for them.”⁵⁹⁴

The Father appears here as the first person of the Trinity, and relatedness of the first and second persons in the form of sonship and fatherhood is explicitly laid down.

In the chapter on creation, we saw that created beings are related to each other by way of reproduction. This is what defines their relationship, which is correlated, as far as fatherhood and sonship is concerned: “It should not terrify you, Listener, if you hear His Scriptures call these meanings Father, Son and Holy Spirit, to think that these are like the fatherhood and sonship which is between creatures due to their reproduction.”⁵⁹⁵ So the specific fatherhood (and sonship) which belongs to creation is a caused, correlated one, which has reproduction as its direct cause. It is clear that he is addressing Muslims, who refute fatherhood and sonship in the Godhead, since, according to them, it would imply a plurality of divinities; and they also reject the idea of God’s having a son, as it is laid down in the Qur’ÁN: “He neither begets nor is born.”⁵⁹⁶

As for the specific kind which belongs to the divine, it is also a correlative one, but when it comes to the person of the Messiah, it needs to be made clearer: since in his case, fatherhood or sonship could be physical and ontological as well: “They are actually unified in the sonship and in the relation to the Father who is described by the essence of **fatherhood**.”⁵⁹⁷ Fatherhood is thus seen here as an attribute of the first person of the Trinity, at the same time, fatherhood is an essence, too.

Fatherhood as a correlative counterpart for the sonship of the Messiah’s divine part may raise the question of merit or gain. The opponent may ask: “... you claim that the pre-eternal of the Messiah’s two substances merited sonship to the Father, and the Father’s **fatherhood** suited him, because He is born of Him eternally, in a substantial way.”⁵⁹⁸ It is the nature of the relationship, which is clarified here. We have seen above that the correlative relationship of fatherhood and sonship, in the case of created beings is due to reproduction. In

⁵⁹⁴ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aĒwiba*, p. 167,4-7

نخبرك أنه لم يخصص في سالف دهور الأعقاب الماضية قبل الإنجيل علة احتيج لها إلى إعلان ذكرها، حتى ظهر الابن متجسداً فأحتاج أهل عصره حينئذ إلى أن يخاطبهم ويخبرهم بعظيم نعمته عليهم في تجسده بشراً من جوهرهم، ويعلن لذلك بنوته الأبويه وأبوة أبيه له وأزلية الروح الفاضلة من ذات أبيه لهم.

⁵⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 168,14-15

فلا يدعرك أيها السامع إذا سمعت كتبه تسمى هذه المعاني أباً وبنياً وروح قدس فتظن أنها كالأبوة والبنوة التين بين المخلوقين من قبل تناسلهم

⁵⁹⁶ Q. 112,3

لم يلد ولم يولد

⁵⁹⁷ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aĒwiba*, p. 178,7-8

بل اتحدا في جهة البنوة والنسبة إلى الأب الموصوف بذات الأبوة.

⁵⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 193,2-3

وهيكم تزعمون أن الأزلي من جوهره المسيح استحق بنوة الأب وصحت له أبوته لأنه مولود منه جوهره قديم

the case of the divine, it is not the reproduction, but ontological, substantial birth, which can be a “cause” of this relation, rendering one of the two substances a substantial-ontological Father, and the other a Son in the same sense. It is essential though to note that this kind of birth is not to be understood in time: since the pre-eternal *hypostasis* of the Messiah has eternally been born of the Father. The hypothetical Muslim opponent may go on to ask how the sonship and fatherhood is to be understood in the case of the human part of the Messiah: “As for the created human, who was created in time, and who is not of the substance of the Creator: how [does he merit] the sonship to his eternal Creator, Whose substance he does not belong to, and how could His Fatherhood suit him?”⁵⁹⁹ There is an apparent antagonism between the eternal fatherhood-sonship relation, which is natural for the divine part by way of eternal birth, and the meriting it on the behalf of a being that is created in time.

An important Christian answer is given for these questions: sonship and fatherhood can be gained by way of unity with the pre-eternal substance: “Fatherhood suited him, and he merited the sonship by way of the unity, which was given to him as a grace (and through him, this grace was given to everyone belonging to the same substance). Since true sonship can be proper in two cases only: either by way of birth, or by way of unity – according to which we intend its interpretation.”⁶⁰⁰ The problem is elucidated from the approach of sonship, but it is due to the correlative nature of the two. Interestingly enough, in nature fatherhood can be concerned to be the cause of sonship, but in the case of this ontological relation, sonship is the key to meriting God’s fatherhood for humankind. The same conclusion may be drawn on the basis of the next example: “As the One who has always existed (eulogy) was born of His Father pre-eternally, he deserved the sonship due to the substantial birth from His Father, then, because of His grace and beneficence, He wanted to share His sonship with the human substance, in order to make the **fatherhood** related to His Father necessary for the human, too.”⁶⁰¹ Fatherhood and sonship still appear together. It is said explicitly here that sonship may be a means in gaining the fatherhood of God for the human.

The relations of sonship and fatherhood are further detailed in connection with incarnation:

⁵⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 193,3-5

فأما الإنسان المحدث المخلوق الذي لا من جوهر الخالق فكيف بنوة خالقه القديم الذي ليس من جوهره وكيف صحت له أبوته
⁶⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 193,6-8
صحت له الأبوة واستحق البنوة من قبل الاتحاد الذي أنعم به عليه وعلى أهل جوهره به. لان البنوة الصادقة إنما تصح من أحد جهتين: إما من قبل الولاد وإما من قبل الاتحاد على ما نحن مزعمون تفسيره

⁶⁰¹ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aĒwiba*, p. 193,9-11

فإذ كان الذي لم يزل، جل ثناؤه، مولود من أبيه أزلياً استحق البنوة لولاده من أبيه جوهرياً، ثم أحب بنعمته وفضله أن يشترك جوهر الأئس في بنوته ويوجب حق أبوة أبيه

“Had the Father – eulogy – incarnated in the human instead of the Son, and had He taken the human into His **Fatherhood** with Himself as the Son has taken him with Himself into His sonship, then – similarly – he should have called the human Father, together with the Pre-eternal. It would have been impossible to attach the sonship of the temporal human to the **fatherhood** of the Father in this statement.”⁶⁰²

This is the first instance to show us that fatherhood and sonship are not only correlated but in some respects they stand in contrast, as well. While humanity can take a share in the divine sonship, it is impossible for them to join fatherhood. Even if the equality of the three divine persons is emphasized elsewhere, this example can be interpreted as implying a hierarchy of Father and Son.

A last approach we have to mention is the question how these persons and their relations (fatherhood-sonship) may be known.

“But, as the Father – eulogy – wanted to complete His eternal generosity towards His creation and fulfil His previous grace upon His whole created world, and wanted to inform all the angels and people on the splendour of the name of His **Fatherhood** that He had concealed before: He assumed a body by His pre-eternal Son, who is born of Him. [This body is] of His creation. He took it with Him into His sonship, and by this, he made for Him and for everyone of the same substance (angels and men) the share of His **Fatherhood** necessary. By this, they all deserved the heritage of His valuable and noble treasures, which he had prepared for them in His kingdom.”⁶⁰³

This quotation shows that fatherhood and sonship in the divine are not necessarily understandable and cognizable in an intellectual way. The author cannot be considered philosophical in this respect, since he even rejects the use of *qiyás* to compare human and divine fatherhoods. Humankind has to be informed on this question (i.e. on the trinity of *hypostases* in the Godhead), the method of which is revelation, i.e. it is not *Yaq̣l*, but *naql* in this case.

For the better understanding of ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, it is essential that we examine some contemporary examples, as well, e.g. the Jacobite AbÛ RÁ’iÔa. The latter is less consistent in his usage of terms when referring to fatherhood. We can see the following

⁶⁰² Ibid., p. 205,9-12

فلو كان الأب جل ثناؤه تجسد البشري بدل الابن وأخذه معه في أبوته كما أخذه الابن معه في بنوته، إذأ لوجب على قياس ذلك أن يسمى البشري مع الأزلي أباً. فكان ذلك مستحيلاً أن ينسب إلى بنوة الإنسان الزمني بأبوة الأب في هذا القول.

⁶⁰³ Ibid. pp. 205,15-206,1-2:

ولكن إذ أراد الأب عز جلاله أن يكمل جوده القديم على خلقه ويتم نعمته السابقة على كافة بريته ويعلم للملائكة والناس أجمعين ما كان أخفاه قديماً من سناء اسم أبوته، اتخذ بابنه الأزلي المولود منه جسداً من خلقه وأخذه معه في بنوته وأوجب له ولأهل جوهره من الملائكة والأنس بذلك حظ أبوته ليستحقوا باجمعهم وراثته ذخائره النفيسة الكريمة التي أعدها لهم في ملكوته.

forms: *ubuwwa*, *abawiyya*, and *abiyya*, all of them in the same sense. Let us first see an example for *ubuwwa*:

“It is only by the Son that He was enjoined the name of the **fatherhood**. Or is anyone without a son described as father? [Or is] anyone without a father described as Son? These are names of the attributes of one of them [in relation] to the other. One of them would not exist without the other, and one exists by the existence of the other. Then the Father and the Son are equal together, and neither of them precedes the other, nor is he later [than the other].”⁶⁰⁴

AbÛ RÁ’iÔa also interprets fatherhood as correlative with sonship. He even emphasizes that Father and Son do not precede or follow each other in time. This argumentation is important in the discussion with the Muslim opponent, since pre-existence in time would mean a differentiation or division in the Godhead, and this needs to be rebutted. ÝAmmÁr al-BaÔrÐ teaches the same, but AbÛ RÁ’iÔa’s argumentation is much more explicit on this matter. Fatherhood may be a name, or an attribute on this basis.

In another instance AbÛ RÁ’iÔa connects fatherhood-sonship with emanation, and the question becomes related to the question of unity and trinity. He also compares the unity of substance and the trinity of *hypostases* to that of Adam, Abel, and Eve. In this comparison both triads can be described by properties, such as fatherhood, sonship and emanation.⁶⁰⁵ In this, he does not emphasize the difference between human and divine fatherhood and sonship, but uses the analogy to demonstrate what it means in the case of divine persons. If compared to ÝAmmÁr al-BaÔrÐ, we may remember that the latter emphasizes that no analogy can arrive at divine fatherhood and sonship, the two being extremely different in nature. However, when AbÛ RÁ’iÔa refers to these relations as correlative, he shares ÝAmmÁr al-BaÔrÐ’s interpretation, but he emphasizes that the three *hypostases* and their relations are said to be one in substance and differ in properties only.⁶⁰⁶

As for AbÛ RÁ’iÔa’s use of *abawiyya*, it is referred to as a property which differentiates the first *hypostasis* from the second and the third, even though their substance is one.⁶⁰⁷ And finally, as for *abiyya*, it is mentioned together with *ibniyya*, as properties, which never change.

⁶⁰⁴ ABØ RÁ’IÓA, *FD al-taÊassud*, p. 50.

إنما أوجب له اسم الأبوة بالابن. فهل يوصف من لا ابن له أباً ومن لا أب له ابناً. فهذه أسماء صفات بعضها إلى بعض لا يوجد بعضها بفقدان بعض ويوجد بعضها بوجود بعض. فالأب إذا والابن معاً سوا لم يتقدم أحدهما الآخر ولم يتأخر.

⁶⁰⁵ Idem, *FD i×bÁt dÐn al-naÔrÁniyya wa- i×bÁt al-×ÁIÛ× al-muqaddas*, pp. 145-146.

⁶⁰⁶ C.f. VANYÓ, László, *Bevezetés az ókeresztény kor dogmatörténetébe*, p. 417.

⁶⁰⁷ ABØ RÁ’IÓA, *al-RisÁla al-ÛLÁ fÐ al-×ÁIÛ× al-muqaddas*. In: *Die Schriften des Jacobiten ÍabÐb Ibn Êidma AbÛ RÁ’iÔa*, Ed. Georg GRAF, <<Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium>> vol. 130.; <<Scriptores Arabici>> tom. 14., Louvain, 1951. pp. 1-26.; p. 13.

AbÛ RÁ'îÔa's interpretation is basically the same as that of ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, since both of them use the term together with sonship, as a property or an attribute. ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ is consistent in his use of the form *ubuwwa*, while AbÛ RÁ'îÔa uses three forms with the same meaning. Given that in the first half of the ninth century terminology was in its formative period, it is not surprising. No Muslim parallels can be drawn on the basis of books of definitions, so suffice us to mention that most of the ideas of Patristic literature recur here. Reflections may only be found in Early Muslim polemical works, but these only show us how Muslims understood Christian teachings.

2. Sonship – *Bunuwwa*

In Patristic literature ó υῖός, son can refer to a spiritual son, or to υῖός θεοῦ (the Son of God), or to υῖός ἀνθρώπου (the Son of Man). The second and the third meanings can be further differentiated. As for υῖός θεοῦ (the Son of God), it can refer to Israel, to Christian believers, heavenly beings, man, and the Second person of the Trinity. The Second person of the Trinity can have this name in relation to the Godhead in general, or it can be his title applied in virtue of eternal sonship, but not of Incarnation. This name is inapplicable for the Holy Spirit, sonship being a peculiar relationship (and not generic). Υῖός ἀνθρώπου is used when referring to Christ; or as Son of man coming in judgement; of Christ as man or Christ's humanity (in general or said to be son by grace).⁶⁰⁸ Sonship is expressed by ἡ υἰότης. This is mainly used for the sonship of the Son in general; and the Sonship of the Son in both natures. The same term can express the relationship of man to God: through Christ, or by baptism, or in general; or sometimes it is simply a human relationship.⁶⁰⁹ On the basis of those examples that were cited in the case of fatherhood, we could see that the Son of God, as the second person of the Trinity, appears as such in virtue of eternal birth and not by way of Incarnation. Sonship was applied to human relations, for human (or more exactly created beings') relationships. The Son of God, the second person of the Trinity, by way of unity, made the human being the son of God. The sonship of the Son in both natures is also a common theme in Patristic literature and ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ's interpretation. Sonship as the relationship of man to God (either through Christ or in a general sense) is a recurring idea; but there is no reference to sonship by way of baptism. We could also see that sonship can express simply a human relationship, as well.

⁶⁰⁸ LAMPE, G. W., *A Patristic Greek Lexicon*, pp. 1426-28.

⁶⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 1428-29.

Let us examine some of the *loci* that have not been cited yet (since only sonship is mentioned in them, without any reference made to fatherhood). When ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ writes on the close relationship of Sonship and the meaning of the word ‘Messiah,’ it is the sonship (without its correlation to fatherhood) which is concentrated on, as we can see it in the following quote: “As for our applying the name of duality for them, it is not in that respect in which they united, since they united in the meaning of the one messianity, and in the one **sonship**, so that there arose a One Messiah and a One Son due to their combination and composition, without their changing away from their essences.”⁶¹⁰ Sonship is then a connection, in which a unity of two different *hypostases* may come into being. It is used parallel to “messianity,” so even if the former is more general (since that may be applied for the second person of the Trinity, for man and for the Messiah), in the case of the Messiah, these two terms are almost to be considered as synonyms. As for sonship in the case of the Messiah, it can be further differentiated: there is an eternal one that is attached to the Eternal Father, and another one that came into being in time and which is attached to the earthly mother: “The human unified with the pre-eternal divinity in His **sonship**, which is attached to His Father, but He didn’t unite with him in his human **sonship** that is attached to his mother.”⁶¹¹ Yet, it is not contrary to what has been established before, since the frame of unity and combination is the One sonship, that of the divine. This frame and the modality of unification are further detailed as follows: “The Pre-eternal made the human take all his graces, and unified with him in all the **sonship** and judgement He had, but he did not take a share in anything the human had.”⁶¹² Thus the sonship in which the two substances united is related to the Heavenly Father and not to the earthly mother.

Sonship also appears as an essence, a name, and a kind of attachment or relation: “(Due to His generosity and grace,) He didn’t want to possess the essence, name, and relation of **sonship** alone after that He had taken the human, which He incarnated in, with Himself ...”⁶¹³ At the same time it is underlined here that the sonship of the Messiah belongs to the divine, and it is a grace that human can have a share of it. The term *alàEa* is used to express that the divine Second Person has taken a human into His sonship. It is the same term which is

⁶¹⁰ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÈwiba*, p. 181,1-3

وأما إجراؤنا اسم الإثنية عليها، فليس من جهة التي فيها اتحدا لأنهما اتحدا في معنى المسيحية الواحدة وجهة البنوة الواحدة إلى أن صار لاجتماعهما وانتلافهما بلا انتقال عن ذاتيهما مسيحياً واحداً وبنياً واحداً

⁶¹¹ Ibid., p. 183,15-16

كذلك اتحد البشري في بنوته بالهية الأزلية المنسوبة إلى أبيه لم يتحد هو معه في بنوته البشرية المضافة إلى أمه

⁶¹² Ibid., p. 183,19-20

كذلك الأزلي أنال البشري فضائله جميعاً واتحد به في كل ما له من البنوة والدينونة، ولم يشترك مع البشري في شيء مما كان له أصلاً.

⁶¹³ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÈwiba*, p. 186,1-2

ولكنه أبى لكرمه وفضله أن يستبد أو يستأثر بذات البنوة واسمها ونسبتها بعد أن أخذ البشري الذي تجسد به معه ...

used (in this form, or more frequently in the VIIIth stem) to mean the taking of the divine a body, a bodily form or a human disposition for himself, as we could see it in the chapter on terms with bodily connotations. The main idea of the citation is expressed elsewhere, too, e.g. in the next example, where another approach shows that sonship is a portion and a share (i.e. something that is probably not to be gained or merited, but can be received as a gift, or a grace.) “[the human] does not deserve to be called Son without the One who made him take the share and portion of **sonship**.”⁶¹⁴ It is then a gift that was given to a particular human by way of the Incarnation, and through him, to all humankind. In the chapter on creation, the creative action was considered to be goodness, something that was carried out in order to be a gift, a grace for humankind. In this, it resembles what was established concerning the intellect, which also appeared as a grace, a gift for humankind. This idea of divine goodness is further emphasized through the action of Incarnation, and the action of making human take a share from divine sonship. This last example mentions the word *Ibn*, as well, out of which the abstract noun, *bunuwwa* is derived. We can see that if the human part of the Messiah cannot be referred to as ‘Son’ without the divine, then it also means that sonship as a meaning must comprise both “components” in the case of the Messiah.

An analogy is introduced at this point, which compares the two parts of the Messiah in one sonship to the sonship of man, who consists of body and soul. We could see the same idea concerning the Messiah’s unity, in the chapter on bodily terms:

“As the formed body of man is the offspring of his father, even if it does not deserve to be called a human being on its own, without the soul, nor [can it be called] a son of the father who bred him. It is because they both share a companionship that cannot be divided in the one humanity and the one **sonship**, equally. And he is not the son of anything but the man, or he is nothing but the son of the man, as long as he is alive.”⁶¹⁵

On the basis of this example we can see that two different substances are united in the framework of sonship. The Messiah’s human part is compared to the body, while His divinity to the soul. In general, sonship is the unifying factor that can keep two substances together: “Instead, according to the compelling truth, it is right to call the body of man one of the two parts of the person of man, and one of the two substances of the sonship of man.”⁶¹⁶ It is not

⁶¹⁴ Ibid., p. 186,10-11

...لا يستحق دون الأحد الذي أناله حظ البنوة وسهماها أن يدعى على انفراده ابناً

⁶¹⁵ Ibid., p. 186,13-187,2

كما أن بدن الإنسان المجلبول زرع أبيه وإن كان لا يستحق أن يسمى على انفراده دون النفس المتحدة معه إنساناً، ولا للأب الذي ولده ابناً لاشتراكهما شركة لا تقسم في أنسية واحدة وبنوة واحدة جميعاً سواء فليس بنو غير إنسان ولا غير ابن الإنسان ما دام حياً

⁶¹⁶ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aĒwiba*, p. 187,4-5

بل قد يحق على الحقيقة الواجبة أن يسمى بدن الإنسان أحد جزئي جثة الإنسان وأحد جوهر بني بنوة الإنسان

just the unifying factor of two substances, but of two *hypostases*, as well. “When you call [Him] Messiah or mention the Son of God from that time on [i.e. the Incarnation], then you take the two *hypostases* together by the unity which is the meaning of their equality in this **sonship** ...”⁶¹⁷ Sonship apparently also means the equality of the parts. At the same time, sometimes sonship also appears as a substance: “By this incarnation in that one person among them all, He wanted to draw the substance of rational beings close to Himself, and He wanted to make the substance of His sonship necessary for him, too.”⁶¹⁸ These meanings are hard to be treated in a separated way, so we can sum it up that sonship is an essence or a substance, at the same time it is a portion and share, which is due to divine grace, as a gift, goodness, and it is also related to another counterpart. The sonship of both parts of the Messiah is also justified: “The **sonship** of the Messiah, our Vivifier is true and right [in relation] to His Father from both aspects: as for His divine *hypostasis*, He is born from Him pre-eternally, eternally; as for the human *hypostasis*, it is unified with the One who is born from Him in His **sonship**, which stands above attributes and similarities.”⁶¹⁹ We may see that the sonship of the second person of the Trinity is related to the First Person by way of birth and not incarnation, so this Patristic idea is recurrent in this context, as well. As for incarnation, it is only the way of unifying with another *hypostasis*, which gains sonship this way, as a gift.

In the next example this unity in sonship is preceded by an action, which may be described as combining the human part with the divine *hypostasis*: “He combined it with His *hypostasis*, ... in order to unify it with Himself in His **sonship**.”⁶²⁰ As if a combination had been a prerequisite of unity in sonship. As for the unity of sonship, it stands parallel to the unity of the Messiah, and their basis is elucidated as follows: “We need to know on this basis that it is not due to the dwelling of the divine in the human that the unity of the Messiah and the unity of His **sonship** came into being, but it is due to the Messiah’s taking the property of humanity for himself by way of incarnation and the unification between them.”⁶²¹ Dwelling plays an important part in the terminology *YammAr al-BaOrD* uses when referring to bodily

⁶¹⁷ Ibid., p. 187,13-15

بل متى سميت المسيح أم ذكرت ابن الله منذ ذلك الوقت فقد عممت القنومين بالاتحاد الآتي هو معنى استوائهما في ذلك البنوة

⁶¹⁸ Ibid., p. 217,3-4

أراد بهذا التجسد من تقريب جوهر الناطقين الذي تجسد الشخص الواحد من أهله إلى نفسه وإيجاب جوهر بنوته له بذلك

⁶¹⁹ Ibid., p. 194,2-4

بنوة المسيح محيينا صحت وصدق لأبيه من كلا الوجهين: أنه من قنوم إلهيته لولاده منه أزلياً قديماً، ومن قبل قنوم ناسوته لاتحادها مع المولود منه في جهة بنوته المتعالي عن الصفات والأمثال

⁶²⁰ Ibid., p. 196,17-18

ألفه إلى قنومه ... ليوحده معه في بنوته

⁶²¹ al-BAÑRĪ, *YammAr, KitAb al-MasÁ'il wa-'l-aEwiba*, p. 202,15-17

ولكن من ههنا يجب أن نعلم أنه ليس من قبل حلول اللاهوت في الناسوت قامت وحدانية المسيح ووحدانية بنوته، بل من قبل اختصاص الابن خاصة الناسوت بالتجسد والتوحيد من بينها

concepts, as we could see above. We have also seen that dwelling does not imply unity, but provides opportunity for a substance to appear in/through another. Incarnation, which implies unity, as well, on the basis of what we could see above, is the clue to the unity of the Messiah and His sonship. So sonship is in close relation with the unity of the Messiah, since it is the “frame” in which the two substances could unify.

Among the several examples of scriptural evidence for the one messianity and one sonship (Mk, Lk),⁶²² let us mention only one: “... the Gospel informs on His change, states, and actions, which refer to the difference of his two substances and the unity of his **sonship**.”⁶²³ The unity of the sonship does not exclude the difference of substances, nor is it contrary to it.

We could see that Patristic ideas frequently recurred in ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s text, so he can be considered a continuer of Greek Patristic literature. There are some minor differences in approach: e.g. Christ’s making humankind God’s sons is presented from the viewpoint of fatherhood in Patristic literature, while ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ introduces it through sonship.

His Jacobite contemporary, AbÛ RÁ’iÔa introduces sonship as a property, just as we could see it in the subsection on fatherhood. “All of them became a perfect *hypostasis* regarding their properties by which they differ from one another; none of them is characterised by the attribute of the other in his property, but all of them is recognizable by his own property: the Father by His fatherhood, the Son by His **sonship**, the Spirit by His emanation from the Father.”⁶²⁴ This example accentuates the correlation of sonship and fatherhood. *Hypostasis* is defined by a property, and both fatherhood and sonship are properties. The relation of the Persons of the Trinity, and their difference as that of the property is an idea shared by ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, too. Since it is Christian teaching, it is not surprising, but their use of the same terms, especially *ÌÁÒÒa*, property in this case shows that Christian terminology is on its way for homogeneity in this period, as far as terms of fundamental importance are concerned.

Muslim anti-Christian refutations understand *ubuwwa* and *bunuwwa* in a literal sense. Even the Qur’Án does so in the *sÛrat al-ÌllÁÒ*, for example. ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ is trying to

⁶²² Ibid., p. 208,16-17; p. 212,3-6; p. 212,5, 19; pp. 212,21-213,1

⁶²³ Ibid., p. 211,14

يخبر الإنجيل من تقلبه وحالاته وصنائه وأفاعيله الدالة على اختلاف جوهرية ووحدانية بنوته

⁶²⁴ ABØ RÁ’iÔA, *FD al-×ÁlÛ× al-muqaddas*, p. 13.

فأما إذ قد صار كل واحد منها قنوماً كاملاً متعلقاً بخاصيته التي يخالف الآخر لم يلزم كل واحد منها بصفة الآخر في الخاصة بل كل واحد منها يعرف بخاصيته الأب بأبوته والابن ببنوته والروح بخروجه من الأب

explain the meaning of fatherhood and sonship to his Muslim counterparts as they seem to misunderstand their meanings.

Conclusion

Concluding we may say that Patristic ideas are elaborated on in Christian authors' works. Key concepts and corresponding terms seem homogeneous. The correlative use of fatherhood and sonship is a characteristic feature of the Christian works. However, it is remarkable that they either emphasize that the nature of this relation is not biological, in order to explain to Muslims what they mean by this, or they implicitly do so, when referring to fatherhood and sonship as properties, which differentiate between the *hypostases* but do not affect the unity of the divine substance.

Chapter VI

Terms that refer to the divine Trinity or Unity

(*Ta×lÐ×* - trinity, „making three” vs. *waġġĀniyya*, *tawġġĀd*, *ittiġġĀd* – unity, “making one,” union; and the question of duality.)

Ta×lÐ×, Trinity is a teaching of crucial importance for Christians that deals with the unity and trinity of God. In this chapter, first I am going to examine a term that refers to the Trinity, even if this term does not exactly mean „Trinity,” since the Arabic form, *ta×lÐ×* is the verbal noun of *×alla×a*, ‘to make or call three.’ It would then best translate as ‘making three’, which, according to Thomas, as a form, expresses the Muslim understanding that the Christian doctrine entails plurality within the Godhead, and indicates that it has never been accepted in Muslim religious thought.⁶²⁵ But, this term is also a name for the doctrine of the divine Trinity for Christians, too. In their case we cannot speak of “making three,” but this form’s appearance in Christian use in general, and in ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s use in particular, demonstrates the presence of interaction, an endeavour to use common terminology with Muslims. It is to be observed that not all Christians aimed at the usage of shared terms with Muslims, e.g. ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s contemporary, the Jacobite ÍabÐb ibn Èidma AbÙ RÁ’iÔa al-TakrÐtÐ used various forms. In addition to *ta×lÐ×*, he also used *×ÁlÙ×*⁶²⁶ and *×ulÁ×iyya*.⁶²⁷ All three terms refer to the same meaning, but when he speaks of what the Muslim opponent asked or told, only the first form is used. However, he does not necessarily use terms when writing on the Trinity. In most cases, he only talks of the three *hypostases*, it is just the minority of occurrences where any of the above mentioned terms appear.

This term can be contrasted to unity, *tawġġĀd*, the verbal noun of *waġġĀda*, ‘to make or call one,’ but also designating the divine Unity, which I am going to examine as third. Since ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ disputed those who accused Christian teachings of dualism in his book, it is worth considering his terminology of duality and dualism, which I am going to do as second.

In the following, I will inspect the corresponding Greek terms, then examine to what extent ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ can be considered to be a continuer of Greek, especially Patristic

⁶²⁵ THOMAS, D., *TathlÐth*, IE. Second Edition, vol. X. p. 373.

⁶²⁶ E.g. ABØ RÁ’IÓA, *Die Schriften des Jacobiten ÍabÐb Ibn Èidma AbÙ RÁ’iÔa*, p. 54,16; p. 81,10; 90,18.

⁶²⁷ E.g. Ibid., p. 74,15; p. 82,10; 88,10; etc.

tradition, and then contrast his (and more generally: Christian) understanding of Trinity, Unity (and duality) to Muslim authors' interpretations and definitions.

1. *ta×ID×* - T/trinity, „making three”

This term is not present in Afnan's philosophical lexicon, which suggests that in those works of Muslim mainstream philosophy that he examined, this question was not dealt with. A simple reason for this is the fact that Muslim philosophers commented on Aristotle and Aristotelian tradition, which is pre-Christian. Trinity is a Christian notion, and as such could not be reflected upon by ancient Greek philosophers. On the other hand, Muslim belief does not accept the teaching of Trinity, so Muslim philosophy is not expected to deal with the question. Due to the theological nature of this question, it is normal that it belong to the field of Christian and Muslim theologies. For being a major subject of debate between the two religions, it should be a primary interest of our analysis. In particular, I will show how ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ elaborates on Trinity in Arabic at an early age of Christian *kalÁm*. Further, I will examine the terminological difference of understanding terms' connotations in a Christian-Muslim polemic context.

Lampe brings several terms that can be examined as bases for further development. The term that could be paired with *ta×ID×* is τριάζω, 'make into a trinity.' But Lampe shows that it is a scarcely used term, with few examples. The one that is worthy of citing introduces it in the same meaning as Muslims use *ta×ID×*: referring to Christians as ones who make God three: “Χριστιανοὶ ἑορταζοῦντες τὴν θεότητα” (Gregentius Tapharensis, disp. cum Hebrano Judaeo, M.86.628C) (i.e.: Christians make the divinity three.) This is probably a phrase of the Jewish counterpart with whom the disputation, which is referred to in the title of the cited *opus*, is carried out.⁶²⁸ If we want to examine terms that refer to the Trinity then the following terms turn up. We may find e.g. the term τριαδικός, which means threefold, with a special respect to Trinity, but it may simply refer to something ternary, i.e. something that consists of three. As for the reference to Trinity: ἕνα θεὸν τὸ τ. ὁμολογοῦντες κράτος (Gregentius Tapharensis, disp. cum Hebrano Judaeo, M.86.1812B) (i.e. the citation is from the Jew's saying: “[Christians] confess the one God in a threefold state”), τῆς ἀπλῆς καὶ μοναδικῆς αὐτοαληθείας καὶ κυριότητος καὶ θεότητος τῷ λόγῳ τῆς φύσεως καὶ τριαδικῆς καθ' ὑπόστασιν (Gregorius Nyssenus, hom. 5.60 in Jo.: *homiliae in Jo.*, H. Hansmann *Forschungen*

⁶²⁸ LAMPE, G. W., *A Patristic Greek Lexicon*, p. 1404.

zur christlichen Literatur- und Dogmen-Geschichte 16 4-5 Paderborn 1930 saec. vi-vii.) As for the substantive meaning, i.e. the threefold character: ὁ λόγος ἐν πρόσωπον ὅλον ὑπάρχων, μία τε ὑπόστασις τῆς ἁγίας τριάδος· ἐξ ὑποστάσεων γάρ, οὐ φύσεων τὸ τ. συείλεται (Leontius Hierosolymitanus *adversus Nestorianos* 7.4 M. 86. 1768aA) Another example: εἰ ὑπόστασιν, τὸ τῆς θεότητος καὶ τὸ τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος σημαίνουσιν ὀνόματα, ὧρα σοι λέγειν καὶ τρεῖς θεότητος διὰ τὸ τῶν ὑποστάσεων ἄπειρον (Johannes Damascenus *contra Jacobitas* 14.(M.94.1444C), *id. de hymno trisagio ad Jordanem* 3(M.95.29B)).⁶²⁹ Looking at the titles of works Lampe enlisted, we may see some of polemical nature, against Nestorians and Jacobites, which shows that the interpretations concerning some details of the teaching on Trinity are different in the three denominations' beliefs.

Another term which brings rich reference to Trinity is ἡ τριάς, though it may refer to a trinity or to the number three in general, as well. If used in a special sense, it denotes the triad of the divine Persons, the triunity (or the essential unity), just to mention the most important connotations.⁶³⁰

Even before Ḳammār al-BaḲrḲ's time, but already in the Islamic era, Arab Christian accounts of the Trinity had been written. These date from the 2nd/8th century. It can be clearly seen that the authors were conscious of the challenge of "plurality;" they knew that their belief in the trinity can be interpreted as believing in more than one God. They replied by explanations and arguments which they inherited from patristic sources, such as numerical proofs (e.g. the perfection of the figure three) and analogies from the phenomenal world (e.g. the sun's disc, heat and rays), which express that the *hypostases* are three functions of one reality. These arguments remained parts of the debate as it developed in the classical period.⁶³¹

Ḳammār al-BaḲrḲ's examples for the term Trinity are few, and all of them mention the trinity of persons, *hypostases*, or properties together with the unity of substance. The fact that Trinity never appears alone, may be considered as a witness to the accusation of the Muslim opponents, according to which Christians support plurality: this has to be avoided by mentioning the Trinity together with the unity of the Godhead.

The term 'trinity' appears first in the third part of the book, which, as a whole, aims at demonstrating that the Creator is one, but has three *hypostases* or properties. This problem arises as a question first, indicating that it has a great importance in disputation.

⁶²⁹ LAMPE, G. W., *A Patristic Greek Lexicon*, pp. 1403-4.

⁶³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 1404-7.

⁶³¹ THOMAS, D., *TathlDth*, IE. Second Edition, vol. X. p. 374. (Later on: THOMAS, D., *TathlDth*)

“If any of the opponents asked this: What is the sign/proof for the truth of the **trinity** of the unity of the Creator that you claim? How can the One be Three or the Three One? At the same time, you have started with the establishment of His unity, and you admitted that He is One, and there is nothing like Him, nothing similar to Him and there is no substituent to Him.”⁶³²

As we can see it on the basis of this example, there is an apparent contradiction between unity and trinity that has to be solved. On the basis of this question unity and trinity is to be understood in a numerical sense. This is even more evident on the basis of the term’s next appearance, where this contradiction is disputed, and the numerical interpretation is negated:

“We would say: As for the One’s being three and the Three’s being one, this is impossible, by my life. It is because the number one cannot be [equal to] the number three. The meaning we want to express in what we state is that we mean that this one, eternal substance has always existed in three substantial properties without distinction and division between them.”⁶³³

Here, ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ refutes numerical interpretation. He introduces the word substance, *Êawhar*, and this is the term which is described as one and eternal. As for three, another term is introduced, .i.e. property, *ÌÁÒÒa*, and it is described by the number three, with a careful addition, according to which there is no distinction and division between them. In order to return to the terms in their forms appearing in the title, let us examine what follows:

“The three properties together equal to this one eternal substance, which – i.e. it is not three in a special meaning – is not partitioned nor divided in its entity and completion, and it is not three in the meaning in which he is one; [they are one,] but [consist of] three properties. This is what we think of the unity of His substance and the **trinity** of His properties [eulogy].”⁶³⁴

Trinity is not used to express the trinity of persons at this stage, it is used to refer to properties, so it is not contrasted any more to unity, this latter being used to refer to the substance. The other appearances are also characterized by a contrast of unity and trinity, but further details may be understood on the basis of the following examples.

“From this approach our claim has to be verified, according to which the distance of the similarity between the substance of the Creator and the substances of His creatures; between his action and the actions of His creatures is the proof of the **trinity** of His properties and the

⁶³² al-BANÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba*, p. 148,14-17.

إن سأل سائل من المخالفين فقال: ما الدليل على صدق ما تدعون من تثليث وحدانية الخالق. وكيف يمكن أن يكون الواحد ثلاثة أو الثلاثة واحداً، معاً ابتدأتم به أيضاً من تثليثكم وحدانيتهم وإقراركم بأنه واحد ليس له مثل ولا شبه ولا نظير.

⁶³³ Ibid., p.149,1-4

قلنا: أما أن كون الواحد ثلاثة والثلاثة واحد، فذاك لعمرى لا يمكن كونه، وذلك أن العدد الواحد لا يكون العدد الثلاثة. فأما المعنى الذي إليه نقصد في قولنا، فإننا نعني أن ذلك الجوهر الواحد القديم لم يزل موجوداً بثلاث خواص جوهرية غير متباينات ولا مفترقات

⁶³⁴ Ibid., p.149,4-7

وجميع التثلاث الخواص هو ذلك الجوهر الواحد القديم الذي – أي ليس هو ثلاثة بمعنى خاصة – لا يتبعض ولا يتجزأ بعينه وكماله، ولا هو ثلاثة، بمعنى ما هو واحد، - واحدة، بل ثلاث خواص. فهذا هو مذهبنا في وحدانية جوهره وبتثليث خواصه جل وعلا

unity of His substance. That is the substance of the source/the entity, to which His Life and Word are attached. Word is the source/entity of His Wisdom; and His Life is the entity/source of His Spirit. [All these] are one, and have always existed.”⁶³⁵

As for the unity of the substance and the trinity of the properties, it is a repetition if we take into consideration the previous examples. The interesting notion that makes this one worthy of citing is that it shows that the properties are attached to the unity of the substance. These properties are His Life (i.e. the Spirit) and His Word (i.e. His Wisdom). We can understand that Life (as the source of the Spirit) may refer to the third Person of the Trinity, whereas Word, the source of Wisdom, to the Second Person.⁶³⁶ It implies that the substance to which these properties are attached is the Father. The next appearance comes after a lengthy analogy, according to which the Muslim opponent asks whether the Pre-eternal needs His Word and Spirit. In the answer, he is warned to examine intelligent beings, which have intellect and spirit as substantial things in the substance: the Pre-eternal has His Word and Spirit as substantial things in His substance the same way. Further similes are introduced: heat and dryness substantially belong to fire, cool and humidity substantially belong to water. On the bases of these examples the question (whether the Pre-eternal needs His Word and Spirit) has no sense. It is possible to ask whether fire needs wood in order to appear, or water a place and dry land in order to get firm, since these things are not in their essences and not in their natures. Then he says: “This is the furthest point we could get to in elucidating the verity of the unity of the Creator’s substance and the **trinity** of his properties by the way of an intelligible analogy.”⁶³⁷ What is emphasized here again is that it is the Creator which is one, then it means that all three hypostases are creators. The trinity of the properties is only partially intelligible, and it is by the way of analogy that we can gain any knowledge on them. Another remark we need to make here is that the examples ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ enumerates are all triads (the fire: its heat and dryness; water: its cool and humidity, etc.) As we could see it on the authority of Thomas, these classical triads originate in Patristic literature, and these are a primary basis for early Arab Christian polemicists. ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ is seen to be aware of this tradition and is a continuer of it.

If analogy can only lead to a partial result, then it is Scripture one needs to turn to: “Understand, oh Listener, what God’s prophet, Moses recites in his book: when God wanted

⁶³⁵ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aĒwiba*, p. 149,20-23

فمن هذه الجهة وجب تحقيق قولنا أن بعد الشبه بين جوهر الخالق وجواهر خلقه وبين صنعته وصناعات خلقه هو الدليل على تثليث خواصه ووحداية جوهره، أي جوهر العين، المضاف إليه حياته وكلمته التي هي عين حكمته، وحياته التي هي عين روحه، واحد لم يزل

⁶³⁶ WOLFSON, *The Philosophy of the Kalam*, p. 121.

⁶³⁷ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aĒwiba*, p. 159,20-21

فهذا منتهى مكننتنا في إيضاح حق وحدانية جوهر الخالق وتثليث خواصه بالقياس المعقول

to create Adam, He said: we create human in our form and similarity. And He didn't say in my form or similarity, nor did he say our forms and similarities. He just said our form and similarity. He indicates by this His unity and **trinity** in a single statement"⁶³⁸ This citation is followed by other examples which all demonstrate that in scripture plural forms are used (literally: numbers that exceed one and two); at the same time, ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ refers to the same scriptures in other languages: Syriac, Hebrew, Greek. After these examples he contrasts these *loci* with the following quotation: "He also says in the beginning of His Testament: Listen, oh Israel, the Lord is your God, the Lord is One. By this, He warns them that He who is **triple** in His properties is One in His substance."⁶³⁹ Trinity in the unity is further emphasized; which is a careful attempt to demonstrate that Christians do not believe in the plurality of divinities. All these examples are taken from the Old Testament, probably due to its being considered a common ground with Muslims, at least, more than any New Testament text would be. New Testament texts are not cited here, as these pieces of evidence could be easily turned down by the Muslim opponents, since the New Testament is labelled to be subject to *taÍrÐf*. In citing Old Testament as a basis of demonstration, ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ continues a tradition. Most Christians of his as well as later ages relied on their own Scriptures, even if they could not be accepted as proofs by opponents with different religions. He thus fits in this traditional method, however, he may be compared to more "modern" fellow Christians, who aimed at detecting hints of the Trinity even in the Qur'Án. Thomas enumerates the following examples: in the mid-second/eighth century the anonymous treatise entitled *FÐ ta×iÐ× AllÁh al-WÁÍid* points at the plural forms of self-address in *sÛras* 90,4, 54,11 and 6,94 as indications of a triune godhead. The Nestorian patriarch Timothy I in his dialogue with the caliph al-MaÍdÐ (781), refers to the following *sÛras*: 19,17 and 21,91, for the same purpose, and to the groups of three letters at the start of some *sÛras*. And ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ's contemporary, the Jacobite ÍabÐb b. Èidma AbÛ RÁ'iÔa also refers to the evidence of the plural forms of address.⁶⁴⁰

After examining the Trinity of the Godhead, I will turn now to the Trinity as dwelling in the Messiah, which is not a trinity in a universal sense, but a particular one. It can be seen on the basis of the following example: "We do not say on the basis of this anything except what the Messiah taught us and informed us concerning His secret, i.e. the whole Trinity

⁶³⁸ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ'il wa-'l-aÈwiba*, p.160,3-6

فافهم أياها السامع ما يتلو نبي الله موسى في كتابه ويقول: إن الله لما أراد خلق آدم قال: نخلق بشراً بصورتنا ومثالنا، ولم يقل بصورتي ومثالي ولا بصورنا ومثالنا، بل بصورتنا ومثالنا: يومي بذلك إلى توحيدته وتثليثه في قوله واحد

⁶³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 161,1-2

ويقول أيضاً في مبتدئ الوصايا: اسمع يا اسرائيل أن الرب الهك، الرب هو واحد، ينبههم بذلك إلى أن المثلث في خواصه واحد في جوهره

⁶⁴⁰ THOMAS, D., *Trinity*, EQ. Second Edition, vol. 6. p. 371. (Later on: THOMAS, D., *Trinity*)

dwelt in Him, and it [can be known on the basis of] His statement: my Father, who dwells in me, He makes these actions.”⁶⁴¹ This is now not a universal issue, concerning the whole Godhead, it simply deals with the specific question of the Incarnation (why the Son incarnated and not the other ones), so this one may be solved by a citation of the New Testament. From another approach, if the dwelling of all three *hypostases* in the Messiah is proven, then it is further underlining the unity of these three divine persons.

Concluding we may say that ideas of Patristic literature are continued by ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, since he uses numerical proofs (or more exactly: explains that unity and trinity are not to be interpreted in a numerical sense); and employs examples of the phenomenal world, referring to classical triads.

It was mentioned above that the Jacobite ÍabÐb b. Èidma AbÛ RÁ’iÔa used three terms to refer to the Trinity, now let us see some examples that demonstrate their synonymity. E.g. $ta \times l\mathcal{D} \times$ is used in the following:

“This is a part of the verification of what we say on the unity of God (eulogy) and His **Trinity** as far as it is possible on the basis of the analogy [on what is] created and visible: i.e. [analogy of] the light; and Adam, Aaron, and Eve; and the Sun for whom it can be an analogy. [It is also] as far as the intellect can prospect, which is created and not capable to comprehend the attribute of His property, since it is distant from comprehending some of God’s (eulogy) attributes.”⁶⁴²

The context shows that $ta \times l\mathcal{D} \times$ is used in the meaning of trinity, triad. As for the second term, $\times \mathcal{A}l\mathcal{U} \times$, it is what appears in the next example:

“Because the early ones were assigned to worship God as One, as a whole, as He is one. His Word and Spirit were not explained for them in a revelation. It was so, in order that they should not think that the One [whose worship] they were invited to is similar to the many gods they used to believe in and worship; since the age of their paganism, believing in many gods was still close. That time they were weak to believe in the unity of God’s substance, [with His] Word and Spirit, even if the secret of the **Trinity** had been clearly explained to them in its property. So they were assigned to worship God as One, as a whole, till they reached a higher state in knowledge and left the plurality of gods behind.”⁶⁴³

⁶⁴¹ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÈwiba*, p. 202,4-6

ولسنا نقول من ذلك إلا ما علمنا المسيح وأطلعنا على سره أن التثليث حل فيه المسرة الكاملة، وذلك في قوله: إن أبي الحال في هو يفعل هذه الأفعال

⁶⁴² ABØ RÁ’IÔA, ÍabÐb Ibn Èidma, *FÐ i × bÁt dÐn al-naÒrÁniyya wa-i × bÁt al- × ÁlU × al-muqaddas* p. 146,12-16

وهذا بعض تحقيق قولنا في توحيد الله له الحمد وتثليثه بقدر ما يمكن من القياس المخلوق المبصر المحدود أعني الضوء وأدم وهابيل وحوى والشمس لمن يكون قياساً وعلى قدر احتمال العقل المخلوق العاجز عن وقوع على صفة خاصته فضلاً عن بعده من الوقوع على بعض صفات الله له الحمد.

⁶⁴³ Idem, *FÐ al-taÈassud* p. 54,12-18

In this example, instead of $\times\dot{A}I\dot{U}\times$, $ta\times I\dot{D}\times$ could also be used, and the meaning would not change. This is a clear reference for the two terms' relatedness in meaning, since God's substance, word and Spirit cannot be referred to by any other meaning, but Trinity. The last one, $\times ul\dot{A}\times iyya$ is used in the third example. "The angels [also] praise the **Trinity**, although they do not need to mention the Cross; while we praise one of the three *hypostases*, who was crucified instead of us."⁶⁴⁴ No difference in the meaning can be seen on the basis of the context. The variety of these terms may be due to the fact that it is the age when Christian writings in Arabic are first written: it is not unexpected then, that the same concept could be expressed in various forms. However, ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ's consistency in his use of the form Muslims used too, may be deliberate, which would imply that he intended to use a terminology shared by and known to Muslims, too.

As for the Muslim counterpart, though it would seem useless to search for such an item in Muslim books of definitions, we may find unexpected results. As a preliminary, we may say, that condemnations of Christian beliefs about God start with the Qur'Án.⁶⁴⁵ (However, early commentators noted that for Christians three was an internal characteristic of the godhead in the form of the persons, and not a series of external beings placed together with God.⁶⁴⁶) Early Muslim attacks appeared at the beginning of the 9th century, contemporary to ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ. Christian explanation was known to Muslims, and, since the ideas employed were presented in a shared Arabic vocabulary, with terms emphasising the differentiations within the Godhead, it focused the debate even more upon the question of plurality, and made it easy for Muslim polemicists to argue that there must be more than one eternal.⁶⁴⁷

As for al-KindÐ, his definitions include 'one', but it will be examined later. Other numbers (such as three, or making three) are not defined. The next author, al-ËwÁrizmÐ, deals with the question of the Trinity in his *MafÁtÐÍ al-ÝulÙm*. The term *al-mu×alli×a* can be found in the *kalÁm* chapter, in the subsection dealing with *uÒÙl al-dÐn*, referring to the

لأن الأولين كلفوا أن يعبدوا الله جملة بأنه واحد من غير أن يفصح لهم بتفسير كلمته وروحه. وذلك القرب عهد طغيانهم لألهة كثيرة لبلا يظنوا أن الذي دعوا إليه شبيه لما كانوا فيه من كثرة الألهة وعبادتهم إياها. لأنهم ضعفوا عن توحيد الله في جوهره وكلمته وروحه وإن كان سر التالوث بخاصة فيهم منشرح واضح فكلفوا أن يعبدوا الله واحداً جملة حتى إذا ما هم اعتلوا في المعرفة ونبذوا الألهة الكثيرة خلف ظهورهم...

⁶⁴⁴ ABØ RÀ'IOÁ, ÍabÐb Ibn Ëidma, *al-MaqÁla li-ÍabÐb Ibn Ëidma al-maÝrÙf bi AbÐ RÁ'iÓa al-TakrÐtÐ al-YaÝqÙbÐ fÐ ítiÉÁÉ Ýan al-×alÁ× taqdÐsÁt li-'llaÆÐ Õuliba ÝannÁ*, p. 93,12-14

فالملائكة تسبح للثلاثية وما بهم حاجة إلى ذكر الصلب ونحن نسبح أحد الأفانيم الثلاثة الذي صلب دوننا.

⁶⁴⁵ In addition to denying that Jesus is identical with God (e.g. V, 17, 72), or taken by God as his son (e.g. IX, 30-1, XIX, 35), it warns Christians against saying God is three (IV, 171) or one of three (V, 73), and clears Jesus of claiming divinity for his mother and himself besides God (V, 116). – References found in THOMAS, D., *TathlÐth*, p. 373.

⁶⁴⁶ THOMAS, D. *Trinity*, p. 371.

⁶⁴⁷ THOMAS, D., *TathlÐth*, pp. 373-4.

Christian teaching. Al-ĒwÁrizmĎ entitles the chapter as follows: “The response to the dualists, like the Magicians and atheists, and to the Trinitarians, i.e. Christians, and others, who establish the plurality of Makers: He is not like other existents”⁶⁴⁸ As we can see, he does not provide a definition for the term, but mentions the question as an issue in *uÒÙl al-dĎn*. However, according to his encyclopaedia, Christians were also called, in *kalÁm* terminology, Trinitarians, i.e. those who make God three. In the Muslim theological understanding this became the standard view: Trinity implies the plurality of divinities, although Muslim theologians, as pinpointed by al-ĒwÁrizmĎ, admit that this plurality of divinities does not resemble plurality of things. Among the ones we are studying, later authors do not deal with this term.

After examining several accounts of Trinity in Muslim theology, Thomas asserts that three main surviving works exemplify the differences of Muslim approaches of Trinity. The ZaydĎ ImÁm al-QÁsim b. IbraĎm al-RassĎ's (d. 246 AH/AD 860) in his *al-Radd ÝalÁ al-NasÁrÁ* identifies *hypostases* with *ašlÁÒ* "separate individuals" (an identification supported by Christian authors, e.g. Theodore AbÙ Qurra and ÍabĎb b. Ēidma AbÙ RÁ'iÔa) who are distinct and equal and are one in *ÔabĎÝa*, nature. The titles “Father” and “Son” are derived from the act of begetting, so their relationship would be of a contingent kind, and it would not express the eternal actuality of God.⁶⁴⁹ On the basis of what we saw above, we can establish that ideas expressed by ÝammÁr al-BaÒrĎ (and also by other Christian authors) only partially reappear in this work written by a Muslim author. First of all, ÝammÁr al-BaÒrĎ does not use the term *šalÒ*; he rather uses *qanÙm* (*hypostasis*) to refer to the divine persons – as we have seen it above. The teaching according to which divine persons are equal and one in nature, as described by al-RassĎ, is a correctly understood statement, either taken from ÝammÁr al-BaÒrĎ or any of his Christian contemporaries. As for these persons' being distinct, it cannot be based on ÝammÁr al-BaÒrĎ's work, since, as we have seen, he always establishes that there is no division and distinction between these three *hypostases*. ÝammÁr al-BaÒrĎ emphasizes that the relationship of Father and Son is not like the begetting of created beings, but rather it is a substantial birth that has always been going on, so in this case what al-RassĎ writes cannot be based on his ideas. This idea is never exactly reflected by Muslim authors.

⁶⁴⁸ al-ĒWÁRIZMĎ, *MaĎÁtĎl al-ÝulÙm*, p. 94.

والرد على الثنوية من المجوس والزنداقفة وعلى المثلثة من النصارى وعلى غيرهم ممن قالوا بكثرة الصانعين وأنه لا يشبه الأشياء
⁶⁴⁹ THOMAS, D., *TathlĎth*, p. 374., and Idem, *Trinity*, p. 371.

According to Thomas, the second important author, al-Kindī employs the Aristotelian categories enumerated in Porphyry's *Isagoge*. He describes the *hypostases* as *ašlāʾō*, individuals, each with its own *lāʾōʾa*, individuating property. He also shows that they cannot be eternal, since they are composite; they can be treated as Aristotelian predicables, so they must each include a number of categories within themselves; and, according to Aristotle, the proposition that they are both one and three, if not absurd, entails them being part of a species or genus. As for their eternity: what is composite must derive from an anterior cause and so is not eternal.⁶⁵⁰

As for al-Kindī's describing the *hypostases* as individuals having a *lāʾōʾa*, in this, Ḳammār al-Baʾrī's statement might be reflected. As we could see, the same term was used by him when referring to the three *hypostases* as three properties. But their standpoints concerning the question of eternity show great disagreement, since according to Ḳammār al-Baʾrī in particular, and Christian authors in general, all three divine persons are eternal. None of the Christian authors would describe the Godhead or the persons as composite, the difference of understanding might be due to terminological reasons as well as general teachings.

Thomas then mentions the ŠDŸĐ theologian Abū Ḳisā Muḥammad b. Hārūn al-Warrāq (d. 816?), who, in his *Radd Ḳalā al-ʾalāʾ firaq min al-Naʾarāʾ*, subjects all aspects of the explanations of the main Christian denominations to an enquiry, and concludes that they are either incoherent or inconsistent with reason. He treats the constituents of the Godhead as a series of separate entities, and so can repeatedly demonstrate that the doctrine is in actuality *taʾlīd*, making God three.⁶⁵¹ The argument according to which the dogma of Trinity is inconsistent with reason cannot be a reflection of Christian writings; this approach looks at it from the outside. As for the separate entities, it can partly be considered a reflection of what Christian writers establish, but due to a different dogmatic background, the unity is not reflected.

Taʾlīd thus means 'making God three' for Muslims, but Trinity for Christians. Even if the term is the same, its denotation is completely different. As Thomas says, the problem with the doctrine for Arabic speakers was that, in the form in which it was expressed, it represented a plurality of real existences within the Godhead.⁶⁵²

⁶⁵⁰ THOMAS, D., *Tathlīdth*, p. 374., and Idem. *Trinity*, pp. 371-372.

⁶⁵¹ THOMAS, D., *Tathlīdth*, p. 374. and Idem, *Trinity*, p. 372.

⁶⁵² THOMAS, D., *Tathlīdth*, p. 374.

Arab Christian theologians could not dismiss these charges till the innovation of the 3rd/9th century: i.e. formulating the doctrine according to the logic of the *kalÁm*, the common ground of theological discourse for Muslim and Christian Arabic speakers. The hypostases were presented as *ÒifÁt*, attributes of the divine essence, or something similar.⁶⁵³ The Son and Holy Spirit were called the *Ýilm* or *nuÓq*, reason, and *ÍayÁt*, life, of the Father, attributes by which he is *ÝÁlim* or *nÁÓiq*, i.e. knowing, reasonable, and *Íayy*, living. The three realities can be distinguished from one another, but are identical, since divine attributes were not distinct from the being of God.⁶⁵⁴ This is what we could see in the example above, where ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ introduced Life and Wisdom as substantial (elements) in the divine substance. We have already seen that he also introduced the term *uqnÙm/qanÙm* as an alternative for attribute. Another term introduced for the same idea is *Êiha*, as it follows: “We open our speech on it by the explanation of what the opponents [i.e. Muslims] find hideous, i.e. our description of the Creator’s unity [eulogy] and essence in three modes.”⁶⁵⁵ Depending on the context, *Êiha* could be translated as direction, approach, too, but in this case mode is the closest to what we have seen insofar, suiting the denotations of previous examples of *qanÙm*, *hypostasis* and *Òifa*, attribute. In all this, ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ perfectly fits in the 9th century interaction, and is a part of the Christian movement which aims at justifying the verity of Christian dogma by the means of *kalÁm*.

2. Duality

If we examine unity and trinity, we should also deal with duality: what ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ means by that, and how accusations of dualism are rejected. But first, let us remember how this concept appears in Greek thought. Afnan mentions the following terms: *ta×niyya*, doubling, but this form is not used as such by ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, so we will leave this one out of consideration. Then Afnan Goes on with *i×nayniyya*, duality, dyad, and gives *δύαζ*, as the Greek term translated by *i×nayniyya* in the translation movement. And finally, he mentions *×anawiyya*, dualism, without indicating a Greek original counterpart.⁶⁵⁶

⁶⁵³ GRIFFITH, S., *The Concept of al-UqnÙm in ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ's Apology for the Doctrine of the Trinity*, in *Actes du premier congrès international d'études arabes chrétiennes* (Goslar, septembre 1980), ed. SAMIR, S. Kh. Rome 1982, 169-91; Idem: *KitÁb MiÓbÁÍ al-Ýaql of Severus Ibn al-MuqaffaÝ: a Profile of the Christian Creed in Arabic in Tenth Century Egypt* In: GRIFFITH, S. H.: *The Beginnings of Christian Theology in Arabic. Muslim-Christian Encounters in the Early Islamic Period*, 2002. pp. 15-42.

⁶⁵⁴ THOMAS, D., *TathlÐth*, IE. Second Edition, vol. X. p. 374.

⁶⁵⁵ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ'il wa-'l-aÈwiba*, 148,4-6

ونستفتح كلامنا منه بشرح ما استقطع أهل الخلاف من وصفنا وحدانية الباري ذات الخالق جل تناؤه بجهات ثلاث

⁶⁵⁶ AFNAN, M. S., *A Philosophical Lexicon in Persian and Arabic*, pp. 43-44.

Lampe brings the following: ἡ δuality, as duality in a Pythagorean, then Marcosian, Valentinian and Manichean sense. In Patristic literature, the term also appears in connection with the Trinity: it can refer to the relationship of the Father and the Son. In Christology, it refers to the duality of natures. More generally, the term's references include the duality of matter and form, and body and mind.⁶⁵⁷ Another term brought by Lampe is δυούπόστατος, meaning 'of two persons.'⁶⁵⁸

As for ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ's text, this concept appears when the two *hypostases* of the Messiah is discussed, so in this case, there is definitely a common concern which is shared by ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ and Patristic literature. As it was the case concerning Trinity, the problem of duality arises due to a question by the (Muslim) opponent. ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ accepts this name but differentiates its denotation in order to defend Christian teaching, and he accepts applying it only in a restricted sense, as it follows:

“As for our applying the name **duality** upon the two of them [i.e. the pre-eternal Son of God and the human by whom He incarnated], it is not in that sense in which they unified, since they unified in the meaning of the one “messiah-ness” and the one sonship. So that they became – due to their combination and composition, without any change from their essences – one Messiah and one Son. We only employ the name **duality** on two things that are distinct and which do not turn to be something else, i.e. to the two *hypostases*, which maintain [the distinction] which exists between them.”⁶⁵⁹

We can see that duality appears in a numerical sense, too, and it cannot be applied to express two *hypostases* if they are united. A necessary prerequisite for talking about duality is a division, or a distinction between two things.

Another important citation – which we have seen in the chapter dealing with body – introduces two terms that refer to duality. In the first two cases the already seen *i×niyya* appears, then, with the same meaning, a different form, *×anÁ'iyya* can be seen.

“It is astonishing that some people may claim that what made them call him one substance, one *hypostasis*, is the will to make the verity of unification between the divine and the human necessary. [By this, they also wanted to make] the rules of **duality** [necessary] in every respect concerning the unity of the one Messiah, who consists of these two. Then they called the body of the Messiah the body of God, and thus, though they wanted to escape from establishing two hypostases, and setting up two substances and denying the unity of the Messiah, they fell into

⁶⁵⁷ LAMPE, G. W., *A Patristic Greek Lexicon*, p. 388.

⁶⁵⁸ Ibid. p. 392.

⁶⁵⁹ al-BANÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ'il wa-'l-aÈwiba*, p. 181,1-4

وأما إجراؤنا اسم الإثنية عليهما، فليس من الجهة التي فيها اتحدا لأنهما اتحدا في معنى المسيحية الواحدة وجهة البنية الواحدة، إلى أن صار، لاجتماعهما وانتلافهما بلا انتقال عن ذاتيهما، مسيحاً واحداً وابتناً واحداً. بل إنما أجرينا اسم الإثنية مع الإثنتين الذين فيهما تباينا ولم يحولا عنهما إلى غيرهما، يعني القنومين الثابتين على ما بينهما

something even more severe. It is because in their calling the body the body of God, there is an establishment of the **duality** of the two substances in the one Messiah, necessarily: i.e. God, and His body. And this would mean the establishing of their **duality** together with the negation of the unity of the Messiah who consists of them, and to whom the substance of both is attached.”⁶⁶⁰

It is again the Messiah and his two parts that makes the question arise. Duality is seen to appear in an exclusive contradiction with unity. It can refer to two *hypostases* or two substances on the basis of this example, and in ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s interpretation the duality of two [distinct] substances can justify the use of this name. This passage is addressed to Orthodox Christians, who negate the two substances in Christ, but ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s argumentation aims at demonstrating that what they actually confess to is another kind of duality.

Our last example is dealing with the duality of the Messiah, too, but the new context introduces the duality of two natures:

“they unified from the viewpoint of sonship and in the relation to the Father who is described by the essence of Fatherhood. They are firm in the **duality** of their natures and in the unity of their persistence, without changing away from their substances and not leaving their *hypostases*. The One, Omnipotent did not become a third [one] for them; the unity of the Messiah came into being by the [two *hypostases*] combination.”⁶⁶¹

The unity of the Messiah has to be explained as existing in a special, restricted sense only. As it was the case in examples for trinity, the multiplicity has an important prerequisite: a distinction or division between two things. This duality, which refers to the two natures present in the Messiah, is important to be mentioned: this way ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ cannot be accused of commixing the divine with the human.

It could be seen on the basis of these examples that duality is not mentioned on its own (as it was the case in his usage of trinity), but it always appears together with unity; be it the Godhead in the centre of his discussion or the Messiah.

⁶⁶⁰ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba*, pp. 197,15-198,2:

والعجب لعقول قوم زعموا أنه دعاهم إلى تسميته جوهرأ واحداً وقنوماً واحداً إرادة إيجاب حقيقة الاتحاد بين اللاهوت والانسوت، والقواعد الاثنينية في الوجوه كلها على وحدانية المسيح الواحد القائم منهما. ثم سمو جسد المسيح جسد الله، فوقعوا من إثبات القنومين وإقامة الجوهرين وإبطال وحدانية المسيح في أعظم مما هربوا منه. وذلك لأن في تسميتهم الجسد جسد الله إثبات اثنتين الجوهرين في المسيح اضطراراً، أي الله وجسده. وذلك مع إيجاب ثنائيتهم وإبطال وحدانية المسيح القائم منهما المضاف إليه الجوهر من كليهما

⁶⁶¹ Ibid., p. 178,8-179,2

بل اتحدا في جهة البنوة والنسبة إلى الأب الموصوف بذات الأبوّة. إذ هما ثابتان على إثنية طبيئتهما وحدانية ثبوتهما بلا اختلاف من جوهريهما ولا افتراق من قنوميهما. ولا أن الواحد القادر لهما صار ثالثاً معهما، إذ كانت وحدانيته إنما صارت بانثلاثتهما

As for the Muslim counterpart, this term is not defined. As we could just see, al-ĒwÁrizmĎ's *MafÁtĎĪ al-ÝulÛm* mentions duality,⁶⁶² but instead of *i×niyya* used by ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrĎ, he uses the term *×anawiyya*. His reference probably denotes dualism as a religious belief, while ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrĎ's term refers to duality. Al-ĒwÁrizmĎ's example shows that Muslim authors did not make a connection between the problem of dualism and the creed of Christians. This chapter of ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrĎ may be directed against fellow Christians (though belonging to other denominations), not Muslims. Places like Qur'Án 16,51: "Allah has said: "Do not take two gods (for worship): for He is just One Allah: fear Me alone."" do not seem to refer to Christians. Even G. Monnot describes that *×anawiyya* was traditionally used to refer to Manichaeans, Bardesanites and Marcionites, not Christians. What might be interesting to note here is that the custom of mentioning these three groups together as dualists comes from Christians. The three doctrines grouped together as connected with each other was already done by Ephrem of Edessa and the bishop Maruta of Maipherkat; it was traditional in Syriac writings, and was then introduced into Arabic by authors like Theodore AbÛ Qurra.⁶⁶³

On the basis of what we could see in the case of this term, we can conclude that the Christian tradition is continued here and ideas are introduced in Arabic, with the translation of terms in different ways from later Muslim usage. In this respect, the duality dealt with by Christians (i.e. the two *hypostases* of the Messiah) is distant from the duality dealt with by Muslims (dualist groups), so interference is not detected.

3. Unity

Unity will be examined from different approaches, given that its terminology contains various items (*waĪdÁniyya*, *tawĪĎd*, *ittiĪÁd* – unity, "making one," union).

a, *WaĪdÁniyya*

Let us start our examination with the form *waĪdÁniyya*, which can also be translated as "oneness". According to Afnan, this is the translation of the Greek philosophical terms

⁶⁶² al-ĒWÁRIZMĪ, *MafÁtĎĪ al-ÝulÛm*, p. 94.

والرد على الثنوية من المجوس والزنداقية وعلى المثالثة من النصارى وعلى غيرهم ممن قالوا بكثرة الصانعين وأنه لا يشبه الأشياء
⁶⁶³ MONNOT, G., *Thanawiyya*, EI. Second Edition, vol. X. pp. 439-441.

Gospel, since it was thought to be affected by *taġrġif*, it is more likely that such a question is worded by a hypothetical opponent, giving occasion to discuss an important question:

“What motivated the Messiah, after all these things you described, to say to His messengers: “Go, and attract all the peoples, and baptize them in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.” He installed in them and in their offsprings the doubt in the **unity** of their Creator, and a cause for schism and quarrel between them concerning this. (As) He was compassionate and empathetic to them, isn’t [it the case that] He [should have] left them with a lasting establishment of the **unity** of their Maker, without assigning them with the faith in something that worries their mind”⁶⁶⁹

If we concentrate on *waġdĀniyya*, we’ll see that the close context it appears in refers to God and the unity of the Creator or the Maker. The three persons introduced by the Messiah stand in opposition with this unity: the introduction of Trinity results in doubts concerning oneness. Introducing an innovation, such as the teaching of the existence of the Trinity causes disagreement and schism.⁶⁷⁰ The teaching of the Trinity appears as contrary to rational thinking, since intellect can only accept the unity of the Creator. How this idea is refuted or justified was already discussed above. Till now, we can see that the same questions (unity and trinity, unity of God) were discussed by the corresponding terms in Greek Patristic literature.

The second most important field where unity is discussed is the unity of the Messiah. In the section of duality, we saw an example relating that the unity of the Messiah comes into being in a special respect: in the sonship related to the Father. It was also demonstrated that unity came into being due to a combination.⁶⁷¹ Now we will see that in addition to the unity of the Messiah, the unity of the meaning “one” will also be introduced. The quote is a problem-raising by the Muslim opponent:

“If you claim that He is eternal and created in time, as well, you will annul the **unity** of the one meaning that you described, and you will return to establishing what you negated; as you claimed that it is impossible to say for the one “the two of them”, and for the two “he,” and yet you describe Him as eternal and created in time, i.e. two substances: an eternal one and another one created in time.”⁶⁷²

⁶⁶⁹ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aĒwiba*, 249,1- 3

فما الذي دعا المسيح من بعد هذه الأمور التي وصفتكم إلى أن يقول لرسله: "انطلقوا فاجتذبوا جميع الشعوب وأعدوهم باسم الأب والابن وروح القدس"، فنصب لهم ولأعقابهم عثرة الشك في وحدانية خالقهم وعلّة الشقاق والمرء فيه بينهم. وألا، إذ كان رحيماً بهم شقيقاً عليهم، تركهم على ما لم يزالوا عليه من الإقرار بوحدانية صانعهم، دون أن كلفهم الإيمان بما ينبو عنه عقلم

⁶⁷⁰ The same polemical argument goes on in later Byzantine apology, then in the “Antiturcica” literature, and it is even used by Catholic and Protestant polemics in the 16th-17th centuries.

⁶⁷¹ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aĒwiba*, 178,8-179,2

⁶⁷² Ibid., 179,7-10

وإن زعمتم أنه قديم وحديث جميعاً، أبطلتم وحدانية المعنى الواحد الذي وصفتموه ورجعتم إلى القول الذي أنكرتموه، إذ زعمتم أنه محال أن يقال للواحد هما وللإثنين هو، مع ما تصفون أنه قديم وحديث أي جوهران قديم وحديث

This quotation shows that the Messiah's unity needs a strong verification. Given that the two parts have mutually exclusive attributes: eternity and createdness-in-time, their unity is not possible in a single unit. This is what the "unity of meanings" refers to, so a unit cannot comprise two different (especially exclusive) meanings. This is what was also emphasized by later *kalÁm*: the simultaneous presence of two opposites (*Áiddayn*) is impossible. This apparent contradiction needed to be resolved, and thus the answer for this is as follows:

"The Messiah, so far as he is Messiah, is coming into being. He came into being after that he had not been Messiah. We mean by this that the pre-eternal Word and the human, who is created in time and created, became one [being] that came into being; and one Messiah, as the meaning of the **unity** of the Messiah is only defined by the combination of the two substances and by their unification."⁶⁷³

The solution for such a problem is that the Messiah, as one, can only be called Messiah after the combination and attachment of His two parts. Instead of the "unity of meanings" that the opponent referred to, ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ concentrates on the "meaning of the unity." On the other hand, he also gives a basis for the unity of meanings, since the Messiah, as consisting of the divine and the human, is coming into being. His unity is then based on the unity of meanings, as well.

The unity of the Messiah as the result of the combination of the two parts is often referred to; while sometimes it is also emphasized that His divine part stands above being intelligible on the basis of analogies. The same divine part is the creator of the other: "The Word of God stands above every analogy. He is the one who commenced and assumed the human for Himself as humanity. By his humanisation, i.e. His taking it up as a garment, their unification became necessary, and thus, by way of their combination, the Messiah's **unity** occurred."⁶⁷⁴ Unity and unification are not distant in meaning. What serves as a basis for distinction between them is the active or passive aspect. When it is an active participation, in which both take part, it is unification, while the result, in which the two are included, is referred to by the term unity.⁶⁷⁵ The same "outcome" is expressed in the next quote: "In His incarnation by [the human], His goal was a will to make the share of sonship necessary by this for him, and to erect the **unity** of the Messiah, to which the attachment of body was

⁶⁷³ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ'il wa-'l-aÊwiba*, p. 179,11-13

بل المسيح من جهة مسيحيتة حادث حدث بعد أن لم يكن مسيحاً. نعني بذلك أن الكلمة الأزلية والإنسان المحدث المخلوق صاراً حديثاً مسيحاً واحداً، إذ لم تحد وحدانية معنى المسيح الواحد إلا باجتماع الجوهرين واتحادهما

⁶⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 197,9-11,

إن الله الكلمة تعالى على كل قياس هو الذي بدأ واتخذ البشري له ناسوتاً، مع تأنسه أي تدرعه وجب اتحادهم وقامت وحدانية المسيح بانئتلافهما،

⁶⁷⁵ It can also be noted in the following: Ibid., pp. 201,18-202,1

كذلك إذ تجسد الله الكلمة البشري فتأنس هنالك الإله بالبشري وتأله البشري بالإله وأقاما باتحادهما وحدانية المسيح، وأضيف البشري والإله إلى المسيح الواحد المجتمع منهما

necessary.”⁶⁷⁶ We have seen above that the difference between inhabitation/dwelling and incarnation is in the result: i.e. inhabitation does not result in unity, while incarnation does. This example further confirms the latter statement. The third field lays emphasis on the unity of meanings in a unique thing/person. We have already seen an example above in the discussion of the Messiah’s unity; let us see, in what contexts it may also emerge. The following example refers to it in connection with the unity-trinity of the Godhead:

“It is strange that some intellects should object to calling him a substance which includes specific *hypostases*, as they saw it; but they didn’t object to describing Him by the **singularity** of meaning in every aspect; while they consider that which has a **singularity** of meaning the lowest in state. Such as the simple forces and the attributes which depend on something else, and cannot exist in themselves, without physical bodies which are different from them. In these, there are no meanings except for a **unity** of meanings. E.g. Heat, known by the **unity** of heat; humidity specified by the **unity** of humidity; whiteness, which is united in the **unity** of whiteness; and blackness, which is single in the **unity** of blackness.”⁶⁷⁷

In this example, probably the Muslim opponent is addressed. On the basis of the similes, it can be demonstrated that unity, or singularity, does not necessarily imply a noble connotation. On this basis, singularity with a unity of meanings is lower in degree than a unity which is of a general kind and includes more *hypostases*.

A third typical field in which unity plays an important role deals with the human being. Obviously, the unity of the human being, who consists of body and soul, is only important as an analogy for the unity of the Messiah, who is combined of a divine or spiritual, and a human or corporeal part. Our first example demonstrates what *YammÁr al-BaÒrÐ* means by the unity of man: “Had the soul and body not combined, the **unity** of human would not have ever come into being out of them.”⁶⁷⁸ It is the problem of unity-duality that shows in this example. Even if two components set up a human being (or the Messiah), by way of combination, it is just one existent that comes into being as a result, and who can not be defined or described without both components. The second example shows it explicitly that the unity of the human serves as an analogy for the unity of the Messiah: “Where is the **unity** of the one human, who has the body and the soul, if the Messiah’s body is called the Pre-

⁶⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 201,2- 3

كان غرضه في تجسده إياه أراد أن يوجد له بذلك حظ البنية ويقوم به وحدانية المسيح التي وجب إضافة الجسد إليه
⁶⁷⁷ al-BAÑRĪ, *YammÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aĒwiba*, p. 163,12-18
 والعجب لعقول استنكفوا له من أن يسموه جوهرأ يعم أقانيم خواصاً كما رأوا، ولم يستنكفوا من وصفهم إياه بواحد المعنى في كل أنحاء، إذ راوا
 أدنى حال ما كان واحدي المعنى، كالقوى البسيطة والأعراض المضطربة التي لا تستغني بأنفسها عن الأجسام المختلفة لها ولا يوجد فيها معاني
 سوى وحدانية معانيها كالحرارة المعروفة بوحدانية الحرارة وكالرطوبة المخصوصة بوحدانية الرطوبة وكالبياض المتوحد بوحدانية البياض
 وكالسواد المنفرد بوحدانية السواد

⁶⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 196,10

ولو لم تألف النفس بالبدن لم تقم وحدانية الانسان منهما أبداً

eternal God's body, and if the Pre-eternal is called the body's divinity?"⁶⁷⁹ The human being's unity is explicitly paralleled with the Messiah's unity. At the same time, the impossibility of speaking of God's body (since it is the Messiah's body, combined with a spirit, or a soul), and the body's divinity (since this is the Messiah's divinity, who has a human counterpart, which consists of a body and a soul) is demonstrated. The last example elucidates that unity happens on a higher level than just adding one constituent to the other. Body cannot be attached to the soul or the soul to the body: both components can belong to a unit of a higher degree, the unity of the human: "Isn't it understood from us what we informed you upon? I.e. the spirit of the human, as it is incarnated in his body, and his body, as it is animated by his spirit, made up the **unity** of the human by their combination through the body of the human and the spirit of the human. And it is not [made up] by the body of the spirit and the spirit of the body."⁶⁸⁰ The example serves as an analogy for the unity of the Messiah. It demonstrates that unity implies something more than the result of adding two things to each other.

The fourth field deals with the unity of sonship. In the following example, the unity of sonship appears parallel to the unity of the Messiah. It is not unexpected, since we have seen elsewhere that sonship is the aspect in which this unity occurs. "But from here we need to know that the **unity** of the Messiah and the **unity** of the sonship did not come into being through the inhabitation of the divine in the human, but due to the Son's taking the humanity as a property for Himself in the incarnation and their union."⁶⁸¹ The example shows that the way for this unity to occur is the incarnation, but the aspect in which the unity of the Messiah takes place is the unity of the sonship. It is then a question of interpretation, too: to make up a frame in which humanity and divinity can be considered as one. The one sonship, which originally belongs to the Second Person of the Trinity and is given to the human at the time of the incarnation, is this frame.

I have not found this term among the definitions of the books investigated on the Muslim side. The only appearance I came across could be found in another definition by al-ÉurÉÁnÐ, i.e. that of *tawÍÐd*, which we will soon see. It may imply that this one is primarily a Christian term that was later incorporated in Muslim terminology.

⁶⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 198,7-8

أين توجد وحدانية الإنسان الواحد الذي له النفس والبدن، إذا قيل لجسد المسيح جسد الله الأزلي، وللأزلي لاهوت الجسد
⁶⁸⁰ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ'il wa-'l-aÉwiba*, p. 201,13-16
 أو لم يفهم عنا ما أخبرناك به من أن روح الإنسان إذ هي متجسدة لبدنه، وبدنه إذ هو متنفس بروحه، فأقاما بائتلافهما وحدانية الإنسان قبل بدن الإنسان وروح الإنسان، لا بدن الروح ولا روح البدن.

⁶⁸¹ Ibid., p. 202,16

ولكن من ههنا يجب أن نعلم أنه ليس من قبل حلول اللاهوت في الناسوت قامت وحدانية المسيح ووحداية بنوته، بل من قبل اختصاص الابن خاصة الناسوت بالتجسد والتوحيد من بينهما.

b, *TawĪḌd* - unification

Another prevalent term in the field of unity is *tawĪḌd*, unification, Unitarianism, or ‘making one.’ This term does not appear in ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrḌ’s text frequently, which implies that the term is not of primary importance for him as far as the question of the unity is concerned. In the following examples we will see three contexts where the term is used with the following meanings: man makes something/God one; God declares of Himself that He is one, the Messiah makes the human one with Himself: so in each case a causative or declarative meaning is discernible. A representative example for the first context can be found when ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrḌ enlists the reasons that can incite one to follow a “made-up”, invented religion. One of the reasons may be “the approval of the decorated speech of claimants who establish polytheism or **unification** or something else.”⁶⁸² It then refers to a human act or belief, by which human considers the divine as one.

As for the second context, when God declares His unity, it appears parallel to trinity, as we have seen above: “when God wanted to create Adam, He said: we create human in our form and similarity. And He didn’t say in my form or similarity, nor did he say our forms and similarities. He just said our form and similarity. He indicates by this His **unity** and trinity in a single statement”⁶⁸³ As a simple meaning, we may think of ‘unity’ in this case, but since God speaks of Himself as one and three, it can be understood as His making/declaring Himself one and three.

A third context shows the Messiah’s making the human one with Himself. “He created a human being, and wore it as an armament, combined it with His *hypostasis* in order to appear in it, and in order to make His words and deeds appear through it. He also did it in order to **unite** this human being with Himself in His sonship.”⁶⁸⁴ ‘Making one’, unite is the only meaning by which the term may be translated.

⁶⁸² al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ‘il wa-’l-aĒwiba*, p. 136,8-9

إما الاستحسان بما جمع فيه من زخرفة كلام المدعين في إثبات شرك أو توحيد أو غير ذلك

⁶⁸³ Ibid., p.160,3-6

فافهم أيها السامع ما يتلو نبي الله موسى في كتابه ويقول: إن الله لما أراد خلق آدم قال: نخلق بشراً بصورتنا ومثالنا، ولم يقل بصورتي ومثالي ولا بصورتنا ومثالنا، بل بصورتنا ومثالنا: يومي بذلك إلى **توحيد**ه وتثليثه في قوله واحد

⁶⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 196,8-197,3

كما أنه إذ **تجسدت** النفس **بالبدن** و**البدن** بالنفس فقام منهما بانتلافهما انسان واحد، سمي **البدن** بدن الانسان والنفس نفس الانسان لا **بدن** الانسان ولا نفس الانسان، ولو لم تألف النفس **بالبدن** لم تقم وحدانية الانسان منهما أبداً. وقد نقول أيضاً بلفظة أخرى ونحو آخر إن الله الكلمة **تأنس** لا على معنى قول القائل: الماء ملح، أي جمدان بذاته فصار ملحاً. وكقوله إن اللين تجبن أي اعتقد بذاته فصار جبناً. وكقوله الصبي ترجل أي شب بذاته فصار رجلاً، بل على معنى قول القائل: إن فلاناً درع أي ليس درعاً، وكقوله إن فلاناً تسلح أي ليس سلاحاً، وكقوله إن فلاناً تعمم أي ليس عمامة، لا أنه صار عمامة أو سلاحاً أو درعاً. كذلك بقولنا أن الله الكلمة **تجسد** و**تأنس** أي أحدث **جسداً** فلبسه وخلق إنساناً فتدرعه وألفه إلى قنومه ليظهر به وليظهر به قوله وأعماله وليوحده معه في بنوته. قلنا فأمرهما جميعاً في وقت **الاتخاذ** و**الاتحاد** مسيح واحد، وجب أن يقال ناسوت المسيح وناسوت الابن المجتمع، لا نسوت الله ولا ناسوت اللاهوت، وإن كان الله هو الكلمة المنفرد وحده **لاتخاذ**ه إياه ناسوتاً، لا أن الناس متضرع الناسوت في الأصل كان المسيح المجتمع عليه

ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ's contemporary Jacobite AbÛ RÁ'iÔa uses this term more frequently. He usually puts Trinity and unity side by side, in order to refer to the unity of the Godhead with its three *hypostases*. E.g.: "We only took the light as a convincing analogy in some approaches: concerning His **unity** and Trinity, as we described God, who, according to us, is one substance and three *hypostases*."⁶⁸⁵ In this, his use of Unity may rather be paralleled to ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ's *waÁdÁniyya*. AbÛ RÁ'iÔa's examples from the Old Testament that concentrate on the singular-plural forms (*ÒÛratunÁ, ÁshhunÁ; Ádam qad ÒÁra ka-aÁadinÁ*, etc.)⁶⁸⁶ are closer to ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ's usage, as we have just seen. Themes and forms are similar, due to a congenial Christian heritage. The similarity of examples shows that the same patterns were used in dialogue with Muslims, without respect to denominations.

Among Muslim authors of books of definition Ibn FÛrak is the first to describe the term, as follows: "The definition of unification is the knowledge that God (eulogy) is one; He is described by His attributes that He has; He is the Maker of the world, and has no companion or a second one with Himself. If someone knows it, his knowledge of this is called **unification**"⁶⁸⁷ His interpreting *tawÁÐd* as 'making one' makes him resemble ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ. The second part of the definition shows that unification also means that one accepts God as the Creator of the world, in which there is no contrast between ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ or other Christian authors and him. Only the question of companions may be a problematic issue, since even if Christians believe in the unity of God, their establishment of *hypostases* is understood by Muslims as establishment of companions. The other author who deals with the term is al-ÉurÉÁnÐ, who differentiates between the linguistic implication;⁶⁸⁸ and the theological one. The second is as follows: "**unification** ... in the terminology of Sufism is the abstraction of the essence of the divinity of everything that can be imagined in conception, or be visualised in fantasy and mind. It implies three things: the knowledge of God's Lordship; the establishment of His **unity**, and the refutation that He should have partners."⁶⁸⁹ *TawÁÐd* is then a human action of accepting and establishing divine unity, referred to by the term

⁶⁸⁵ ABÛ RÁ'iÔA, *FÐ i×bÁt dÐn al-naÒrÁniyya wa- i×bÁt al-×ÁlÛ× al-muqaddas*, p. 143.

فإنما اتخذنا الضوء قياساً مقتعاً في بعد أنحائه في توحيدته وتثليثه جميعاً معاً كما وصفنا من الله سبحانه عندنا جوهرأ واحداً أقانيم ثلاثة جميعاً معاً

⁶⁸⁶ Ibid. p. 147.

⁶⁸⁷ Ibn FÛRAK, *KitÁb al-ÁudÛd fÐ 'l-uÒÛl*, p. 24.

حد التوحيد: هو العلم بأن الله تعالى واحد موصوف بصفاته التي هو عليها، وأنه فاعل للعالم لا ثاني له ولا شريك معه فمن علم ذلك وصف علمه وخبره بأنه توحيد

⁶⁸⁸ al-ÉURÉÁNĪ, *KitÁb al-TaÝrÐfÁt*, p. 77.

التوحيد في اللغة: الحكم بأن الشيء واحد، والعلم بأنه واحد

⁶⁸⁹ al-ÉURÉÁNĪ, *KitÁb al-TaÝrÐfÁt*, p. 77.

التوحيد... وفي اصطلاح أهل الحقيقة: تجريد الذات الإلهية عن كل ما يتصور في الأفهام، ويتخيل في الأوهام والأذهان، وهو ثلاثة أشياء: معرفة الله تعالى بالربوبية، والإقرار بالوحدانية، ونفي الأنداد عنه جملة

waĪdĀniyya, the latter is then a basis of the former. In general terms, these later Muslim authors share ŸAmmĀr al-BaŌrĪ's interpretation.

c, *IttiĀd*

Our last term is *ittiĀd*,⁶⁹⁰ union, unification. This one is exclusively used for the hypostatical union, i.e. that of the Messiah. As an exception, only the human body and soul is described by this term in an analogy for the Messiah's unity. It is not a Qur'Ānic form, but can be considered the translation of the Greek philosophical term ἔνωσις.⁶⁹¹ In Patristic literature ἡ ἔνωσις has various connotations. It can denote unity in general: in a material sense; in philosophy, when it refers to simplicity, unity in essence; unity of body and soul in man; concord, agreement. The same term may denote in theology the unity of divine persons. In Christology, it is both the act of union in incarnation and the state of being in union of the two natures of Christ, etc.⁶⁹²

Let us remember that *ittiĀd* was often mentioned together with incarnation when ŸAmmĀr al-BaŌrĪ described how the Messiah came into being. His other examples include a variety of contexts. E.g., he clarifies that this unity is not substantial but is to be understood through sonship:

“The **unity** between them is not substantial so that one of them would have been carried away from the essence of his substance by which he is distinguished from the substance of the other in such a manner that they would have become one, inclusive substance, other than the two they had been before. They **unified** in the aspect of sonship and the relation to the Father who is described by the essence of fatherhood.”⁶⁹³

Union refers to hypostatical union, but it is made clear that it does not mean a unity in substance. In a dispute with a Muslim opponent, in order to present an explanation acceptable for the adversary, it is essential to make clear that the human can not affect the divine. A great majority of occurrences present *ittiĀd* in the unity of sonship and messianity,⁶⁹⁴ and it is also emphasized elsewhere that no substantial change took place in the unity.⁶⁹⁵ In other instances, the unity is told to be that of a body and an incarnating one (*al-Ēasad wa-'l-mutaĒassid*), but

⁶⁹⁰ HAYEK's translation is 'union'. C.f. Ed. HAYEK, *Apologie et controverses*, p. 85.

⁶⁹¹ AFNAN, p. 312.

⁶⁹² LAMPE, pp. 486-89.

⁶⁹³ al-BANĀRĪ, ŸAmmĀr, *KitĀb al-MasĀ'il wa-'l-aĒwiba*, p. 178,5-8

لأن الاتحاد الذي كان بينهما لم يكن اتحاداً جوهرياً نقل واحد منهما عن ذات جوهرة المميز به من جوهرة صاحبه فصيرهما جميعاً جوهراً واحداً جاذباً غير الذين كانا. بل اتحدا في جهة البنوة والنسبة إلى الأب الموصوف بذات الأبوة.

⁶⁹⁴ E.g. Ibid., p. 181,1-2

⁶⁹⁵ E.g. Ibid., p. 183,15-16

the way or the method is said to be unknown (as referred to above in the *bi-lÁ kayf* approach of incarnation); however, the framework is always sonship.⁶⁹⁶

As an analogy, sometimes the union of man's body and soul is offered. E.g.: "The body of man which is set up from the seed of his father cannot be called man on its own, without the soul which **unified** with him."⁶⁹⁷ The union of two substances is introduced here with the same term. The framework of this union is also implied by the context: given that the body unified with the soul is the son of the father, this framework is sonship, just as in the case of the Messiah.

We may also find scriptural evidence for unity. ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ first refers to the Old Testament prophecies, and explains 'Emmanuel' as the Pre-eternal dwelling among us in a human form.⁶⁹⁸ He then goes on with examples from the New Testament, citing *loci* from every gospel, and interprets each citation in a way to demonstrate that both *hypostases* are present in the Messiah.⁶⁹⁹

Another approach of our investigation can be the examination of *ittiÁd* when it appears with other terms, it can add to our understanding of its connotation. We may see the difference between two terms that are derived from the same stems: i.e. the difference of *waÁdÁniyya* and *ittiÁd*: "as the meaning of the **unity** of the Messiah is only defined by the combination of the two substances and by their **unification**."⁷⁰⁰ On this basis, *waÁdÁniyya* can be interpreted as the result, the state of unity, and *ittiÁd* as the action which results in this unity. *IttiÁd* appears parallel to *i'tilÁf*, as it can be seen in the following example: "The meaning of the name 'One Messiah' is structured of two substances, or *hypostases*, i.e. god and man, by way of **unification** and combination, as the meaning of the one necklace is made up of different substances: pearl, sapphire, and others, by the combination of orders."⁷⁰¹ Such a simile is supposed to make the Muslim opponent understand that Christian teaching does not include contingency for the divine or any change and commixion. The image is probably of Patristic literature. Unification and combination both denote the act that results in unity; but they are not synonyms. While unification implies here the "frame" for the gathering of

⁶⁹⁶ E.g. Ibid. p. 214,17; and 215,6-7

⁶⁹⁷ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ'il wa-'l-aÊwiba*, p. 186,13-14

كما أن بدن الإنسان المجبول زرع أبيه، وإن كان لا يستحق أن يسمى على انفراده دون النفس المتحدة معه إنساناً...

⁶⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 207.

⁶⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 208.

⁷⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 179,11-13

بل المسيح من جهة مسيحيته حادث حدث بعد أن لم يكن مسيحاً. نعني بذلك أن الكلمة الأزلية والإنسان المحدث المخلوق صاراً حديثاً مسيحاً واحداً، إذ لم تحد وحدانية معنى المسيح الواحد إلا باجتماع الجوهرين واتحادهما

⁷⁰¹ Ibid., p. 182,11-13

معنى اسم المسيح الواحد ينتظم من جوهرين أي قنومين، إله وإنسان، باتحاد وانتلاف، كما ينتظم معنى العقد الواحد جواهر مختلفة من لؤلؤ وياقوت وغير ذلك بتأليف النظم.

individual entities, as the necklace and the one Messiah, combination refers to the individual entities which are rendered side by side. Here, we then witness a usage of *i'tilÁf* that diverges from atomistic implications. Let us now turn to *ittiÁAd* and *ittifÁq*: “the same way it was not possible to call the divine or the human *hypostasis* by the name of the Messiah on their own without their coordination and **unification** in what they unified.”⁷⁰² Coordination is synonymous to the combination of the previous example. The acts of coordination and unification are parallel; they result in the Messiah’s unity. The end of the sentence “in what they unified” implies that this unification is not absolute, i.e. not substantial, but there is an aspect in which the two are one. We may see *ittiÁAd* as synonymous with *ittiÁÁE*, too: “at the time of unification and assumption...”⁷⁰³ The wider context is about the One Messiah, so assumption and unification may be understood as acts resulting in the unity. The term may appear in the proximity of *ta'annus* (and *tadarruÝ*), as well: “By His humanisation, i.e. taking the humanity up as a garment, the **unification** of the two became necessary, and the unity of the Messiah was set up by their combination.”⁷⁰⁴ Humanisation and incarnation were the first steps which brought forward the act of unification that resulted in the unity of the Messiah. This example puts the combination in parallel with unification, as well; and the result, i.e. unity, described by the term *waÁdÁniyya* can clearly be distinguished from the act, *ittiÁAd*. We have seen above that incarnation makes this unification necessary, while dwelling does not,⁷⁰⁵ so we will leave the examination of the *locus* in which the terms *taÉassud* and *ÍulÍl* appear in the proximity of unification out of consideration now. As for the accompanying term, *tadarruÝ*, it is a proof for ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s Syrian origin, since this term is the arabization of a specifically Syriac (and Nestorian) term, *lbéš*.⁷⁰⁶

Concluding we may say that *ittiÁAd* in the usage of ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ is the hypostatical union of the Messiah’s two substances, or, as a parallel, it can denote the union of man’s body and soul. The term denotes an action, which results in the unity of the Messiah.

ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s Jacobite contemporary, AbÛ RÁ’iÓa uses this term in the sense of hypostatical union. As an example, let us see how he describes the unity of man, as a parallel for the unity of the Messiah: “the soul is soul forever, and the flesh is flesh forever.

⁷⁰² al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÉwiba*, p. 183,7-8.

⁷⁰³ *Ibid.* p. 196,18
كذلك لم يكن يجوز أن يقال على قنوم الإله وقنوم الإنسان على انفرادهما اسم المسيح دون اتفاقهما واتحادهما فيما فيه اتحدا

⁷⁰⁴ *Ibid.* p. 197,10-11

في وقت الاتخاذ والاتحاد

⁷⁰⁵ C.f. *Ibid.*, p. 201.

⁷⁰⁶ HAYEK, M., ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, *La première somme de théologie chrétienne en langue arabe, ou deux apologies du Christianisme*. In: *Islamochristiana*, (1976) 2, p. 93.

ومع تأنسه أي تدرعه وجب اتحادهما وقامت وحدانية المسيح بانتلافهما

The complexity of these two different [*hypostases*] will not be two, but one, by way of **unification**.⁷⁰⁷ It is the action that results in the unity of two *hypostases*. Let us see another one describing the unification of the Word with the flesh: “[the Word] and the flesh are one by real, permanent **unification**, without division concerning number and being called two; even if a substantial difference is attached to it, which is firm in it, as the firm presence of difference between the two-two substances: the Sun, the fire, the soul and those things by which they embodied.”⁷⁰⁸ Unification is thus the act, the way for union between a bodily and corporeal entity. It does not exclude the presence of two different substances in the unified outcome, but the two different entities are not to be counted as two, since there is always an aspect in which they form a union. His approach is similar to ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s one, even if his Monophysite approach shows in the “without division” aspect of this union.

Among the Muslim authors, al-ËwÁrizmÐ is the first to define the term. He does so in the chapter on *kalÁm*, in a subdivision introducing the three denominations of Christians. His definition of union: “Union is a word derived from ‘one,’”⁷⁰⁹ comes right after the definition of *uqnÛm*, and is placed before *nÁsÛt*. With the exception of the first one in this line, i.e. *uqnÛm*, these terms are explained only in an etymological way, but no exact description is given. It shows that Muslim authors knew about Christian teachings, have read Christian theological or polemical works and recognized specific terms used by Christian authors. But their understanding might have been limited, since the definitions are not concentrating on the meaning of these terms, but only on their forms.

Ibn SÐnÁ also defines *ittiÁd*. He does it in a differentiated way, saying that the same term is used for various concepts. First, *ittiÁd* refers to different things that have a feature in common, e.g. the bull and the man are both living entities.⁷¹⁰ *IttiÁd* may also refer to different features that are unified in a single substrate, e.g. a single apple may have both smell and taste.⁷¹¹ A third reference of *ittiÁd* is when substrate and feature are unified in a single essence, e.g. the coming into being of man out of body (*badan*) and soul (*nafs*).⁷¹² In this description he shares ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s interpretation. Another denotation is the

⁷⁰⁷ ABØ RÀ ’IÓA, *FD al-taËassud*, p. 31.

فالنفس نفس أبدأ والجسد جسد أبدأ من غير أن يكون المركب من هذين المختلفين اثنين بل واحد بالاتحاد
⁷⁰⁸ ABØ RÀ ’IÓA, *FD al-taËassud*, p. 34.
وهي [الكلمة] والجسد واحد باتحاد حقيقي دائم بلا تباين تبايناً يجري عليه العدد ويدعو إلى اثنين وإن كان فرقاناً جوهرياً لازماً له ثابتاً فيه كثيوت
فرق جوهرى الشمس والنار والنفس واللذين تجسمت بهم

⁷⁰⁹ al-ËWÀRIZMĪ, *MafÁtÐĪ al-ÝulÛm*, p. 90.

الاتحاد لفظة مشتقة من الواحد

⁷¹⁰ IBN SĪNÀ, *KitÁb al-ÍudÛd*, p. 39.

⁷¹¹ Ibid. p. 40.

⁷¹² Ibid.

gathering of physical bodies (*aĒsĀm*) in a sequence or contiguity, or liaison.⁷¹³ His definition is more elaborate than that of ÝAmmĀr al-BaÒrĎ, but by his time philosophy and *kalĀm* were also more developed, so the variety of interpretations is not unexpected. As far as the *hypostatical* union is concerned, Christian authors might have played a role in its understanding. It is also to note that the union of body and soul, frequently used as a parallel either by Church Fathers or early Arab Christian authors is also recurrent here. The same fact may be confirmed if we take into consideration what is written by al-ĒurĒĀnĎ. He describes it as the unification of two essences, and then classifies it according to a unification of number in *genus*, *species*, property, mode, quantity; there is also a unification of sides/surfaces; attachment. It can also refer to a commixing of two existent beings in such a manner that they become one.⁷¹⁴ Both authors define union in a detailed and differentiated way, it shows that by their time philosophy was more developed. But the basis or the core of these definitions may already be found in ÝAmmĀr al-BaÒrĎ's theological usage.

d, *wĀĪid* – the One

If we examine terms dealing with unity, then the term *wĀĪid* may also be of interest, since God's unity is the essential teaching for both Christians and Muslims. Wolfson argues that *kalĀm* is “a system of religious philosophy based upon ... scriptural presuppositions laid down by Philo.”⁷¹⁵ In particular, Philo refers to the unity of God, which means the denial of polytheism and the denial of the dependence of God upon something else: that is the self-sufficiency of God, the assertion that he alone is eternal, and that his unity means simplicity, excluding from him internal plurality. Wolfson also asserts that Christians⁷¹⁶ accepted this conception of unity, and that the first Philonic conception of the unity of God, the denial of polytheism is also stressed by the Qur'Ān, as well as the self-sufficiency of God.⁷¹⁷

⁷¹³ Ibid.

⁷¹⁴ al-ĒURĒĀNĎ, *KitĀb al-TaÝrĎĎĀt*, pp. 18-19.

الاتحاد هو تصبير الذاتين واحدة، ولا يكون إلا في العدد من الاثنين فصاعداً، في الجنس: يسمى: مجانسة، وفي النوع: مماثلة، وفي الخاصة: مشكلة، وفي الكيف: مشابهة، وفي الكم: مساواة، وفي الأطراف: مطابقة، وفي الإضافة: مناسبة، وفي وضع الأجزاء: موازنة، وهو شهود الوجود الحق الواحد المطلق، الذي الكل موجود بالحق، فيتحد به الكل من حيث كون كل شيء موجوداً به، معدوماً بنفسه، لا من حيث إن له وجوداً خاصاً اتحد به، فإنه محال. وقيل: الاتحاد: امتزاج الشئيين واختلاطهما حتى يصيرا شيئاً واحداً، لاتصال نهايات الاتحاد. وقيل: الاتحاد، وهو القول من غير رؤية وفكر.

⁷¹⁵ WOLFSON, H. A., *The Philosophy of the Kalam*, p. 74

⁷¹⁶ ... and that only the assertion of absolute simplicity was rejected by Orthodox Christians – but it was accepted by heretics. C.f. Ibid., p. 75.

⁷¹⁷ ...God's unity as meaning his being eternal alone and his absolute simplicity were partially accepted: both conceptions played an important role in controversy between Attributists and Antiattributists. C.f. Ibid., pp. 74-75.

As for *wÁîid*, the one, its establishment as a name of God in Christianity does not contradict the statement that there are three *hypostases* in the One and only God; its acceptance at the same time excludes polytheism. So Christianity had to solve the problem of the contradiction by defining what ‘one’ exactly is. Many Christian authors enlisted different types, categories of ‘one’ returning to what Aristotle said in his *Topica*,⁷¹⁸ and established the types of One: as one in *genus*, one in *species* and one in number.⁷¹⁹ This is exactly what AbÛ RÁ’iÔa does in his treatise titled *FD al-×ÁlÛ× al-muqaddas*: “if we asked you about this, and you answered from how many aspects the one is described as one... we would know, you are right. So: do you say: one can only be established according to three aspects: *genus* or *species* or number?”⁷²⁰ This example offers a parallel that can be found at AbÛ ‘ÏsÁ al-WarrÁq (d. 816?) a Muslim *mutakallim*, who lived in the same period, and who is attested to have engaged in polemics against Christians. In his treatise titled *The Refutation of the Creed of the Three Christian Sects (Radd ‘ala al-×alÁ× firaq min al-NaÔÁrÁ)* he made a rational and philosophical attempt to refute the Christian doctrine of the Trinity and the Incarnation of Jesus Christ.⁷²¹ He also enumerates the kinds of one for defining *wÁîid*: “on what foundation do some of them say: ‘one in substance’ or ‘one in class, type or property’ but not ‘one in number’”⁷²² The example is of special interest, since al-WarrÁq aimed at the refutation not only of a “general Christian teaching”, but he turns to all the main denominations, to which the above-mentioned Christian authors belong.

For Christianity, unity is in fundamental relation with God’s existence and his essence. That is: if God were not One, than He would not be God.⁷²³ On the subject of *wÁîid*, ‘one,’ ÝAmmÁr al-BasrÐ does not define what ‘one’ means, but if we look at examples in his argumentation, we may find that he uses the term *wÁîid* in the meaning of ‘one in his substance.’

“if they said: if you made it necessary that all things are created and created in time, then what is the sign for their Creator’s and Producer’s being **one**, despite of their contrariety that we see

⁷¹⁸ al-BAÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba*, p. 170. (Reference is also made to it by KHOURY in his *BaÝÁ al-iÔÔilÁÁt al-falsafiyya wa-’l-lÁhÛtiyya*, pp. 173-74.)

⁷¹⁹ al-KHOURY, B., *BaÝÁ al-iÔÔilÁÁt al-falsafiyya wa-’l-lÁhÛtiyya*, ‘Ûniyya, al-Maktaba al-BÛlusiyya, 2006. p. 54.

⁷²⁰ ABÛ RÁ’iÔA, *FD al-×ÁlÛ× al-muqaddas* 1-26. p. 5

لو قد سألتناكم عن ذلك، وأجبتمونا على كم نحو يوصف الواحد واحداً ... علمنا انكم صادفون ... فهل تقولون إن الواحد يقال إلا على ثلاثة أوجه: إما في الجنس، وإما في النوع، وإما في العدد

⁷²¹ al-WARRÁQ, AbÛ ÝÏsÁ, *AbÛ ‘ÏsÁ al-WarrÁq’s ‘Against the Trinity’*. Ed. and tr. THOMAS, David, Cambridge, University of Cambridge Press, 1992, pp. 218.

⁷²² Ibid. p. 154. (translation by Thomas, d., c.f. p. 153)

وهل أصل قول الناس أو قول من قال منهم واحد في الجوهر وواحد في الجنس أو واحد في النوع أو واحد في الوصف إلا الواحد في العدد

⁷²³ al-KHOURY, B., *al-MafÁhÐm Ýinda al-MasÐÏyyÐn – AllÁh al-WÁîid*, ‘Ûniyya, al-Maktaba al-BÛlusiyya, 2007. p. 39.

in this world? We would say the answer: what we see of the cooperation of these opposing things, which results in benefiting the world and those who are living in it, is the sign [showing] that their Creator and Organizer is **One**, Omnipotent, Wise, and not two opposing ones.”⁷²⁴

God’s unity appears in the meaning of the opposite of multiplicity. Later on, in the second part of his book, he writes about the three *hypostases* (*aqÁnÐm*), too, but as the first, introductory part aims at demonstrating the Christian belief in the unity of God, as Creator, we may think of interaction from an another point of view, remembering what Wolfson said:

“Muslims ... continued assault upon the Christian doctrine of Trinity. ... Christians under Muslim rule, ... began to accommodate their doctrine of the Trinity to the Muslim doctrine of attributes. [And] began to argue that... there is no fundamental difference between the Christian persons of the Trinity and the Muslim attributes of God in their respective effects upon the unity of God in which both Christians and Muslims believe.”⁷²⁵

Proving this unity is ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s aim in the above-mentioned quotation. Turning to Muslim books of definitions, we see that al-KindÐ gives a less detailed description of ‘one’ in comparison with his classification in the Refutation of the Christians.⁷²⁶ It may imply that Muslim philosophical thinking of the age is reflected in this short definition, while in a dispute with Christians the author is forced to deal with the question more thoroughly, and turn to the common source, the works of Aristotle. Al-ËwÁrizmÐ does not bring a definition for ‘One’, but uses it as a divine name, implying that this oneness is in close relation to his being the Creator, or the First cause; and everything else can be characterized by plurality in some respect.⁷²⁷ His description is more philosophical than ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s interpretation, since he refers to the Creator as the First cause, but in other respects, ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s ideas are paralleled here. Ibn FÙrak defines one on the basis of its impossibility to accept division or partition.⁷²⁸ It is again philosophical in approach, but this idea can also be found in ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s theological description. Al-ÀmidÐ describes

⁷²⁴ al-BANÑRĪ, ÝAmmÁr, *KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aËwiba*, p. 100.

وإن قالوا: فإن أوجبتم أن الأشياء كلها ... مخلوقة محدثة جميعاً، فما الدليل على أن خالقها ومحدثها واحد لا إثنان، على ما نرى من تضادها في العالم؟ قلنا: الجواب أن الذي نرى من تعاون هذه الخلائق المتضادة ... فيما يؤول إلى مصلحة شأن العالم وأهله، هو الدليل على أن خالقها ومدبرها واحد مقتدر، حكيم، لا إثنان متقاومان

⁷²⁵ WOLFSON, *The Philosophy of the Kalam*, pp. 81-82.

⁷²⁶ al-KINDĪ, *RisÁla fÐ ÁudÙd al-ašyÁ’ wa-rusÙmihÁ*, p. 168

الواحد هو الذي بالفعل، وهو فيما وصف به تارة بالعرض

⁷²⁷ al-ËWÁRIZMĪ, *MafÁtÐĪ al-ÝulÙm*, p. 123.

الله تبارك وتعالى وعز وعلا هو موجد العالم وهو السبب الأول والعلة الأولى وهو الواحد والحق، وما سواه لا يخلو من كثرة من جهة أو جهات

⁷²⁸ Ibn FØRAK, *KitÁb al-ÁudÙd fÐ ’l-uØÙl*, p. 7.

حد الواحد هو الشيء الذي لا ينقسم ولا يتجزأ

one according to number, liaison, composition, *species* and *genus*. As it can be seen, his definition represents a later development, and is similarly elaborated as Ibn SĎnÁ's *ittiĬÁd*.⁷²⁹

Conclusion

Concluding we may say that Christians argued for divine unity, but this differed from the absolute oneness of Islamic doctrine. This oneness was to be interpreted in another way, and in the Christian argumentations Greek philosophical triads could be seen implying oneness at the same time. This interpretation of divine Unity could not be agreed upon by the Muslim side. Christian reliance on scriptural evidence mostly included Biblical sources, but Muslims could not accept the same sources. We could see that Christian authors relied on Greek philosophical and patristic terms and interpretations; these were further developed in Arab Christian writings, and could be seen as preceding Muslim appearances in the majority of cases. In this field which is fundamental for both sides interaction can be discerned, either in an argumentative way, or on the level of terminology, and Christian influence is undeniable.

⁷²⁹ al-ĀMIDĬ, *al-MubĎn fĎ šarĬ maĬĀnĎ alfĀŪ al-ĬukamĀ' wa-'l-mutakallimĎn*, p. 114.

وأما الواحد فقد يطلق ويراد به: الواحد بالعدد مطلقاً، والواحد بالاتصال، والواحد بالتركيب، والواحد بالنوع، والواحد بالجنس

Conclusion

I demonstrated that ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ's *KitÁb al-MasÁ'il wa-'l-a°wiba* is an important piece of Christian theology. It played an important role in the transmission of Greek wisdom and Hellenistic knowledge to the Muslim theology. I relied on various Arab Christian and Muslim sources, and examined their terminologies. On this basis, I demonstrated that these terminologies and the ideas expressed by them show similarities, and by comparing them I drew the conclusion that either Christian authors had influenced Muslim thought, or that both parties had relied on a shared tradition. I found remarkable the fact that the Christian authors of the ninth century had already had a ready set of terminology in Arabic.

So the hypothesis I started with about the role of rhetorical or Christian schools in the transmission – which is the idea defended by M. Maróth – seems to be confirmed. He argues that the earliest transmission of Greek wisdom to Arabic had taken place in the milieu of the remnants of once rhetorical schools which turned to be the centers of education for Christians in the East. The examination of the *KitÁb al-MasÁ'il wa-'l-aÊwiba* proves this, since I demonstrated that its terminology corresponds to Greek philosophical terminology, more specifically in the form these terms were used by Church Fathers in Patristic literature. I carried out a comparative terminological examination including contemporary and later Muslim sources, as well, in which I discovered further agreement, which may indicate direct influence in some cases or reliance on mutually known sources in other instances.

In the first chapter, I examined the concept of the intellect, referred to by the term *Ýaql*, which is the Arabic translation of the Greek philosophical terms ἡ φρόνησις, and ὁ νοῦς. In Patristic literature, these terms mean intellect, understanding; description of mind and its functions with reference to man's distinctive nature: in relation to other faculties; particularly in relation to sense perception. Mind's capacity for knowing God is often discussed; as well as mind between good and evil. In mind's way to perfection divine assistance was referred to. I showed that in Theodore AbÛ Qurra's analogy mind is God's gift, a means for cognition, and as such, it is a faculty. It had a responsibility for choosing between right and wrong. In this, I showed that Patristic ideas are clearly reflected. Then I demonstrated that according to AbÛ RÁ'iÔa, faith goes beyond the capacity of the intellect, so man needs divine assistance. In this, I recognized another recurring Patristic theme. I analysed ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ's usage, and found that he introduced intellect as a cause, a faculty, a disposition, an attribute,

and a quality. In the examples I examined, I found ideas that had already been present in Patristic literature, but ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ's differentiated usage shows greater elaboration and development. In his argumentation, I pointed at the influence of rhetorical education. I found several examples for Christian influence on Muslims: e.g. Theodore AbÛ Qurra's medical allegory shows an interaction between Christian and Muslim imageries. I realized that contemporary Muslim thought on *Ýaql* shows another approach, based on a different tradition. In the examination of Muslim definitions I highlighted those points that are present both in ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ's work and later Muslim definitions, as well: e.g. intellect's being a faculty, a means of cognition, a distinctive feature of humankind, etc. These features could already be seen in Greek writings, then in Christian ones, and finally in Muslim works, in which I saw a proof for Christian transmission. Later Muslim authors represent a more elaborated stage of philosophy; but in their distinguished classifications the aspects emphasized by Christian authors are also included.

In the second chapter I examined the following terms: *Êirm*, *Êism*, *Êasad*, *badan*; adjectival forms like *ÊismÁnÐ* and *ÊasadÁnÐ*; and derived forms like *taÊassud*, alongside with *ittiÁÁE*, *ta'annus* and *ÍulÛl*. I set up a hierarchy of meanings according to ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, and I arrived at results as far as Christian role in transmission between Greek and Islamic cultures is concerned. In the case of the first term, *Êirm*, I demonstrated that 9th-century Christian usage can be paralleled to Muslim usage of the same period, so a parallel development on the basis of Greek roots can be discerned. In the case of *Êism*, a differentiated Christian usage was introduced, which relies on Neo-Platonic and Patristic roots, but is further developed by this time in Christian authors' works. A recurring range of ideas in later Muslim use may indicate a strong Christian influence. I found that *Êasad* is a Christian term: corresponding contemporary Muslim examples could not be found. It is the term that denotes the Messiah's flesh, or sometimes human body. Since its appearance is early documented in Christian texts, while it cannot be found among Muslim definitions for a long time, a later Muslim appearance and interpretation may well be influenced by Christian usage. I found *badan* as a term denoting human body made up of elements, or sometimes as the human corporeal part of the Messiah. Its appearances at Christian authors, as well as at their Muslim contemporary, al-KindÐ, represent an early stage of terminological development; this parallel, and the one found at MuÝtazilÐ authors imply an analogous evolution of the term at both parties. I also showed that in the case of incarnation, interaction in the field of ideas had happened, especially in the emphasis of divine transcendence. I found that ideas and analogies used in the demonstration of incarnation echoed Patristic ideas in a more developed form. In

the case of *ittiġĀĒ*, I observed a possible influence of Qur'Ānic terminology in the use of this term for expressing assumption. I found that *ta'annus* as a specifically Christian term developed from Patristic roots, while Christian *ġulġl* had an undeniable influence on later Muslim usage.

In the third chapter, I investigated terms referring to eternity or perpetuity, continuity. In every case, I demonstrated that the connotations of corresponding Greek, Patristic terms were recurrent in ĲammĀr al-BaĲrĲ's interpretation but his interpretation also shows a further development of these ideas. In case of two terms, *baqĀ'* and *sarmad* scarce occurrences made a detailed analysis impossible. However, I discerned ĲammĀr al-BaĲrĲ's being influenced by Patristic usage, as well as the fact that he preceded Muslim authors in the use of them; and I discovered that *baqĀ'* in later Muslim authors' usage resembles ĲammĀr al-BaĲrĲ's *azalĲ*. I found all this as attesting to the early formation of terminology. I found that the only term described by a contemporary Muslim author is *azalĲ*, which made me confirm ĲammĀr al-BaĲrĲ's pioneer role in this field. His use of *qadĲm* is synonymous to *azalĲ*: similar examples were observed. I showed that in his usage of *qadĲm*, ĲammĀr al-BaĲrĲ preceded Muslim authors. In the more detailed definitions of later authors, his ideas were recurrent, which may be a sign for Christian influence on Muslim thought. Given that Patristic ideas are developed by Christian authors, and that their ideas recur in later Muslim books, it shows that Christians are transmitters of ideas between Greek and Islamic cultures.

In the fourth chapter, I examined terms denoting creation. Through the examples of *ibĲĀ'* and *ibtidĀ'* I showed that ĲammĀr al-BaĲrĲ developed Patristic concepts, though a slight Qur'Ānic parallel can also be observed in his usage of the term. Examining Muslim authors' definitions I found that ĲammĀr al-BaĲrĲ had preceded them in this field. In the usage of *ibĲĀ'Ĳ* and *ibtidĀ'Ĳ* I found that ĲammĀr al-BaĲrĲ relied and carried on Greek and Patristic ideas as far as he used this term in the meaning of engendering. A Qur'Ānic parallel could be found in this case, as well. ĲammĀr al-BaĲrĲ is among the earliest authors to have used this term. His contemporary, al-KindĲ emphasizes the *ex nihilo* approach, and it is mentioned by later Muslim authors, too. I showed that ĲammĀr al-BaĲrĲ's ideas expressed by this term are shared by later Muslim authors, which implies Muslim-Christian interaction in its formation. I examined different forms derived from the root *Ĳ-d-Ĳ*. I also demonstrated that the meaning of corresponding Greek terms is recurrent in ĲammĀr al-BaĲrĲ's usage. *ĲĲĀ'Ĳ*, when a source, or entity, *Ĳayn*, or when a substance, *Ĳawhar* are mentioned as the One who carries this action out, it is closer to philosophical terminology and interpretation. When it is God, or God, the Logos (especially in the case of incarnation), theological aspects are

stronger. The contemporary author, al-Kindī uses the term *Īdī* in the meaning of ‘occurring, created in time,’ so some parallels could be observed. Later authors’ definitions show similarities with Ḳammār al-BaḲr’s interpretation: i.e. creation/createdness in time, though some of them, like al-Ēwārizmī approach them as *kalām* terms, while others, like Ibn Fūrak, are rather philosophical in defining them. On the basis of Ibn SḌnā’s definition, which introduced *īdī* as a kind that happens in time and another kind which has no relation to time, I demonstrated that the first meaning is usually represented in Ḳammār al-BaḲr’s book, as well. On the basis of the other kind, which is concentrating on the emanation of existence without respect to time, I drew a parallel with what Ḳammār al-BaḲr in particular, and all Christian authors in general write on the emanation of existence out of time (either in the case of the Son who has always been born of the Father; or the Spirit). I found it possible that Christian understanding of the emanation of existence might have influenced Muslim thought in this field. Later Muslim definitions were found to be similar to Ḳammār al-BaḲr’s interpretation in general terms, but it was demonstrated that later Muslim use is more specific. Ḳammār al-BaḲr’s usage already includes those two meanings that can be discerned at later Muslim thinkers: the existence of a thing, after its nonexistence, in a temporal extension, i.e. *al-Īdī* *al-zamān*; and contingency: a being’s existing after not having existed, in an ontological or essential extension, which does not necessarily involve time, i.e. *al-Īdī* *al-Ēāt*. His usage shows parallels with *mutakallims*’ usage of ‘a beginning in time’ as a basis for proving the existence of God. So in this case it is quite probable that Christian authors in general, and Ḳammār al-BaḲr in particular, influenced later Muslim interpretations; but at least, they represent a transition between the two. In the case of *iltirā* I demonstrated that apparently Ḳammār al-BaḲr used the term before its having been defined as an idiom of a special connotation by Muslim authors. In the case of *Īalq*, Ḳammār al-BaḲr does not seem to have used the term in a firm, strictly limited sense, as far as *ex nihilo* is concerned, just only as a term that refers to a kind of creative action. Greek and Patristic ideas are carried on as far as “making” is concerned, but Islamic parallels could also be found in Ḳammār al-BaḲr’s usage when he used the term to refer to the production of something out of something else. I found that a possible explanation for this may be that his age is a period when the terminologies of theology and philosophy were on their way to separation. Ḳammār al-BaḲr’s use of the term was examined in different contexts: I set up a classification of eight differing subsections. I showed that he developed and enriched the concept he had inherited from Church Fathers. I also contrasted his use of the term with its appearances in Muslim books of definitions: and found that though *Īalq* is a

Qur'Ánic term, it appears relatively late in Muslim usage if compared with Christian one. I found that Muslim usage can be paralleled to his interpretation where *Ìalq* is not considered to be *ex nihilo*. The third theme around which ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ's examples could be grouped is the idea that the created world is a reflection, a sign, or a proof of the existence of the Creator, which is an important idea in Muslim thought, too, and I considered this a common development of thought. ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ's idea of "first" and "second" creation may rather be paralleled to Muslim usage of *ibtidÁ'* and *ibdÁÝ*; it is not the word *Ìalq* which is used by Muslim thinkers to refer to this contrast, but the idea is present in both cases. As for the synonyms in ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ's text that appear alongside the term *Ìalq*, we have seen instances where they appear in Muslim definitions, too, though, given that definition needs to clarify the accurate use of a term, these terms are used in order to contrast *Ìalq* with, not as synonyms. We need to remark, finally, that ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ's differentiated use of the term already in the 9th century is not paralleled in contemporary Muslim usage, so we may think of his or more generally of Christian influence in the formation of its interpretation in later Muslim usage. I showed that ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ's interpretation and use of *ÒanÝa* is parallel to the Greek use of corresponding terms. Appearances that denote a creative action were mostly concentrated on, but examples for 'conduct' in general were also cited. I examined this term in the framework of the same classification that was used in the case of *Ìalq*, and I found that the two terms are synonymous in ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ's usage. Muslim authors did not define it, so I demonstrated that ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ is earlier to have used the term. In the case of *takwÐn* I showed that the ninth-century Nestorian author preceded Muslim authors in his use of the term in a stricter theological-philosophical sense. Contemporary parallel is offered by early Muslim occult writings. However, *takwÐn* was used first by MÁturÐdÐ theologians extensively to the point where they believed *takwÐn* to be the eighth essential attribute of God. Even though not present among his definitions, Ibn SÐnÁ used it later and in his footsteps, ÑÙfÐs and AšÝarÐs used it as well especially to express the divine command "*kun*." Christian precedence in using this term may have influenced its interpretation on the Muslim side. In the case of *inšÁ'*, seemingly Christian usage, or that of ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ in particular, preceded the term's appearance at Muslim authors with a clearly delineated meaning – as far as it is possible to judge it on the basis of books of definitions. However, I brought an example of the Qur'Án, in order to demonstrate that ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ might have used this term due to its being a part of Muslim religious terminology, acceptable and intelligible for his opponents.

In the fifth chapter, I demonstrated that Patristic ideas are carried on in Christian authors' works. The correlative use of fatherhood and sonship is a characteristic feature of both Greek and Arab Christian authors. However, it is to be noted that Arab Christian authors either emphasize that the nature of this relation is not biological, in order to explain to Muslims what they mean by this, or they implicitly do so, when referring to fatherhood and sonship as properties, which differentiate between the *hypostases* but do not affect the unity of the divine substance. Examples of early polemics show that vivid interaction accompanied this teaching, so alongside an exchange of ideas, terms used by Christians could also reach Muslim opponents (and *vice versa*).

In the sixth chapter, I showed that Christians argued for divine unity, but this differed from the absolute oneness of Islamic doctrine. This oneness was to be interpreted in another way, and in the Christian argumentations Greek philosophical triads could be seen implying oneness at the same time. This interpretation of divine Unity could not be agreed upon on the Muslim side. Christian reliance on scriptural evidence mostly included Biblical sources. I showed that Christian authors relied on Greek philosophical and Patristic terms and interpretations; these were further developed in Arab Christian writings, and could be seen as preceding Muslim appearances in the majority of cases. In this field which is fundamental for both sides interaction can be discerned, either in an argumentative way, or on the level of terminology, and Christian influence is undeniable.

It is admitted that Christian authors use more frequently the theological terminology. The books examined, and especially that of ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, relate more to *kalÁm* than to philosophy, although the philosophical influence on some materials is evident. In my view, this is the case because the adversaries in the debates were Muslim theologians. It is expected that Christian authors address them according to their vocabulary. Had they used a clearly philosophical terminology, with which they were familiar, they would have been objected. Furthermore, their aim is apologetic. They debate to defend the Christian belief and to invalidate the Muslim creed.

Apart from the examination of the terms, I benefited from my examples in order to draw attention to the Christian authors' argumentation. E.g., we could see that ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ's second-figure syllogism shows perfect agreement with the one accepted in rhetorical argumentation. Greek and Patristic analogies, *topoi*, and imageries were also referred to, which attested to Christian authors' reliance on rhetorical traditions. However, I also demonstrated, that for being a dialectician, ÝAmmÁr al-BasrÐ had to use the terms and reasoning of his opponents, too.

We may thus conclude that either as the performers of translations, or heirs to a tradition not known to Muslims till the end of the 10th and the beginning of the eleventh century, or as genuine thinkers, Christian authors show characteristics of a deep conceptual and terminological knowledge not paralleled by Muslims in the ninth century. ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ's book is one of the earliest pieces of theology written in Arabic. For this reason, an intercession of philosophical and theological terminologies has happened in his works. Having borrowed philosophical and theological terms and transmitting them to later Muslim theologians, he makes the case of a bridge between Christianity and Islam.

I aimed at demonstrating that Arab Christian theology plays an important role in the transmission and in the development of ideas and corresponding terms. The example of ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ shows that an examination of an Arab Christian corpus with numerous sources could contribute to a better understanding of this major state of the beginning of philosophy and *kalÁm*, and it could add to a more accurate knowledge of the history of beginning of Arabic and Islamic prose.

Epilogue

The present dissertation aimed at a terminological analysis in order to confirm the thesis introduced in the foreword. These terms were selected from among a much wider range of terms, and were limited to these selected ones only for the sake of brevity. I am aware that other philosophical and *kalÁm* terms could have been investigated, offering significant results: they will be the theme of my future research.

I have not dealt with theological issues: a comparative analysis of Christian denominations as far as their apologies and terminologies are concerned is also a topic of future elaboration.

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Summary

Yammár al-BaÒrÐ's *KitÁb al-MasÁ'il wa-'l-a^owiba* is an important piece of Christian theology. It played a major role in the transmission of Greek wisdom and Hellenistic knowledge to the Muslim theology. The terminological comparison of this piece in particular and Arabic Christian sources in general with Muslim ones shows that sometimes Christian authors had influenced Muslim thought, or that both parties had relied on a shared tradition. It is remarkable that the Christian authors of the ninth century had already had a ready set of terminology in Arabic. The hypothesis about the role of rhetorical or Christian schools in the transmission is confirmed by the examination of the *KitÁb al-MasÁ'il wa-'l-a^owiba*, since its terminology corresponds to Greek philosophical terminology, more specifically in the form these terms were used by Church Fathers in Patristic literature. In contemporary and later Muslim sources there are further examples for agreement, which may indicate influence in some cases, or reliance on mutually known sources in other instances. The comparative examination is carried out in six chapters: the term of the intellect; terms of bodily connotations; terms referring to eternity; terms denoting creation; correlative use of fatherhood and sonship; and divine unity are examined. In Christian authors' usage, continuity with Greek philosophical and Patristic terms can be discerned, however, these are further elaborated. Several examples for Christian influence on Muslims can be found; features that could already be seen in Greek writings, then in Christian ones, and finally in Muslim works, form a proof for Christian transmission. The majority of terms used by Yammár al-BaÒrÐ show reliance on Neo-Platonic and Patristic roots even if they are further developed. In some cases parallel appearance of the terms at Muslim authors can be discerned, so parallel development on the basis of Greek roots could be seen. In other instances Muslims began using terms later than Christian authors: a recurring range of ideas in later Muslim use may imply a strong Christian influence on Muslim thought. In a minority of cases specifically Christian terms can be found, while others reflect a possible influence of Qur'Ánic terminology on Christian usage. Examples for early Muslim-Christian polemics are also mentioned, which attests to a vivid interaction. It is admitted that Christian authors use more frequently the terminology of theologians. The books examined, and especially that of Yammár al-BaÒrÐ, relate more to *kalÁm* than to philosophy although the philosophical influence on some materials is evident. The adversaries in the debates were Muslim

theologians, so it is expected that Christian authors address them according to their vocabulary. Had they used a clearly philosophical terminology, with which they were familiar, they would have been objected. Furthermore, their aim is apologetic. They debate to defend the Christian belief and to invalidate the Muslim creed. Apart from the examination of the terms, the Christian authors' argumentation is examined, which, in some cases, shows perfect agreement with earlier forms of rhetorical argumentation. Greek and Patristic analogies, *topoi*, and imageries were also referred to, which attested to Christian authors' reliance on rhetorical traditions. Concluding: either as the performers of translations, or heirs to a tradition not widely known to Muslims till a later age, or as genuine thinkers, Christian authors show characteristics of a deep conceptual and terminological knowledge not paralleled by Muslims in the ninth century. ÝammÁr al-BaÒrÐ's book is one of the earliest pieces of theology written in Arabic, which, having borrowed philosophical and theological terms and transmitting them to later Muslim theologians makes the case of a bridge between Christianity and Islam.

Összefoglalás

Yammár al-Ba'Orð *Kitáb al-Mas'íl wa-'l-a'wiba* c. műve a keresztény teológia egyik fontos darabja, mely jelentős szerepet játszott abban a folyamatban, mely a hellenisztikus és görög műveltséget a muszlim teológia számára elérhetővé tette. Ennek a műnek, átlalánosságban pedig más kortárs arab munkáknak az összehasonlítása a muszlim forrásokkal azt bizonyítja, hogy az arab keresztény szerzők egyes esetekben hatottak a muszlim gondolkodásra, máskor pedig azt látjuk, hogy a két fél terminológiája közös forrásokra támaszkodva, párhuzamosan fejlődött. Fontos megjegyezni, hogy a kilencedik századi arab keresztény írók már kész terminológiai rendszerrel dolgoztak. Az az előföltevés, mely szerint a retorikai (keresztény) iskolák szerepet játszottak a hagyományozásban, megerősíthető a *Kitáb al-Mas'íl wa-'l-a'wiba* vizsgálata alapján. Terminológiája egyezést mutat a korábbi görög filozófiai terminusokkal, különösen abban a formában, ahogy ezek az egyházatyák műveiben is megjelentek. Kortárs és későbbi muszlim forrásokban is találunk terminológiai egyezéseket, ami lehet annak jele, hogy a keresztény irodalom hatott a muszlimra, de azt is jelezheti, hogy a két fél azonos forrásokra támaszkodott. A disszertációban elvégzett összehasonlító terminológiai vizsgálat hat fejezetre osztható: intellektus; testi jelentéssel bíró terminusok; örökkévalóság; teremtés; atyaság és fiúság; egység. A keresztény szerzők terminushasználatában megfigyelhető, hogy a görög filozófiai, illetve az egyházatyák által képviselt vonulatot követik, fejlesztik tovább. Több olyan példa is felsorakoztatható, mely a keresztény írók muszlim teológusokra gyakorolt hatását mutatják, illetve közvetítő szerepüket a görög és muszlim gondolkörök között: az először görögben, majd arab keresztény íróknál, később muszlimoknál megjelenő fogalmak és terminusok ezt a közvetítő szerepet igazolják. Yammár al-Ba'Orð legtöbb terminusa a neoplatonikus és egyházatyai hagyományokra épül, ezeket fejleszti tovább. Egyes esetekben azt látjuk, a terminus a muszlimoknál is ugyanekkor, hasonló jelentéssel jelenik meg: ezek a példák a közös görög alapokon nyugvó, párhuzamos fejlődést mutatják. Más terminusok esetében megfigyelhető, hogy a muszlimok később kezdik használni őket, ami, a jelentésbeli egyezésekkel együtt, keresztény hatást enged feltételezni. Az esetek kisebb hányadában kifejezetten keresztény terminusokkal is találkozhatunk, míg mások koráni hatásra engednek következtetni. A korai muszlim-keresztény hitviták azt bizonyítják, hogy a vitatott kérdésekben élénk eszmecsere folyt a két fél között, melynek során fogalmaik ütköztek, terminológiájuk, érveléstechnikájuk pedig hatott a másikra. A keresztény szerzők elsősorban teológiai terminusokkal élnek, még ha a filozófiai hatások

nyilvánvalóak is. Az ellenfelek muszlim teológusok voltak, tehát a filozófiai helyett a teológiai terminológiát kellett használni. A célkitűzés apologetikus: a keresztény hit védelme, a muszlim tanítások cáfolata a cél. A példák lehetőséget adnak a terminusok mellett az érvelés vizsgálatára is, aminek eredményeképp a korábbi görög retorikai formákkal való egyezés mutatható ki számos esetben. Összességében elmondható, hogy akár fordítókként, akár egy olyan hagyomány örököseiként, mely a muszlim szerzők számára később vált általánosan ismertebbé, a keresztény szerzők olyan mértékű elméleti és terminológiai tudással rendelkeztek a kilencedik században, mely a muszlim oldalon még egy ideig nem jelenik meg. ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ könyve a legkorábbi arab nyelvű teológiai művek egyike, mely korábbi filozófiai-teológiai terminusokat továbbfejlesztve, s azokat a muszlim félnek továbbadva a kereszténység és az iszlám közti közvetítő szerepe miatt az egyik legjelentősebb korai arab prózai mű.